This thesis applies Søren Kierkegaard's understanding of irony as outlined in his master's thesis, The Concept of Irony, to the literary works of Fernando Pessoa. Recently Kierkegaardian scholarship has opened possibilities for non-traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard's dissertation and pseudonymous "aesthetic" texts by reading them in the ironic tone in which they were written. This paper offers a similar re-reading of the poetic and prose works Pessoa attributes to his heteronyms. Kierkegaard's presentation of Socrates as irony serves as a model for how Pessoa sustains the heteronymic project by balancing the use of rhetorical irony within the works of the heteronyms with simultaneous use of "Socratic" irony relating to both the heteronyms and their literary contributions. Pessoa "controls" irony by bringing his heteronyms into his historical reality whereby he posits subjectivities for them. The necessary element of eros as it is identified with Socrates and thereby with irony is defined negatively as the desire for that which one is lacking and is sustained by the distance inherent in desire. Irony-eros as desire is present in the works of each of Pessoa's poetic heteronyms, gains for them corporeality, and characterizes the relationship the reader has with those works. Pessoa, like Socrates, is unable to extend controlled irony to his personal life and remains in the negativity of desire. Bernardo Soares and O Livro do Desassossego challenge traditional notions of reality since Soares feels with equal intensity the reality of his actuality and that of his imagination. Kierkegaard holds that the imagination provides the thinker with various possibilities or ideals. The thinker must then actualize the ideal. Kierkegaard's pseudonyms offer possible life-views as do Pessoa's heteronyms. The distance of irony is essential, for in reflecting on the life-views, the reader must not be able to see the author in that reflection. Unlike Kierkegaard, Pessoa successfully distanced himself from his heteronyms by multiplying and deferring his identity. Adept in Socratic midwifery Pessoa establishes the subjectivity of other "Pessoas" through whom he offers his readers possibilities. Pessoa's ironic existence proves the self is indefinable and unassimilable to any System.

This thesis examines the concept of sovereignty, as developed by the jurist Carl Schmitt, and argues that this concept helps to elucidate the very core of Fear and Trembling, a text that continues to be heavily misunderstood despite its great fame in Western thought today. Through a close examination of Schmitt’s formulation of the concept of sovereignty and the method by which he develops this concept through Kierkegaard’s concept of the exception in Repetition, I show how Kierkegaard influenced Schmitt and also how Schmitt’s interpretation is useful for reading Fear and Trembling. However, I also show how Schmitt’s usage of Kierkegaard, despite its ingenuity, is misleading, and present a more faithful reading of Kierkegaard’s concept of exception. With this reorientation, I in turn critique Schmitt’s methodology and the way he understands sovereignty. Following this reinterpretation of sovereignty, I examine the text of Genesis 22 and Fear and Trembling and examine the theological themes that ground the narrative of the Binding of Isaac. I argue that the problem of the Binding and the arguments set forth in Fear and Trembling cannot be understood adequately without a clear awareness of the image of reality that is presupposed. Here, I make use of Erich Auerbach’s illuminating reading of Genesis 22, and Jacob Taubes’ understanding of eschatology. I then examine the problem of violence as presented in the Binding, and how Kierkegaard departs from both Kant’s and Hegel’s critique of Abraham. Finally, I examine Derrida’s reading of Fear and Trembling in The Gift of Death and the way he challenges the height of sovereignty that is implicit within Kierkegaard’s “absolute relation to the absolute.” / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

As I hope to show, a philosophical study of love is highly relevant today, since the sciences have not adequately answered the perennial question: What is love?; Since the time of Socrates, the idea of love and the conception of the human heart have been devalued by thinkers who, by definition, are known as "lovers of wisdom." Considered pejoratively as "the passions," the subject of emotion was deemed inferior to thought centered upon the human faculty of reason. Many studies in the sciences, from biology to psychology, claim to have pointed us to the source of the human experience of love--but do they help us to understand love properly? In order to provide a full consideration of love in my philosophical research, I will focus my analysis on love under the philosophical lens of phenomenology. Known as the study of firsthand human experience, phenomenology became the influential school of thought for many German philosophers in the early twentieth century. My research will closely examine the writings of Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Jean-Luc Marion within the context of this tradition. Moving from a justification of love in philosophy to the topic of self-love, I hope to define effectively what it means to love another. I shall also attempt to disambiguate the common assumptions regarding the nature of love. Is there a fundamental difference between the phenomenon of "falling in love" and of love itself? I question whether love, in its essence, is defined by the element of choice--of a willful emotional giving of oneself to another--and whether it can be distinguished from a passive feeling and an active loving will. I aim to bring the human affective sphere into the full light of philosophical inquiry, considering whether love is a moral act of the will that involves a total participation of the self--in mind, body, and spirit. Love is arguably the most powerful of the human emotions, one that elevates the human sphere of emotions and the ethical existence beyond simple desire.

No description available.

This essay starts at the proposition that there is not yet a satisfying way to differentiate between different worldviews. Although many attempts have been made, they fail in ways that are difficult to pinpoint. The usual way of researching a worldview is to start from a set of questions that are deemed fundamental to our beliefs, a method the author regards as flawed. In this essay it is instead proposed that we should regard actions and behaviour to determine worldview, because they lead us to the essential part of worldview, the core. To get a worldview with this method, we would categorise different tendencies of actions of individuals, instead of trying to ask them questions and categorising the answers. From this, a model of four different worldviews is established based of four different aims that are sought in actions. These for are: the way of virtue; the way of empowerment or worldly security; the way of pleasure; and the way of spiritual liberation or salvation. The aim of this model is to increase our explanatory power in terms of what people believe, why they act as they do, and what decisions they reach.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1716.pdf: 531315 bytes, checksum: 80ad12e3b9add2d71c45a8170d033728 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / In the Destruction of Reason, from 1953, Georg Lukács plays several thinkers as philosophics idealizers of german way to Hitler. This work has as purpose to show such reading as a mistake. Another moment, through a deviation about the Hungarian author s trajectory, shows also that there is a transformation in the writing style after his convertion on the communist party in 1918, wich emphasires mainly after the thirties, in it s soviet period. On the other hand, shows also that during Lukács last years there is an effort to revise mistakes of the past / Em A Destruição da Razão, de 1953, Georg Lukács interpreta diversos pensadores como idealizadores filosóficos do caminho alemão até Hitler. Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar tal leitura como um equívoco. Noutro momento, através de uma digressão sobre a trajetória do autor húngaro, mostra também que há uma transformação no estilo da escrita após sua conversão ao partido comunista em 1918, que se acentua principalmente após os anos 30, em seu período soviético. Por outro lado, mostra também que nos últimos anos de vida de Lukács há um esforço para corrigir os erros do passado

The aim of this Master’s thesis is to achieve philosophical clarity on an interpretative problem I have been struggle with in Euripides’ Medea: That Medea murders her own children, while claimingto love them. Situated within the philosophical and literary tradition of ordinary language philosophy and ordinary language criticism, the thesis draws on ideas, theoretical discussions, and concepts from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Toril Moi, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, and Niklas Forsberg – but also Søren Kierkegaard. The analysis is divided in two parts. The first is anarticulation of the grammar of my problem through Cora Diamond’s conception of the phenomenon “a difficulty of reality”, and an emulation of a hermeneutical strategy to deal with such problems, which I identify in Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. I reach the conclusion that the co-existence of Medea’s murder och love is a paradox, which cannot be thought. The second part of the analysis is an attempt to step out of this paradox. Here, I compare Medea to Stanley Cavell’s readings on the Shakespearean tragedies Othello and King Lear, and Cavell’s ideas on “lived scepticism”, “avoidance of love” and “best case of acknowledgment”. By doing this, I am able to form the hypothesis that Medea’s understanding of “love” has been severely damagedafter Jason’s betrayal, and that she actually fails to sensically mean that she loves her children. In its use of my own confusion as a starting point and in employing Toril Moi’s views on reading, this thesis continuously stresses the individual reader’s responsibility in literary interpretation, as well as the importance of daring to voice or personal struggles, questions, and interests – even (or especially) when reading great classics.

This thesis argues that any historiography that would contribute to theological knowledge must take into consideration, at a methodological level, the reality of God. This theological claim, in turn, has significant implications for historical knowledge and thus, historiography. The thesis moves ahead in five chapters. The first is an overview and description of N. T. Wright's historical and theological method as they both are grounded in his critical realist epistemology. The second chapter argues for a particular theological epistemology that goes beyond Wright's and corrects it, drawing primarily on the work of T. F. Torrance and Søren Kierkegaard. In the third and fourth chapters an ‘apocalyptic' theological approach is defined and articulated according to a progression from soteriology to Christology to creation. The final chapter builds upon this constructive theological work by articulating an ‘apocalyptic' theology of history which is then used to articulate some key considerations for a theological approach to historiography in critical dialogue with Wright's historical and theological method.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The problem explored in this study concerns authenticity, and can be formulated as the question: 'How does one become oneself? In order to answer this query, related issues must be addressed, for example: the nature of consciousness/ self-awareness; the individual's relationship to society; the meaning of existence, and so forth. The reply's of three thinkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, will be discussed in this investigation. They have been selected for several reasons: Each of their respective theories addresses issues that are generally pertinent in contemporary society, such as: the alienation and dissociation of individuals from each other and themselves through mass-mindedness and the impersonal nature of state and religious institutions; the anxiety that many experience due to, firstly, a lack of confidence in the abovementioned institutions and, secondly, a loss of trust in existing (political, religious, moral, social) life-strategies, because these often fail to give a convincing sense of meaning and purpose to life. Each of the three thinkers places the 'self at the center of their philosophy, and addresses many similar themes which share between them a family resemblance that admits of comparison. The theories are presented in an order that · allows for a dialectical approach to the problem of self: Kierkegaard's fundamentally Christian theory is presented as thesis, and Sartre's atheistic position as anti-thesis. Jung's theory of the psyche is presented as synthesis, because it is antimetaphysical, but nevertheless claims to prove empirically that a convincing religious/ spiritual experience is the key ingredient for authenticity. The outcome of the enquiry will show that the three thinkers point from different directions towards the same basic conceptualization of the 'self: The self is both a project and a goal or, to put it differently, a journey and a destination, the goal/destination being the synthesis of the various disparate and conflicting elements that influence or make up the personality. The study as a whole echoes the three individual approaches in describing the condition of modem man as a malady or sickness, which is the lack of authenticity, of which the symptoms are falsehood, anxiety, alienation, crippled relationships, lack of responsibility and adaptibility, and perhaps, on a larger scale, issues such as social/ political injustice and conflict. The cure for this malady is an enhancement of consciousness/ awareness that is known as 'the self. The self is seen as a 'becoming' and a choice, a dynamic synthesis, something which is not given and cannot be taken for granted, but must be actively striven for. The study outlines and explores the nature and value of such a project towards the self. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie beskou die probleem van outentisiteit, wat as die vraag, 'Hoe word ek myself?', gestel kan word. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, moet verdere kwessies, soos byvoorbeeld die aard van (self)bewussyn, die verhouding waarin die indivudu tot die samelewing staan, en die betekenis van 'bestaan' ( eksistensie ), ook aangespreek word. Die voorstelle van drie denkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, word bespreek in hierdie tesis. Die drie is vir verskeie redes uitgesoek: Elkeen van hulle spreek pertinente kwessies rondom die modeme samelewing aan, byvoorbeeld: individue se vervreemding en verwydering van hulself en ander weens die massa-mentaliteit en onpersoonlike aard van staats- en godsdienstige instellings; die angs en spanning wat baie ervaar as gevolg van 'n gebrek aan vertroue in bogenoemde instellings, asook 'n gebrekkige geloof in bestaande (politiese, godsdienstige, more le, so si ale) lewensstrategiee wat nie meer daarin slaag om sin of rede aan die lewe te gee nie. Elkeen van die drie denkers plaas die 'self sentraal tot hulle filosofie, en spreek temas aan wat onderling familie-ooreenkomste vertoon, en daarom onderlinge vergelyking toelaat. Die teoriee word aangebied in 'n volgorde wat 'n dialekti~se aanslag tot die probleem moontlik maak: Kierkegaard se Christelike teorie word as tese aangebied, en Sartre se ateistiese posisie as anti-tese. Jung se teorie van die psige word as sintese voorgehou, want, alhoewel dit geen metafisiese aansprake maak nie, beskou dit 'n oortuigende religieuse/ geestelike ervaring as die hoofbestandeel vir outentisiteit. Die gevolgtrekking van die ondersoek sal wys dat die drie denkers vanuit verskillende rigtings na dieselfde konsepsie van die 'self wys: Die self is sowel 'n projek as 'n doel, of, anders gestel, 'n reis en 'n bestemming. Die doel/ bestemming is 'n sintese van die verskillende, onderling botsend~ elemente waaruit die self bestaan en waardeur dit beinvloed word. Die studie in geheel volg die voorbeeld van die drie denkers deur die modeme mens se 'toestand' as 'n soort siekte te beskryf. Die simptome van hierdie siekte, of gebrek aan outentisiteit, is valsheid, angs, vervreemding, gebrekkige verhoudings, die afwesigheid van persoonlike verantwoordelikheid en aanpasbaarheid, en ook miskien kwessies soos sosiale en politiese onreg en konflik. Die remedie vir so 'n siekte is die 'self: 'n verheldering en intensifisering van bewussyn, wat gesien kan word as 'n 'wording' en 'n keuse, 'n dinamiese sintese, iets wat nie as voor-die-hand-liggend beskou kan word nie, maar wat aktief nagestreef moet word. Hierdie studie ondersoek die aard en waarde van so 'n projek gerig op die self

This dissertation investigates the evangelical ethics of Prof. Oliver O’Donovan in order to explore the implications of his “evangelical realism” for theological anthropology, moral knowledge and the concept of moral order. The Barth-Brunner debate regarding natural theology provides a lens onto these issues. Theological case studies are used to test our findings. Chapter 1 provides an overture to these issues, paying attention to current ideas about human nature and morality, and the growing influence of neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 2 focuses on Resurrection and Moral Order, elucidating the salient factors in its outline for evangelical ethics. Chapter 3 diagnoses the challenges which a dialectical epistemology presents to the development of a doctrine of evangelical ethics. Chapter 4 delves into O’Donovan’s treatment of the Barth-Brunner debate over natural theology, and discovers therein an illuminating correspondence between O’Donovan’s ethics and the concept of a human “capacity for revelation” (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit), which became a hinge issue in the debate. This provides a helpful lens onto O’Donovan’s concept of moral order. Chapter 5 examines the intrinsic connection between the concept of moral order and the epistemic role of faith. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the paradoxical aspects of faith as an event of epistemic access figures prominently in this analysis. Chapter 6 brings together the results of our analysis and applies them to the thesis that: the transformation of persons lies at the heart of evangelical ethics. The cosmology of faith emerges as a critical hermeneutical factor in the development of a doctrine of evangelical ethics. We explore here the doctrinal implications for Trinitarian theology. Chapter 7 draws out practical implications of our thesis. We see the central place of prayer and worship in evangelical ethics, and point out implications for teaching. Lastly, we show practical applications of our thesis by examining the bio-ethical issues of human reproductive technologies, with special attention to O’Donovan’s work, Begotten or Made?