Are implicit biases something we can rightly be held responsible for, and if so, how? A variety of social and cognitive psychological studies have documented the existence of wide-ranging implicit biases for over 30 years. These implicit biases can best be described as negative mental attitudes that operate immediately and unconsciously in response to specific stimuli. The first chapter of this thesis surveys the psychological literature, as well as presents findings of real-world experiments into racial biases. I then present the dominant model of implicit attitudes as mere associations, followed by evidence that at least some implicit attitudes take on a propositional form and involve making inferences based on evidence. I then reject adopting either of these two rigid models in favor of a dispositional approach that treats implicit biases as on the same spectrum of, but adjacent to, beliefs. I then evaluate the moral wrongdoing associated with holding explicitly prejudicial beliefs, appealing first to Kantian notions of respecting individuals as agents, then appealing to Strawson’s argument that we are responsible for expressions of our will. Our status as human agents involves participating in complex and sustained interactions with others, which necessarily implies that we take part in the social practice of holding each other responsible for the quality of their will. The reactive attitudes we display in our everyday interactions indicate which features and circumstances are most important when investigating this practice. After applying this approach to implicit attitudes, I then pose the objection that their unconscious and unendorsed nature disqualifies implicit attitudes as proper expressions of our will. I develop this objection using Scanlon’s account of moral responsibility, which requires the capacity to self-govern in light of principles that are generally agreed upon as good reasons for guiding interactions with one another. Finally, I critique Real Self theories that seek to arbitrarily privilege one part of ourselves in favor of the Whole Self, which privileges those features that are most integrated into our overall character.

This thesis will revisit the debate between moral particularists and moral generalists in the field of meta-ethics. The general aim of this project will be to come to a better understanding of the status and role of moral principles in a reasons-holistic moral landscape. The specific aim will be to develop a viable position within the particularism-generalism debate that will combine elements from both theories. My central argument will be threefold: (a) I will argue that, in a reasons-holistic moral landscape, exceptionless moral principles are not sufficient to ground the possibility of moral thought and judgement; (b) that the possibility of moral thought and judgement depends in part on a determinate set of exceptionless moral principles and an indeterminate set of defeasible moral principles; and (c) that moral principles are insufficient to codify all or most moral truths in finite and manageable terms. My position therefore is a modified version of Principled Particularism. In this thesis, despite defending a version of particularism, I will not shy away from employing generalist terminology or from accepting certain generalist assumptions. Furthermore, unlike some particularists, I will stress the necessity and utility of moral principles. This thesis will also incorporate research about moral thought and judgement from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience.

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Le débat entre les tenants de l’égoïsme et ceux de l’altruisme porte sur la question de l’altruisme, soit : pouvons-nous parfois agir de manière – au moins en partie — désintéressée, pour le bien d’autrui sans considérer le nôtre? Mon mémoire a pour objectif de revoir la problématisation du débat altruisme/égoïsme en philosophie et en psychologie et de répondre à la question : quelles conséquences peut-on tirer des travaux empiriques concernant la question de l’altruisme compilés par C. Daniel Batson, un chercheur en psychologie sociale, dans A Scientific Search for Altruism (2019) ? Je soutiens, en partie comme Batson, que les résultats qu’il présente montrent que l'altruisme tel qu'il l'entend fait partie de nos motivations. Cependant, ma thèse principale est que la caractérisation de l'altruisme et de l'égoïsme que font Batson et ses collègues peuvent laisser en nous des interrogations quant à nos motifs fondamentaux. Autrement dit, d'autres formulations de la thèse égoïste pourraient permettre à celle-ci de résister, sans pour autant être exemptes de critiques, aux arguments présentés par Batson. Par exemple, ouvrir la recherche sur la ou les causes de l’empathie, par rapport à l'hypothèse de l'empathie-altruisme de Batson, pourrait éclairer l'enjeu d'une nouvelle manière; mais seulement si nous acceptons de modifier la caractérisation de l'altruisme de Batson. Ainsi, nous pourrions considérer la cause de l'empathie comme ayant un poids plus important dans la résolution de la question de l'altruisme que l'empathie elle-même. Une telle reformulation de la thèse égoïste pourrait ressembler à cela : la valorisation d’autrui sera générée ou conservée si et seulement si elle sert soit les désirs personnels profonds, tel qu’un état ressenti de significativité dans la vie (Wolf 2010), ou bien les désirs personnels plus simples tels que les motivations égoïstes énoncées par Batson (2019). Pour défendre l’intérêt d’une telle reformulation, je présenterai d'abord la caractérisation de l'égoïsme et de l'altruisme de Batson (2019) ainsi que la méthode que Batson et ses collègues utilisent pour répondre à la question de l'altruisme. Je présenterai également des critiques à cette position, provenant entre autres de Doris et al. (2020) et d’une adaptation des propos de Slote (1964). Mon texte débouchera sur une nouvelle hypothèse égoïste s'inspirant des travaux de Susan Wolf (2010) et Bernard Williams (1981). / The debate opposing egoism and altruism concerns the altruism question: Can we sometimes act – at least partly – in a disinterested way to promote the well-being of others without considering our own? My master’s thesis aims to review the central problem of the altruism/egoism debate in philosophy and psychology and answer the question: Which consequences can be drawn from the empirical work concerning the altruism question compiled by C. Daniel Batson, a researcher in social psychology, in A Scientific Search for Altruism (2019)? I agree with Batson that his empirical results show altruism, as he defines it, to be a part of our motivations. However, my main thesis is that Batson and his colleagues’ characterization of altruism and egoism leaves us questioning our ultimate motives. Restating the thesis of egoism could allow it to resist Batson’s arguments, although it may face other criticism. For example, opening the research on the cause or causes of empathy regarding the empathy-altruism hypothesis of Batson could shed light on the debate in a new way; but only if we agree to rethink Batson’s characterization of altruism. Thus, we could consider empathy’s causes to be of greater importance than empathy itself in resolving the altruism question. Such a recharacterization of egoism could resemble this one: The valuing of others will be generated or conserved if and only if it serves either profound personal desires, such as a state of felt meaningfulness (Wolf 2010), or simpler personal desires like the egoistic motivations listed by Batson (2019). To defend the interest of this recharacterization, I will present the definitions of altruism and egoism given by Batson (2019) as well as the method he used with his colleagues to answer the altruism question. I will also formulate critiques to the position of Batson through Doris et al. (2020) and an adaptation of the argument of Slote (1964). My argument will lead to a new egoistic hypothesis inspired by the works of Susan Wolf (2010) and Bernard Williams (1981).

Ce mémoire est consacré à l’approche hiérarchique de Frankfurt, laquelle donne une explication de l’action autonome grâce à son modèle théorique à deux niveaux de désirs. Pour Frankfurt, l’action autonome est une action causée ou guidée par un désir qui est lui-même causé ou guidé par un désir de deuxième niveau, lequel est formé par un processus d’identification qui fait l’évaluation du désir de premier niveau. Dans un premier temps, j’étudie le développement de l’approche de Frankfurt afin de démontrer que celle-ci subit une modification essentielle : Frankfurt donne d’abord une explication causale de l’action autonome pour ensuite lui donner une explication structurale. Dans un deuxième temps, je m’arrête sur les différentes versions d’une critique adressée à son approche, la critique féministe de l’autonomie du processus d’identification. Dans un troisième temps, je présente une défense de l’approche de Frankfurt à l’égard de cette critique. Cette défense est fondée sur une interprétation du processus d’identification : je soutiens, à l’aide des développements du premier chapitre, que l’évaluation consiste en une évaluation de la conformité d’un désir à l’égard d’un modèle motivationnel, et que cette interprétation permet de répondre à la critique féministe précédemment traitée. / The present study is about Frankfurt’s hierarchical approach, which gives an explanation of autonomous action by means of its two-level theoretical framework. According to Frankfurt, an action is autonomous when it is caused or guided by a desire that is itself caused or guided by a second-order desire, the latter being formed by a process of identification that realizes the evaluation of the first-order desire. As a first step, I study the development of Frankfurt’s approach and I show that it undergoes a significant change: if Frankfurt first gives a causal explanation of autonomous action, he will give later on a structural explanation of this kind of action. As a second step, I review different versions of a critique of Frankfurt’s approach made by some feminists, that is, the critique of the autonomous status of the process of identification. In the third part, I defend Frankfurt’s approach regarding this critique. This defense is based on an interpretation of the process of identification: I claim, with the help of the interpretation I suggest in the first chapter, that the evaluation intrinsic to the process of identification consists in the evaluation of the conformity of a desire with a motivational model, and that this interpretation avoids the feminist critique.

This thesis is an interdisciplinary project in experimental social psychology, psychopharmacology, neuroscience, and neuroethics. The role of emotion in higher order psychological processes – social and moral judgments – was investigated. Specifically the role of noradrenergic mediated emotional arousal was researched. Behavioural studies demonstrated that acute beta adrenergic blockade with propranolol led to a reduction in negative implicit racial associations and also a modification of moral decision making. These findings suggest that basic affective processes might be causally relevant for higher order evaluations. However, enhancement with the noradrenergic potentiating agent reboxetine did not show effects opposite to those of propranolol on racial attitudes or moral judgments, which might indicate that emotional arousal, specific to beta-adrenoceptors might be involved in the effects of propranolol. Further a pharmacological fMRI study demonstrated that the activation pattern in brain regions commonly associated with intergroup bias -- such as the amygdala, insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and fusiform gyrus -- was affected by propranolol, and that the effect in the amygdala was correlated with implicit racial bias. Taken together the research suggests that automatic emotional arousal plays a role in higher order psychological processes, such as moral and social judgments, which aids the understanding of the underlying neurobiology of such processes. Finally, the ethical implications – such as the prospect of pharmacological moral enhancement – are discussed. The findings also suggest that the moral and social effects of already widely used psychotropic medications should be subject to further empirical and ethical investigation.

La notion d’autonomie personnelle joue un rôle central dans les théories politiques contemporaines et, plus spécifiquement, dans les théories de la justice. Or, dans le paradigme libéral dominant, elle est définie par une compréhension rationaliste de l’agent individuel. La présente étude défend la nécessité de redéfinir ce concept d’autonomie à la lumière des développements philosophiques et psychologiques qui ont complexifié notre compréhension de la subjectivité. L’emploi du concept d’autonomie relationnelle développé par certains auteurs féministes et par certains théoriciens de la reconnaissance semble pour ce faire prometteur. En passant par une critique du libéralisme politique rawlsien, cette étude cherche à montrer qu’une compréhension relationnelle de l’autonomie est nécessaire pour expliquer la motivation à la coopération sociale et pour redéfinir la justice et l’injustice de façon à ce qu’elles correspondent à l’expérience sociale vécue. / The notion of personal autonomy plays a central role in contemporary political theories and especially in theories of justice. Generally speaking, the dominant liberal paradigm defines individual agency in a purely rationalistic manner. Against this tradition, the present study argues for the necessity of rethinking and redefining this rationalistic concept of autonomy in light of psychological and philosophical developments that have complicated our understanding of subjectivity. For this purpose, the concept of relational autonomy, developed by feminist authors and some theorists of recognition, is most promising. This study proceeds via a critique of Rawlsian political liberalism, and aims to show that a relational understanding of autonomy is necessary to explain motivations for social cooperation and to understand justice and injustice in a way that corresponds to lived social experience.

Ce mémoire est consacré à la condition de l’estime de soi telle que défendue par Paul Benson au sein de sa théorie substantielle de l’autonomie. Soulevant l’insuffisance des théories procédurales dans les cas d’oppressions, cette condition défend la nécessité de considérer les relations intersubjectives et le sentiment de mérite à agir au sein de la définition même de l’autonomie. En ce sens, les théories relationnelles permettent également de rendre compte de l’impact du contexte social sur les valeurs intériorisées par un agent, mais aussi sur la manière dont un agent s’évalue en fonction de ses expériences. Afin d’approfondir cette condition de l’estime de soi, j’étudie le rôle des émotions autoréflexives sur la perception d’un agent à l’égard de soi tout en soulevant comment ces dernières peuvent l’informer des valeurs qui lui sont propres, de celles provenant d’un contexte d’oppression. Dans un premier temps, j’explore en quoi consiste la condition de l’estime de soi selon Benson, son lien avec l’identité et comment elle met en lumière l’insuffisance des théories procédurales. Dans un deuxième temps, je la distingue des autres conceptions similaires telles que retrouvées dans les théories relationnelles tout en défendant que l’estime de soi n’est pas un phénomène affectif distinct, mais plutôt un jugement normatif s’élaborant à partir des expériences affectives vécues par un agent. Bien que défendant la thèse de Benson dans une perspective relationnelle, j’approfondis la définition de la condition de l’estime de soi en soulevant comment les émotions morales s’avèrent nécessaires pour qu’un agent soit autonome à l’égard de ses actions, de ses pensées et de ses valeurs. / This present study is devoted to the sense of self-worth as defended by Paul Benson in his theory of substantial autonomy. Revealing the limitations of the procedural accounts in the cases of oppression, this theory defends the necessity of considering the intersubjective relationships as well as the importance of regarding onself as being competent to answer for one’s conduct in the definition of autonomy. Meanwhile, relational theories acknowledge how social contexts can define values interiorised by agents as well as the self-regarding attitudes that influence one’s sense of worth. To deepen our understanding of this condition, I study the role of moral emotions on the perception that an agent has upon his or herself while demonstrating how these emotions can adequately inform the agent of his or her own values, as well as those internalized from oppressive circumstances. First, I explore what holds the condition of self-esteem from Benson’s viewpoint while linking it to concept of identity. I then demonstrate how this condition captures the limitations of procedural accounts, specifically in oppressive contexts. Secondly, I distinguish other self-regarding attitudes found in the relational theories while showing how self-esteem is not a separate affective phenomenon, but rather a normative judgment formed from the affective experiences of an agent. While I defend Paul Benson’s thesis in a relational perspective, I suggest a deepened definition of what the self-esteem condition stands for, while showing how moral emotions are necessary for an agent to be autonomous upon his actions, thoughts and values.

In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

O Transtorno do Déficit de Atenção e Hiperatividade (TDAH) é um transtorno neurobiológico amplamente estudado e o que mais acomete a população infantil em idade escolar. No entanto, pesquisas relacionando o contexto familiar destas crianças e adolescentes com a moralidade são escassas. Este estudo teve por objetivo mapear o contexto familiar deste público no que diz respeito às concepções educativas morais, a legitimidade da autoridade parental e as representações de si dessas mães. MÉTODO: Participaram da pesquisa 17 mães e 5 avós (responsáveis legais) de crianças e adolescentes com diagnóstico de TDAH atendidos por uma instituição filantrópica especializada localizada na cidade de São João da Boa Vista, interior do estado de São Paulo. Para a coleta de dados, os instrumentos utilizados foram: Escala de Concepções Educativas Morais ECEM, Questionário de legitimidade da autoridade parental e Representações de si de mães de crianças e adolescentes com TDAH. RESULTADOS: Os resultados apontaram para mães que priorizam o respeito unilateral, a justiça retributiva com o uso de sanções expiatórias, o desejo pela obediência e baixa autonomia. Além disso, as mães legitimam a autoridade parental em todos os domínios, sendo as regras de domínio pessoal menos legitimadas que as demais. O uso de punições físicas está muito presente no discurso dessas mães. As representações de si como pessoa dessas mães estão voltadas para a maternidade como valor central e para um olhar positivo sobre si mesmas. Como mães, essas mulheres tem representações de si positivas e positivas morais com ênfase no cuidado. A maior parte das mães percebem diferenças entre educar crianças com TDAH e sem o transtorno. Elas também apresentam representações de si positivas, quando questionadas sobre como o filho, os familiares, os professores e os profissionais da saúde que atendem o filho com TDAH as veem como mães. Em relação às apresentações do TDAH, podemos destacar que as mães de crianças com apresentação predominantemente hiperativa/impulsiva apresentam a menor média para o construto autonomia e as maiores médias para o construto obediência e para as regras de domínio pessoal. As mães de crianças com apresentação predominantemente desatenta utilizam mais regras e apresentam maior legitimidade da autoridade parental, exceto quando se trata das regras de domínio pessoal. As mães de crianças com apresentação combinada apresentam as menores médias em todos os domínios, o que aponta para menor legitimidade da autoridade parental e menor expectativa de obediência. CONCLUSÃO: O contexto familiar dessa amostra não favorece o desenvolvimento moral. As participantes deste estudo desejam filhos obedientes e utilizam sanções expiatórias para garantir a obediência. Para as participantes, ser boa mãe está relacionado ao cuidado e o sacrifício pelos filhos / Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a neurobiological disorder that is widely studied and which affects the school-age children. However, research relating the family context of these children and adolescents with morality is scarce. This study aimed to map the family context of this public with regard to moral educational conceptions, the legitimacy of parental authority and the self-representations of these mothers. METHODS: 17 mothers and 5 grandmothers (legal guardians) of children and adolescents diagnosed with ADHD attended by a specialized philanthropic institution located in the city of São João da Boa Vista, in the state of São Paulo, participated in the study. For the data collection, the instruments used were: Moral Educational Conceptions Scale - ECEM, Questionnaire of legitimacy of parental authority and Self-representations of mothers of children and adolescents with ADHD. RESULTS: The results pointed to mothers who prioritize unilateral respect, retributive justice with the use of expiatory sanctions, the desire for obedience and low autonomy. In addition, mothers legitimize parental authority in all domains, with rules of personal dominance less legitimized than the others. The use of physical punishments is very present in the discourse of these mothers. The self-representations as a person of these mothers are focused on motherhood as a central value and a positive image at themselves. As mothers, these women have positive and positive moral self-representations with an emphasis on care. Most mothers perceive differences between educating children with ADHD and without the disorder. They also present positive self-representations when questioned about how the child, family members, teachers, and health professionals who treat the child with ADHD see them as mothers. Regarding the presentations of ADHD, we can highlight that the mothers of children with predominantly hyperactive / impulsive presentation present the lowest mean for the autonomy construct and the highest averages for the obedience construct and the rules of personal dominance. Mothers of children with predominantly inattentive presentation use more rules and have greater legitimacy of parental authority, except when it comes to rules of personal domain. Mothers of children with a combined presentation have the lowest averages in all domains, which points to a lower legitimacy of parental authority and lower expectation of obedience. CONCLUSION: The family context of this sample does not favor moral development. Participants in this study desire obedient children and use expiatory sanctions to ensure obedience. For the participants, being a good mother is related to the care and sacrifice for the children