Finland makes an exception to its Nordic neighbors in the Second World War in that it first fought and outlasted great power aggression alone, later fought alongside the Axis, and finally remained under Soviet pressure for the duration of Cold War. With the ambition of contributing to research regarding small power at large and Finland in particular, this study looks at Finnish military strategy from its independence till its’ final peace with the Soviet Union. It identifies what strategies Finland employed and what factors influenced these strategies. The study conducted a qualitative text analysis in a thematical approach driven by theoretical perspectives on small powers. Contrary to preferences of small power strategy suggested by previous authors, the results indicate that Finland adhered mostly to a strategy of courting. Partly to the international community through the League of Nations and too by efforts of forming defensive measures with its neighbors. The external environment, including its neighbors’ worries of greater powers and the German conquests in the west, played a vital part in shaping Finnish strategy. When no other alternative seemed viable, Finland pursued a strategy of bandwagoning for profit.

Diploma thesis tracks a process of transformation of the military strategy of the Russian Federation since its establishment (end of 1991) up to now (May 2016). The author observes, using longitudinal method of Process Tracing and with help of strategic theory and concept of strategic culture, the author observes in which areas of the Russian strategic culture and military strategy occurred changes throughout the surveyed period of time and how the changes influenced strategy implemented in armed conflicts in which Russian Federation was involved. Another observed phenomenon is a formalisation of ideological anchoring of revisionist foreign and security policy in the key strategic documents. Following factors are identified as critical in formation and implementation of final strategy: Presidential administration, strategic culture, strategic documents, armed forces, and military operations. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

兩岸在經歷數十年的和平演變之後，中共亦經歷數代領導人的軍事謀略轉化，為何中共會選擇在九五、九六年進行一連串的軍事演習與軍事事務革新動作？除了直接的政治目的之外，亦必有其內部的黨、政、軍之運作與領導人直接的軍事謀略思維有相當程度的互動與角力。若是單單從武器裝備的比較並不能看清中共對台軍演的目的，單從國際政治的角度也不易探求中共內部利益衝突的真相。 本論文先從謀略、軍事謀略及中共軍事謀略的基本認知和概念著手，進而與中共軍事演習的關係做一整理與分類，找出其間相互依存的關係，進而從較為宏觀的角度出發，依照本論文所發現之LIAR理論，從領導統御（Leadership）、智庫系統(Intelligence)、國家利益與安全觀(Aspect of Nation Security)、資源(Resources)等四個面向進行整理，從中外學者各項文獻的統整開始，到本人的觀察與心得作一綜整，探求中共軍事謀略的演變與內涵，以期為國內相關研究提供有益的貢獻。

<p>It is rather undisputed that the United States has maintained its position of global primacy since the end of the Cold War. According to the current Bush- administration and the US National Security Strategy, this power will be used to fight terrorists as well as to encourage free and open societies on every continent. With this position held by the government, it becomes essential to know more about the US power to better understand world politics. What opinions an American foreign policy elite has on international politics in general and on the US power in particular, can be consideredto have a certain influence on the US governmental policy making and is hence an interesting object of analysis for an improved knowledge of the US power position. This thesis aims to analyse different foreign policy elite interpretations, both of the present US situation and of what can be expected in the near future. In addition to opinions on the power position itself, the question addressed is whether there seem to be any impact of modern theories of international politics among the elite and if these theories are relevant at all for policy- orientated estimations. The result of the analysis indicates at least some impact of neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism, while there tend to be no influence of feminist IR-theory. However, as a base assumption in this thesis, most modern theories of international politics are conceived as partly related to a realist tradition in the field of academics, and this might diminish the influence of the separate theories among the elite. Accordingly, nor can extreme theoretical differences be confirmed, neither can the differences be disregarded. A majority of the foreign policy elite representatives describe the present US position as unrivalled in all critical dimensions, with an unsurpassed military, economic, technological and cultural power. The opinions on the expected power position in the near future are more diverging and suggest different courses of development. However, as long as the US keeps the precedence of interpretation and attracts others to American values and ideas, in addition to a solid base of economic and military strength, the US power position will most probably last for a foreseeable future.</p>

How do states win wars against other states? We have three explanations. By selection, states enter more winnable wars. By warfighting, states use negative inducements so enemies fear fighting. By peacemaking, states use positive inducements so enemies hope for settling. This dissertation investigates peacemaking. It theorizes that states optimally produce influence only if they efficiently combine warfighting negative and peacemaking positive inducements. It hypothesizes that using some peacemaking on average improves outcomes verses using none. The dissertation tests this with a statistical analysis that measures peacemaking as law of war compliance and estimates effects on all inter-state outcomes from 1899 to 1991. It finds that compliance likely on average improves immediate military and final political relative outcomes. This dissertation also tests peacemaking in four case studies from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and World War II. These case studies find that state peacemaking to enemy states, allies, leaders, troops, and civilians probably on average improves absolute war outcomes. These complementary and independent empirical results provide unprecedented support for the peacemaking explanation of how states improve inter-state war outcomes. To succeed, states should be prudent by selection, fierce in warfighting, and principled for peacemaking. / Government

南海海域以往僅不過是來往商船的航路與漁船作業的漁場，在1960 年代末期，該區域被認定蘊藏豐富的資源後，南海周邊國家開始爭相佔領附近島礁。再加上南海是某些國家戰略物資之必經航路，南海頓時轉變為重要的戰略要域，因多方國家經濟利益交錯複雜的牽扯下，地區亦時有摩擦事件發生，南海從此成為亞太地區的熱點。 外交是內政的延續，外交政策應在維護或爭取國家利益的先決條件下制定，並主導國家整體對外的作為，謀求國家在國際地位中的生存與發展。南海問題涉及國家事務，亦屬外交政策項下之一環，所以中國大陸南海政策，亦受其外交政策指導。中國大陸因為經濟力的發展，帶動了軍事力的茁壯，而使其遠在南海海域的諸島主權得以有軍事力量予以維護。也因其在南海地區的軍力強化，造成南海聲索國 普遍的不安。相對之下，各聲索國亦增購軍備，加強南海防務。再加上美國與東協組織的介入，使南海地區各方較勁的意味濃厚。 當南海各聲索國增購軍備，加強維護其南海所佔島礁主權時，同是南海聲索國的中華民國，雖對於軍事武力的建置從未懈怠，只不過所增強的軍事武力均建置於台澎金馬區域，而對於東沙群島的東沙島及南沙群島的太平島而言，中華民國是不是應當有完善的南海軍事戰略，足以維護其安全。 / The area of the South China Sea was route of the merchant ships coming and going and fishing ground for the fishing boats in the past. In the late 1960s, after this area was found with abundant resources, the surrounding countries of the South China Sea began to occupy the nearby islands and reefs. In addition, the South China Sea is the passage of some countries’ strategic materials; hence, the South China Sea tends to be an important strategic point. Regional frictions occur under the conflict of interests involving a number of surrounding countries. This is why the South China Sea becomes the flash point of Asian-Pacific area. Diplomacy is the continuity of the internal affairs. The foreign policy should be made under the preconditions of maintaining or striving for the interests of the State as well as the guideline for the State，s foreign affairs , seeking the State，s survival and development in the international arena. The issue of the South China Sea involves the national affairs, also affected under the foreign policy, so the policy of the South China Sea should be guided by their individual foreign policies. Mainland China，s military power is supported by its economic growth and cause an uneasy atmosphere for claimant in the area. As each claimant purchases arms and equipments along with the involvement of the U.S. and Association of South-east Asian Nations, the South China Sea becomes the hub of tension. When every claimant of the South China Sea purchases the arms, strengthening to safeguard the islands and reefs sovereign right in the South China Sea, Republic of China , one of the claimants of the South China Sea, although the building of the military power has never been stopped, but the focus has been placed only in Taiwan、Penghu、Kinmen and Matsu area. For Dongsha islands and Taiping island, whether the government of Republic of China should build a complete strategy of the South China Sea to maintain its security remains debatable.

For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.

For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.

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No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard for publicity. They were two very different types of personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills and operational strategic insights which enabled them to compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of logistical employment, which they replaced with beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely as much - if not more - on the personalities of the commanders. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)