O presente trabalho visa analisar em que medida a alteração das circunstâncias negociais que levem à situação de onerosidade excessiva prevista pelo Código Civil produz efeitos sobre a utilidade que as partes derivam dos contratos de engineering, considerados estes como contratos que têm por objeto o desenvolvimento de projetos industriais e de infraestrutura de grande porte. Situa esses contratos em seu contexto histórico e social, descrevendo seus principais elementos de distinção, especialmente a complexidade e risco das operações econômicas que lhes é subjacente e os qualifica como contratos socialmente típicos, sujeitos ao regime dos contratos de empreitada. A tese discute a adequação do tratamento jurisprudencial que vem sendo dado à onerosidade excessiva e descreve os esquemas negociais geralmente usados em tais contratos para fins de alocação de riscos. Finalmente, a tese discute a aplicação de modelos da Análise Econômica do Direito, como a Teoria dos Contratos Incompletos, como subsídio para a valoração de aplicabilidade das normas sobre onerosidade excessiva aos contratos de engineering e análise dos efeitos de sua aplicação sobre esses contratos. / The aim of this work is to analyze to what extent changed circumstances that are contractually relevant, so as to characterize the legal figure of excessive onerosity [a situation of material burden for complying with a given obligation on one of the contracting parties] pursuant to the Brazilian Civil Code, bring about effects on the payoffs the contracting parties derive from so-called engineering agreements, understood as agreements for the development of large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. The work traces back the historical and social context of such agreements and describes their main distinguishing features, especially the complexity and risk elements of their underlying economic transactions. The work also describes such agreements as socially codified agreements, subject to the discipline of a legally codified figure called empreitada [or contractor agreement]. The work also discusses how court precedents deal with the legal figure of excessive onerosity and describes the deal structures normally used in such agreements for the purposes of risk allocation. Finally, the work discusses the application of Law & Economics models, such as the Theory of Incomplete Contracts, as a tool for evaluating the applicability of rules governing the legal figure of excessive onerosity to engineering agreements and analyzing their respective effects.

In this article, the author analyzes the property legal system has to achieve efficient and useful results. In addition, he points out the reasons for the existence of private property and public property, then he explains the costs and benefits of private property, and he states the difference between real and personal property is the registry system. He concludes by stating the courts believe that a property agreement is obligatory if it is economically efficient. / En este artículo, el autor analiza que el sistema de reglas de la propiedad tiene que lograr resultados eficientes y útiles. También, señala las razones de la existencia de la propiedad privada y propiedad pública, luego, explica los costos y beneficios de la propiedad privada, y establece que la diferencia entre la propiedad inmueble y mueble es el sistema de registros. Concluye, afirmando que las cortes creen que un pacto de propiedad es vinculante si es económicamente eficiente.

The analysis of tort law is one of the most well-developed applications of economic methodology in the study of law. in this essay, we provide an overview of the economic approach to tort law, analyzing the effects of liability rules on care incentives. We catalogue a variety of possible tort regimes, systematically breaking down possible assignments of liability in terms of primary and secondary rules, and describe how their permutations distribute the costs of accidents (and the concomitant incentives to exercise precautionary care). We further consider what factual circumstances may render one tort regime preferable to another from the perspective of policymakers. / El análisis de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual ha sido unade las aplicaciones más y mejor desarrolladas aplicaciones de la metodología económica en el estudio del Derecho. e n el presente ensayo, ofrecemos un vistazo general de la aproximación económica a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, analizando los efectos de las reglas de responsabilidad en los incentivos de precaución. Catalogamos una variedad de regímenes de responsabilidad, desglosando sistemáticamente las posibles asignaciones de responsabilidad en términos de reglas primarias y secundarias; asi como describimos como sus transformaciones distribuyen los costos de los accidentes (y los incentivos concomitantes para tomar las medidas precautorias). Consideramos luego que circunstancias empíricas o facticas pueden determinar que un régimen de responsabilidad extracontractual sea preferido sobre otro desde la perspectiva del legislador.

With the arrival of the Economic Analysis of Law, some scholars began to consider Law as a set of “official prices” given by the legislature or the courts. Such change of perspective created some ius-economic inconsistencies because  a  large segment of the doctrine didn’t realize the impossibility of efficiently regulating the economy by recurring only toorders and mandates.In this article, the author argues that it is necessary to establish the ius-economic differences between sanctions and prices, i.e. between those hypotheses in which Lawsets a price on a behavior and those cases which Law looks forward to impose a sanction. Such ideas should be applied to Tort Law, specifically in the definition and understanding of allocation criteria. / Con la llegada del Análisis Económico del Derecho se pasó a considerar el Derecho comoun conjunto de “precios oficiales” dados por ellegislador o por los jueces. El cambio de perspectiva creó algunas incoherencias ius-econó-micas, ya que un amplio sector de la doctrinano cayó en la cuenta de la imposibilidad deregular eficientemente la economía usando sólo órdenes y mandatosEn el presente artículo, el autor sostiene que resulta necesario establecer las diferencias ius-económicas entre las sanciones y los pre- cios; es decir, entre aquellas hipótesis en que el Derecho atribuye un precio sobre un com- portamiento y aquellos supuestos en que el Derecho se ocupa de imponer una sanción, ideas que deberán ser aplicadas a la responsabilidad extracontractual, específicamente a la delimitación y comprensión de los criterios de imputación.

The current round table gathers four renowned specialists infields such as Law and Economics, Civil Law, Litigation, and others, inorder to discuss the relevance and impact of the development of behavioral psychology and neuroscience in Law. thus, the guests addressthe criticism directed from the mentioned study fields to the modelof individual rationality that underlies traditional legal institutions. / La presente mesa redonda convoca a cuatro reconocidos especialistas en materias como el Análisis económico del Derecho, Derecho Civil, Derecho Procesal, entre otras, con la finalidad de discutir la relevancia e impacto que tienen los recientes descubrimientos realizados por el desarrollo de la psicología conductual y las neurociencias en el Derecho. De esta forma, los invitados abordan el cuestionamiento que se dirige desde las áreas de estudio referidas hacia el modelo de racionalidad individual que subyace a las instituciones jurídicas clásicas.

Insolvency law is one of the fields of law that most influence economic relationships. Its creation, interpretation and application is crucial both in ex ante and ex post paradigms, in that it influences the future behavior of legal entities and determines the rights and obligations of creditors, stakeholders and the debtor. Bringing about interpretations which lead to legal uncertainty and to perceived economic injustice influences the tendency to enter into transactions negatively. Therefore, the creation, interpretation and application of insolvency law should follow the principle of the least and necessary ingressions and always serve to fulfill its purpose. All three processes should be - given the prevailing economic dimension of insolvency - complemented by economic analysis as a tool to discover the true effects of insolvency law and to correct the same.

A l'origine de l'étude se trouve un paradoxe ; alors que l'analyse économique met en avant la nécessité de réglementer les activités dangereuses pour l'environnement et les hommes, on voit émerger dans la plupart des pays développés des systèmes hybrides, de plus en plus complexes, mêlant réglementation et responsabilité civile pour traiter ces problématiques. Pour expliquer ce décalage entre théorie économique et évolution juridique, la première partie de la thèse revient sur les fondements de l'économie de l'environnement et propose une approche opérationnelle qui permet de déterminer l'efficacité de chaque institution – propriété, responsabilité et réglementation – selon les caractéristiques des situations et des risques envisagés. Ce faisant, elle aboutit à la conclusion que seul un système combinant les institutions de la responsabilité civile et de la réglementation publique des activités risquées est à même de promouvoir le développement tout en maîtrisant ses dangers. Confrontant cette théorie nouvelle au cas français, la thèse met en évidence les interactions des deux acteurs clés du système, le juge et le régulateur, et observe l'influence positive et réciproque de l'un sur l'autre. A l'aide d'une base de données unique regroupant l'ensemble des litiges environnementaux traités devant la Cour de Cassation et le Conseil d'Etat au cours des soixante dernières années, la seconde partie éclaircit les rôles de chaque institution et démontre que loin d'être paradoxal, le système français a évolué spontanément vers davantage de cohérence et d'efficacité grâce à l'information diffusée par les tribunaux. / Most developed countries use a mix of public regulation and civil liability to cope with environmental risks and damages. Though, a vast majority of economic scholars tend to favour a regime of pure regulation in the domain of environmental accidents, arguing that liability cannot provide incentives for polluters and potential injurers to take socially desirable care. Our dissertation aims to answer this paradox between legal reality and economic theory. In the first part of our study, we develop an operational approach of the concept of externality based on the concrete characteristics that represent an impediment to individual cooperation and thus to the application of property rights. This method allows us to compare the efficiency of public regulation and civil liability and to reach a clear-cut conclusion: in the most complex situations, neither regulation nor liability is able to encourage socially desirable care and to ensure complete compensation for victims at the same time. In these situations, joint use of both legal instruments might be superior to regulation or liability alone because it enables each instrument to overcome the inefficiencies of the other, through interactions and informational transfers occurring between judges and regulators. In the second part, we test our theory in the French case. To observe the existence of institutional interactions between judges and regulators, we create a unique dataset gathering the whole litigations on environmental accidents from cases adjudicated by the Court of Cassation since 1956. Our econometric results show that joint use of regulation and liability emerged to promote economic efficiency of the legal system.

Qualquer sociedade deve decidir como serão repartidas as despesas comuns e isso tem ocorrido há milhares de anos. A partir de elementos próprios do movimento da Law and Economics, esta tese elabora uma proposta científica sobre a questão. Trata-se da democracia fiscal. Parte-se da constatação de que o direito e a economia se influenciam mutuamente numa dinâmica de constantes e infindáveis estímulos e feedbacks recíprocos, o que impede a observação da prevalência de um destes fenômenos sociais sobre o outro. Na democracia fiscal, há três fundamentos que interagem como um sistema de pesos e contrapesos, de modo que um influencie e seja influenciado pelos demais em um desejável equilíbrio. São eles: a liberdade material, a igualdade de sacrifícios e a não inibição, pelo Estado, da atividade econômica. A liberdade material se consubstancia no respeito aos direitos fundamentais da propriedade (em sentido amplo) e da livre iniciativa, cujo exercício permite ao indivíduo decidir como melhor satisfazer suas necessidades e desejos, não se submetendo, por conseguinte, aos desígnios estatais ou à caridade alheia. A igualdade de sacrifícios se revela na necessidade de que a perda de bem-estar causada pelo pagamento dos tributos seja igualmente repartida entre todos os cidadãos, o que se obtém pela aplicação dos princípios da capacidade contributiva, progressividade e pessoalidade, de maneira que a arrecadação se origine, o máximo possível, dos tributos diretos pagos pelas pessoas físicas (sobre a renda, as propriedades e as transmissões de bens em geral). É que os tributos indiretos, além daqueles pagos pelas empresas, de um modo geral, conferem caráter regressivo ao sistema de tributação. A não inibição da atividade econômica permite o incremento da arrecadação, uma vez que as exações, em geral, incidem sobre fatos e atos de cunho econômico. Assim, com mais recursos, o Estado pode melhor se desincumbir de suas missões constitucionais. Logo, a tributação não pode ser desmedida a ponto de gerar distorções mercadologias ou, pior, estimular que os contribuintes abandonem o sistema legal e passem a operar, sempre que possível, na informalidade, sendo certo que em tais hipóteses o Tesouro Público é prejudicado. / Any society must decide how the common expenses will be shared and this has happened for thousands of years. From elements of the own movement of Law and Economics, this thesis formulates a scientific proposition about this theme. Its the fiscal democracy. Starting from the basic assumption that the Law and the Economics influence each other in a dynamic of constant and no-ending stimulus and reciprocal feedbacks, this prevents the observation of the prevalence of one of these social phenomena over the other. On the fiscal democracy, there are three substances that interact like a system of checks and balances so that one influence and be influenced by the others in a likewise balance. They are: material freedom, equality of sacrifices and the non-inhibition, by the State, of the economic activity. The material freedom is about the respect to the basic rights of property (in ample sense) and free initiative, whose exercise allows to the individual decide how to better satisfy their needs and desires, not submitting themselves, wherefore, to the wills of the State and charity. The equality of sacrifices reveals itself in the needing that the loss of welfare due to the tax payment to be equally shared amongst all citizens thats obtained by applying the principles of contributive capacity, progressivity and personality in order that the origin of tax, the maximum possible, is that from the direct taxes paid by the natural persons (over the income, property and goods trades in general). Its that the indirect taxes, besides those paid by companies, usually give an indirect regressive quality to the Tax System. The non-inhibition of the economic activity allows the increase of the tax payment, once the taxes, in general, occur over economics facts and acts. This way, with more resources, State can better attain to the constitutional missions. Therefore, taxing cannot be in a way to create market distortions or, worse, stimulate that the contributors abandon the legal system and start working, always when possible, on the informality, because, in those cases, the Public Treasure is the one aggrieved.

Qualquer sociedade deve decidir como serão repartidas as despesas comuns e isso tem ocorrido há milhares de anos. A partir de elementos próprios do movimento da Law and Economics, esta tese elabora uma proposta científica sobre a questão. Trata-se da democracia fiscal. Parte-se da constatação de que o direito e a economia se influenciam mutuamente numa dinâmica de constantes e infindáveis estímulos e feedbacks recíprocos, o que impede a observação da prevalência de um destes fenômenos sociais sobre o outro. Na democracia fiscal, há três fundamentos que interagem como um sistema de pesos e contrapesos, de modo que um influencie e seja influenciado pelos demais em um desejável equilíbrio. São eles: a liberdade material, a igualdade de sacrifícios e a não inibição, pelo Estado, da atividade econômica. A liberdade material se consubstancia no respeito aos direitos fundamentais da propriedade (em sentido amplo) e da livre iniciativa, cujo exercício permite ao indivíduo decidir como melhor satisfazer suas necessidades e desejos, não se submetendo, por conseguinte, aos desígnios estatais ou à caridade alheia. A igualdade de sacrifícios se revela na necessidade de que a perda de bem-estar causada pelo pagamento dos tributos seja igualmente repartida entre todos os cidadãos, o que se obtém pela aplicação dos princípios da capacidade contributiva, progressividade e pessoalidade, de maneira que a arrecadação se origine, o máximo possível, dos tributos diretos pagos pelas pessoas físicas (sobre a renda, as propriedades e as transmissões de bens em geral). É que os tributos indiretos, além daqueles pagos pelas empresas, de um modo geral, conferem caráter regressivo ao sistema de tributação. A não inibição da atividade econômica permite o incremento da arrecadação, uma vez que as exações, em geral, incidem sobre fatos e atos de cunho econômico. Assim, com mais recursos, o Estado pode melhor se desincumbir de suas missões constitucionais. Logo, a tributação não pode ser desmedida a ponto de gerar distorções mercadologias ou, pior, estimular que os contribuintes abandonem o sistema legal e passem a operar, sempre que possível, na informalidade, sendo certo que em tais hipóteses o Tesouro Público é prejudicado. / Any society must decide how the common expenses will be shared and this has happened for thousands of years. From elements of the own movement of Law and Economics, this thesis formulates a scientific proposition about this theme. Its the fiscal democracy. Starting from the basic assumption that the Law and the Economics influence each other in a dynamic of constant and no-ending stimulus and reciprocal feedbacks, this prevents the observation of the prevalence of one of these social phenomena over the other. On the fiscal democracy, there are three substances that interact like a system of checks and balances so that one influence and be influenced by the others in a likewise balance. They are: material freedom, equality of sacrifices and the non-inhibition, by the State, of the economic activity. The material freedom is about the respect to the basic rights of property (in ample sense) and free initiative, whose exercise allows to the individual decide how to better satisfy their needs and desires, not submitting themselves, wherefore, to the wills of the State and charity. The equality of sacrifices reveals itself in the needing that the loss of welfare due to the tax payment to be equally shared amongst all citizens thats obtained by applying the principles of contributive capacity, progressivity and personality in order that the origin of tax, the maximum possible, is that from the direct taxes paid by the natural persons (over the income, property and goods trades in general). Its that the indirect taxes, besides those paid by companies, usually give an indirect regressive quality to the Tax System. The non-inhibition of the economic activity allows the increase of the tax payment, once the taxes, in general, occur over economics facts and acts. This way, with more resources, State can better attain to the constitutional missions. Therefore, taxing cannot be in a way to create market distortions or, worse, stimulate that the contributors abandon the legal system and start working, always when possible, on the informality, because, in those cases, the Public Treasure is the one aggrieved.

Après les secteurs de la musique et de l’audiovisuel, c’est au tour du monde de l’édition de connaître sa révolution numérique. Le bon fonctionnement des industries culturelles repose notamment sur une législation ancienne en matière de propriété intellectuelle : le droit d’auteur. Celui-ci est appréhendé en économie comme le garant d’un équilibre subtil entre le maintien de l’incitation à la création des auteurs et la bonne diffusion de leurs œuvres. L’irruption du numérique bouleverse l’environnement économique dans lequel s’applique le droit d’auteur et en modifie donc les effets traditionnels. Cette thèse de doctorat en économie vise ainsi à saisir ces nouvelles conséquences sur le marché du livre afin d’évaluer la pertinence du droit d’auteur dans sa forme actuelle ainsi que celle de son éventuelle réforme. L’analyse des deux versants du droit d’auteur montre qu’il ne génère pas les mêmes effets dans l’univers du livre numérique que dans celui du papier : malgré l’abaissement des contraintes économiques, subsiste la rigidité du cadre juridique qui ne permet ni l’assurance du maintien de la rémunération des auteurs ni le saisissement des opportunités de diffusion du numérique. C’est pourquoi nous nous interrogeons sur l’avenir du droit d’auteur en proposant à la fois quelques principes généraux pour la forme future d’un droit d’auteur efficace et un exemple de disposition de droit d’auteur renouvelé qui permettrait de se saisir des opportunités ouvertes. / After the music and the audiovisual industries, it is the turn of the publishing world to start its digital revolution. The proper functioning of the cultural industries is based on a specific and old intellectual property law: the copyright. Economics usually identifies it as the guarantor of a subtle balance between the incentive for the creation of authors and good dissemination of their works. The emergence of digital technology modifies the economic environment in which copyright applies and therefore alters its traditional effects. This doctoral thesis in economics aims at seizing such new consequences on the book market in order to assess the relevance of copyright in its current form and its possible revision. The analysis of the two aspects of copyright shows that it does not produce the same effects in the market of digital books than in the traditional one: despite the decrease of economic constraints, the current legal framework remains rigid and challenges both the stability of author’s remuneration and the sound management of the dissemination opportunities on the digital book market. That is why we discuss some general principles applicable to an effective copyright and suggest some guidelines for the renewal of the copyright regulation allowing to seize opportunities offered by the digital technology both in terms of encouraging the creation and distribution of books.