The Master's thesis "Private Military Companies in Africa" deals with the issues of the private military and security companies and their current position in international security relations. The central thesis of this academic publication is the question whether these commercial companies are capable of representing a significant position within the international community and executing extensive operations in conflict resolution and the subsequent transition towards a stable arrangement of the stricken regions. Essentially, the arguments leading to the key objective of this thesis are drawing upon a comparative study of recent activities of PMCs on the African continent, a discursive analysis of the approach towards these private subjects, as well as their international legal status. Consequently, by relying on the gathered information from the aforementioned research, the most substantial section of the text offers basic models of potential widespread use of private military companies in connection with national states and international organizations and explains the benefits resulting from this shift towards privatization of global security. Furthermore, the publication points out specific contemporary cases for the prospective application of PMCs and analyses the space for this industry within the existing international system.

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La participation de personnes privées à des opérations militaires n’est pas récente et s’est longtemps illustrée par le phénomène des mercenaires, mais elle a pris beaucoup d’ampleur depuis les années 1990 et le recours à des sociétés militaires privées. Ces sociétés se voient confier des tâches qui ne sont pas directement liées au cœur de métier des armées étatiques, mais certaines d’entre elles peuvent concerner des prestations armées. Le recours à des personnes privées dans le cadre d’opérations militaires soulève de nombreuses difficultés juridiques. Il est en effet essentiel de déterminer le droit qui est applicable à ces personnes, qu’elles soient qualifiées de mercenaires ou qu’il s’agisse d’employés de sociétés militaires privées. La définition de leur statut est quant à elle fondamentale afin d’examiner la possibilité de retenir leur responsabilité en cas de nécessité. La question de la responsabilité des sociétés militaires privées elles-mêmes est également posée, tout comme celle, primordiale, de la responsabilité des États qui emploient de telles sociétés. / Private persons whether individuals or legal entities have always taken part in military operations and the best and most famous example was the one of mercenaries. But, since the 1990’s, this participation has been renewed by the increasing activity of the private military companies. These companies have contracts for various tasks and some of them are directly linked to armed missions. The participation of private entities in military operations raises a lot of legal questions. It is necessary to as certain the law which will apply to them, whether they are mercenaries or employees of private military companies. The definition of their status is also crucial in order to determine the liability for their acts. Several fundamental questions arise not only as far the liability of these companies is concerned but also, and perhaps even more, as far as the liability of States employing these companies is concerned.

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Private Military Companies (PMCs) have increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, primarily hailing from the Western countries and South Africa, and notably employed in the War on Terror. In recent years, the Russian group generically known as ‘Wagner PMC’ has been deployed in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa. While often referred to as Russian ‘proxies’, the Wagner group has not previously been analysed through the lens of proxy theory, and academics are divided on whether PMCs may be considered proxies at all.  Russia’s intervention in the Central African Republic through Wagner provides an important case to study this new development. Employing a theoretical framework combining elements from both proxy and PMC literature, this thesis contributes to both fields by suggesting key analytical elements through which a PMC may be considered a proxy and explains how this alters the dynamics between the intervener and its proxy. Moreover, this permits a novel analysis of Russian strategies to expand its influence in Africa, suggesting that intervention through Wagner may serve as a model for interventions in other weak countries requiring security support.

En 1729, la Corse débute quarante ans de révolte militairement organisée, justifiée par des arguments historiques, juridiques et théologiques contre la République de Gênes. L’instabilité d’une île de la Méditerranée occidentale occupant une position stratégique de première importance pour le commerce et la guerre maritimes, devient un enjeu dans les rivalités des monarchies occidentales. Sous l’impulsion de Luigi Giafferi, capitaine à Venise lors de la première guerre de Morée, porte-parole des Nobles XII, le mouvement s’appuie sur un réseau de notables de la côte orientale de la Corse et d’officiers corses résidant dans les États de Venise : le lieutenant colonel Giafferi, frère de Luigi, les colonels Giappiconi et Zicavo, au service de la République, et le brigadier général Boeri, ancien colonel vénitien passé au service de la Cour de Parme puis de l’Espagne. A partir de sources originales d’archives, cette thèse rétablit le rôle central des prédécesseurs de Pascal Paoli, illustre quelques aspects mal connus de la complexité des rivalités internationales autour de la Corse, et met en lumière le rôle des entrepreneurs de guerre corses dans l’orientation et le financement de l’insurrection. / In 1729, Corsica entered a forty year period of militarily organised revolt against the Republic of Genoa, justified by historical, legal and theological arguments. The instability of this western Mediterranean island, situated as it was at a strategic position of prime importance for commerce and naval warfare, made it an important factor in the rivalries between Western monarchies. Under the leadership of Luigi Giafferi, a captain in the Venetian army during the first Morean War and the representative of the “Noble Twelve”, the movement was supported by a group of clan leaders from the East coast of Corsica and Corsican officers based in the Venetian States: Lieutenant Colonel Giafferi, the brother of Luigi, Colonels Giappiconi and Zicavo, in the service of the Venetian republic, and the Brigadier General Boeri, a former colonel in the Venetian army who had gone on to serve at the courts of Parma and of Spain. Based on original archival sources, this thesis reconstructs the central role played by the predecessors of Pascal Paoli, sheds light on some lesser known aspects of the complex international rivalries over Corsica and underlines the role of Corsican “entrepreneurs de guerre” in financing and influencing the direction of the insurrection.

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

Avant les Conventions de Genève de 1949, seuls les conflits armés internationaux étaient réglementés par le droit de la guerre. Ce dernier ne pouvait s’appliquer dans les guerres civiles qu’après la reconnaissance des forces rebelles comme partie belligérante. Or, depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale on a assisté à une multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 leur ont consacré seulement l’article 3 commun ; puis le Protocole II additionnel de 1977 est venu le compléter. Ces deux textes comportent de nombreuses lacunes, notamment l’absence de définition des « combattants » et des « civils », rendant ainsi difficile le respect du principe de distinction pourtant essentiel à la protection des populations civiles. Ces dispositions ne réglementent pas non plus les moyens et méthodes de guerre. Outre les lacunes normatives, il y a des problèmes matériels qui compliquent la mise en œuvre efficace des règles pertinentes. Il s’agit notamment de la participation des populations civiles aux hostilités, y compris les enfants-Soldats et les mercenaires. L’absence du statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux apparaît comme le problème principal compromettant l’efficacité du DIH. Celle-Ci ne contribue-T-Elle pas au non respect de ce droit par les groupes armés ? Faudrait-Il conférer ce statut à ces derniers en vue de les amener à appliquer le droit international humanitaire ou envisager d’autres moyens ? Lesquels ? / Before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only the international armed conflicts were regulated by the law of the war. This last one could apply in the civil wars only after the recognition of the rebel forces as belligerent party. Now, since the Second World War we attended an increase in non-International armed conflicts. But the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dedicated them only the common article 3; then the additional Protocol II of 1977 came to complete it. These two texts contain numerous gaps, in particular the absence of definition of the "combatants" and the "civilians", making so difficult the respect for the principle of distinction nevertheless essential for the protection of the civil populations. These rules do not regulate either the means and the war methods. Besides the normative gaps, there are material problems which complicate the effective implementation of the relevant rules. It is in particular about the participation of the civil populations in the hostilities, including the children-Soldiers and the mercenaries. The absence of combatant's status in the non-International armed conflicts appears as the main problem compromising the efficiency of the international humanitarian law. Does not this one contribute to the non compliance with this law by the armed groups? Would it be necessary to confer this status to these last ones to bring them to apply the international humanitarian law or to envisage the other means? Which one?

Les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan ont vu la réapparition massive de sociétés de mercenariat d’un nouveau genre.Le mercenariat occidental est ainsi passé en moins de vingt ans de structures artisanales, arrimées à la politiquepost-coloniale des grandes puissances, à un stade professionnel et industriel tendant à une transnationalisationcroissante de ses activités. Des bavures de la célèbre Blackwater à l’implication d’employés de CACI dans lescandale de la torture au sein de la prison d’Abu Grahib, en passant par les activités de la tentaculaire Aegis, lessociétés militaires privées, omniprésentes sur le champ de bataille, ont rythmé et marqué le récit de ces guerresmajeures du début du XXIe siècle. Fait crucial : c’est la première fois dans l’histoire des opérations militairesaméricaines qu’on assiste à un basculement de la démographie des forces en faveur du secteur privé. Produit del’économie de guerre permanente et ramifications expéditionnaires du complexe militaro-industriel, ces sociétésreprésentent un changement d’expression de la puissance militaire étatsunienne sans précédent. Cettemercenarisation de l’american way of war est désormais une tendance structurelle de la politique étrangère del’Empire et pourrait bien révolutionner à terme le visage même de la guerre. Cette thèse trace le récit historique deces armées privées, décrit les conditions politiques qui ont permis à ce nouveau marché de la guerre d’émerger etse propose d’analyser la portée sociopolitique de ce phénomène de mondialisation de la violence privée quant à laquestion de l’Etat. Cette question du retour du mercenariat à grande échelle dans la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis permet non seulement de former une hypothèse aiguë sur le déclin de la puissance militaire américaine maisaussi sur les évolutions de l’identité sociohistorique du monopole de la violence étatique. / Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have seen a massive return of mercenary companies of a new genre. The Westernmercenaries have transformed in less than twenty years from craft structures, linked to the post-colonial politics ofgreat powers, to a professional and industrial stage that tends to a growing transnationalization of their activities.From the blunders of the famous Blackwater to the involvement of CACI’s employees in the torture scandal inAbu Ghraib prison, through the activities of the sprawling Aegis, private military companies, everywhere on thebattlefield, have marked and labeled the story of these major wars of the early twenty-first Century. Crucial fact:this is the first time in the history of U.S. military operations that we are witnessing a shift in the demographics offorces in favor of the private sector. Product of the permanent war economy and overseas branches of themilitary-industrial complex, these companies represent an unprecedented change in expression of U.S. militarypower. This mercenarization of the American way of war is now a structural trend of the foreign policy of theEmpire and could eventually revolutionize the face of the war. This thesis traces the history of these privatearmies, described the political conditions that led to the birth of this new market of war, and analyzes the scope ofthis sociopolitical phenomenon of globalization of private violence. This return of mercenaries on a large scale inthe foreign policy of the United States not only help to form a decisive hypothesis on the decline of Americanmilitary power but also on the socio-historical changes of the identity of the State monopoly of violence.