The point of conflict between competition law and patent law is mainly on the objectives of these two policies. Whereas competition law encourages market pluralism, patent law promotes exclusive exploitation of patented-technology by patent holders. Despite this asymmetrical purposes both policies compliment each in promoting innovation, dissemination of technology, and developmentof a vibrant economy. The interface between these two should be treated cautiously since a preferential treatment of one over the other can have adverse consequences in the development of the economy. Admittedly competition law is very crucial in regulating anti-competitive conduct by cartels and monopolies that will affect the interests of the society. On the flip side, the enforcement of anti trust policies should not be overly applied to the extent of eroding the spirit of innovation and investment in beneficial technology. In the face of this aggressive global market, promotion of innovation and competition law are crucial in maintaining a competitive edge. Wherefore a balance must be struck!

No other markets have likely ever been as closely part of our everyday lives as digital markets have. Digital markets can be described as a place for innovation where new products, services, and companies pop up on a nearly daily basis. These markets can at the same time be described as highly concentrated, in the hands of a few, who control the market, and make the rules on the market. It is without a question that digital markets are full of possibilities for innovative companies and therefore it is of such importance that these markets are protected and kept as fair, competitive, and transparent as possible. There have been concerns whether the existing competition law is the best tool to be used on digital markets and whether the often-lenghty process of Article 102 TFEU can, or at least effectively can, control these gatekeepers controlling digital markets. The purpose of the thesis is therefore to analyse the existing and new theories of harm when it comes to Article 102 TFEU and whether they could be useful in the Commissions' ongoing investigations against these gatekeepers. As existing theories of harm margin squeeze, unfair contractual terms and conditions as well as tying will be analysed and their applicability in the digital markets. While some conducts might fall under the existing theories of harm others won't and thereof it is worth looking into new theories of harm such as self-preferencing, forced free riding, and privacy policy tying, in order to determine whether they could be used by the Commission.  While the application of Article 102 TFEU is of great importance, the Commission has also drafted a proposal called Digital Markets Act which would be an ex-ante tool to be used alongside EU competition law and which could help address the problems the current competition law isn't at least effectively addressing. The Digital Markets Act is based on certain undertakings when fulfilling the criterium, being defined as gatekeepers, and when defined as such, the obligations of the Digital Markets Act become applicable. This would offer the Commission a tool that is likely more efficient and legally certain than the application of Article 102 TFEU. Since the existing competition law hasn't been able to prevent digital markets becoming even more and more concentrated, the Digital Markets Act might be exactly what is needed in order to secure the internal market remaining competitive, fair, contestable, and transparent.

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Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenska aktiemarknaden sker främst med kontantvederlag, ofta förenat med aktievederlag. Som alternativ till sådant vederlag kan budgivaren erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare ”stub equity” med vilket avses det fall budgivaren erbjuder målbolagets aktieägare en begränsad mängd aktier i ett särskilt onoterat holding- eller budbolag, vilket i sin tur efter det offentliga uppköpserbjudandet innehar samtliga aktier i målbolaget. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur ett sådant erbjudande måste utformas för att vara förenligt med Takeover-reglerna, då i synnerhet den aktiemarknadsrättsliga likabehandlingsprincipen. Det föreligger inga direkt aktiemarknadsrättsliga hinder för stub equity vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, förfarandets förenlighet med regleringen är helt beroende av hur erbjudandet utformas och vilka syften erbjudandet avser uppnå. Möjligheterna att särbehandla målbolagets aktieägare är till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen i regel mycket små. Ett erbjudande med stub equity torde kunna utformas så att mindre aktieägare erbjuds ett kontantvederlag alternativt ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget medan de större aktieägarna enbart erhåller ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget, då mot bakgrund av de praktiska skäl som finns till stöd för en sådan utformning. Budgivaren har därutöver vid ett erbjudande med stub equity möjligheten att erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare A-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot A-aktier i målbolaget, B-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot B-aktier i målbolaget samt en premie för aktier med olika ekonomiska rättigheter. Ett stub equity-erbjudande ställer därutöver krav på erbjudandehandlingens utformning, innefattande att ett värderingsutlåtande avseende värderingen av aktievederlaget bör inhämtas och bifogas samt att målbolagets aktieägare bör informeras om upplägget i erbjudandehandlingen på ett tydligt och lättbegripligt sätt. Vidare torde villkor om viss anslutandegrad för stub equity-delen av vederlaget, villkor om att aktievederlaget med stub equity begränsas samt villkor om att vissa aktieägare ska acceptera erbjudandet vara förenligt med likabehandlingsprincipen. Gällande reglering torde slutligen innebära ett erforderligt skydd för okvalificerade investerare vid erbjudanden om stub equity, detta då möjligheterna att särbehandla aktieägare till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen är mycket begränsade och skyldigheterna att informera okvalificerade investerare om innebörden av ett erbjudande med stub equity betydande. / Public takeover bids on the Swedish stock market are mainly made with cash considerations, frequently combined with share considerations. As an alternative to such public offerings, the bidder may offer the company's shareholders “stub equity”, in which case the bidder offers the target company's shareholders a limited number of shares in a special unlisted holding or bidding company, which in turn after the public takeover bid holds all shares in the target company. This thesis seeks to discuss how such an offer needs to be designed in order to be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation, in particular the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. There are no direct restrictions to stub equity in public takeover bids in the Swedish takeover regulation, the procedure's compatibility with the regulation is entirely dependent on how the offer is designed and what purposes the offer is intended to achieve. The opportunity to treat the target company's shareholders differently are generally very limited due to the principle of equal treatment. An offer with stub equity ought to be able to be designed so that smaller shareholders are offered a cash consideration or a share consideration in the holding or bidding company, whilst the larger shareholders only receive a share consideration in the holding or bidding company. This in accordance with the exception for practical reasons the Swedish takeover regulation permits in these cases. In addition to this, in an offer with stub equity, the bidder has the opportunity to offer the target company's shareholders A-shares in in the holding- or bid company in exchange for A-shares in the target company, B-shares in the holding- or bid company in exchange for B-shares in the target company as well as a premium for shares with different financial rights. Furthermore, an offer with stub equity places high demands on the design and content of the offer document, including obtaining a valuation statement regarding the valuation of the share consideration and informing the target company's shareholders about the structure of the offer document in a clear and easy to understand manner. Conditions regarding certain degree of accession to the stub equity part of the offer, conditions that the share consideration with stub equity is limited and conditions that certain shareholders must accept the offer ought to also be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation. Lastly, the existing regulation ought to entail the necessary protection for unqualified investors when offering stub equity, as the opportunity to treat shareholders differently due to the principle of equal treatment is very limited and the obligations to inform unqualified investors about the meaning of an offer with stub equity are significant.

The fashion industry is one of the largest industries in world, yet the priority of creating an adequate protection for the industry can be questioned. Thankfully, the EU introduced the UCDR in the early 21st century, which grants protection for the appearance of a design of it reaches the requirements of novelty and individual character.  The aim of this thesis has been to examine whether the UCDR is adequte for small fashion businesses and designers trying to gain a foothold in the industry. The larger businesses are not of interest as they have the resources to go through court-proceedings. As the UCDR is quite a new protection and the thesis aims to see if it is in fact the best protection for small fashion businesses, a comparison have been made with three national legislations within the EU; France, UK and Sweden. All requirements and aspects of the UCDR and the national legislations have been analysed with the finding that the UCDR, even though the french legislation is more generous in giving out protection, is the best protection for small businesses within the EU. The UCDR ensures that the copyist is caught whilst interpretations are allowed. Nevertheless, it has been found that there is a need for clarification regarding whether a design first disclosed in a third country can gain protection, if it is made available within the EU before the circles specialised operating within the Community become aware of the design. Furthermore, the time it takes to go through litigation exceeds the lifetime of the design which has been allegedly infringed. This makes the UCDR:s deterrent effect lower, although not non-existent. At the end of the thesis, suggestions have been made as to how these issues can and/or should be solved, and a basis for a future discussion have been made.

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This thesis aims to investigate the consequences of a judgement issued by UK Supreme Court in November 2021, known within the shipping industry as the "CMA CGM Libra" case. This case is perceived by the industry to have affected hte the understanding of the concept of seaworthiness and due diligence, as they should be understood within the context of the Hague Rules and Hague Visby Rules.  The focus lies on the understanding of these two concepts within an English as well as Swedish context, in order to further conclude whether the Judgement may have changed the definitioin of these concepts in any way; from the perspecteve of English as well as Swedish maritime law. This also includes a thorough discussion about the extent of influence English maritime law has on Swedish maritime law, if any.  This text is suitable for anyone with an intererst in or objective to learn more about seaworthines and due diligence as these concepts shall be understood from an English and/or Swedish point of view, and/or in getting better aquainted with the reasoning of the UK Supreme Court in the Libra judgement. As mentioned, the relationship between the two legal systems (including Denmark and Norway) will also be discussed. Students of maritime law will likely be best suited to read and understand this thesis and the conclusions thereof.

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