L’œuvre est le reflet de la personnalité de l’auteur. Dès lors, nul ne peut légitimement dissocier de l’œuvre l’esprit qui en est à l’origine, ni la dénaturer. A ce titre, L’article L. 121-1 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle dispose en son troisième alinéa que le droit moral de l’auteur d’une œuvre de l’esprit est inaliénable, de sorte que sa contractualisation semble exclue. Pourtant, l’étude des pratiques contractuelles montre, en réalité, que le droit à la paternité, ainsi que le droit au respect de l’œuvre, deux des prérogatives le constituant, font fréquemment l’objet de conventions. Ainsi, l’on peut en déduire que l’on assiste à une contractualisation du droit moral. Toutefois celle-ci ne s’opérera que de manière indirecte, soit à l’occasion d’une cession des droits patrimoniaux de l’auteur ou à l’occasion de la vente du support de l’œuvre ; soit par application du droit commun des contrats. / The work is the reflection of the personality of the author. From this, nothing may be legitimately dissociated or changed from the spirit of the original. To this end article L. 121-1 of the Code of intellectual property shews in its third paragraph that the moral right of the author of a work of the intellect is inalienable, in that contractualisation would seem to be excluded. All the same, the study of contractual practises shows, in reality, that the right of authorship as well as the rights in respect of the work, both of these constituant prerogatives, are often the subject of contract. Therefore one may deduce that it may be seen as a contractualisation of the moral right. Often this only operates in an indirect manner, as in a surrender of these rights of the author as in, perhaps, the sale of the work ; or by application of the common rights of contract.

A presente dissertação de mestrado visa responder afirmativamente a seguinte questão: existe um direito moral ao casamento homossexual? Para tanto, analisa o tema a partir da Filosofia Moral e Política, o que demonstra a necessidade de se conceituar o casamento antes de verificar se este constitui ou não um direito moral. Parte-se das concepções de casamento formuladas por John Finnis e Ronald Dworkin, analisando-as criticamente, propondo-se após uma que seja capaz de tratar o casamento enquanto um conceito interpretativo. Somente então é possível verificar se o casamento corresponde a um direito moral dos homossexuais, o que se faz primordialmente a partir das críticas desenvolvidas por Herbert Hart e Dworkin à posição de Patrick Devlin, e da concepção dworkiniana de igualdade e dignidade humana. Conclui-se que o dever do Estado de tratar os indivíduos com igual respeito e consideração implica no reconhecimento do casamento como direito moral dos homossexuais, e que a análise da questão sob a ótica da moralidade pública implica na discussão de seus limites, bem como no debate mais amplo acerca dos direitos das minorias em geral. / This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state\'s duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.

Based on the recent damage done to the murals in the Centre of Lima, this article analyzes the conflict that can occur between the moral right of authors to the integrity of their work and the property rights of the holders of the support containing the intellectual creation. Criteria are provided to analyze conflicts in which murals are involved. Finally, the infringement of moral right of integrity is discussed. / Sobre la base del reciente daño efectuado a los murales en el Centro de Lima, a través del presente artículo se analiza el conflicto que puede producirse entre el derecho moral de los autores a la integridad de sus obras y el derecho de propiedad de los titulares del soporte que contiene la creación intelectual. Se brinda criterios a tomarse en cuenta en los conflictos donde estén involucrados murales. Finalmente, se examina las posibles infracciones al derecho moral de integridad.

A presente dissertação de mestrado visa responder afirmativamente a seguinte questão: existe um direito moral ao casamento homossexual? Para tanto, analisa o tema a partir da Filosofia Moral e Política, o que demonstra a necessidade de se conceituar o casamento antes de verificar se este constitui ou não um direito moral. Parte-se das concepções de casamento formuladas por John Finnis e Ronald Dworkin, analisando-as criticamente, propondo-se após uma que seja capaz de tratar o casamento enquanto um conceito interpretativo. Somente então é possível verificar se o casamento corresponde a um direito moral dos homossexuais, o que se faz primordialmente a partir das críticas desenvolvidas por Herbert Hart e Dworkin à posição de Patrick Devlin, e da concepção dworkiniana de igualdade e dignidade humana. Conclui-se que o dever do Estado de tratar os indivíduos com igual respeito e consideração implica no reconhecimento do casamento como direito moral dos homossexuais, e que a análise da questão sob a ótica da moralidade pública implica na discussão de seus limites, bem como no debate mais amplo acerca dos direitos das minorias em geral. / This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state\'s duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.

In this thesis I argue that access to an adequate quantity and quality of safe water in sustainable ways is a basic moral human right, one that has been legally recognized by the international community through UN Resolution 15/9. As a result of water’s being a basic moral human right, governments, institutions, and individuals are obligated to avoid depriving, protect from deprivation, and aid those deprived of access to safe drinking water. Using this as a foundation, I examine the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and water pricing as strategies used to fulfill the right to safe drinking water. I also provide arguments in favour of (national and international) tax schemes that cover the cost of providing 50L of safe water per person per day. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Le droit d’exposition des oeuvres graphiques et plastiques est un élément nouveau du droit d’auteur, dégagé par la Cour de cassation en 2002. Il permet à l’auteur d’autoriser ou d’interdire l’exposition publique de ses oeuvres, qu’elles soient de dessin, de peinture, de sculpture, de photographie, d’architecture ou de tout autre oeuvre graphique. Ce droit lui permet aussi d’en contrôler les conditions de présentation et d’en tirer une rémunération. Il est en cela assimilable au droit de représentation, tel qu’il s’exerce pour les oeuvres dramatiques ou musicales. Mais le droit d’exposition ouvre des problématiques nouvelles pour le droit d’auteur. En effet, son objet ne peut être qu’une chose corporelle, qu’il s’agisse de l’exemplaire original de l’oeuvre ou de toute autre copie. Par conséquent, cela oblige à reconsidérer la nature du droit d’auteur, que l’on qualifie usuellement de droit sur « l’immatériel », cette notion étant plus adaptée pour les oeuvres littéraires, dramatiques ou musicales. Cette évolution remet en question le sens même de l’expression « propriété incorporelle », telle qu’elle est employée par le Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Le droit d’exposition interroge donc les fondements du droit d’auteur et bouleverse son contenu et sa portée. La thèse apporte les réponses aux questions qui sont posées par ces problématiques. Ainsi, il sera démontré que l’expression « propriété incorporelle » ne qualifie que la propriété du droit de l’auteur, considéré comme un bien, et non celle de l’oeuvre à proprement parler. En cela, la distinction entre cette propriété et la propriété de l’objet matériel doit être entendue le plus strictement, c’est-à-dire comme une simple distinction des droits. De même, le caractère novateur du droit d’exposition révèle que le droit d’auteur a davantage été conçu pour les oeuvres littéraires, dramatiques et musicales, et non pour les oeuvres graphiques et plastiques. De ce fait, le droit d’exposition concourt également à une harmonisation des prérogatives conférées aux auteurs au titre de la propriété littéraire et artistique / The visual artists display right is a new part of the author’s copyright, introduced by the French supreme court in 2002. It implies, for the author, the right to authorize or prohibit the public exhibition of his works, such as paintings, sculptures, photographs, architectural works or any work of graphic or plastic art. This right also gives the author a control over the conditions of presentation of the work and allows him to exploit it financially. It is similar to the performing right for dramatic and musical works. But the visual artists display right is the cause of new problems about intellectual property. Indeed, the exhibition is based on a physical thing in which the work is embodied. Therefore, we need to examine the nature of copyright, which is considered to have an intangible subject-matter. This concept is more convenient for literary, dramatic and musical works. This development calls the terms “intangible property” into questions, as they are used by the French copyright law. The visual artists display right shakes the very foundations of copyright and upsets its own structure. This thesis is intended to examine theses problems. Thus it appears that the terms “intangible property” refer to the property of the author’s right itself, as a possession, instead of the property of the work. That’s why the distinction between this property and the property of the tangible item should be considered as a distinction between two rights. In addition, the innovative nature of the visual artists display right shows that copyright has more been provided for literary, dramatic and musical works, than for the artistic works. This right also contributes to the harmonization of the literary and artistic property

近年來隨著科技進步以及傳媒興盛，文化創作已非少數專業作者之權利，一般大眾得藉由網路、新聞等媒介進行個人創作。日本的｢同人文化｣即為其中代表之一，所謂「同人誌」，係指原創作品的愛好者於未授權的狀態下，藉資訊技術，改編、混合或以原作品設定為基礎進行衍生創作，這些創作可能帶有補完原創作不足劇情之目的、惡搞或諷刺之目的。同人作者通常對於原作抱持著「稱讚或崇拜」的態度，而非企圖以自己之再創作和原作進行市場競爭，且同人作家之再創作，有時可為原作帶來更高之經濟及文化利益。 然而，同人行為以及同人誌在其內容以及行為模式上，均可能涉及著作權侵權問題，以著作人格權為例，同人誌可能侵害「禁止不當改作權」、「姓名表示權」；以著作財產權為例，同人誌所面臨者，係同人誌行為可能侵害「重製權」以及「衍生著作權」，但由於同人誌之高度經濟效益，亦有美日學者提出同人誌應得就其經濟優勢主張「合理使用」；除此之外，同人誌「借用原作角色和背景設定」之行為，同時也涉及美國法所謂「角色著作權」爭議問題。另外，同人誌本身亦為一種著作作品，惟此種未獲得同意之衍生創作，是否得以合法地取得新的著作權？ 　　本文將先從同人誌的產生及其經濟效益為始，講解為何目前同人誌發源地--日本，對同人誌之發展採取何種態度。第三章至第五章則就著作權法法規面，先行說明與同人誌相關之著作權法規定和法學理論，進而以美、日以及我國實務判決，釐清同人誌與著作人格權、著作財產權的交集，試圖釐清同人誌在著作權法中之定位。第六章係以近來同人誌地位最具威脅性之爭議問題- -TPP協約，推測未來同人誌產業可能之走向若未來日本簽暑該條約後將對日本同人誌產業和其他國家的同人誌產業造成衝擊。 　　　最後，本文將總結同人誌在著作人格權及著作財產權面臨之侵權爭議，依照本文所引用之外國判例或實務見解，試圖提出使同人誌合法之方式，盼能藉此維護同人產業和相關動漫產業的持續發展。 / In recent years, because of the rapid development of digital technologies, everyone can be a creator and easily public his or her work online. The “doujin-activities”(also called “fan-based activities” in American) originating from Japan has provided a good example of how ordinary people can become creators participating in the free culture.Most famous doujin-activities is “doujinshi” , which is associated with the preparation of derivative works without authors’ permission.Most doujinshi creators involve in the activities in order to show their respect of the original works. The aim of these doujin-activities is to create mocks, or parodies of the original work, or to complete the original story. Nonetheless, these fan-based creators have exposed themselves to great extent of copyright infringement. For example, doujinsi may infringes author’s moral right, like “the right to claim the authorship of works” and “the right of integrity”. Moreover, because doujinshi is an unauthorized derivative work, it could infringe author’s property right.However, due to the huge economic interest behind doujinshi, a lot of copyright scholars claim that doujinsi should apply to fair use doctine. By the way,because doujinshi is a work that “borrow characters “from a story, it also face a controversy- -whether a character should be protect by copyright or not? Considering doujinshi is an unauthorized derivative work,can this work be protect by copyright? This research will introduce the problems above. Chapter 2 introduced the origin of doujinshi, and try to explain why the birthland,Japan tolerate the development of doujinshi.Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 introduced the copyright issues which is relevant to doujinshi. Chapter 6 analysis the future of doujinshi.Finally,after discussing the copyright issues about doujinshi,this research provide certain suggestion and try to let doujinshi legalized.

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L’appel au renforcement de la protection du droit d’auteur dans le but de mieux lutter contre la contrefaçon, surtout avec l’avènement et le développement incessant des nouvelles technologies, est-il justifié ? Le bilan des efforts déployés récemment sur la scène internationale pour réaliser un tel renforcement, ayant débouché sur l’élaboration du très controversé ACTA, démontre que la réponse à cette question ne peut être ni simple ni immédiate. Evaluer l’opportunité et déterminer la nécessité de renforcer cette protection ne peuvent se faire qu’après un examen approfondi des solutions juridiques, existantes déjà dans les dispositifs nationaux des deux Etats qui assurent chacun une protection efficace des droits des auteurs, tout en adoptant des approches diamétralement opposées en la matière à savoir, la France et les Etats-Unis. Une fois ces deux droits comparés, une inégalité dans le niveau de protection ressort, appelant des améliorations qui passent par une intégration d’institutions juridiques « venues d’ailleurs ». Cette intégration qui aura pour résultat d’harmoniser ces deux droits, dans le respect des particularismes nationaux, pourra se réaliser à l’aide du droit comparé. L’harmonisation des droits nationaux dans le respect de leurs différences est aussi l’oeuvre du droit international surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’une matière qui ne peut être traitée qu’à l’échelle internationale, voire mondiale. Pour pouvoir comprendre les raisons de la persistance des différences entre les deux droits menant à cette inégalité, l’examen des instruments internationaux adoptés en la matière, censés harmoniser la protection du droit d’auteur, est indispensable. Le bilan de cet examen s’avère mitigé dans la mesure où, les spécificités nationales l’emportent, bloquant ainsi le processus d’harmonisation. Or, le droit comparé a comme rôle principal de préparer un terrain favorable à une harmonisation internationale réussie, en dégageant des solutions concrètes, pratiques et surtout adaptées puisque ne heurtant pas les traditions juridiques nationales qu’il aura réussi à identifier. / Is the call to strengthen the protection of copyright in order to better fight copyright infringement, especially with the advent and the constant development of new technologies, justified? The results of the recent efforts on the international stage to achieve such a purpose, which led to the drawing up of the very controversial ACTA, show that the answer to this question cannot be simple nor immediate. Assessing the appropriateness as well as determining the need to strengthen this protection can only be made after a thorough review of legal solutions that already exist in the domestic law of two states, each of which ensures effective protection of copyright while adopting diametrically opposite approaches in this field namely, France and the United States. Once these two domestic laws have been compared, inequality in the level of protection appears, calling for improvements that go through an integration of legal institutions "coming from somewhere else". This integration that will have as a result the harmonization of these two laws while taking into account the national specificities, can be realized using the comparative law. The harmonization of national laws while respecting their differences is the work of international law as well, especially when the subject matter could only be addressed on an international even global scale. To understand the reasons for the persistence of differences between these two laws leading to this inequality, review of international instruments adopted in this field which are supposed to harmonize the protection of copyright, is essential. The results of this review are mixed due to the fact that national differences prevail, thus blocking the harmonization process. However, comparative law's primary role is to prepare the ground for a successful international harmonization, by providing concrete, practical and appropriate solutions given the fact that they do not conflict with national legal traditions that the comparative law has managed to identify.

La spécificité de l’objet de la PI imprime une singularité au régime du contrat d’entreprise. L’affirmation se constate aussi bien au sujet de la PLA qu’au sujet de la PIND et appelaient donc la recherche d’une théorie générale. Concernant la PLA, l’existence de droits moraux de l’auteur perturbe la relation contractuelle et justifie la mise en œuvre d’un formalisme important. L’objectif du législateur est alors de tenter de protéger l’auteur, envisagé comme la partie faible face au maître de l’ouvrage. Et quoique certaines exceptions aient été mises en place, elles demeurent insuffisantes. Une telle méthode « principe – exception » se révèle néanmoins alternativement inutile ou préjudiciable, de sorte qu’il conviendrait de convertir les exceptions en règle commune. À titre d’exemple, l’attribution initiale des droits d’auteur au maître de l’ouvrage dans le cadre de l’œuvre collective ou le logiciel devrait être généralisé. Si la protection apportée à l’entrepreneur dans le cadre du droit de la propriété littéraire et artistique apparaît ainsi excessive, elle est au contraire insuffisante dans le cadre du droit de la propriété industrielle. En effet, en dépit de fondements identiques, le contrat d’entreprise relatif aux droits de propriété industrielle est régi par les dispositions du Code civil, lesquelles ne protègent pas l’auteur ou le créateur. Ainsi, dans ce cadre, l’inventeur ne bénéficie pas d’un droit à la rémunération proportionnelle, car l’aspect économique domine toutes les étapes de la relation contractuelle, de l’obtention de la création à son exploitation. Néanmoins, les règles de l’attributions du droit à la création industrielle ne sont pas claires / The specificity of the subject of intellectual property entitled to a singularity of the contract of enterprise regime. The assertion is evident both on the literary and artistic property as about industrial property and therefore called the search for a general theory.Concerning the literary and artistic property, the existence of moral rights of the author disrupts the contractual relationship and justify the implementation of an important formalism. The aim of the legislator is then to try to protect the author, seen as the weak party to face the project Owner. And although some exceptions have been introduced, they remain insufficient. Nevertheless, such a method "principle - exception" proves alternately unnecessary or harmful, so the exceptions should be converted into common rule. For example, the initial attribution of copyright to the Owner project under the collective work or software should be generalized.If the protection provided to the contractor under the law of literary and artistic property thus appears excessive, it is insufficient otherwise under the law of industrial property. Indeed, despite identical basis, the contract of enterprise for industrial property rights is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, which do not protect the author or creator. Thus, in this context, the inventor does not have a right to remuneration proportional because the economic aspect dominates all stages of the contractual relationship, obtaining creation to its exploitation. Nevertheless, the rules of the attribution of the right to creation industrial are not clear