Enlightenment theorists like John Locke and Montesquieu were incredibly influential for the American Revolution. However, while Jean-Jacques Rousseau is widely regarded as one of the most influential Enlightenment writers in history and while his work was very influential in Europe, especially during the French Revolution, Rousseau's theories were not widely read and he is not considered a strong influence on American political theory. In this thesis, I argue that Rousseau is considered noninfluential in particular because of the conflict between his theories of communtarianism and egalitarianism and Federalist political projects that aimed to convert the United States into a large, mercantalist, international presence. Anti-Federalists were much more receptive to Rousseau's theories but were unable to commit to them fully because of their reliance on chattel slavery and his firm opposition to the institution. Finally, I argue that the tensions between early American politicians and Rousseau's theories of egalitarianism showcase the pseudodemocratic nature of early American politics and rhetoric and explain American government's oligarchic tendencies.

Taking Saba Mahmood's question 'Can secularism be other-wise?' (2010) as the starting point for a critical-historical investigation of the 'secular body' (Asad 2003; Hirschkind 2011), my thesis develops in two stages. In the first, I argue that current works of secular theory - particularly A Secular Age (Taylor 2007) - tend to rely on an excessively rationalistic conception of Enlightenment thought for the construction of their central conceptual categories (e.g. the 'immanent frame', 'buffered self', or 'modern exclusive humanism'), thus reinforcing a double-binary linking rationality to Euro-American secularity, and emotion to subaltern 'religion'. Against Taylor and others, I emphasise the contradictory, 'assembled' nature of Enlightenment discourse, and point to alternative, more body-centred strands of thought in key figures of the seventeenth-eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, such as Descartes, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Helvétius, and Holbach. Against common perceptions, and drawing on a range of philosophical works, institutional reports, and stage plays in French and in translation, I suggest these figures in some ways reinstated emotion and the body against the rationalistic tendencies of the past. Insofar as 'the secular' was shaped by the Enlightenment, it emerged out of a conscious project of nationalist cultivation, based fundamentally on manipulating the body and emotions. In the second stage, I consider the way Orientalist representations of non-Western religions meshed with prevalent theories of political manipulation to generate an affective system of anti-Catholic propaganda geared towards the national good. Though existing critiques of Taylor tend to focus on the importance of religious (i.e. Christian) constructions of Oriental religions for the genealogy of secularity (e.g. Mahmood 2010), I suggest a distinctively secular form of Orientalism emerged in the eighteenth century, in which anti-religion, racism, and nationalism merged into a powerful weapon of republican discourse, congruent with ambient theories of emotion. The aesthetic manipulation of racist and Orientalist tropes in Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes (1721) and Voltaire's Le Fanatisme (1741), for example, can be read as a practical response to existing theory on the power of images to regulate people's passions in the national interest.

Ce travail a pour thème la tolérance dans la pensée de Montesquieu, et son but est de l´analyser à partir de trois aspects présents dans son oeuvre : la diversité, la liberté et l´éducation. La raison de se concentrer sur ces trois notions repose sur la recherche d´une compréhension exégétique des principes constitutifs qui soutiennent sa conception de la tolérance. Ainsi, certains problèmes fondamentaux guident cette recherche : quelle est la genèse conceptuelle de la tolérance dans la pensée de Montesquieu ? Y aurait-il dans ses textes des notions intermédiaires qui s´enchaînent et se réfèrent à ce concept ? Sur quels Principes la tolérance repose-t-elle ? L´hypothèse testée dans notre étude sur la pensée de Montesquieu est que pour arriver à une conception de la tolérance, il faut d´abord valoriser la diversité, maintenir la liberté et contribuer à l´éducation. Ce qu´on essaie de révéler, c´est de mettre en lumière la démarche de l´auteur de « l´Esprit des Lois » pour arriver à un concept postérieur de la tolérance, fondamentalement formé par un triple pilier (la diversité, la liberté et l´éducation). Pour tester cette déclaration, on a développé dans ce travail trois chapitres, sur lesquels figurent trois objectifs spécifiques : 1) Penser le thème de la diversité lié au thème de la tolérance ; 2) Associer la liberté politique à la liberté religieuse ; 3) Lier le thème de l´éducation au thème de la tolérance. Dans le premier chapitre, on parlera de la notion de diversité à partir de trois domaines spécifiques : le physique, le social et le politique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, on discutera des concepts de liberté politique et de liberté religieuse. Et, dans le troisième chapitre, on débattra sur l´éducation dans les trois sphères du gouvernement : monarchie, despotisme et république. En fait, cette recherche a pour but d´ajouter à la bibliographie naissante de Montesquieu au Brésil, d´une façon bien particulière, des perspectives qui n´ont pas encore été exploitées. / Esse trabalho tem como tema a tolerância em Montesquieu e por objetivo analisá-la a partir de três aspectos em sua obra: diversidade, liberdade e educação. A razão de focar nessas três noções está na busca por uma compreensão exegética acerca dos princípios constitutivos que sustentariam sua concepção de tolerância. Nesse sentido, alguns problemas basilares norteiam essa dissertação: qual a gênese conceitual da tolerância em Montesquieu? Haveria em seus textos noções intermediárias que se interligariam e remeteriam a esse conceito? Em quais princípios a tolerância repousa? A hipótese a ser testada é a de que para se chegar a uma concepção de tolerância foi necessário a esse autor defender antes a valorização da diversidade, a manutenção da liberdade e o auxílio da educação. O que se procura averiguar é a ideia segundo a qual o autor do Espírito das Leis teria percorrido um caminho conceitual formado fundamentalmente por um tríplice pilar, (diversidade, liberdade e educação) para chegar a uma conceituação posterior da tolerância. Para testar essa afirmação optou-se em desenvolver esse trabalho em três capítulos, os quais configuram três objetivos específicos: 1) Pensar o tema da diversidade vinculado ao de tolerância; 2) Relacionar a liberdade política à liberdade religiosa; 3) Vincular o tema da educação ao da tolerância. No primeiro capítulo, discorrer-se-á acerca da noção de diversidade a partir de três campos específicos: o físico, o social e o político. No segundo capítulo, serão abordados os conceitos de liberdade política e liberdade religiosa. E, no terceiro capítulo, discorrer-se-á acerca da educação nas três formas governos: monarquia, despotismo e república. Esta pesquisa visa a acrescentar à bibliografia incipiente sobre Montesquieu no Brasil, de forma particular, no sentido de abordar perspectivas ainda não exploradas.

Raymond Aron is widely recognised as France's greatest twentieth-century liberal, but the specifically liberal quality of his thought has not received the detailed historical analysis that it deserves. His work appears to fit so well within widely accepted understandings of post-war European liberalism, which has been defined primarily in terms of its anti-totalitarian, Cold War orientation, that its liberal status has been somewhat taken for granted. This has been exacerbated by an especially strong perception of a correlation between liberalism and anti-totalitarianism in France, whose late twentieth-century renaissance in liberal political thought is viewed as the product of an 'anti-totalitarian turn' in the late 1970s. While the moral authority accumulated through decades of opposition to National Socialism and Soviet communism made Aron into an anti-totalitarian icon, his early contribution to the rediscovery of France's liberal tradition established his reputation as a leader of the renaissance in the study of liberal political thought. Aron's prominence within this wider renaissance suggests that an historical treatment of his thought is overdue, but while the assumptions underpinning his reputation are not baseless, they do need to be critically scrutinised if such a treatment is to be credible. In pursuit of this end, two main arguments are developed in the present thesis. These are, first, that Aron's liberalism was more a product of the inter-war crisis of European liberalism than of the Cold War and, second, that his relationship with the French liberal tradition was primarily active and instrumental rather than passive and receptive. The first argument indicates that Aron's liberalism developed through a dialogue with and partial integration of important strands of anti-liberal crisis thought during these inter-war years; the second that earlier liberals with whose work he is frequently associated - notably Montesquieu and Tocqueville - had no substantial formative influence on his political thought. These contentions are interrelated in that Aron's post-war interpretation of his chosen liberal forebears was driven by a need to address specific problems arising from the liberal political epistemology that he formulated before the Second World War. It is by establishing in detail the link between Aron's reading of Montesquieu and Tocqueville and these earlier writings that the thesis makes its principal contribution to the existing literature on Aron, but several other original interpretations of his work are offered across its four thematic chapters on 'Political Epistemology', 'Anti-totalitarianism', 'The End of Ideology' and 'Instrumentalizing the French Liberal Tradition'. Regarding Aron's relationship with the wider late twentieth-century recovery of liberal political thought in France, it contends that the specific liberal renaissance to which he contributed most substantially emerged not as part of the anti-totalitarian turn, but in hostile reaction to the events of May 1968. This informs a broader argument that French liberal renaissance of these years was considerably more heterogeneous than is often assumed.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

À la fin du XVIIe siècle, la dissolution du pacte allégorique semblait avoir à tout jamais disjoint la fable et le conte, la première prenant en charge seule un but didactique et le second se définissant comme un récit pur, sans intention de transmettre un quelconque message. Paradoxalement, de la fin du XVIIe siècle jusqu'aux années 1775, un nombre important de contes affichent, dès leurs seuils (titres, épigraphes, frontispices, préfaces), une fonction cognitive : on assiste à l'émergence d'une nouvelle catégorie du conte, qui se réconcilie avec les savoirs. Cette thèse vise à montrer que la portée philosophique et morale de ce sous-genre réside moins dans le message transmis que dans le mode de déchiffrement qu'il induit et dans la singularité de l'expérience qu'il fait vivre au lecteur. Les contes à visée morale et philosophique ne sont pas des illustrations d'une thèse préalable, ils déclenchent la réflexion du lecteur grâce à un dispositif narratif particulier, qui repose sur un pacte de lecture non plus allégorique, mais analogique : le lecteur est amené à faire des liens entre ce qui a priori est sans rapport, à prendre une posture critique à l'égard de tous les discours (notamment religieux, politiques, pseudo-scientifiques et même fictionnels), et à s'interroger sur lui-même, en somme à être philosophe, au sens où l'entendait le XVIIIe siècle. Après avoir repéré les constantes structurelles et thématiques de ces textes, aussi divers soient-ils, nous étudions l'entremêlement des discours philosophiques et moraux et de la fiction, dans les contes de Fénelon, Montesquieu, Saint-Hyacinthe, Crébillon, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire et Marmontel.

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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humansas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T04:20:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Moscateli_Renato_D.pdf: 2504525 bytes, checksum: f2f44d13ede27b3741481f2e4d45e503 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Ao se colocar Montesquieu e Rousseau lado a lado como pensadores políticos, costuma-se opô-los como se primeiro tivesse apenas estudado as leis tais como existiam para explicá-las segundo as situações reais que as geraram, e o segundo houvesse somente buscado o que as leis deveriam ser para corresponder às necessidades humanas. Assim, ter-se-ia de um lado um Montesquieu demasiadamente preocupado com a historicidade das instituições humanas para elaborar uma verdadeira teoria dos fundamentos do direito, e, de outro lado, um Rousseau avesso à história e dedicado à construção de formulações ideais acerca da política. Todavia, há boas razões para questionar essa oposição, o que pode ser feito pela aplicação de uma metodologia comparativa às reflexões de Montesquieu e de Rousseau sobre a história e a política, atentando-se para o diálogo por vezes aberto, mas freqüentemente implícito, empreendido pelo filósofo de Genebra com a corrente de pensamento político cujos problemas e proposições centrais estão configurados na obra de Montesquieu. Assim, o objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a obra de Rousseau frente ao legado de Montesquieu, para substanciar a tese de que é inadequado interpretá-la nos termos restritos de uma oposição ao tipo de abordagem praticado pelo autor d'O Espírito das Leis. Trata-se, portanto, de compreender como o sistema de causalidade atribuído pelo filósofo francês à história foi incorporado de algum modo por Rousseau em suas próprias reflexões, investigando-se nelas a existência dos princípios de um modelo interpretativo e discursivo a partir do qual se deveriam constituir representações de eventos interconectados de maneira coerente. Igualmente, busca-se visualizar como a teoria das formas de governo presente na obra rousseauniana, sua concepção acerca das instituições promotoras da liberdade civil, bem como sua visão sobre as razões que levam à corrupção moral e política ao longo da história dos Estados, devem algo à leitura dos textos do barão de La Brède. O que se pretende, enfim, é mostrar que há muito mais pontos comuns entre as idéias de Montesquieu e Rousseau do que se reconhece usualmente / Abstract: When Montesquieu and Rousseau are laid side by side as political thinkers, it is usual to oppose them as if the first had just studied laws as they existed in order to explain them according to the real situations in which they were generated, and the second had only looked for what laws should be in order to fulfill human needs. One would have, therefore, on the one side, a Montesquieu too concerned with the historicity of human institutions to be able to elaborate a true theory on the foundations of political right, and, on the other, a Rousseau hostile to history and dedicated to ideal formulations about politics. There are, however, good reasons to question that opposition, which can be done by applying a comparative methodology to Montesquieu's and Rousseau's reflections on history and politics, paying attention to the sometimes open, but often implicit, dialogue undertook by the Geneva's philosopher with the current of political thought whose central problems and propositions are laid out in the work of Montesquieu. Thus, the aim of this research is to analyze Rousseau's work in the wake of Montesquieu's legacy, in order to show that it is wrong to interpret it narrowly in terms of a mere opposition to the kind of approach characteristic of the author of The Spirit of Laws. More specifically, what is sought here is to understand how the system of causality ascribed by the French philosopher to history was somehow incorporated by Rousseau into his own reflections, which are here investigated in order to show that they make use of a interpretative and discursive model that allows to build representations of interconnected events in a coherent way. Moreover, it will be shown how the theory of the forms of government presented in Rousseau's work, his conception of the institutions that promote civil freedom, as well as his understanding of the reasons that lead to moral and political corruption throughout the history of States, owe something to the reading of baron of La Brède's texts. The objective, in short, is to show that there are much more points in common between the ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau than it is usually recognized / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Dans la perspective des chercheurs qui développent une science, la réalité de sa fondation se présente comme la solution imaginaire de quatre énigmes relatives à l’unité et aux progrès de leurs travaux : 1- La fondation est la source stable des principes d’une science qui se maintiennent au fil de ses développements. 2 – Elle donne à lire la finalité commune des développements individuels de ses recherches. 3 – Elle opère une rupture avec la pensée antérieure en définissant le projet d’un savoir original et plus désirable que ce que l’on croyait savoir auparavant. 4 – Elle institue l’esprit distinctif d’une recherche qui estime que le savoir qu’elle procure vaut la peine d’être développé. En sociologie, il y a consensus pour affirmer que la discipline est fondée, mais on ne s’entend ni sur la ou les œuvres qui la fondent ni même sur l’époque où elle débute. À partir d’une analyse comparée des sociologies d’Auguste Comte et d’Émile Durkheim avec d’autres œuvres depuis les études de l’homme et de la cité d’Aristote, nous explorons la réalité d’une fondation qui pourrait résoudre ces quatre énigmes ainsi qu’une cinquième qui est particulière à cette science sociale : 5 – La fondation de la sociologie initie un mode d’organisation de la recherche incompatible avec le modèle kuhnien de la science normale qui progresse dans le développement d’un paradigme commun. / In the perspective of researchers developing a science, the foundation is presented as the imaginary solution to four enigmas regarding the unity and progress of their work: 1- Its foundation is the stable source of the principles of a science that remain throughout its development. 2- It provides a common finality of the individual developments of its research. 3- It contrasts from previous schools of thought by defining the project of an original and more desirable one. 4- It introduces the distinctive characteristics of a research, emphasizing that the knowledge it brings is worth it. In sociology, there is general agreement about sociology having a beginning, only no one agrees on the works that make it, nor the time it all started. By comparing the works of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim with other works since Aristotle, we explore those four enigmas and even a fifth one that is specific to sociology: 5- The foundation of sociology initiates an organisation of research that is incompatible with the kuhnian model of normal science.

Cette thèse se propose d'analyser la conception des droits de l'homme proposée par René Cassin, ses principes de base, ses caractéristiques, son contenu qui est inséparable d'une conception intégrale de la personne humaine, et de faire connaître ses sources philosophiques et religieuses. Puisque la dignité humaine constitue le fondement de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme de 1948, une attention particulière est portée à ce thème ainsi qu'aux objections qu'on soulève contre lui. Le dernier chapitre est consacré au problème du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, droit qui, en fait, est la conséquence et la condition sine qua non de la reconnaissance des droits individuels.