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This thesis explores if and how states can regain control over large social media platforms like Facebook, and by doing so ensuring that individuals on those platforms can de facto enjoy their human rights, as enshrined in international treaties. Today, the platforms are crucial facilitators of human rights but at the same time facilitators of threats towards the enjoyment of the same rights. Behind this duality hides three gaps, namely between individuals’ de jure enshrined human rights and their de facto possibilities to enjoy them on social media, states extensive de jure obligations to ensure those rights on social media and their limited de facto possibilities to actually do so, and lastly between the platforms limited de jure responsibilities to respect human rights and their extensive de facto influence over human rights. The reason that these gaps have arisen is essentially that public international law – mainly its strict horizontal character and its definition of jurisdiction as something exclusively tied to a delimited physical territory – is inadequate to tackle the virtual, cross-border, and non-state activity that the platforms are pursuing. To find what could be done to lessen these gaps, this thesis turns to theories in analytical jurisprudence and public international law: the identity of systems, legal pluralism and international legal subjectivity. The first suggests that this issue cannot be solved due to different legal systems having different identities and thus cannot be bridged. The second also suggests that the issue cannot be solved not because of differing identities of systems but because the platforms should be regarded as autonomous legal systems, not subordinate to state law. Finally, the third alternative suggests an actual solution: making the platforms subject directly to international law and universal jurisdiction. Even though this is a legally sound solution it is, however, not as simple a solution as it might appear.

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has led to society being forced to switch to a digital presence, where physical meetings have been replaced by digital ones. For universities, this has meant that teaching and examinations have taken place through a special installation of the video conferencing service Zoom. Zoom is offered in a so-called on-premises installation which largely runs on private servers or instance, in Denmark. NORDUnet and Sunet are the providers of the special installation which has been given the “Sunet E-meeting”. For the service to work, personal data is processed. This data includes names and e-mail addresses, but also meeting data, gathered by the camera and audio feed, and IP-addresses. All personal data should be processed on the private instance according to the service description. To connect to the service, various options are provided, including installing a client provided by Zoom on a computer or smartphone. Another way to connect that does not require any installation is through a web client, also provided by Zoom.  One of Sweden’s universities recently discovered that a student who joined the meeting via the web client was connected to a public Zoom data center in the United States. Through network analyzes and the study below, it turns out that the web client is a form of exception in the service where traffic does not go directly to the private cloud. Instead, the traffic goes via Zoom's public cloud where traffic is at risk of going to various data centers both outside and within the European Union. This study of the service is based on the data protection legislation. Questions concerning the division of roles and responsibilities between the data controller and the processor, security concerns, the use personal data, processing, and third-country transfers has been done.  Following the Schrems II judgment, where the European Court of Justice ruled that the United States does not have an adequate level of protection regarding the protection of individuals' personal data, the possibilities of transferring personal data to the country were limited. Determining whether the usage of the cloud service means that personal data is transferred to the United States or not is therefore of great importance. This study concludes that a third country transfer has occurred at least once, which is not compatible within the data protection regulation. The study also shows the importance of knowledge of the service being used both by the controller and processor to ensure correct processing of the data.

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No description available.

Enligt infosoc-direktivets artikel 3 har upphovsmän en ensamrätt att överföra sina verk till allmänheten. EU-domstolen har i en rad mål nått slutsatsen att publiceringen av länkar som leder till ett verk utgör en överföring av verket till allmänheten. När en länk leder till ett lag­ligen uppladdat verk, som tillgängliggjorts gratis, är den emellertid att betrakta som tillåten och kräver inte upphovsmannens samtycke. Detta beror på att länken under dessa omständig­heter inte anses ha tillgängliggjort verket för en ny publik. Kravet på att en överföring, för att höra till ensamrätten, måste ske till en ny publik framgår inte av infosoc-direktivets lydelse. Rekvisitet har utvecklats i praxis, med åberopande av framförallt internationell rätt. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka hur länkar hanteras av EU-domstolen, samt om domstolens praxis till sin metod respektive till sina resultat är lämplig. Min slutsats är att ny publik-rekvisitet saknar stöd i såväl infosoc-direktivet som inter­nationell rätt, och att det till och med i vissa delar framstår som svårförenligt med dessa rättskällor. Genom en praxisgenomgång når jag slutsatsen att ny publik-rekvisitet har tillämpats på ett anmärkningsvärt inkonsekvent sätt, och att detta antagligen kan förklaras med en ändamålshänsyn som inte uttalats i domskälen. Generellt framstår ny publik-rekvisitet som ett verktyg EU-domstolen använt då de velat nå slutsatsen att ett visst agerande antingen ska vara tillåtet eller ej, och stöd för detta saknats i rättskällorna. När det kommer till länkar har alltså ny publik-rekvisitet använts för att motivera att dessa ska vara tillåtna. Utifrån en avvägning mellan upphovsmannens intressen och intresset av informations- och yttrandefrihet anser jag att EU-domstolens inställning som huvudregel är befogad. Jag anser dock att det finns vissa omständigheter som i det specifika fallet skulle kunna motivera att en viss länkningsåtgärd bör betraktas som ett intrång. Särskilt ser jag att sådana situationer skulle kunna komma att uppstå då material inbäddas i vinstsyfte på ett sätt som konkurrerar med upphovsmannens tillgängliggörande av verket. Utifrån EU-domstolens hittills avlagda praxis framstår det som svårt att beakta dessa omständigheter inom ramen för ny publik-rekvisitets tillämpning. Sammantaget når jag slutsatsen att ny publik-rekvisitet inte utgör ett effektivt och lämpligt verktyg för att dra gränsen mellan tillåtna och otillåtna överföringar till allmänheten. Länkar hade kunnat hanteras på ett nyanserat sätt där majoriteten, men inte alla, tillåts även utan ny publik-rekvisitet. Om inte annat bör ny publik-rekvisitet omdefinieras så att det kan leda till lämpliga resultat även med en konsekvent tillämpning, och så det går att förena med övrig upphovsrättslig reglering. / According to Article 3 in the InfoSoc Directive, the creator of a creative work owns the exclusive right to communicate his work to the public. The CJEU has made it clear that the act of hyperlinking to a webpage where a work has been uploaded constitutes communication to the public. However, when a link leads to a creative work that has been uploaded freely and legally, the act of linking does not constitute a copyright infringement. This is motivated by the notion that a link under those circumstances does not communicate the work to a new public. The perception that a communication, to constitute an infringement, must be made to a new public is not based on the writings in the InfoSoc Directive. The criterion is developed by the CJEU, referring primarily to international law. This essay is an investigation of whether and under which circumstances linking constitutes a copyright infringement according to the CJEU. The approach chosen by the court is evaluated, considering both the suitability of its methods and its results. My conclusion is that the new public criterion lacks support in superior legal sources. To some degree, the criterion even appears discordant with both union and international law. Looking at the CJEU rulings, I reach the conclusion that the new public criterion has been used and defined in a remarkably inconsistent manner, and that this is probably due to an application of the criterion in accordance with a desired outcome. The new public criterion is, inter alia, used to support that the act of linking does not constitute an infringement. With consideration for both the interests of the rightsholder and the freedom of expression, I deem it suitable to let most links fall without the scope of the creator’s exclusive right. There are, however, circumstances under which I think it could be suitable to let a specific link fall within the rights of the creator. Such a situation could be at hand when imbedded links are used for profit by an actor in direct competition with the rightsholder. The rulings by the CJEU do not, as of yet, open up for such circumstances to be taken into consideration when applying the new public criterion. In conclusion, I believe that the new public criterion does not constitute an effective or suitable tool for drawing the line between lawful and unlawful communications to the public. Links can be handled in a nuanced way where the majority, but not all, are allowed – without the new public criterion. If nothing else, the new public criterion should be redefined so that it can lead to suitable results with a consistent definition, and to make it reconcilable with international and union copyright law.

Text and data mining can be a useful tool in such diverse fields as scientific research, journalism, culture and not least training of artificial intelligence and its importance is likely to only grow in the future. Despite its huge potential there are many indicators that copyright law restricts use of text and data mining – keeping users from optimal application. This thesis discusses possible barriers crated by EU copyright law, in particular in the light of the new exceptions provided by the Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and finds that despite improvements in terms of legal certainty there are still obstacles to the efficient application of text and data mining.

The thesis evaluates the  competition law and new legislation adopted under the Digital Single Market Strategy framework and itf effect on the principle of copyright territoriality and current territorial licensing practices. The interest of consumers to access cultural content, the interest of right holders to exploit their work in exchange for renumeration and interest of distributors to secure a broader audience and high income are interests which are taken into account. The thesis discusses how the EU legislation reflects and balance these interests. The thesis also discusses the role of principle of copyright territoriality for business and financial practices in the audio-visual industry.