SANTOS, Maria Deiviane Agostinho dos. Angústia e história um reencontro da liberdade em Kierkegaard. 2014. 129f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-10-20T16:14:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-10-20T16:34:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-20T16:34:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_mdasantos.pdf: 893500 bytes, checksum: a8aa0882a9945cbd1149e027d4bf1af8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Kierkegaard discusses the fundamental metaphysical categories through human existence. It is not, in this work, only to establish ontological relations, but to discover, if possible, how Kierkegaard puts the interiority to the externality in an earlier conception of the History itself. This effort is the key issue facing the condition of the individual in history, since their absence to their historical and current can overcome. Focused on the implication of the concept of anxiety, of freedom and the history itself. This work aims to establish the foundations of freedom for its reunion, giving through the dialectical conception and, at the same time, the possibility of rupture that the man is able to establish in the history, an answer to the questions that pertain to freedom and anxiety. This work touches finally the question of the ethics of love, as the reconciliation of the man with himself. / Kierkegaard discute categorias metafísicas fundamentais através da existência humana. Não se trata, neste trabalho, de estabelecer apenas relações ontológicas, mas de descobrir, se possível, como o homem passa de sua interioridade para sua exterioridade em uma concepção anterior à própria história. Este esforço, por sua vez, é voltado à questão fundamental da condição do indivíduo na história, desde sua ausência até sua atualidade histórica e possível superação. Voltado à implicação do conceito de angústia, da liberdade e da própria história. Este trabalho tem como objetivo estabelecer as bases da liberdade para seu reencontro, dando, através da concepção dialética e ao mesmo tempo da possibilidade de ruptura que o homem é capaz de estabelecer na história, uma resposta às questões que dizem respeito a liberdade e a angústia. Este trabalho toca, finalmente, a questão de uma ética do amor, como reconciliação do homem consigo mesmo.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-10-20Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:34:01Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 aun_fs_me_mar.pdf: 463147 bytes, checksum: 11557c23bc2276776599c3083e1ac47c (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Esta dissertação procura esclarecer a singularidade da concepção kierkegaardiana do conceito de ironia e a relação estabelecida entre este conceito e a questão da subjetividade. Com essa finalidade priorizamos a análise da obra O conceito de ironia constantemente referido a Sócrates, na qual podemos investigar as distinções que Kierkegaard estabelece entre a ironia socrática, a ironia no romantismo alemão e a concepção hegeliana de ironia. Valorizamos a análise da definição de ironia como “negatividade” e também a noção de “personalidade” apresentada pelo autor. Tendo em vista que, como figura de transição, o lugar ocupado pela ironia na obra de Kierkegaard é configurado sempre no intervalo e na passagem entre várias dualidades, tais como, real e ideal; finito e infinito; interior e exterior; vida e forma ou, ainda, entre uma subjetividade e outra, defendemos ao longo da dissertação que um estudo detido da tese kierkegaardiana sobre a ironia é essencial para compreendermos alguns dos principais aspectos de sua filosofia / This dissertation aims at clarifying the singularity of Kierkegaard´s concept of irony and its relation to the subjectivity. Thus, the priority of this research is the analysis of the work: “The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates”, by Kierkegaard, in which it is possible to examine the distinctions between the Socratic irony, the irony in the German Romanticism and the Hegelian notion of irony. We focus on the analysis of irony as negativity and also on the author´s idea about “personality”. Considering the place of irony in the Kierkegaard´s work as an element of transition, that figures in between several dualisms, such as: Real and ideal; finite and infinite; interior and exterior; life and form; or also between subjectivities; we believe that a careful study of Kierkegaard´s thesis about irony is essential to understand some of the main aspects of his philosophy

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-11-19Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:13:30Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 martins_wm_me_mar.pdf: 608229 bytes, checksum: a365622e0381361ee617673beb9eecea (MD5) / Investigamos no presente trabalho o pensamento estético e filosófico do pensador húngaro György Lukács (1885-1971), especificamente na obra A teoria do romance, de 1916, com vistas a analisar e compreender os aspectos e elementos que o referido filósofo desenvolve nessa importante obra do, assim denominado, período de juventude; é importante para nosso trabalho destacar e salientar a significação que a filosofia da existência formulada pelo danês Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) adquiriu para o jovem Lukács nessa sua obra de 1916. Para tanto analisamos, inicialmente, o ensaio de Lukács dedicado a Kierkegaard, presente no livro A alma e as formas, de 1911; destacamos os contornos de A teoria do romance; elaboramos a conceituação de Kierkegaard dos conceitos de demoníaco, desespero e ironia; e, por fim, analisamos as ressonâncias kierkegaardianas em A teoria do romance. Os dois pensadores analisados adquiriram importância capital no desenvolvimento do debate filosófico durante todo o século XX, o presente trabalho justifica-se, portanto, nas próprias afirmações de Lukács em sua maturidade onde ele mesmo destaca entre suas influências juvenis a constante presença das ideias de Kierkegaard, entre outros, para seu percurso intelectual, por ele chamado de seu “caminho para Marx” / We investigate in this work the aesthetic and philosophical thought of the Hungarian thinker György Lukács (1885-1971), specifically in the work The theory of novel, of 1916, in order to analyze and understand the aspects and elements that this philosopher develops in this important work, named as, period of youth, it is important for our work to highlight and emphasize the significance that the philosophy of existence formulated by the Danish Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) acquired for the young Lukács in his work of 1916. For this, we analyze, initially, Lukács' essay devoted to Kierkegaard, in present in the book The soul and forms, of 1911; highlighting the outlines of The theory of novel; we elaborated the Kierkegaard's concepts of demoniacal, despair and irony, and finally, we analyze the kierkegaardian resonances in The theory of novel. The two thinkers analyzed acquired importance in the development of philosophical debate throughout the twentieth century, this work justified, therefore, in Lukacs' own statements in his maturity where he stands among his juveniles influences the constant presence of Kierkegaard ideas, and others, for his intellectual journey, called by him as road to Marx”

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3042.pdf: 1304916 bytes, checksum: ca23a9815be2800168dbcd1cc6af4a93 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-07 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / The present study, based on the Kierkegaard s existential dialectics, intends to deal with ethical and religious existence in Kierkegaard, critically assessing the demands of religion and the limits of ethics. Upon establishing the relationship between the ethical and the religious, Kierkegaard using pseudonyms presents varied conceptions. In Fear and Trembling(1843) under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, he highlights the rupture between the ethical and the religious, showing that Abraham s story (Gn.22) holds a suspension of ethics; and under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, in the introduction to Concept of Anxiety (1844), he inserts, into his understanding of ethics, another distinction: between a first ethics , which encompasses Greek ethics as well as Hegel's speculative thinking, and a second ethics , established upon the Christian message, the concept of love to one s neighbor, demanded by a divine commandment, and the principle of ethical life. This second ethics is described a work titled Works of love , authored by way of his own name. In other words, it was attempted to clarify if there was a thorough exclusion or if it would be possible to think of an intrinsic reconciliation, due to some essential relationship between religious existence and ethical existence. / A presente pesquisa, fundamentada na dialética existencial de Kierkegaard, pretende abordar a existência ética e religiosa, avaliando criticamente a exigência religiosa e os limites da ética. Ao colocar a relação entre o ético e o religioso, Kierkegaard com o uso da pseudonímia apresenta concepções variadas. Em Temor e Tremor (1843) sob o pseudônimo Johannes de Silentio, destaca a ruptura entre o ético e o religioso, onde a história de Abraão (Gn. 22) comporta uma suspensão da ética; e sob o pseudônimo de Vigilius Haufniensis, na introdução ao Conceito de Angústia (1844), insere, em sua compreensão de ética, uma outra distinção: entre uma primeira ética , que compreende tanto a ética grega, como o pensamento especulativo de Hegel, e uma segunda ética , estabelecida sobre a mensagem cristã - o conceito de amor ao próximo, ordenado pelo mandamento divino, e princípio de vida ética. Esta segunda ética é descrita em uma obra veronímica intitulada As Obras do Amor . Em outras palavras, procurou-se esclarecer se havia uma total exclusão ou se poder-se-ia pensar numa conciliação advinda de alguma relação essencial, intrínseca entre a existência ética e religiosa.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, 2013. / Submitted by Luiza Silva Almeida (luizaalmeida@bce.unb.br) on 2013-07-30T19:51:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-08-02T12:24:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-02T12:24:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_MatildesPazLandimBezerraFilha.pdf: 684054 bytes, checksum: 8d278547e6be2a179d814ded970e1c67 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem por intuito principal um aprofundamento no entendimento acerca da ironia tendo por foco sua relação com a negação. Tal intuito é buscado por meio da investigação das obras de Kierkegaard e Freud. Em Kierkegaard a ironia é tomada (por meio de sua expressão em textos platônicos), a partir de seu papel histórico transformador, como vinculada ao surgimento da noção de subjetividade encaminhando para a noção de autorreflexividade e responsabilização. No contexto, a ironia socrática nos serve de exemplo para o entendimento da correlação entre ironia (considerada a partir de dois sentidos possíveis: figura de linguagem e vivência) e negação/negatividade no cerne da possibilidade de virada histórica e pessoal. Da obra freudiana, alguns aspectos concernentes aos entendimentos dos “Der Witz” conduzem à compreensão do papel dos processos psíquicos constitutivos tanto da produção irônica quanto de sua assimilação pelo interlocutor, levando ao entendimento de que a efetivação de tais processos na constituição de uma ironia fina (Witz) exige a participação de todo o psiquismo. Pela coadunação de conhecimentos propostos pelos dois autores, a negação (em relação a que a ironia se opõe) é abordada como no bojo do desenvolvimento da capacidade de julgamento, a partir de sua vinculação com o “fantasiar” e o “pensar. Enquanto instrumentalidade clínica (de negação da negação), a ironia conduz para a possibilidade de uma visão mais bem humorada (cômica) dos próprios infortúnios (trágicos) e possibilidades destinais. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This writing intends to detail irony understanding concerning its link to negation, and Sigmund Freud and Soren Kierkegaard works are the main theoretical references used here. Kierkegaard seems to consider irony (according to its standing in platonic texts) starting from its historical change role and tied to the appearing of subjectivity notion going to self- reflexivity and self-implication meanings and issues. Socratic irony serves as an useful example to realize the correlation between irony (in two possible respects: figures of speech and experience) and negation/negativity in the drama of historical and personal turnings. Inside Freud’s teachings, in turn, there are some aspects concerning “Der Witz” that lead to an understanding of the constitutive psychic processes role regarding irony production and its assimilation by speakers and listeners, since they imply that is necessary full psychic participation to construct fine irony (Witz). By means of combination of both authors’ arguments, negation (to which irony is opposed to) is approached as part of ethical and moral development, arising from its link to imagination and thinking. Irony, if used as a clinical instrument (being a negation of another negation), may be fit to construct a happier (comical) experience of someone’s own troubles (tragic) and possible fates.

Submitted by Jaqueline Duarte (1157279@mackenzie.br) on 2018-04-27T21:15:44Z No. of bitstreams: 2 FRANSMAR BARREIRA COSTA LIMA.pdf: 3275378 bytes, checksum: db0e4d113869620dd2efeadb7b3f0104 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Rejected by Eliana Barboza (eliana.silva1@mackenzie.br), reason: Jaque, o orientador foi trocado com um dos membros da banca. Favor alterar. on 2018-05-02T12:21:09Z (GMT) / Submitted by Jaqueline Duarte (1157279@mackenzie.br) on 2018-05-02T16:09:08Z No. of bitstreams: 2 FRANSMAR BARREIRA COSTA LIMA.pdf: 3275378 bytes, checksum: db0e4d113869620dd2efeadb7b3f0104 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliana Barboza (eliana.silva1@mackenzie.br) on 2018-05-02T17:39:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 FRANSMAR BARREIRA COSTA LIMA.pdf: 3275378 bytes, checksum: db0e4d113869620dd2efeadb7b3f0104 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-02T17:39:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 FRANSMAR BARREIRA COSTA LIMA.pdf: 3275378 bytes, checksum: db0e4d113869620dd2efeadb7b3f0104 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-09 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This essay intends a study of the Danish film-maker's work, Lars von Trier, as a grounding for the "cinema-thougt" that, when incorporated by a reader who assumes the reflexion in the existence, develops significant reviews. We call this reader "inspectador", because he is the initiative of incorporating the "restlessness" of the director and of assuming movie's situations in his subjectivity. The first part of the research analyzes the cinema as philosophy form Lars von Trier ideas, where the "inspectador"'s role is defined, the methodology of indirect communication and the cinema as possibility. This part also discuss the grounding and references that founds the problematic in Lar von Trier's work and how his movies stand out as "cinema-thougt. The second part analyzes the Cinema as philosophy from the "restnessless" of the existent, that is, visits Lars von Trier's production in order to reflect questions that arise in especific moments of his movie: as the Dogma 95 (Idioterne - #2, 1998), and the movies that precinds the correct formulation of the scenario, substituited by a "plan-map", as Dogviller (2003) e Manderlay (2005). / A presente tese investiga a obra do cineasta dinamarquês Lars von Trier como fundamento para o cinema-pensamento que, ao ser apropriado por um leitor que assume a reflexão na existência, desenvolve leituras significativas. Chamamos esse leitor de inspectador, pois é dele a iniciativa de se apropriar das inquietações do diretor e assumir as situações do filme em sua subjetividade. A primeira parte da pesquisa analisa o cinema como filosofia a partir de Lars von Trier, onde se define o papel do inspectador, a metodologia da comunicação indireta e o cinema como possibilidade. Trata também dos fundamentos e referências que embasam a problemática da obra de Lars von Trier e como seus filmes se situam como cinema-pensamento. A segunda parte analisa o Cinema como filosofia a partir das inquietações do existente, ou seja, visita a produção de Lars von Trier para refletir questões que surgem em momentos específicos de sua produção cinematográfica: como o movimento Dogma 95 (Os idiotas - #2, 1998), e os filmes que abstraem a formulação concreta do cenário, substituídos por uma planta-baixa, como Dogville (2003) e Manderlay (2005).

This thesis is an investigation into ambiguity and irony in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Dread [Begrebet Angest]. The frequent ambiguities in Kierkegaard’s texts have been discussed by several scholars, and Kierkegaard’s interest in irony is evident not only from his master’s thesis On the Concept of Irony, but also from his other texts. The irony in Kierkegaard has especially been expounded on by Roger Poole and Jacob Bøggild, who both consider irony to be at the heart of Kierkegaardian writing. Furthermore, the ambiguity in Kierkegaard can also be considered typical for the existentialist line of philosophy in general. Finally, both of these subjects tie in to the difficult subject of Kierkegaard’s ”indirect communication”, a subject discussed at length by Poole. The investigation falls into three parts. The first part is essentially a preparation: the concepts of ambiguity and irony are introduced, as is their relation to each other, and the discussion of these pertaining to Kierkegaard is paraphrased. An introduction to Kierkegaard’s indirect communicationis also provided. The second part constitutes the main body of the thesis. This part consists of a reading of The Concept of Dread with special attention brought to the ambiguities of this text. These ambiguities are numerous and in most cases fundamental concepts in the book’s line of reason including things such as dread itself, sin, guilt and the demonic. This reading follows the basic layout of the book itself, interspersed with remarks and topics discussed by other scholars, notably Jonna Hjertström Lappalainen and Gordon Daniel Marino. At the end of this part, the ironic readings of Poole and Bøggild are discussed in relation to the more “direct” reading proposed previously. Such readings put even greater emphasis on the ambiguity, as the text in its entirety is ambiguous. The third part is a tentative discussion of the conflicting accounts of Bøggild, Poole and Hjertström Lappalainen, and an attempt at reconciling these into a coherent view of The Concept of Dread. It is argued that ambiguity, while not equatable with indirect communication, is nonetheless a necessary prerequisite for communicating without compromising the individual’s subjective and concrete experience of the human condition. Finally, the Kierkegaardian notion of absolute freedom as discussed by Hjertström Lappalainen is considered in relation to the “existential concepts” fundamental to existentialist philosophy and, once again, the necessity of ambiguity is shown. The task of the ambiguous or ironic text is then to communicate the subjective, that which cannot be grasped in language, making necessary a certain “emptiness” or openness with regards to the central concepts.

This dissertation examines the way the Pythagorean conception of the incommensurable structures the assertions of subjective agency in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées (1670), Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), and Alain Badiou’s Being and Event (1988). The Pythagoreans coined the term “incommensurable,” alogos, to describe magnitudes that cannot emerge within a specific system of signification. Across three chapters, I extend the Pythagorean understanding of the incommensurable into the areas of philosophy, religious studies, and mathematics in order to posit the fundamental instability at the core of subjective agency. Moving from Thomas S. Kuhn’s failure to define the incommensurable logically in his Structures of Scientific Revolutions, I argue that such a conception of the incommensurable must be understood as fundamentally faith-based. Given the fact that the incommensurable cannot emerge into signification, its existence must be posited on faith. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Badiou each move from a faith-based assertion of the incommensurable to offer a conception of subjective agency within a specific system of signification. Thus, against the work of Bonaventura Cavalieri and Evangelista Torricelli, Pascal refigures the incommensurably infinite to establish a heterodox subjective agency within Augustinian faith-by-grace; Kierkegaard manages to navigate the incommensurability of direct communication and personal faith by effacing his pseudonym Johannes Climacus; and Alain Badiou relies on the incommensurable “event” to imagine the possibility the subject’s calling into being of the new. In each of these three texts, the incommensurable functions to guarantee the possibility of subject agency within a specific system of signification.

Denna studie är en kvalitativ litteraturstudie av suicidnära personers upplevelser av erhållen vård, diskuterat ur ett personcentrerat perspektiv. Syftet med denna studie var att få en inblick i den suicidnära personens upplevelser av erhållen vård, detta, för att få en djupare inblick i hens upplevelse av erhållen vård. I denna litteraturstudie analyserades och avkodades sammanlagt nio artiklar, där flertalet teman identifierades. Mest framträdande av dessa teman var den suicidnära personens omfattande behov av empatisk respons från personal och det faktum det faktum att hen behöver hjälp med problem som inte är direkt förankrade i hens suicidproblematik per se. / This is a qualitative literature review of the suicidal person’s experiences of receiving care, discussed from a person-centred perspective. The purpose of this study was to share suicidal people's experiences of suicidal preventive care, in order to gain a deeper insight into the person’s experience of received care. In this literature review, a total of nine articles were analysed and decoded in which several themes were identified. Most prominent of these were our findings that the suicidal person has a great need for empathic response from staff, and that what the person needs help with problems that are not rooted in the person’s suicidal behaviour per se.

Die tema van hierdie verhandeling is 'n vergelykende studie van die kategorie enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max Stirner met die doel om punte van ooreenkoms en basiese verskille uit te wys. Daar word gepoog om deur 'n analise van begrippe wat binne die kategorie van die enkeling val, nuwe lig te werp op die twee denkers se filosofie. Hierdie probleemstelling bring mee dat daar gedurig vergelykend gewerk word, maar dat die uiteensetting ook beperk word tot daardie basiese begrippe wat die vergelyking duidelik na vore bring. So word in hoofsaak dan die volgende behandel: Die probleem van denke en syn soos dit by die twee denkers voorkom, word ondersoek. Beide Kierkegaard en Stirner stel die eksisterende enkeling as die sentrale begrip in die soeke na 'n relasie tussen denke en syn. Belangrike verwante eksistensiebegrippe kom voorts onder bespreking; die stel van die self en selfkeuse, selfbewussyn, moontlikheid en wording, eksistensie, essensie, reele en ideele syn. By die ontleding van hierdie begrippe word duidelik aangedui hoe verskillend die antwoorde was wat Kierkegaard en Stirner gegee het in die lig van die filosofiese probleme van hulle tyd. Wanneer Kierkegaard die enkeling stel as eindig-oneindig word die moontlikheid meteen gestel vir 'n relasie van die enkeling tot God, terwyl Stirner die enkeling slegs as oneindig sien. Die begrippe "sprong" en "oomblik" gee die sleutel tot die verstaan van Kierkegaard se filosofie en stel meteen ook die moontlikheid dat 'tiie enkeling voor God" kan staan. Stirner en Kierkegaard se beskouing van "gees" is wyd ui teenlopend en illustreer duidelik Stirner se negatiewe denke en Kierkegaard se positiewe siening. Kierkegaard stel die begrip subjektiwiteit as antwoord op die vraag na die waarheid, terwyl Stirner ook van hierdie prinsipe uitgaan, maar 'n heel ander resultaat bereik. Kierkegaard stel die moontlikheid van 'n etiese lewe waarin die enkeling hoër as die universele is. Be ide Stirner en Kierkegaard trek te velde teen die moraliteit van hulle tyd, maar op heel verskillende wyse - dit blyk veral uit die inhoud wat hul gee aan begrippe soos "vryheid" en "massa". Kortliks word aangedui hoe Kierkegaard se filosofie uitloop op die finale stadium van religieusiteit deur die stel van begrippe soos sonde, skuld, angs ens. Stirner verwerp alle vorme van godsdiens as blote verbeeldingsvlugte. Die resultaat van die studie is dat hoewel daar enkele ernstige besware ingebring kan word teen Kierkegaard se siening van die "enkeling", hy nogtans 'n baie belangrike bydrae tot die filosofie lewer. Die positiewe van sy siening lê juis daarin dat die "enkeling" oop is vir 'n relasie tot die jy en veral die U. Stirner se beskouing loop uit op 'n volslae skeptisisme en is volledig onvrugbaar. Stirner en Kierkegaard se uiteindelike siening van die "enkeling" is wyd uiteenlopend en die basiese verskil kan reeds aangetoon word in die gebruik van die terme "Einzige" en "Einzelne"; Kierkegaard se "enkeling" is uniek en enig op 'n heel ander wyse dan Stirner se "enkeling". / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1971. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted