Dr. Robert A. Pape publicerar 1996 boken Bombing to Win. Kvantitativa studier av 33 konflikter där luftstridskrafter använts har genomförts. Detta för att söka ett samband mellan lyckade respektive misslyckade slutresultat. De teorier som Pape framför har därför en empirisk förankring och de slutsatser som förs fram är att strategisk bombning väldigt sällan fungerar och att luftstridskrafter istället bör användas för att neka fiendes styrkor framgång på slagfältet. Tre år efter att Bombing to Win publiceras inleds Operation Allied Force. En operation ledd av NATO för att förhindra den etniska rensningen av albaner i Kosovo. Syftet med detta arbete är att se om Robert A. Pape:s teorier uppmärksammats. Detta genom att leta efter händelser där NATO använder luftstridskrafterna på ett sätt som överensstämmer med Pape:s teorier. Slutsatsen är att det finns vissa händelser i konflikten där NATO:s agerande överensstämmer med de teorier Pape presenterar i Bombing To Win. Det finns däremot inte en koppling till ett särskilt skede eller del av operationen. Genom uttalanden av militära beslutsfattare går det att påvisa att teorierna har uppfattats av dessa. Politiska viljor har haft stor inverkan, och vissa militära strategiska viljor har fått stå tillbaka.

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My critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the New York Times' front-page and editorial articles, within the framework of Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, shows that the newspaper constructed the intervention in Rwanda as suicidal for the United States and beyond the capacity of the international community. On the other hand, U.S. and NATO intervention and military airstrikes against Serbia were represented as surgical and the only options available to save ethnic Albanian lives in Kosovo. My analysis finds that the New York Times' constructions of the two conflicts, conflict actors and victims of the conflicts heavily favored the official U.S. policy of nonintervention in Rwanda and intervention in Kosovo. In particular, the analysis of the Kosovo conflict discourse in the New York Times found strong support for the dichotomization hypothesis of the propaganda model. I further analyzed U.S. policy papers or the official propaganda discourses alongside news media discourses, and also reviewed my CDA findings alongside key historical episodes related to the two conflicts. My analysis shows, while the New York Times showcased and regurgitated arguments that were in favor of U.S. policy of intervention in Kosovo and nonintervention in Rwanda, the newspaper--deliberately or otherwise--omitted and distorted key details that could potentially and fundamentally reshape perceptions of the need or lack of need for U.S. interventions in each of the two conflicts. Lastly, my analysis finds that there was high degree of similarity between the official propaganda discourses and the discourses in the New York Times.

The Balkans has suffered from quite a few problems as a result of the countless ambitious endeavors for great states of the ethnic groups residing in the Peninsula. The most recent great state idea to have caused troubles in the region is the Serbs’ Great Serbia (i.e. Yugoslvia), which caused a cycle of wars, the latest one being the war in Kosovo in the late 1990s. This thesis attempts to evaluate the rumors of yet another great state in the making – or rather awakening again: the attempt at a Greater Albania, and whether the Albanians in the Balkans are still harboring the idea of any such state. Particular emphasis is placed upon the following questions:   Where does the idea of a Greater Albania stem from? Is a Greater Albania today still on the Albanians’ agenda as a real political plan? What speaks for and against a Greater Albania? Is the idea even feasible?   The findings indicate that none of the Albanian communities residing in the Balkan region wish for a Greater Albania, nor do their leaders. The Serbs nonetheless maintain that an Albanian threat exists and has done so ever since 1878 when the idea of a Greater Albania first arose. However, according to the results of this study, their claims lack credibility. Everything indicates that today, and with Albania striving for membership in the European Union, the idea of a Greater Albania has been left in the past.

The aim of this project is to explore the state of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) in Kosovo, from a student's perspective. The education system in Kosovo has for some years undergone reform. The principles of Education for Sustainable Development have been incorporated in ministerial policy and the curriculum. Throughout the past years, numerous research papers and reports have assessed the practice of ESD in Kosovo. An assessment of the voice of youth regarding this topic seems to be lacking. This project contributes towards filling this gap. The results of this study show that official policy in Kosovo makes reference to ESD, yet educational practice remains far from living up to what is desirable and doable in terms of ESD. By and large, this study suggests there is a large gap between the rhetoric of ESD in the education system in Kosovo and the actual practice in schools. Further research is hence needed to provide a more in-depth and representative analysis of ESD in the Kosovo education practice. Moreover, this study concludes that it is increasingly important to recognize the opinion of young people, they are marginalized and have been left out of the decision making about the future of the country. More importantly, youth will determine what Kosovo will be in 10-20 years and therefore they should be heard more strongly and more often.

The purpose of this thesis is to achieve a greater understanding of the contemporary situation in Kosovo. This understanding is to be made concrete by viewing the international community’s and the domestic actor’s view of the root causes to the contemporary situation. First, the historical background and the contemporary political-, economical- and societal situation of the province are presented. Secondly follows the International Community’s- and the domestic actors stated view that is analyzed using the theories of Political Culture, Relative Deprivation and Human Needs. The method that I have chosen is the qualitative together with Semi Structured Interviews that took place in Kosovo during spring 2007. I find in my analysis that the view of the International Community and the domestic actors differ. The international community judge the root causes to be foremost the economy, historical legacy and unresolved status and that these have an Interest need based feature. The Kosovo Albanian elite deems that the economy, dual administration, living in a post-communist society and the unresolved status are the most important root causes. The Kosovo Serbs judge them to be lack of political stability and security, and the unresolved status. These needs are Value- and Human Need based to a greater extent than the International Community’s stated ones. Keywords: Kosovo, International and Domestic Perspective, Relative Deprivation, Human Needs

With lessons learned from the 1999 Kosovo intervention as a point of departure, this thesis addresses the question of whether the development of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) actually made a difference in determining whether and how Europe responded to subsequent mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. Viewing the RtoP as an emerging international norm, a social constructivist framework is applied to explore the influence of norms on European foreign policy-making. It is argued that even an emerging international norm can be influential if it is considered a legitimate behavioural claim. The influence of the RtoP will be assessed by gauging the extent to which it is distinctively used to justify foreign policy decisions and to communicate the basis for those choices to a wider audience. The development of the RtoP and the CSDP from 1999-2011 in theory and practice paves the way for an in-depth case study analysis. Focusing on the UN, the EU as well as French, German and British discourses, the question of whether the RtoP has actually made a difference will be answered by scrutinizing European responses to the Libyan crisis (March – October 2011) and the Syrian crisis (March 2011 – September 2013). Ultimately, light is shed not only on the relevance of the RtoP for Europe but also on the role of the EU as a security actor in its neighbourhood.

This paper aims to show how identity can be of importance to issues relating to development. More specifically, it deals with how the Kosovar Albanians perception of their collective identity have affected Kosovo’s economic development. The study draws primarily from the theories of Identity Economics and Orientalism and presents a hypothesis which is then tested empirically through the analysis of the in-depth interviews and participant observation carried out in Kosovo. The results show that Kosovar Albanians have, to a degree, internalized the Orientalist discourse, which often portrayed them in racist terms as the ’other’, in their view of their collective identity and that this has had a negative effect on how they perceive their potential in the global economic system, which in turn has undermined the country’s economic development. Thus, identity seems to be of significance when it comes to issues relating to development.

Syftet med uppsatsen är via kvalitativ innehållsanalys undersöka vad Svenska Dagbladet rapporterade om kriget i Kosovo, samt hur kriget gestaltades via ledarsidorna under krigets samtid. Jag har delat upp kriget i 4 perioder. Under varje period presenteras vad som stod på agendan i tidningen om just Kosovokriget. Sedan analyserades de två första ledarsidorna under varje period. För att besvara min första frågeställning tillämpades dagordningsteorin; Vad presenteras på dagordningen i Svenska Dagbladet om kriget i Kosovo, samt hur rapporteringen skiljde sig över tid. Till den andra frågeställningen tillämpades gestaltningsteorin; Hur framställer (gestaltar) Svenska Dagbladet sina nyheter om kriget i Kosovo via ledarsidorna? Via databasen retriver.se har jag samlat mitt empiri.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / Donald J. Mrozek / From 1989 to 1999, the US had an opportunity to end its rivalry with Russia. However, a “loss aversion heuristic” dominated the decision-making processes of George Bush and Bill Clinton resulting in policies that provoked Russian fears of encirclement. This “loss aversion heuristic” manifested in four key security decisions: the reunification of Germany within NATO, NATO expansion to newly independent states, the Balkans interventions, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although initially suspicious of Gorbachev, Bush eventually pursued a policy of supporting his reforms. However, as the administration came to terms with the inevitability of German reunification and increased European integration as outlined in the Single European Act of 1987, worries about the US leadership role in Europe emerged. By the fall of 1989, Bush backed German reunification to bolster pro-NATO political parties in Germany. As he assumed the presidency in 1993, Clinton wanted to increase financial assistance to Russia. However, when it came to security issues, Clinton’s fear of losing democratic gains in Eastern Europe to an emerging Russian nationalist movement made him less conciliatory to Russia. Despite Yeltsin’s dismay, Clinton pushed for NATO’s enlargement to protect the newly independent states. The same “loss aversion heuristic” was in play with the NATO interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1998. Criticisms of NATO’s ineffectiveness at preventing genocide on the continent called into question the necessity of a European security organization that could not provide security. Even though the interventions cemented a continued rivalry with Russia, the US backed them as a means of protecting the relevance of NATO. These decisions had implications to the US policy of protecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Instead of securing a nuclear security partner, US policy contributed to Russians selling technology to rogue regimes, and they resisted US attempts to create an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) system in Eastern Europe. In this way, US policy success in securing NATO resulted in decreased nuclear security. In the first three security decisions, the US overestimated the probability of loss making them unable to consider a more cooperative posture vis-à-vis Russian security concerns. The result of this loss aversion was the protection of NATO and the loss of cooperation on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.