Šiame magistro darbe tiriama S. Kierkegaard'o recepcija G. Deleuze'o filosofijoje, veikale "Différence et répétition- (1968)" bei analizuojamos praktinės pakartojimo, skirties, pasirinkimo, lyrinės abstrakcijos konceptų moduliacijos kino filosofijos plotmėje, knygose (Cinéma I: L'image-mouvement (1983)) ir (Cinéma II: L'image-temps (1985)). / This master's paper is analyzing the reception of S. Kierkegaard in G. Deleuze's philosophy in books "Différence et répétition- (1968)" and (Cinéma I: L'image-mouvement (1983)) and (Cinéma II: L'image-temps (1985)). Also there is examined concepts of repetition, difference, choosing to choose and lyrical abstraction in G. Deleuze's film philosophy.

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Barry Faulk, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of English. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 18, 2005). Includes bibliographical references.

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What do religions do and how do they do it? In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim claims that religions are “grounded in and express the real” and center upon a set of ritualized practices that enact and embody in a distinctively intense and potentially transformative form the truth regarding the constitutive relations in which we stand to one another. With the help of Heidegger’s account in “The Origin of the Work of Art” of the way in which works of art work, along with Kierkegaard’s relational account of the health and sickness of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, I attempt in this dissertation to develop an improved version of the basic Durkheimian picture. The central claim is that religious practices are in the game of cultivating and actively integrating the fundamental relationships upon which our being as persons in a most radical and literal sense depends. Where successful, the heightened modes of relationality enacted in such practices transform us into more active, vital, and unalienated agents capable of tackling the concrete normative situations in which we lead our lives. For these reasons, I argue that religious practices aren’t going and shouldn’t go anywhere. If anything, we have grounds for leaning into them more if we hope to develop the existential resources to tackle the various forms of relational breakdown that constitute the true ground of the problem of “disenchantment” and with which our alienated, lonely, and unjust world is saturated.

The aim of this paper is to investigate what it means to call oneself a Christian according to Søren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, so as to shed new light on this important question. For there needs to be an agreement between the Christian's "what" and "how", between what he proclaims as his doctrine of faith and how this faith manifests in his life, if the designation of Christian is not to lose its fundamental value. This twofolded issue – (1) on what it means to call oneself a Christian, and (2) on how this designation comes to expression in one's life – will be explored with the help of theories by thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, and Pierre Hadot. The result of the paper shows that the designation of Christian must first of all be understood in its ontological perspective, as "pure subjectivity", and furthermore that this designation is expressed through a "double reflection" by the single individual: first as "direct communication" and then, through his unique existence in the world, as "indirect communication". Lastly, the designation of Christian (or simply "having faith") implies being in an inward state of "immediacy after reflection". The single individual can gravitate either to "this world" or to that mystical "other world" of Christian theology, i.e. Paradise, and if he is caught in between these two worlds he is in the "reflective" state. The goal of the Christian life, however, must be to overcome this second state of reflection and to "take a leap of faith" into the unknown – into "irrationality" – into "immediacy after reflection". This, I argue, is the true τέλος of the Christian way of life.

This study examines the criticism of Christianity expressed by Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard, particularly in relation to the question of moral action. These author's work were both published in the 19th Century. To analyze their written works, a hermeneutic approach is assumed. The Concepts pf slave morality, nihilism, and the disticntion between Christendom and Christianity are emphasized in the previous research and are here used analytically to contrast the author's works. The results of the study reveals both clear similarities and differences between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard's thought. The main difference lies in their views on the Church as an institutional doctrine and the impact of western moral principles on divine and human reason. The main similaraity is the emphasis both authors place on the individual's free will. The analysis also highlights the problematic nature of prevailing principles and the Christian image of God in the author's works. The concept of free will is seen as most central to their arguments, partilcarly in relation to wheter mankind's deire for the Christian God is rational or not. In conclusion to the result, the study also discusses the implications pf the study for teaching about philosophy of religion in the classroom. Therefore, a discussion regarding didactics is held to suggest how this subject matter could be utilized in a teaching context, espacially to encourage critical thinking and reflection.

<p>This thesis argues for the presence of an apocalyptic theological perspective in Søren Kierkegaard’s <em>Practice in Christianity</em> (1848), one that is of a piece with the apocalypticism that a number of contemporary biblical scholars, theologians and philosophers have located in the letters of the Apostle Paul.</p> <p>Though familiar motifs (such as the imminent eschaton or the idea of two ages) may be helpful indicators of an apocalyptic theological perspective in a given work, I take the position that apocalyptic theology is fundamentally a matter of settling the question of ultimate lordship or sovereignty. In a Christian context, therefore, where an author manifests a desire to declare the ultimate sovereignty of God (by way of the intervening act of his incarnation in Christ) over and against any worldly counter-claim to sovereignty, he or she partakes of an apocalyptic theology.</p> <p>I demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s apocalyptic theological perspective is manifested in three ways in <em>Practice in Christianity</em>, namely, with respect to his thinking about temporality, epistemology and politics. The three chapters that make up this thesis take up these themes in turn. In each case, Kierkegaard’s position on these matters is compared with an apocalyptic reading of Paul’s letters. I argue that a concern to declare the ultimate sovereignty of God in these three fundamental areas of human experience is one that Kierkegaard shares with Paul. Insofar as Paul is therefore regarded by his scholarly readers as an apocalypticist, so too, I argue, should Kierkegaard be.</p> <p>Furthermore, just as the identification of Paul’s apocalypticism is alleged to provide a coherent framework for his gospel, so too, I argue, should Kierkegaard’s apocalypticism be understood as the substratum that informs his theo-philosophical project in <em>Practice in Christianity</em>.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

L’objet de la présente recherche consiste à expliciter la signification subjective de la conversion prise en tant que transformation voulue des paradigmes. Pour ce faire, sera d’abord abordé le Pari de Pascal en tant que révélateur des tensions qui font de la conversion telle que nous l’envisageons un phénomène hautement problématique, tant parce que, afin d’apparaître en tant que problème pour la subjectivité appelée à se convertir, elle se suppose déjà elle-même en tant que résultat, que par le fait qu’elle laisse difficilement penser la liberté qu’encore une fois elle présuppose. Ces problèmes soulevés, nous les reprendrons ensuite à travers la lecture qu’en fait Kierkegaard et leur déplacement vers la sphère de la décision existentielle. Ce faisant, nous serons à même de constater comment les paradoxes de la conversion laissent penser une conquête du libre-arbitre à travers l’élargissement du cercle de la conscience et de la responsabilité.

De tous les penseurs du cercle romantique d'Iéna, Friedrich Schlegel est celui qui, en langue française, fut le plus négligé. Novalis, Schleiermacher, Wackenroder ont déjà fait l'objet d'études nombreuses et de traductions largement diffusées. Le travail de Louis-Charles Le Blanc vise essentiellement deux choses: donner, d'une part, au public généralement cultivé une traduction inédite et acceptable au point de vue philologique des Fragments de Friedrich Schlegel, ouvrage fondamental pour le développement du courant romantique européen; et accompagner, d'autre part, cette traduction d'un apparat critique qui puisse servir d'introduction à la pensée de l'écrivain allemand. Outre l'aspect plus strictement philologique, l'ouvrage présente le rôle dialectique joué par l'ironie dans la pensée de Friedrich Schlegel, c'est-à-dire en quoi l'ironie romantique détermine de la part du sujet une appropriation du monde, appropriation qui témoigne d'une compréhension intime (pathos) qui n'est pas de l'ordre de l'explication encyclopédique (logos). L'ironie schlégélienne, qui s'inspire de la théorie fichtéenne de la liberté, forme une esthétique de l'ironie qui, en dénonçant la séparation qui existe entre l'idéal et le réel, et en insistant sur cette séparation, forme le premier moment du nihilisme européen.

The purpose of this study is to map the ethical arguments presented in the Church of Sweden Bishops’ letter of "The Beginning and End of Life: Tools for Orientation in Ethical Choices", and to analyse and discuss these in relation to Sören Kierkegaard's philosophical concepts of choice, freedom and anxiety. The research questions focus on understanding Kierkegaard's view of choice, identifying the ethical arguments in the Bishops’ letter and investigating how Kierkegaard's concepts can contribute to a deeper understanding of the ethical arguments therein. The method includes conceptual analysis to clarify Kierkegaard's ideas and argumentation analysis to discuss the ethical arguments that appeared in the bishops’ letter. The study's questions are answered through the essay's two methods of a analysis, followed by a summary and conclusions. The study has shown that there are arguments in Sören Kierkegaard that contribute to deepening the Bishops’ letter. In particular, a) potential risks of allowing communities to participate in decision-making, b) the anxiety as an opportunity in decision-making and c) call to see ethically difficult choices as the possibility of the meeting with God. The result shows that Kierkegaard's philosophy of choice, freedom and anxiety offers a deeper perspective to the ethical reasoning behind the Bishops’ letter, based on Lutheran theology and a Christian view of humanity Keywords: Søren Kierkegaard, choice, freedom, anxiety, Bishops' letter, Church of Sweden,ethics, ethical arguments, ethical principles, Christian view of humanity.