Work will deal with the comparison of two great philosophers of the 20th century. Both connects the fact that they were born in a Jewish environment and fundamental philosophical discipline considered ethics. Therefore, both authors agree in their works devoted to the nature of the relationship, "I - Thou", as one of the most pressing philosophical themes. How is their view of this relationship different? What must we do to meet "Thou"? Can a human have a "I and Thou" relationship with god? How can we recognize, that we are in "I and Thou" relationship? These and other questions will be the main subject of my research.

Au vu des monographies récentes portant sur les sciences juives médiévales, Musique est la petite sœur oubliée. Elles sont héritées des sciences, de la méthode philosophique et de la partition du savoir arabes, qui constituent un enseignement où la musique est pourtant inscrite. Elle apparaît notamment dans des classifications arabes des sciences, et des traités lui ont été consacrés, dont certains sont fameux. À en juger par les textes hébreux médiévaux qui nous sont parvenus, les textes arabes ont influencé le discours juif sur la musique. Nous qualifions de « discours sur la musique » l’ensemble des parties textuelles relatives à la musique, dont nous fournissons une traduction française inédite. Il s'agit de textes hébreux produits dans le rayonnement de la culture juive andalouse entre le XIIe et le XVe siècle, traduits ou adaptés de l'arabe et, dans une moindre mesure, d'autres langues, et de textes originaux. Ces textes sont de nature pédagogique et de genres différents : classifications des sciences ou encyclopédies, dialogues, commentaires ou super-commentaires, traités, sermons et notes éparses. Dans cette étude, nous retraçons l'histoire des idées et notions musicales introduites dans les textes juifs, d'une part ; nous déterminons les raisons pour lesquelles leurs auteurs convoquent ces idées et notions, d'autre part. Cette thèse vise à montrer que la musique, considérée par les savants juifs des points de vue rationnel, psychologique ou éthique, est à la fois une des sciences et un des principes unificateurs des différents corps de la connaissance juive médiévale. / Music appears to be an overlooked subject in recent monographs focusing on medieval Jewish sciences. Medieval Jewish scholars are indebted to Arab-Muslim scholars : the former received the philosophical method and the branches of knowledge that the latter conceived. However, music was part of the Arab philosophical education. For instance, it appears in classifications of sciences ; scholars compiled treatises on that matter. Judging by medieval Hebrew texts that have been handed down to us, Arabic texts that circulated have influenced the way Jewish scholars speak about music. The corpus of texts upon which this study is based is constituted of texts or excerpts that can be related to music. They all constitute what will be called « discourse on music ». These Hebrew texts all account for the influence of Judaeo-Spanish culture on Provençal Judaism between the 12th and the 15th centuries. Some of them are original texts ; others are translations or adaptations from texts originally written in Arabic or, to a lesser extent, in other romance languages. These texts are essentially pedagogical and belong to various textual types. The first aim of this study is to trace musical ideas and concepts that are found in Jewish texts ; the second aim is to determine the reasons why Jewish scholars rely upon musical ideas and concepts in texts that are not devoted to the subject. This thesis shall prove that music, a subject that Jewish scholars considered alternatively in a rational, psychological, or ethical way, turns out to be one of the medieval Jewish sciences, and one of the unifying principles of the various bodies of Jewish medieval knowledge.

In contemporary philosophy about justice, a contrast between empirical and transcendental approaches can be identified. Hillel Steiner represents an empirical approach: he argues for building an account of justice-as-rights out of the minimal inductive material of psychological linguistic and moral intuitions. From this opening, he ultimately concludes that persons have original rights to self-ownership and to an initially equal share of natural resources. Emmanuel Levinas represents a transcendental approach: he argues that justice arises from a transcendent ethical relation of responsibility-for-the-Other. This relation underpins all subjective cognition, and makes rationality, reasoning, and rights possible. Analysis of each of these positions reveals certain problems. On the one hand, Steiner’s argument contains a number of latent methodological, conceptual, and structural presuppositions. These include the pretheoretical concepts of “person”, “equality”, and “consistency”. These presuppositions prefigure and condition the conclusions which Steiner reaches. On the other hand, Levinas fails to provide a convincing account of how the self comes to be an object of my own deliberations about morality and justice. This amounts to an annihilation of the subject which undermines his argument for the subject as a site of responsible action. As Steiner identifies, justice encompasses equal moral agents. Levinas’s hyperbolic description of the ethical relation’s asymmetry must therefore be revised. Nevertheless, what remains is the strength of Levinas’s argument for the priority of the ethical relation over thematization, rationality, and consciousness. The hidden presuppositions supporting Steiner’s work are evidence of Levinas’s plausibility in this respect. Steiner’s account of justice-as-rights requires a prior ethical relation in which we recognise one another as separate persons, each possessing an ethical status of their own; an attitude of justice motivates Steiner’s description of justice. This attitude is evident in language, which is communication before it is thought. In that individual rights can be conceived only on the basis of a relation of responsibility, rights are primordially the rights of the Other.

This dissertation examines the scope and limitations of the re-appropriation of the term barbarism by modern Jewish intellectuals in conversation with Third World social movements. Emmanuel Lévinas is my paradigmatic example of this re-appropriation, as his Talmudic interpretations illuminate this process, and his work is located on the axis of the encounter between Jewish and decolonial thinking. I contend that Lévinas follows a classic line of modern European interpreters who expressed their discomfort with the description of the Jewish people as barbaric. While this discomfort can be traced within this orthodox interpretation of Lévinas, I argue that his particular solution for the problem can only be explained by a more heterodox exploration. Lévinas’ positive re-appropriation of the term is part of contextual conversations that he sustained with other peoples characterized as barbarians (i.e. Third World decolonial theorists). While this re-appropriation was originally conceived in order to establish an East-East revolutionary conversation between Eastern European rabbinical interpreters and other radical Eastern projects (i.e. Maghrebi Marxism) it became an East-South decolonial conversation between Jewish and Afro-Caribbean/Latino-American intellectuals. This conversation, however, ultimately challenges the apologetic Jewish re-appropriation of exteriority in the concert of multiple barbarians. I explore the limitations of Jewish thought to engage with this community and cross from an apologetic to a critical barbarism. This dissertation, in conclusion, seeks to make an original contribution in the interrelation between Jewish and post-colonial studies. I aim to do so by first, demonstrating that the Jewish return to classical sources is historically and conceptually a decolonial counter-narrative that was influenced by (and in turn influenced) Third World discourses; second, explaining the reasons and consequences of the persistence of Jewish imagery and influences in Third World decolonial theory; third, exploring the limits of Jewish thinking and the benefits of the expansion of Jewish apologetical dialogues into barbaric critical conversations. And finally, challenging most contemporary scholarship in modern Jewish philosophy, which holds that Jewish thought and the modern re-reading of its sources can only be understood in the context of Western consciousness.

Les philosophes juifs du Moyen Âge emploient des stratégies d’écriture ésotériques pour traiter certains problèmes d’importance capitale. L’opposition de la « thèse religieuse » de la création du monde et de la « thèse philosophique » de son éternité en est l’exemple type. Ces « arts d’écrire » ont été généralement considérés, depuis les travaux de Leo Strauss, comme des moyens de dissimuler une opinion hétérodoxe, en vue de se prémunir contre la persécution politique. Nous nous engageons à comprendre cet « ésotérisme », non pas comme un stratagème politique, mais comme la conséquence proprement philosophique d’une difficulté intrinsèque à certains problèmes qui mettent en défaut les capacités expressives du langage, comme en l’occurrence la tentative d’énoncer l’origine radicale de toute chose. À partir de cette hypothèse, nous abordons le traitement de la création du monde chez des philosophes juifs actifs entre le Xe et le XVe siècles, qui soutiennent chacun une thèse différente sur la question (Saadia Gaon, Abraham Ibn Ezra, Maïmonide, Isaac Albalag, Gersonide et Ḥasday Crescas). Nous montrons comment la perspective doxographique, visant à identifier la « véritable thèse » de chaque auteur, n’est pas appropriée eu égard à de tels écrits ésotériques et nous efforçons de mettre en lumière, à travers eux, un style original du philosopher qui s’invente dans le moment médiéval de la rencontre de la philosophie et de la « révélation ». / The Medieval Jewish philosophers used esoteric writing strategies in order to deal with matters of critical importance. The opposition between the « religious theory » of the creation of the world and the « philosophical theory » of its eternity constitues one of the most typical example of such subjects. Since Leo Strauss’ works, these « arts of writing » have been generally considered as means of hiding heterodox opinions, used by the philosophers in order to avoid political persecution. We try to show that this esotericism does not stem from mere political calculation, but from intrinsically philosophical considerations : the limitation of langage itself, that fails to express certain issues, such as the radical origin of all things. From this starting point, we discuss the views and writing strategies of diverse Jewish philosophers, active between the 10th and the 15th centuries, each of whom held a different theory on creation (Saadia Gaon, Abraham Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Isaac Albalag, Gersonides and Ḥasday Crescas). We argue that the doxographic perspective, aiming at identifying each author’s « real view », is not appropriate when dealing which such esoteric writings, which we propose to envisage as the manifestation of a specific philosophical style, emerging in the Medieval period from the confrontation between philosophy and « revelation ».

[pt] Fílon de Alexandria, filósofo judeu do século I, surge como o primeiro pensador a tentar conciliar o conteúdo bíblico à tradição filosófica ocidental. Neste sentido, é mais conhecido por sua doutrina do Logos, sobre a qual ainda se encontram à espera de solução inúmeras controvérsias. Esta Dissertação assume a tarefa de investigar as acepções desse Logos na obra de Fílon, abordando suas relações com a tradição filosófica e com as fontes judaicas. Considera-se sua importância para teologia cristã posterior e o papel da tradição filosófica, sobretudo do platonismo e do estoicismo, na formulação da doutrina do Logos. No entanto, o pensamento filoniano ainda se mostra original e marcado por contribuições alheias à cultura helênica, a saber, judaicas. Esta combinação tem por resultado instigantes reflexões acerca de questões metafísicas, teológicas, éticas e epistemológicas da maior relevância, revelando Fílon como pensador de grande importância na História da Filosofia, pelo que a Dissertação pretende resgatar inúmeras questões que, ao que parece, ainda hoje não foram adequadamente respondidas. Também são questionados o próprio papel da filosofia na busca humana pela sabedoria e o da fé na obtenção da virtude. No que diz respeito especificamente ao Logos filoniano, ele é a ação de Deus no mundo, o instrumento da Criação, modelo do mundo e imagem de Deus, a Palavra reveladora e o único meio a partir do qual a alma humana adquire o conhecimento verdadeiro, que vem do conhecimento de Deus. Esta faculdade, porém, não pertence ao homem senão como dom divino, como graça. / [en] Philo of Alexandria, a first century Jewish philosopher, appears as the first thinker who tried to conciliate biblical contents and western philosophical tradition. In this way, he is better known by his Doctrine of the Logos, about which many controversies are still waiting to be solved. This Dissertation claims the task to examine the meanings of that Logos in Philos works, dealing with its connections to philosophical tradition and Jewish sources as well. We pay regard to its significance to Christian theology and to the role played by philosophical tradition, especially by Platonism as by Stoicism. Otherwise, the Philos thinking still shows itself original and marked by contributions external to the hellenistic culture: Jewish ones. This combination has, by result, provocative ideas on most important metaphysical, theological, ethical and epistemological questions, revealing Philo as a very weighty thinker in the History of Philosophy. For this, the Dissertation aims to restore many questions that we see not yet properly answered. Also questioned are the role played by philosophy in the human search for wisdom and the role played by faith in the attainment of virtue. More strictly concerning philonic Logos, it means Gods action in the world, an instrument for Creation, pattern and example for the world and Gods image, the revealing Word and the sole way by which human soul acquires true knowledge, that comes from the knowledge of God. This power does not belongs to man, but its a gift from God, a grace.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

This dissertation examines the scope and limitations of the re-appropriation of the term barbarism by modern Jewish intellectuals in conversation with Third World social movements. Emmanuel Lévinas is my paradigmatic example of this re-appropriation, as his Talmudic interpretations illuminate this process, and his work is located on the axis of the encounter between Jewish and decolonial thinking. I contend that Lévinas follows a classic line of modern European interpreters who expressed their discomfort with the description of the Jewish people as barbaric. While this discomfort can be traced within this orthodox interpretation of Lévinas, I argue that his particular solution for the problem can only be explained by a more heterodox exploration. Lévinas’ positive re-appropriation of the term is part of contextual conversations that he sustained with other peoples characterized as barbarians (i.e. Third World decolonial theorists). While this re-appropriation was originally conceived in order to establish an East-East revolutionary conversation between Eastern European rabbinical interpreters and other radical Eastern projects (i.e. Maghrebi Marxism) it became an East-South decolonial conversation between Jewish and Afro-Caribbean/Latino-American intellectuals. This conversation, however, ultimately challenges the apologetic Jewish re-appropriation of exteriority in the concert of multiple barbarians. I explore the limitations of Jewish thought to engage with this community and cross from an apologetic to a critical barbarism. This dissertation, in conclusion, seeks to make an original contribution in the interrelation between Jewish and post-colonial studies. I aim to do so by first, demonstrating that the Jewish return to classical sources is historically and conceptually a decolonial counter-narrative that was influenced by (and in turn influenced) Third World discourses; second, explaining the reasons and consequences of the persistence of Jewish imagery and influences in Third World decolonial theory; third, exploring the limits of Jewish thinking and the benefits of the expansion of Jewish apologetical dialogues into barbaric critical conversations. And finally, challenging most contemporary scholarship in modern Jewish philosophy, which holds that Jewish thought and the modern re-reading of its sources can only be understood in the context of Western consciousness.

Les principaux livres de Ouaknin ont constitué un matériau de choix me permettant de poser deux questions par hypothèse liées l’une à l’autre :<p> <p>\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished