Orientador: Elisa Angotti Kossovitch / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-09T10:41:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Reis_Magalidos_D.pdf: 9259963 bytes, checksum: 96abba94516a8bc653f74a60cdc42898 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Resumo: O estudo analisa a imagem da criança nas pinturas de Eliseu Visconti, Vicente do Rego Monteiro, Tarsila do Amaral e Lasar Segall. Compreende o período de 1890-1940 (aproximadamente), cujo eixo de problematização está na emergência de um movimento político, artístico e cultural. O período registra uma profunda mudança não só no papel social da criança, como também de sua representação nas artes plásticas, na literatura, na educação e no imaginário social. A arte sugere um ensaio de modulação da afeccionalidade social sobre a infância, o que permite trabalhar com aspectos ainda pouco explorados, no que diz respeito à imagem de crianças. Na pintura crianças tornam-se anjos, meninas enlaçam-se e enlaçam a composição da obra, corpos repousam sobre lençóis, meninos transfiguram a inquietude da puerícia. As paisagens são permeadas pelos enigmas da infância. As imagens da criança não são retratos de uma certa infância, o que faz a sua força é que elas são imagens políticas e inseparavelmente imagens de um inconsciente social, e sob esta ótica, são registros de corpos sempre falados, descritos e analisados por adultos, não tendo voz própria, sobre as formas como vêm sendo interpretados, expressos, percebidos. A orientação desta pesquisa caminhou no sentido de evitar proceder a uma simples e arbitrária ¿leitura¿ ou descrição das imagens, rejeitando procurar nelas uma possível intencionalidade do artista em representar uma idéia pré-estabelecida de infância, e mais ainda foi preciso refutar a idéia de que a imagem 'reflete¿ a vida do artista e suas experiências. A produção de uma pintura cujo tema seja a criança, não significa que se possa depreender dela uma visão de infância ¿possível¿ daquele momento histórico social. Daí a necessidade de recorrer a história da arte e, sobretudo, encontrar uma metodologia de estudos adequada à compreensão da infância que a arte torna visível / Abstract: This study analyses the image of children in the paintings of Eliseu Visconti, Vicente do Rego Monteiro, Tarsila do Amaral, and Lasar Segall. It encompasses the period of approximately 1890 to 1940, whose central line of problematics is the emergence of a political, artistic, and cultural movement. That period registers a profound change, not only in the social role of children, but also of their representation in the plastic arts, in literature, in education, and in social imagery. Art insinuates a test of modulation of social affectionateness on infancy, which permits that lesser explored aspects may be treated in regard to the image of children. Children in paintings become angels, little girls entwine themselves and become part of the composition of the painting, bodies lie on sheets, little boys transfigure the turbulence of childhood. Landscapes are permeated with the enigmas of infancy. Children¿s images are not portrayed with a defined infancy. What gives them strength is that they are political images, and images that are inseparable from social unconsciousness. It is through this perspective that they are records of bodies that are always talked about, and described and analyzed by adults, without manifesting through their own voices in regard to the forms that are being interpreted, expressed, and perceived. The orientation of this research advanced in the direction of avoiding a simple and arbitrary reading or description of the images, thereby rejecting the possibility of looking for any intention by the artist of presenting a pre-established idea of infancy. Even more so, it was necessary to refute the idea that an image reflects the life of the artist and his experience. The production of a painting whose theme is a child does not signify that it may infer the vision of a possible infancy at that historical social moment. Therefore, there is a need to resort to the history of art, and above all, find an adequate methodology of study for the comprehension of infancy that is made visible through art / Doutorado / Educação, Sociedade, Politica e Cultura / Doutor em Educação

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 459289.pdf: 904643 bytes, checksum: 494bba68668b2082672ac959477f8cff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / The text of the Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the text attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its efficacy in measuring the inclusive scope of any ethical theory ever developed. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. In order to solve the constitutive paradoxes, Husserl nurtures the idea of an inclusive basis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the lifeworld, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the liveworld thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. Waldenfels emphasized an inevitable response before any thesis, due to our being in the world, as an event that just happens, regardless of our will or objectivications. Such responsiveness promotes the threshold of the senses as a responsive ethical possibility. In response itself, we find a responsive content that is not objectified, guiding us to the thresholds, considering them as possibilities and not as threats. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness which is open, latent, included in the lifeworld, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. Although the studied authors do not work directly with the theme of inclusiveness, we examine sufficient sources to propose a method of phenomenology that demonstrates inclusivity, i.e., that is phenomenologically inclusive. Although the method is neither a measure nor a foundation, nevertheless it provides a base that serves as the measure and foundation of all morality ever built. Thus, we can measure the inclusive scope of all ethics and see how far the inclusivity extends, but yet not present inclusivity as the determinative basis. The foundation of the base is phenomenological, i.e., predicted within the latency and horizontality of the lifeworld / O texto Fenomenologia da inclusividade se caracteriza por ser um novo trabalho na ?rea da fenomenologia. Buscando fontes fenomenol?gicas em Husserl, Merleau-Ponty e Waldenfels, o texto procura desenvolver uma inclusividade capaz de contemplar o paradoxo inclusivo/exclusivo e, indo al?m, mostrando-se eficaz para medir o escopo inclusivo de qualquer tese ?tica j? elaborada. A partir de Husserl, encontramos as bases para uma fenomenologia da inclusividade, que fora trabalhada em sua obra Krisis. Buscando resolver os paradoxos constitutivos, Husserl nutre a ideia de um fundamento inclusivo. Tal inclusividade se caracteriza por uma atitude reflexiva latente, uma atitude de inclus?o no mundo-da-vida, uma atitude de n?o fechamento de nossas teses e, por fim, uma atitude que evite o reducionismo dos polos subjetivo e objetivo. Com a radicalidade do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, o texto encontra subs?dios para uma cumplicidade de sentido. Agora, o sujeito se v? c?mplice de toda significa??o em sua rela??o com o mundo-da-vida. Retira-se o pesado fardo que antes era concedido t?o somente ao sujeito como doador ?ltimo de todo o significado. O processo constitutivo enseja uma atitude radical que habilita uma inclusividade encarnada, avultando o escopo inclusivo ? horizontalidade da vida. Todavia, investigando os avan?os da teoria ?tica de Waldenfels, acresce-se, ? dimens?o constitutiva, um car?ter ?tico-pr?tico. Waldenfels enfatiza uma inevit?vel resposta dada antes de qualquer tese decorrente de nosso estar no mundo como um evento que simplesmente acontece, independente de nossa vontade ou objetifica??es. Tal responsividade promove a fronteiriza??o dos sentidos como possibilidade ?tico-responsiva. Na pr?pria resposta encontramos um teor responsivo n?o objetivado, guiando-nos ?s fronteiras, considerando-as como possibilidade e n?o como amea?as. Para Waldenfels, o que antes era exclu?do da ordem estabelecida aparece junto ao limiar, facultando possibilidades inclusivas. Feitas estas considera??es, o texto revela uma inclusividade aberta, latente, inclu?da no mundo-da-vida, n?o reducionista, c?mplice nos processos constitutivos e possuindo um car?ter ?tico-responsivo. Embora os autores estudados n?o trabalhem diretamente com o tema da inclusividade, obt?m-se fontes suficientes para elaborarmos uma fenomenologia com uma proposta inclusiva. O m?todo proposto ? fenomenol?gico inclusivo. Entretanto, apresenta-se como uma medida, como um fundamento que n?o ? nem uma medida nem um fundamento. Mas, mesmo assim, serve como medida e fundamento de toda a eticidade j? constru?da. Dessa forma, podemos medir o escopo inclusivo de toda eticidade, ver at? onde se estende sua inclusividade, mas sem se apresentar como um fundamento determinativo. O fundamento ao qual nos pautamos ? fenomenol?gico, ou seja, previsto dentro da lat?ncia e horizontalidade do mundo-da-vida

¿Por qué plantear como problema el principio del proceso creativo en el arte en vez de lo bello en sí? Este último no es un problema que prime en el trabajo creativo del artista de hoy, como tampoco lo fue en los artistas de ayer, a pesar de haber sido y de ser un tema relevante para los filósofos. Desde la plataforma de los que somos artistas plásticos o visuales, el proceso creativo sí es parte de nuestra rutina. En ese sentido, urge seguir encontrando un mejor orden que ayude a organizar ese proceso. / Tesis

Wonder has had a rich and diverse history in the western philosophical tradition. Both Plato and Aristotle claim that philosophy begins in wonder, while Descartes marks it as the first of the passions and Heidegger uses it as a signpost for a new trajectory of philosophy away from idealism and nihilism. Despite such a rich history, wonder is almost always thought to be exhausted by the acquisition of knowledge. That is, wonder is thought of almost exclusively in epistemological terms and is discarded as soon as knowledge has been achieved. In this dissertation, I argue for an ontological reorientation of wonder that values wonder beyond its epistemic uses. To do this, I read the phenomenological and ontological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty through recent developments in object-oriented ontology and new materialism. Much of Merleau-Ponty's work is directed toward dissolving the distinction between subject and object. His insights regarding the mutual constitution of the world lead to the possibility of an operative wonder that occurs between subject and object. Both object-oriented ontology and new materialism radicalize these insights by articulating them in terms of a vibrant or quasi-agential material world. Objects and assemblages of objects are capable of performing the becoming of the world that includes human activity, but is not reduced to it. As such, the world is capable of both self-organization and practice. Ultimately I use the philosophy-physics of Karen Barad to argue that operative wonder acts like a kind of superposition of relations between objects, and thereby accounts for a concept of wonder that is both ontologically significant and acutely generative.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-17 / Our research has as central theme of corporeality in Merleau-Ponty, considering the expression and flesh notions articulated to the body and brought in some of his works. Our argument is based on the assertion that the body gains distinction and philosophical thickness along the Merleau-Ponty thought experiment. In order to emphasize the strength of its proposal and the contrast with certain philosophical tradition, initially present understanding the body in Descartes, without losing sight the philosophical and medical context of the XVI e XVII centuries. In a second move, we follow the phenomenological description of the body proposed by Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie de la perception, in order to reveal the textures of the body itself and its modes of expression in the world, and his incisive criticism of the Cartesian philosophy and its impact an empirical science. In the third and final movement of this research, we expose certain plots of esthesiological body articulated to the Merleau- Ponty’s ontological project, with reference to his last writings, L’oeil et l’esprit and Le visible et l’invisible / Nossa investigação tem como centralidade o tema da corporeidade na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, considerando as noções de expressão e carne articuladas ao corpo e apresentadas em algumas de suas obras. Nosso argumento assenta-se na afirmação de que o corpo ganha distinção e espessura filosófica ao longo da experiência do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. No sentido de ressaltarmos o vigor de sua proposta e o contraste com certa tradição filosófica, inicialmente apresentamos a compreensão do corpo em Descartes, sem perder de vista o contexto filosófico e médico dos séculos XVI e XVII. Em um segundo movimento, acompanhamos a descrição fenomenológica do corpo proposta por Merleau-Ponty em Phénoménologie de la perception, no sentido de evidenciar as texturas do corpo próprio e seus modos de expressão no mundo, bem como sua crítica contundente à filosofia cartesiana e seu desdobramento empírico na ciência. No terceiro e último movimento dessa investigação, expomos certas tramas do corpo estesiológico articuladas ao projeto ontológico de Merleau-Ponty, tendo como referência seus últimos escritos, L’oeil et l’esprit e Le visible et l’invisible

"2004". / Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Division of Society, Culture, Media & Philosophy, Department of Critical and Cultural Studies, 2005. / Bibliography: p. 315-327. / Introduction -- Aporias and openings in the architecture of the mind's eye: deconstructing pure visuality in Descartes -- Visuality, universal flesh and phenomenal circularity: visio-corporeal generality with Merleau-Ponty -- Corporeal envisionings as power-knowledge: Foucault and diffuse visio-governmentality -- The grammatology of visuality: visio-corporealising Derrida's "science" of the trace -- Conclusion. / The conception of visuality within what Jacques Derrida understands as the 'metaphysical epoch' demands revision in order to produce a fully post-metaphysical theory of visuality. Drawing upon the corporeal phenomenology of perception in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the politico-cultural conception of visuality in Michel Foucault and the trace philosophy of vision in Jacques Derrida, visualities are theorised here as dynamic 'corporeal tracings' immanently bearing politico-cultural forces. Elements of these three major thinkers are here brought into generative dialogue and welding which, for instance, relocates the corporealism of Merleau-Ponty in terms of the trace dynamics conceived by Derrida and which in turn insists upon the visio-corporeality of general writing that Derrida largely elides. A rereading of Rene Descartes on vision is advanced in the light of this theory that deploys Derrida's deconstructive method to detect the aporias and self-deconstructions within a characteristic metaphysical discourse of pure visuality that overtly elides both corporeality and the trace (understood in the theory of corporeal tracings as inseparable). -- Merleau-Ponty is critiqued from a post-dualist position on the role of the mind and the body in the experience of visuality, Foucault's ideas on bodies, visualities and diffuse powers are developed through the notion of'visio-govemmentality' and Derrida's conceptions of grammatology and the trace are redefined in terms of an emphasis on visiocorporeality. New terms and concepts emerge from these engagements that extend and elaborate visuality theory in terms of fully post-metaphysical domains of understanding. There is a commitment throughout to three theoretical positions: corporealism, culturalism and holism or what is termed here 'total contextualism'. These positions enable the fully post-metaphysical theorisation of visualities as dynamic and complex corporeal tracings encompassing both human bodies and total visio-corporeal contexts. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / 327 p

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Through a detailed analysis of a selection of works produced between 1999 and 2003 by the South African artist Berni Searle, this thesis explores the need to theorise a corporeal viewer in the process of interpreting art works. Such an approach is particularly necessary when dealing with an artist such as Searle because her work, which deals predominantly with the theme of identity, appeals not only to conceptual but also to experiential and corporeal understandings of identity. Searle incorporates the viewer into an experience of her own identity through a physical identification that the viewer feels in relation to her work. For viewers this means that they are made aware of how their own identity in the moment of interpretation is contingent on visual, mental and physical components. In order to develop this argument the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty is drawn on. These two theorists are very useful for an argument of this nature because both interpret identity as a construction involving an enfolding between the mind and, via the act of vision, the body of the subject. Through an inclusion of the corporeal element in interpretation, this thesis also offers a critique of interpretive theories that would reduce analysis to an interaction between eye and mind by analyzing how the viewer's body participates in the act of looking.

viii, 189 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / The question of the present study concerns the relationship between language and nature as it has been taken up in the history of Western philosophy. The goal of this study is to show how language and nature are held together by thinking the transition between them, through the figure of silence. I will show this by drawing primarily on the work of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the body, and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language and nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the hinge of this passage, in which language, in its emergence from the silence of nature, turns back to disclose nature as already expression. Merleau-Ponty's late interrogation into how philosophical language might both emerge from and return to silence turned on the example of Proust's literary language. This study will also draw on Proust's meta-novelistic awakening to his literary calling, as it is recounted near the end of Le Temps Retrouvé, which discusses explicitly how Proust's language makes a turn through silence in order to emerge as literature. This provides an example of the emergence which Merleau-Ponty describes. I will then make the case that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy can be read as the thinking of being as nature, and that it begins to think how language roots human beings in nature as it blossoms out of nature's soil. I will show how Merleau-Ponty repeats a structure of thought traversed by Schelling in his essay on freedom, which will further show how philosophical attention to language discloses nature as a radical excess. Finally, I will discuss how the negotiation between language, nature, and silence, as it is practiced by Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is another turn in a long story of the human place in language and in nature, a story which is at least as old as the mythical thought of ancient Greece. / Committee in charge: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy; Naomi Zack, Member, Philosophy; Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy; Jeffrey Librett, Outside Member, German and Scandinavian

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseEF.pdf: 1200454 bytes, checksum: 3cc2b220954ccdaa9c8640eedaa81fb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-12-14 / Ce travail a l intention d éclarcir la portée des considérations de Merleau- Ponty sur le comportément. On a fait l inventaire critique sur le comportément, tel que cet notion est presentée dans l oeuvre « La Structure du Comportément ». On a cherché de montrer que lesécoles classiques de psychologie, se trouvent devent deux positions : l intellectualiste, que préconise une psychologie analytique de la conscience comme sa cause productrice et son antithèse empiriste, laquelle se mantient fidèle a la pensée causalle, lorsque elle a determinée pour le psychisme une realité matérielle extérieur. Ce sont, deux positions antithétiques vis a vis la relation entre consciencenature : la philosohie intellectualiste que fait de la nature une unité constitué par la conscience et la science empirique, que separe la conscience et la nature comme si elles étaient deux réalités que appartiennent à la même catégorie substantielle, liée par des rélations de cause et effet. Dans la séquence, ayant en vue les conséquences de ces théories classiques, on va dans la diréction d une nouvelle description du comportément : les idées de expérience directe et de structure. Finalement, on a cherché, a travers une lecture de la « Phénomenologie de la Perception », montrer comment une conception phenomenique du comportémentl est elle possible, si on mantient les catégories de expérience directe et de structure, pour qu on puisse, a traves une approche phénomenique du corps, élaborer une nouvelle lecture des relations entre conscience et nature. / Este trabalho procura esclarecer o alcance das considerações merleaupontyanas sobre o comportamento. Fizemos, antes de tudo, o inventário crítico do comportamento como está sugerido em A Estrutura do Comportamento. Nesse caso, buscamos mostrar que as escolas clássicas de Psicologia, na explicação do comportamento, encontram-se, em geral, diante de duas posições: a intelectualista, que preconiza uma psicologia analítica da consciência como causa produtora e a sua antítese empirista que se mantém fiel ao pensamento causal quando determinou ao psíquico uma realidade material e exterior. São, portanto, duas posições antitéticas sobre a relação consciência-natureza: a filosofia intelectualista, que faz da natureza uma unidade constituída pela consciência e a ciência empirista, que separa natureza e consciência como duas realidades da mesma categoria substancial, ligadas por relações de causa e efeito. Depois, num segundo momento, tendo em vista os problemas decorrentes dessas teorias clássicas, apontamos os fundamentos para uma nova descrição do comportamento: as idéias de experiência direta e de estrutura. Finalmente, procuramos através de uma leitura da Fenomenologia da Percepção mostrar como uma concepção fenomênica do comportamento é possível, desde que mantidas as categorias de experiência direta e de estrutura para que possamos, por meio de uma abordagem fenomênica do corpo, elaborar uma nova leitura das relações entre consciência e natureza.