Military Strategy is defined as a plan at the military strategic level of war that consists of a set of military strategic ends, ways and means and the relationships between them. This definition leads to the following research questions: 1. How can the extent of the many-to-many relationships that exist between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means be quantified? 2. If the relationships between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means are quantified and if the effectiveness of the force design elements is known, how shall that enable the quantification of the state’s ability to execute its military strategy? 3. If the relationships between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means are quantified and if the effectiveness of the force design elements is known, how will it aid decision-making about the acquisition of the future force design? The first research question is answered by mapping a military strategy complete with its ends, ways and means to a ranked tree where the entities in the strategy corresponds with the vertices of different rank in the tree. The tree representation is used to define and determine the contribution of entities in a military strategy to entities at the next higher level. It is explained how analytical, heuristic and judgement methods can be employed to find the relative and real contribution values. Also, a military strategy for South Africa is developed to demonstrate the concept. The second research question is answered by developing measures of effectiveness taking the interdependence of entities at the terminal vertices of the ranked tree into account. Thereafter, the degree to which the force design would support the higher order entities inclusive of a military strategy could be calculated. The third research question is answered by developing a cost-benefit analysis method and a distance indicator from an optimal point to aid in deciding between supplier options for acquisition. Thereafter the knapsack problem is amended to allow for scheduling acquisition projects whilst optimising the force design's support of a military strategy. Finally, the model is validated and put into a contextual framework for use in the military. / Quantitative management / D.Phil.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.

During the Cold War, the largest threat against the countries of Europe was an enemy attack or invasion. After the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment changed drastically. The impending threat of a large-scale war was gone and the countries of Europe approached each other in the hope of cooperation with mutual benefits. As the old threat faded away, new threats which were significantly more dynamic and complex emerged. Threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime over the boarders and state failure became more apparent, both, in Europe and in its proximity. Irregular conflicts as in Kosovo and Afghanistan showed an assortment of the various threats. This complexity poses as a big challenge for the officers of today and tomorrow. It is of vital importance that both current and future military commanders are well educated in the complexities of their line of work. The first step to achieve this is ensuring that adequate education in the subject is given. In this thesis, the author researches to what extent the Swedish National Defence College and the Theresan Military Academy choose to educate their officer cadets regarding the new threats. The purpose of researching more than one country is to enable a discussion on eventual areas of improvement in the two countries’ curricula, within the context of the common threats. The author chose Austria because of its many similarities to Sweden. The methodological approach of the thesis is mainly of a quantitative nature. The author researches whether the different threats are found in both national and military strategies as well as in the curricula of the two academies’ Basic Officer Education. The study shows that more education is needed regarding certain threats. More training is needed regarding cyber security as a result of the growing dependence on IT systems and digital information. In addition, an international collaboration could yield potential benefits for both officer cadets’ problem solving skills and their knowledge of the ESS. / Under det kalla kriget var det största hotet mot länderna i Europa ett fientligt angrepp eller invasion. Efter det kalla krigets slut förändrades den säkerhetspolitiska miljön avsevärt. Det överhängande hotet om storskaligt krig var borta och Europas länder närmade sig varandra i hopp om samarbete med ömsesidig nytta. I takt med att det gamla hotet bleknade så växte det fram andra hot som var betydligt mer dynamiska och komplexa. Hot som terrorism, spridning av massförstörelsevapen, organiserad brottslighet över gränserna och nedbrytning av svaga stater blev allt mer påtagliga, både i Europa och i dess närområde. Irreguljära konflikter som i Kosovo och i Afghanistan uppvisade en blandning av de olika hoten. Denna komplexitet innebär stora utmaningar för både dagens och morgondagens officerare. Det är av yttersta vikt att både nutida och framtida militära chefer och beslutsfattare är väl insatta i hur komplexa uppgifterna faktiskt kan komma att vara i deras yrkesutövning. Det första steget för att nå detta är att adekvat utbildning i ämnet ges. I detta arbete undersöker författaren i vilken utsträckning Försvarshögskolan i Sverige och Theresianische Militärakademie i Österrike utbildar sina officersaspiranter gällande de nya hoten. Syftet med att undersöka mer än ett land är för att kunna diskutera eventuella förbättringsmöjligheter i de två ländernas utbildningar, kopplat till de EU- gemensamma hoten. Författaren valde Österrike för dess många likheter med Sverige. Arbetets tillvägagångssätt är främst genom en kvantitativ metod. Författaren undersöker huruvida de olika hoten återfinns i såväl nationella som militära strategier och i kursinnehållen för de båda ländernas grundläggande officersutbildning. Studien visar att mer utbildning behövs avseende vissa hot, bland annat gällande cybersäkerhet som ett resultat av det växande beroendet av IT-system och digital information. Dessutom hade ett internationellt samarbete inneburit potentiella fördelar gällande både kadetters förmåga till problemlösning samt deras kunskap om ESS. / <p>Erasmus</p>

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war as a global insurgency. Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is intended to determine the utility of analyzing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency. The study is broken down into five chapters: an introduction, explanation of Dr. McCormick’s Counterinsurgency model used for analysis, application of the model to a historical case, application to the war on terrorism, and conclusions. The first half of the study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick’s model. This is done by, first providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a historical case: the insurgency in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982. The second half of the study addresses the current U.S. lead war on terrorism. The counterinsurgency model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda Network and the United States’ vision and mission for the conflict. Ten on terrorism are drawn from the analysis. The final chapter addresses the utility provided by the insurgency/counterinsurgency framework as applied to the war on terrorism. / Major, United States Army

中共一直沒有放棄以武力作為解決「臺灣問題」的選項，「統一臺灣」是中共建軍備戰主要目標之一，而國軍自然是共軍的主要假想敵。但是在1996年美國派遣兩支航母戰鬥群干預臺海軍事危機後，使中共體認美軍才是解決「臺灣問題」的最強大對手，開始深入思考如何阻止擁有高科技優勢的美軍介入臺海軍事衝突。防止美軍在中國大陸周邊地區進行作戰行動，是目前中共軍事現代化的主要發展方向，美國官學界將其稱為「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略，一時之間已成為研究中共軍事發展者之主要觀察指標。 中共「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略的主要著眼，在於建構能防止美國運用軍力涉入中國大陸周邊事務的能力，中共相信即使強大如美軍也不可能擁有全方位的優勢，其「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略主要依據地理環境、地緣戰略、美軍作戰特性及弱點等要素，並憑藉共軍數量與質量俱增的現代化武器，希望在西太平洋地區可能的軍事衝突中壓制美軍的作戰行動，或迫使美軍由較遠的基地發起軍事行動，並且阻止美軍後續的兵力增援，這可能使美軍在西太平洋作戰中遭到中共擊敗，或是迫使美國付出其不願意承擔的重大代價，此將導致中共可以達成其軍事和政治目標，同時也阻止美國全部或部分的軍事和政治目標。 中共軍力在「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略的帶動下快速成長，使美軍在西太平洋地區面臨重大挑戰和風險，並使美國區域盟邦有遭受侵略或被迫接受強制手段之虞，美軍為因應中共的挑戰，已確立「空海一體戰」的新型作戰概念，並著手發展相關能力。「空海一體戰」係以美軍現有軍力優勢為基礎，再經由西太平洋軍力部署的重組、海空作戰力量的整合、新型武器裝備的研發，並且加強與盟邦的軍事合作，希望建構一個多層次立體作戰體系，俾遏制中共的軍事擴張。在中、美兩強「反介入與區域拒止」和「空海一體戰」軍事戰略的競逐下，臺灣的自處之道和所應扮演的角色，亦為吾人應予深思的課題。 / The People’s Republic of China has never given up the use of military force as an option to solve the “Taiwan issue”, and the “unification with Taiwan” has also been one of the PLA’s objectives in its military buildup, which naturally makes the ROC military as the PLA’s hypothetical enemy. However, after the US sending two of its aircraft carrier battle groups to intervene a military crisis across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, the PRC started to realize that US military is its strongest opponent in solving the Taiwan issue and began to think how to deny the high-tech US military force from stepping into a military confrontation across the Taiwan strait. The prevention of US military operation in surrounding areas of China has been leading the modernization of China’s military, and officials and academia in the US have been calling this phenomenon “anti-access and area-denial” strategy which all of a sudden becomes an observation index when studying the PRC’s military development. The main focus of China’s “anti-access and area-denial” strategy is to develop the capability of preventing the US military from intervening affairs taking place in surrounding areas of China. China believes that no matter how powerful the US military is, it is unable to gain a comprehensive advantage in this region. By the PLA’s increasing modernized weapons, the anti-access and area-denial strategy, based on the geographic environment, geostrategy, and characteristics and weakness of the US military, aims to suppress US military activities in possible military conflicts in the western Pacific region, or to compel the US military to launch its force from bases further away and to stop its reinforcement. The success of this strategy will make the US military be defeated by the PLA or force the US to pay a price that it is unwilling to afford, and then China is able to achieve its military and political objectives and at the same time stops the US, entirely or partially, from achieving its military and political objectives. The anti-access and area-denial strategy has led to a rapid military development in China, which poses a great challenge and risk to the US military in the western Pacific region and makes allies of the US in this region in the fear of being invaded or coerced. In responding to China’s challenges, the US military has developed a new operational concept -- “AirSea Battle” and begins the development relating to this new concept. The “AirSea Battle” concept, building on current US military supremacy and the integration of air-sea combat powers as well as the reorganization of US force in the western Pacific region and the development of new weapons, looks to enhance the military cooperation between the US and its allies to establish a multilevel operation system which is able to contain Chinese military expansion. Amid the competition between China’s “anti-access and area-denial” strategy and US “AirSea Battle” concept, Taiwan’s responses and the role that Taiwan should play is a subject that we must deliberate thoroughly.

冷戰結束後，以往來自敵國或他國以軍事、政治和外交等面向，對國家安全（national security）及人類生存構成影響的「傳統安全」（Traditional Security）威脅因素，已隨著全球化帶來的效應產生轉變，全球面臨非傳統安全（Non-Traditional Security）的挑戰，包括經濟安全、金融安全、環境安全、能源安全、文化安全等威脅均大幅上升，其中能源是工業建設、經濟活動與國家發展不可或缺的戰略資源，是國家發展環節中最要要的關鍵，而石油即將耗竭也是全球將面臨的嚴重課題，近百年來因爭奪石油引發多次的區域衝突，並擴散成為全球的能源危機，石油已成為影響國家安全的最直接戰略威脅。 1970年代的能源危機使美國警覺石油的重要戰略地位，長期以來透過其國際強權的地位，積極對全球主要的石油生產區採取戰略佈局；1970年代後期起，中國的改革獲得耀眼的成效，經濟的成長帶動能源的龐大需求，1993年中國更成為石油淨進口國。中國逐漸正視到石油將是關係未來經濟持續成長的關鍵，於是挾以經濟、外交、政治等手段向中東、中亞、拉丁美洲乃至於非洲積極佈局展開油源開發觸角，引發西方國家對「中國能源威脅論」之隱憂。 石油已經成為維繫國家穩定發展的重要因素，石油安全既是經濟問題，更是政治問題、國家安全的核心。因此，爭奪石油成為地區衝突的導火線，隨著中國經濟崛起後政經力量的茁壯，中國透過各種手段在主要產油國甚至美國國內相關企業著力日深，已對美國的利益產生嚴重威脅，中、美都在極力的爭取石油主導權，希望透過石油的控制力量，從而獲得對全球經濟的操控能力。 石油安全往往牽動國際政治問題，愈發凸顯石油在國家安全戰略地位的重要性。長期仰賴石油進口，對我國國家安全容易受國際局勢影響，中美雙方在各種國際活動中，因石油產生的競合關係，恐令我國隨中美的互動關係產生轉變，因此對中美在石油安全競合的過程中，其雙方的發展與效應及對我國國家安全的影響，值得我們加以觀察與探討。

No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard for publicity. They were two very different types of personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills and operational strategic insights which enabled them to compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of logistical employment, which they replaced with beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely as much - if not more - on the personalities of the commanders. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Military Strategy is defined as a plan at the military strategic level of war that consists of a set of military strategic ends, ways and means and the relationships between them. This definition leads to the following research questions: 1. How can the extent of the many-to-many relationships that exist between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means be quantified? 2. If the relationships between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means are quantified and if the effectiveness of the force design elements is known, how shall that enable the quantification of the state&#8217;s ability to execute its military strategy? 3. If the relationships between a military strategy, its ends, ways and means are quantified and if the effectiveness of the force design elements is known, how will it aid decision-making about the acquisition of the future force design? The first research question is answered by mapping a military strategy complete with its ends, ways and means to a ranked tree where the entities in the strategy corresponds with the vertices of different rank in the tree. The tree representation is used to define and determine the contribution of entities in a military strategy to entities at the next higher level. It is explained how analytical, heuristic and judgement methods can be employed to find the relative and real contribution values. Also, a military strategy for South Africa is developed to demonstrate the concept. The second research question is answered by developing measures of effectiveness taking the interdependence of entities at the terminal vertices of the ranked tree into account. Thereafter, the degree to which the force design would support the higher order entities inclusive of a military strategy could be calculated. The third research question is answered by developing a cost-benefit analysis method and a distance indicator from an optimal point to aid in deciding between supplier options for acquisition. Thereafter the knapsack problem is amended to allow for scheduling acquisition projects whilst optimising the force design's support of a military strategy. Finally, the model is validated and put into a contextual framework for use in the military. / Operations Management / D.Phil.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)