Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / This thesis takes as its point of departure the problem that the disciplined study of International Relations (IR), whose very basis of existence makes claims towards universality and international applicability, is seen by some to push pertinent issues relating to the majority of the world’s population to the periphery of its enquiry. It begins by exploring the concept “Third World”, arguing for its continued relevance in the post- Cold War arena as generalised term when referring to the “majority of the world’s population”. It is then theorised that one can parallel the marginalisation of the Third World in the global political economy with a perceived marginalisation of a “Third World academic” in the discipline of IR. By making use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, the thesis investigates the production of knowledge within the discipline of IR theory to argue that a possible root cause for the above problem could be the absence of Third World academic contributions to the core of the discipline. Embarking from the notion that IR theory is dominated by a British-American condominium of authorship, by re-interpreting the data provided by Ole Waever on academic contributions to leading IR journals, the researcher concludes that “Third World academics” find themselves on the periphery of knowledge production within the discipline of IR and are therefore dependent on the core to construct knowledge. A brief critical look at the history of the social sciences dominated by Western science as a hegemonic and specific “ethnoscience” furthermore puts into context the development of IR as a conversation dominated by voices from the First World academic community. With reference to the concepts of “responsibility” and “reflexivity” as they relate to theory, it is proposed that the development of IR as a discipline can be equated to a dialogue/conversation rather than a debate. For the dialogue to be responsible, all voices should be considered valid contributors, while all contributors should themselves act responsibly by being selfreflexive. Ultimately, although the discipline of IR must open up to contributions from the Third World, for the development of a truly global discipline that reflects the diversity of global interactions, it is necessary for academics from the Third World to establish themselves within the discourse by producing valuable contributions towards advancing the discipline as a whole and stepping out of the periphery by realising the importance of teaching and understanding “theory”.

[pt] Esta dissertação objetiva problematizar o conceito de poder presente na filosofia de Michel Foucault a fim de mostrar as suas conseqüências para se pensar o político na Teoria de Relações Internacionais (RI). Busca, desse modo, aprofundar o diálogo com as vertentes críticas que contestam os pressupostos do realismo desde a década de 80. Mesmo se tais perspectivas já obtiveram certa visibilidade na área de Teoria das Relações Internacionais, as teorias que seguem o pós-estruturalismo continuam confinadas às margens do pensamento de RI. A presente dissertação busca, portanto, explorar o conceito chave do pensamento de Foucault, o poder, para expor tanto os pressupostos quanto as implicações de sua utilização para se pensar a política global. Por meio da análise do modo com que Foucault trabalha o conceito de poder, conclui-se que o filósofo apaga, em grande medida, as fronteiras normativas entre os conceitos de poder e violência. Como conseqüência dessa indiferenciação conceitual, Foucault concebe o fenômeno político como campo de forças, como acontecimento estratégico ou como a continuação da guerra por outros meios. Pretende-se, por meio deste trabalho, pensar acerca da desejabilidade normativa de tal concepção política e de sua capacidade de prover um modelo capaz de constituir alternativa ao realismo em RI. A dissertação contrapõe, finalmente, a visão do político de Foucault a visões que outras perspectivas críticas, como aquelas inspiradas pelos trabalhos da Escola de Frankfurt, oferecem para se pensar um novo paradigma teórico e prático para a política global. / [en] This dissertation problematizes the concept of power present in Michel Foucault`s philosophy in order to show its consequences for thinking the political in International Relations (IR) Theory. It seeks to deepen the dialogue with the critical perspectives that question the assumptions of realism since the 1980s. Even if such critical perspectives have already obtained some visibility in International Relations Theory, poststructuralist theories remain confined to the margins of IR thought. This dissertation seeks, consequently, to explore the key concept of Foucault`s thought, power, in order to reveal its assumptions as well as its implications for thinking abou global politics. By means of the analysis of the way Foucault constructs his concept of power, we arrive at the conclusion that the philosopher erases the normative borders between the concepts of power and violence. As a consequence of his conceptual indifferentiation, Foucault conceives the political phenomenon as a field of forces, as a strategic event or as a war continued by other means. This work seeks to question the normative desirability of such a conception of the political and about its capacity to provide an alternative model do realism in IR. This dissertation opposes, finally, Foucault`s vision of the political to visions that other critical perspectives, such as those inspired by the works of the Frankfurt School, offer to help us think another theoretical and practical paradigm for global politics.

[pt] Desde sua criação em 1944, o Fundo Monetário Internacional já sofreu grandes crises de legitimidade; no entanto, após períodos de rejeição e limbo, a instituição sempre logrou renascer das cinzas; argumentar-se-á que esta aparente imortalidade do FMI é devida à capacidade da instituição de adequar-se aos novos ciclos normativos que emergem de crises financeiras. Esta capacidade se vincularia, por sua vez, à legitimidade da instituição relacionar-se à justificação de sua atuação em coerência com o propósito para o qual teria sido criada. Assim, se o discurso que emerge como consenso da análise das crises acusa a instituição de ter tido parte nas causas da instabilidade, o realinhamento do FMI à nova norma em ascensão pode resultar em mudanças em sua orientação prática, como quando após a crise asiática teve sua relevância significativamente reduzida com a adoção da política de supervisão e liberalização financeira ditada pelo mercado, e não mais ordenada por si, ao longo dos anos 2000. Já a crise que se desenvolve, ao final da primeira década do século XXI, com origem nos maiores produtores de consenso sobre política macroeconômica — Estados Unidos e União Européia — mostra-se como oportunidade para reajuste do papel do Fundo em uma posição novamente central, propiciando uma análise dos interesses diversos que esta instituição, com 187 Estados-membros e potencial de levantamento de centenas de bilhões de dólares em poucos dias, é capaz de atender ou suscitar em um cenário de maior equilíbrio financeiro nos países emergentes e desequilíbrio nos grandes centros. / [en] Since its inception in 1944, the International Monetary Fund has suffered major crises of legitimacy; however, after periods of rejection and limb, the institution was always able to rise from the ashes. It will be argued that this apparent immortality of the Fund is due to its ability to adapt to the new normative cycles that emerge from financial crises. This ability could be traced to the relation between the legitimacy of the institution and the justification of its acts in coherence with the purpose for which it was created. In this sense, if the discourse that emerges — as a consensus from the analyses of the crises — accuses the institution of having had a part in the causes of the instability, the realignment of the IMF to the new ascending norm may result in changes in its practical orientations, as it happened, for instance, after the Asian crisis, when the Fund had its relevance significantly reduced with the adoption of a policy of market-led financial liberalization throughout the decade of 2000, replacing the former model of IMF-led orderly liberalization. Finally, the crisis developed by the end of the first decade of the XXI century and that originated in the largest producers of macroeconomic policy consensus — the United States of America and the European Union — presents itself as an opportunity for readjustment of the Fund s role once again in a central position, allowing for the analysis of the diverse interests that this institution — with its 187 member-States and potential for raising hundreds of billions of dollars in a few days — is able to meet in a scenario of greater financial balance among emerging markets, along with the instability of the great centers.

<p>Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research.</p><p>Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war.</p><p>From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.</p>

The author offers a survey of recent studies on the role of the European Union in world affairs. While some theoretical and conceptual progress has been made since the 1970s and 1980s, a good deal of the current work is still largely descriptive. Only a small number of studies take factors such as culture, norms, or ideas sufficiently into account. Referring to such variables, however, promises a value added for the explanation of certain phenomena in EU external relations. With reference to IR Theory, an institutionalist approach that conceptualises ideas as an intervening variable is therefore proposed.

This thesis addresses the factors which lead the Russian government to increase natural gas prices for Ukraine in 2006. Through the use of methodological individualism, an explanation which links system, state, and individual levels of analysis is constructed. The system level variables concerned include global energy prices and the increasing importance of Turkmen natural gas to Russia and other regional gas consumers. State level variables, include changes in Russia’s patrimonial society (changing source of rents, increased authoritarianism); and increasing state control over Russia’s natural gas industry. Changes in these conditioning factors influence individuals’ beliefs about their preferred source of rents, and the nature of their rent seeking and distributing. The resulting actions bring about variations in Russia’s natural gas price for Ukraine. This framework is tested over three time periods (1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2004-2008) selected based on the nature of the conditioning variables over those years. Evidence from these case studies suggests that the above mentioned factors played a large role in the Russian government’s decision. Further, it is concluded that methodological individualism offers a way to bring together system, state, and individual levels of analysis when explaining this event, and perhaps other events in international politics.

This thesis addresses the factors which lead the Russian government to increase natural gas prices for Ukraine in 2006. Through the use of methodological individualism, an explanation which links system, state, and individual levels of analysis is constructed. The system level variables concerned include global energy prices and the increasing importance of Turkmen natural gas to Russia and other regional gas consumers. State level variables, include changes in Russia’s patrimonial society (changing source of rents, increased authoritarianism); and increasing state control over Russia’s natural gas industry. Changes in these conditioning factors influence individuals’ beliefs about their preferred source of rents, and the nature of their rent seeking and distributing. The resulting actions bring about variations in Russia’s natural gas price for Ukraine. This framework is tested over three time periods (1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2004-2008) selected based on the nature of the conditioning variables over those years. Evidence from these case studies suggests that the above mentioned factors played a large role in the Russian government’s decision. Further, it is concluded that methodological individualism offers a way to bring together system, state, and individual levels of analysis when explaining this event, and perhaps other events in international politics.

Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research. Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war. From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.

This dissertation explores how different understandings of power in IR theory lead to different understandings of world order. In particular, I examine how notions of power have informed recent 'debate about empire' and what the term empire might usefully mean in the context of contemporary international relations. I start by investigating how power is understood in relation to the role of shared understandings. Mainstream or "Rationalist" scholars of IR have argued that shared norms and principles are epiphenomenal, existing only to the extent that sovereign states find utility in them. 'Reflectivist' scholars, on the other hand, have suggested that we attribute a much greater degree of autonomy to what they call "constitutive knowledge". That is, the intersubjective and historically contingent truths about world politics that inform the values and norms of state behavior. What is noteworthy about the recent debates about "empire" is that, for better or for worse, Rationalist scholars have tended to explain America's recent unilateralism in terms of a return to the logic of political realism which gives primacy to state power. However, following the Reflectivist argument, I argue that it is a mistake to limit the analytic scope of unilateralism to the egoistic agency of any one state. Instead, it may be more precise to situate American unilateralism in the context of an emerging regime or formation of shared understandings which is more global in scope. To explore this possibility, I turn to Foucault's theory of power which explores how liberal governments both direct their populations and rationalize the use of certain forms of violence. I turn also to Hardt and Negri who, taking their lead from Foucault, offer a novel definition of the term empire as a quality or condition of the practice of global governance particular to late modernity. Hardt and Negri define empire as a new form of global sovereignty that has emerged along with the global market and global circuits of production. My research explores how this definition can be used to refine such key concepts and categories of IR theory research as sovereignty, political economy and security. Through the reinterpretation of these key categories, I show how theories based on constitutive knowledge are capable of recognizing that there is in fact a great deal more going on in contemporary global power relations than American unilateralism. / Ph. D.

South African foreign policy is not made in a bubble; as a democracy since 1994, its outward orientation is theoretically subject to lobbying and pressure from outside groups as well as jockeying among bureaucratic entities. This study applies the principles of Foreign Policy Analysis, a theoretical framework that attempts to unpack the processes through which governments’ foreign policies are made, to South Africa to determine whether foreign policy making is in reality open to outside inputs, or whether the foreign policy arena—as in many countries globally—is an elite reserve. The thesis has a specific focus on the 1994-2008 period, during which time Deputy President (1994-99) and later President (1999-2008) Thabo Mbeki dominated government’s foreign policy formulation, to determine whether South Africa’s democratic transition was accompanied by “democratization” of the foreign policy making process compared to the apartheid government. In addition, the thesis sought to disaggregate the various actors involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision making sides of the coin—to analyze their individual roles in influencing foreign policy, both pre- and post-1994. The thesis found that the dominant actor in South African foreign policy, both before and after 1994, was the national leader (Prime Minister before 1984; President thereafter) or, on occasion, his chosen delegate if the leader was disinterested in the external realm. This is in part because South African Constitutions vest most decision-making power in the executive, in line with international norms, but also due to a lack of pressure by non-governmental actors. While South Africa’s post-apartheid dispensation allows for greater inputs by the public and other outside actors, the practice of influencing foreign policy—either through the ballot box or through concerted pressure between elections—changed very little. Public engagement on foreign policy, already weak, did not improve after 1994. Parliament, despite having a dedicated committee on the issue, showed itself largely disinterested, as did the broader ANC. The press, business, the ANC, and most civil society organizations similarly showed little desire to weigh in on foreign policy beyond isolated instances. Only academia consistently attempted to influence policy during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, with mixed results. Ultimately, blame for this lack of change appears to lie mostly with outside actors themselves, who during the first 14 years of democracy failed to take advantage of political space opened to them. In examining Thabo Mbeki specifically, the thesis found that he took advantage of this leeway to dominate the foreign policy debate and rarely went out of his way to open the foreign policy debate any more than he had to. He gave short shrift to the inputs of pressure groups; had no time for the press or business; and dominated the ANC and its parliamentary caucus. Mbeki had a clear and well-defined worldview, and he had little time for people or organizations with decidedly different views. That said, those close to Mbeki, and even outsiders—notably from the academic community—paint a far more nuanced picture of the man, as someone who would listen and engage with others on foreign policy, at least if he believed they had done their homework on the issues in question. Hence, portrayals of Mbeki as a “dictator” in the foreign policy realm appear to be overstated. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (African Politics)