近年來，女權意識逐漸抬頭，女性在商業所扮演的角色也漸受重視，根據《第三期中國婦女社會地位調查主要數據報告》，中國女性的就業率及教育程度已逐年提升，女性在工作上的表現也不亞於男性。由於獨立董事與外部審計同為重要的治理機制，且在中國，獨立董事就有權對會計師事務所的聘任及審計公費的決定程序發表意見，因此，為了解性別多元化對董事會決策之影響，本研究以中國2006年-2011年的A股上市公司為研究對象，來探討女性獨立董事對會計師選擇及審計定價之影響。在控制其他變數之後，本研究發現，當公司有女性獨立董事且女性獨立董事比例越高時，越不傾向選擇國際四大或中國國內十大會計師事務所進行審計；另外，本研究也發現，女性獨立董事比例越高之公司，其審計公費越低。 / Independent director and external audit are both important corporate governance mechanisms. In China, independent directors are authorized to provide suggestions on auditor choice and the decision process of audit fees. Considering gender diversity of the board may affect the monitoring role performed by independent directors and the decision made by independent directors, we conduct a study using a sample of China A-shares over the period 2006 to 2011 to realize the relationship between female independent director and external audit, including auditor choice and audit fees. After controlling other variables, we find that corporations with female independent directors are less likely to choose Big4 and China local 10 as their audit firm than those without female independent directors. Furthermore, there is a significant negative relationship between female independent director ratio and audit fees. This may indicate that female independent directors can partly substitute the governance function of external audit and thus reduce audit fees and the possibility of choosing bigger audit firms.

L’objectif de ce travail de recherche consiste à déterminer l’impact du comité d’audit sur la performance financière des PME libanaises. Ceci dit que l’objectif consiste aussi à étudier l’influence du système de gouvernance sur l’indépendance du comité d’audit. Les variables mobilisées sont relatives aux caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit. A cela s’ajoute, trois déterminants qui sont relatifs à l’indépendance du comité d’audit, la structure du conseil d’administration et l’impact du système dual. A titre indicatif la rentabilité des PME est relatée notamment à partir des rapports annuels. L’échantillon comprend 58 PME libanaises et l’étude s’étale sur une période de 4 ans, à savoir entre 2011 et 2014. Les résultats font apparaître que le comité d’audit peine à avoir une indépendance totale. Cela peut être expliqué par l’apposement d’un système dual et aussi par le nombre limité au sein du comité. Dans ce sens, le comité d’audit dans les PME libanaises est réprimé notamment à travers le déploiement de ses responsabilités et de sa contribution au niveau de la revue des états financiers. Ce qui s’avère préjudiciable à une meilleure croissance de la performance financière pour les PME / The aim of this research study is to determine the impact of the audit committee on the financial performance of Lebanese SMEs. This research focuses also on the influence of the governance system on the independence of the audit committee. The variables used are related to the characteristics of the board and of the audit committee. Moreover, three other determinants are referred as the independence of the audit committee, the structure of the board and the impact of the dual system in order to bring some elements of answers to our main interrogation. As an indication, SMEs profitability is reported especially from annual reports. The sample includes 58 Lebanese SMEs and the study covers a period of 4 years, from 2011 till 2014. The results show that the audit committee hardly has a total independence. This can be explained by the appeasement of a dual system and also by the presence of a limited number within the committee. In this sense, the audit committee in Lebanese SMEs is repressed and cannot be clearly active through the deployment of its responsibilities and its contribution in reviewing the financial statements. This appears as detrimental to a better growth for the SMEs sector financial performance

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

This thesis comprises three research essays. The study documents empirical evidence around the research themes by analysing a sample of the UK’s listed non-financial firms from 2005 to 2018. It applied panel data analysis (fixed or random effects) techniques and the potential endogeneity issue is controlled by using the two-step system, GMM. Earnings-management research holds that manipulating a firm's real activities is more damaging to its long-term growth and value than accruals manipulation. Therefore, by building on agency theory and emphasising board monitoring, first essay investigates the role of independent directors’ tenure and connection to several boards in controlling real earnings management (REM). This study finds that independent directors elected to board before appointment of current CEO are negatively associated with the level of REM. Furthermore, this research provides evidence that REM is higher in those firms whose INDs are connected to several boards at a time. Though economically insignificant in most of the models, this research also shows that the association between INDs’ tenure and REM varies with the phases of their tenure. Directors in the early stage of their tenure are observed as being less effective in controlling REM. However, as INDs’ tenure grows, they employ better oversight over management's conduct, thereby reducing REM. Contrary to this, the extended tenure of INDs is associated with higher REM. These results collectively suggest that the board monitoring role protects the stakes of shareholders/stakeholders by constraining REM; when INDs are free from the influence of CEO, they are not over-committed due to their presence on several boards, and they have moderate board tenure which is neither too short nor too long. Furthermore, drawing on collective contributions and group performance perspectives, second essay explores the role of board diversity in the firm’s R&D investment decisions. Additionally, building on a fault-line argument about a team's demographic attributes, the current research decomposes the impact of demographic and cognitive diversity on R&D spending. The research observes a positive relationship between board diversity and the level of R&D spending. Moreover, this research documents that cognitive diversity is positively associated with R&D investment. However, demographic diversity has an insignificant relationship with firms’ spending on R&D projects. Further, this study confirms that demographic diversity negatively moderates the relationship between cognitive diversity and R&D investment. These results suggest that the board's attributes as a group carry the significance to influence the decisions having strategic importance. The findings on the sub-dimensions of board diversity imply that board functional/cognitive diversity is more relevant to corporate decisions and outcomes than is demographic diversity. Based on the monitoring perspective (agency theory) and resource provision view (resource dependency theory), third essay investigates the role of independent directors’ specific attributes in the corporate propensity to R&D investment. The study documents a positive association between INDs’ moderate (median) tenure and the firm’s spending on R&D projects, but early and extended tenure is observed as being insignificant. INDs with a presence on three or fewer boards are observed to promote R&D investment. However, INDs sitting on more than three boards negatively affect the firm’s propensity to invest in R&D initiatives. Financially expert INDs are negatively associated with corporate R&D investments, suggesting that such directors may resist funding these projects beyond optimal risk level because of their expertise. These results suggest that INDs’ monitoring and advising competence improves as they spend time on the firm’s board, but that extended tenure is counterproductive as it impairs INDs’ impartiality. Furthermore, INDs’ capital (resources) accruing from connection to multiple boards is only beneficial for the firm’s strategic decisions if their monitoring role is not compromised because of their over-commitment (busyness). / Mirpur University of Science and Technology (MUST)

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

隨著國內外相關弊案的爆發，「公司治理」近幾年來一直是企業相當重視的議題。除了由於受到國際環境變化劇烈所影響之外，公司治理也與整體企業監控制度有密切之關聯。在國內外有相當多的學者從不同角度進行公司治理的相關的研究，而主管機關如金管會、證交所等也陸續制定相關的措施，希望能夠盡最大的力量來保障投資人的權益。 本研究主要是藉由公司治理的主要變數來探討企業購併案所造成的超額報酬與公司治理之間的影響，並進一步討論當公司治理愈差時，宣告購併所產生的超額報酬是否會較低。研究期間為民國87年1月至97年3月間，曾發生併購活動的上市、櫃公司，共選取100個樣本。而實證結果如下： 一. 經理人持股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關 二. 大股東股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關 三. 獨立董事占董事會的比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關 四. 董事會的規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關 五. 市值規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈現正相關，但不顯著 另外，本研究也針對公司治理較差的公司去進行研究分析，發現若公司治理較差的公司去從事購併案時，可賺取的超額報酬愈少，而當公司治理愈差時，這種關係將愈顯著。最後，本研究也彙整一些相關建議，以供後續學者、企業以及政府機關做參考。 / As scandals related to managers and the wealth of investors spring up worldwide, corporate governance has become an important issue recently. In addition to drastic international macroeconomics changes, corporate governance is also strongly influenced by overall monitor systems. Scholars around the world have done lots of research regarding corporate governance for decades. In addition, relevant efforts and measures, aimed at protecting investors’ rights and interests, have also been done by authorities such as FSC and TSE. The purpose of the study is to study the relationship between abnormal return of M&A and corporate governance by examining the factors we choose. Furthermore, we discuss if a company performs poorly on its corporate governance system, whether the abnormal return caused by merger deals will also decrease? 100 samples were selected from the listed companies from TSE and OTC between 1998~2008. Main findings include the following： (1). The ratio of the stock held by managers has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (2). The ratio of the stock held by major stockholders has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (3). The ratio of the outside independent directors has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (4). The scale of the board has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (5). The market value has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A Moreover, the study has also done some empirical research on companies whose corporate governance pale in comparison with others and found that those who do poorly on corporate governance tend to make less abnormal return when making acquisition announcements. Last but not least, the study has also made some suggestions for scholars, businesses and government and hope that they may come in handy in the future.

Although private family organisations are prevalent role players in both the South African and international economies, limited research has been performed with regard to them. In terms of regulatory requirements, South African private organisations are neither legally required to comply with corporate governance principles, nor are they required to make their financial data available to the general public. Lack of available data, and limited available research, have resulted in an absence of clarity with regard to whether governance structures in private family organisations add any value to these organisations. This study therefore explores, through the use of a multiple-case study, how the individual private family organisations have structured their governance mechanisms, and the reasons as to why they chose to implement these structures. Both case studies revealed that governance structures, in general, add value. The implemented governance structures may even have contributed to the increase in financial performance over time. / Management Accounting / M. Phil. (Accounting Sciences)

Submitted by Samy Sznajder Mesnik (samy.mesnik@gmail.com) on 2018-05-16T23:57:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-05-17T00:07:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-17T15:45:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-17T15:45:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-07 / A importância do cumprimento de regras de governança corporativa pelas empresas é um assunto recorrente em trabalhos acadêmicos em muitos países devido ao interesse do assunto por gestores, investidores, reguladores, entre outros agentes. Apesar do monitoramento sobre o cumprimento das normas e regulações impostas pelos níveis de governança corporativa, não encontram-se muitas métricas de eficiência ou controle a respeito do resultado destas ações. Entre algumas das práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil, está a presença obrigatória de pelo menos 20% de conselheiros independentes na composição do conselho de administração das empresas de capital aberto listadas no Nível II e Novo Mercado na bolsa de valores brasileira (B3). Muitos artigos abordam as contribuições ou implicações, em termos qualitativos, da presença destes agentes no conselho de administração. Por um lado, os conselheiros independentes podem exercer o papel de fiscalizar, discutir a visão de longo prazo ou representar acionistas minoritários. Por outro lado, a diversidade levada ao conselho de administração pode reduzir a concisão ou o consenso sobre as decisões deliberadas. Este trabalho propõe uma análise quantitativa a partir de modelos econométricos para constatar a relação da presença de conselheiros independentes e da quantidade de membros no conselho de administração com o desempenho financeiro das empresas no Brasil no período de 2010 a 2016. O trabalho contribui com a literatura para atualização do tema avaliado e apresenta uma conclusão convergente entre as análises univariadas e multivariadas. / The importance of corporate governance rules and its application is a recurrent subject in academic work in many countries due to its significance to managers, investors and regulators, among other agents. Beyond regulations to control whether companies are in agreement with the regulations imposed by the levels of corporate governance, there are not many published metrics regarding the efficiency of these norms. One of the corporate governance practices in Brazil is the mandatory presence of at least 20% of independent directors in the composition of the board of directors of public companies listed on Level II and Novo Mercado on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3). Many articles address the contributions or qualitative implications of the presence of these agents on the board. On the one hand, independent directors can play the role of overseeing, discussing the long-term vision or representing minority shareholders. On the other hand, diversity brought to the board of directors can reduce conciseness or consensus over deliberate decisions. This article proposes a quantitative analysis with econometric models to validate any relation between the presence of independent directors, the number of members in the board of directors and the financial performance of companies in Brazil between 2010 and 2016. This article contributes to the related literature with an update about the subject and presents a convergent conclusion amid the univariate and multivariate analyzes.