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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2005Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:17:38Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 pereira_pjr_me_mar.pdf: 634737 bytes, checksum: 42ad5fbb8f9641695581f99171b1bffe (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Rio Branco, com a criação da embaixada brasileira em Washington em 1905, deu um novo fôlego para o movimento de aproximação com os Estados Unidos que já se verificava na política externa desde o advento da República. Objetivamos, nesse contexto, entender as concepções políticas e a influência que o primeiro ocupante do cargo de embaixador, Joaquim Nabuco, teve na condução desse relacionamento para nos esclarecer melhor sua forma e características. Por meio de um trabalho de análise histórica, tendo como base, essencialmente, documentação primária, mas também os poucos trabalhos dedicados ao objeto de estudo, evidencia-se que Nabuco tentou imprimir em alguns eventos significativos da época um tom drástico para a política de aproximação com os Estados Unidos pelo embate de idéias e posições com Rio Branco, que o conteve em parte. Estimulado pelo receio do imperialismo Europeu e deslumbrado com o substantivo crescimento do poder mundial dos Estados Unidos, Nabuco, apoiando-se no monroísmo como garantia de proteção para o território brasileiro, considerando este o interesse nacional mais imediato, formulou idéias sobre um sistema americano que deveria ser liderado pelos Estados Unidos, apreciados como uma civilização modelo e irradiadores de paz, que o levou a aceitar as pretensões desse país no continente, especialmente nas referentes ao pan-americanismo, retórica política utilizada para intensificar o comércio com os países sul-americanos e apaziguar as tensões provocadas pelas ações de polícia do corolário Roosevelt na América Central. / Rio Branco, with the creation of the brazilian embassy in Washington in 1905, gave a new breath for the movement of approach with the United States that already was verified in the foreing policy since the advent of the Republic. We objectify, in this context, understand the politic conceptions and the influence that the first occupant of the position of ambassador, Joaquim Nabuco, had in the conduction of this relationship to better clarifying us its form and characteristics. By means of a work of historical analysis, having as base, essentially, primary documentation, but also the few dedicated works to the study object, is proven that Nabuco tried to print in some significant events of the time a drastic tone for the politics of approach with the United States for the shock of ideas and positions with Rio Branco, that contained it in part. Stimulated for the distrust of the European imperialism and enthusiastic with the substantive growth of the world-wide power of the United States, Nabuco, supporting in the monroism as a pledge of protection for the brazilian territory, considering this the more immediate national interest, he formulated ideas on an american system that would have to be led by the United States, appreciate as a civilization model and irradiators of peace, that took him to accept the pretensions of this country in the continent, especially in the referring ones to the pan-americanism, politic rhetoric used to intensify the commerce with the south-american countries and to calm the tensions provoked for the actions of police of the Roosevelt corollary in Central America.

根據現代經濟學之父–亞當斯密的理論，在經濟上那隻「不可見之手」的引導下，可 以使經濟資源作最有效的分配。然而，在現實世界裡，某些經濟情況往往導致市場機 能失去作用，此時則須要政府參與資源的配置。近年來有關「政治經濟學」的分析， 多集中於如何透過投票行為以從事公共選擇。本文研究之目的，主要在於探討如何經 由政治投票方式，正確地顯示人民對於公共財之需求；若這些偏好的顯示性愈正確， 則實際資源的配置也就愈能接近最佳境界。 第一章為緒論。第二章為非市場經濟決策的情況與基礎。第三章為實證面的公共選擇 。第四章為規範面的公共選擇。第五章為公共選擇的實際應用。第六章為結論。

Dès 1919, la France et l’Italie se tournent vers l’espace balkanique et danubien, issu de l’effondrement des empires multinationaux, pour assurer leur sécurité et leur puissance. Alors que la question adriatique éloigne les deux pays, ils trouvent un consensus provisoire sur l’Europe danubienne : ni Anschluss, ni confédération danubienne. Ce modus vivendi va cependant voler en éclats à partir de 1924, lorsque la volonté française de mieux organiser son système d’alliances rencontre le révisionnisme fasciste. L’une et l’autre puissance tentent de surmonter les difficultés internationales créées par le mouvement pour l’Anschluss, l’opposition de la Petite Entente et de la Hongrie, le statut de la Yougoslavie, mais la divergence de leurs représentations sur ce que devait être un concert européen rénové empêcha toute collaboration. Leur confrontation favorisa la déstabilisation de l’Europe balkanique et danubienne : le lien entre les deux phénomènes éclata au grand jour lors des négociations économiques pour la reconstruction de l’Europe entre 1931 et 1933. Dans le sillage de ces dernières, le Pacte à quatre fut conçu par la diplomatie française comme une occasion d’arrimer l’Italie à la vision française de l’organisation du continent, tandis que Mussolini en faisait la première étape d’un bouleversement de l’ordre issu des traités de paix : l’Europe balkanique et danubienne fut le grand enjeu tacite du Pacte à quatre. / By 1919, France and Italy look to the Balkan and Danubian Region, shaped by the collapse of multinational empires, to ensure their safety and power. While the Adriatic question drives away the two countries, they find a temporary consensus on Danubian Europe: neither Anschluss, nor Danubian confederation. This modus vivendi is however shattered in 1924 when the French desire to better organize its system of alliances meets fascist revisionism. Both powers try to overcome the difficulties created by the international movement for the Anschluss, the opposition of the Little Entente and Hungary, the status of Yugoslavia, but their divergent representations of what should be a renovated European concert prevent any collaboration. Their confrontation promotes the destabilization of the Balkans and the Danubian Region : the link between the two phenomenons breaks out in the open during the negotiations for the economic reconstruction of Europe between 1931 and 1933. In the wake of these, the Four Power Pact was designed by French diplomacy as an opportunity to tie Italy to the French vision of the organization of the continent, while Mussolini figures it as the first step in the disruption of the order created by the peace treaties: the Balkans and Danube was the great unspoken issue of the Four Power Pact.

歐洲政治合作(European Political Cooperation)為歐體自1970起實施之一制度，以便各成成員國討論及協調對外交事務之立場，並在適當之情勢下採取一致行動，以確保各國之共同利益並對抗來自外部之壓力，此種各會員國聯合模式之集體外交，迥異於傳統以個別國家為主體之外交行為，而其後續之演進--共同外交暨安全政策(Common Foreign and Security Policy)，更是研究歐洲統合不容忽視之重要範疇，故值得加以進一步之探討.歐洲政治合作係與共同體平行的行動，它溯自1970年迄至1993年，歐體藉此一架構採取共同外交政策之協調，並由其會員國制訂及實施. 本論文首先將當前歐洲政治合作文獻作一初步整理，隨後探討相關問題，包括歐洲政治合作理論之建構，其次為自其發展過程及個案研究評估歐洲政治合作的實際成效與影響. 綜合研究之初步成果，目前國際關係理論尚不能完全解釋歐洲政治合作此一現象，有待學界進一步之努力. 其次，歐洲政治合作此一政府間本質之架構，在實施上僅能達到有限之效果，檢視其以往記錄並無一項明確之共同外交政策存在，所謂歐洲政治合作的協調映象僅建立於次要的議題，包括共同宣言及部份的制裁與援助措施，但若與個別成員國利益衝突或面臨國際危機時，則其所能發揮之效用最小，因此歐體各國對個別的國家利益及國內政治的認知仍優於對共同體，而從歐洲政治合作演進至共同外交暨安全政策的發展過程來看，各國真正能讓渡主權而實施一項共同外交政策，仍有一段漫長的路途.