Cette thèse a pour point de départ l’idée du jeune Heidegger selon laquelle le sens de l’être doit être recherché au moyen d’une phénoménologie ontologique, plus précisément par l’analytique existentiale du Dasein et la destruction de l’histoire de l’ontologie ; ou, comme nous l’interprétons, dans la transcendance du Dasein et la transcendance de l’être. L’étude du problème de la transcendance fait l’objet d’une approche phénoménologique, laquelle porte une attention particulière au vécu en tant que tel ainsi qu’aux conditions de possibilité de ce vécu, et repose sur une lecture attentive et critique des œuvres de Heidegger. C’est une telle approche phénoménologique qui nous permettra de mener à bien notre analyse du problème de la transcendance dans le corpus heideggérien. Nous serons par ailleurs en mesure d’aborder le débat opposant à ce sujet la tradition analytique (plus particulièrement l’approche pragmatiste) et la tradition continentale, notre étude s’inscrivant dans le cadre de cette dernière. Nous proposons ici une phénoménologie du problème de la transcendance qui fait également figure de phénoménologie du sens, de la possibilité et de la normativité. Prenant pour point de départ certaines contributions issues de la tradition continentale, nous soutenons que le sens de l’être peut être compris comme le problème de la transcendance. L’histoire de la philosophie doit être perturbée, déconstruite et repensée afin que le chemin de la philosophie, encore non pensé, puisse être mis au jour. L’accès à cet autre commencement doit être recherché dans la transcendance en tant que telle – de l’appel de la conscience fondé dans la nullité à l’encontre authentique avec la mort et l’ouverture de la temporalité ; de l’avènement historial de l’être jusqu’à, ultimement, le i! ! ! ! refus de l’être et le retrait du rien. L’événement (Ereignis) de l’être est donc compris comme processus de dépassement de soi à partir duquel la transcendance de l’être – ou, comme le formule Heidegger, la fin des questions – est possible. / This thesis takes its starting point from the early Heidegger’s insight that the meaning of being must be sought through an ontological phenomenology, and specifically, through the existential analytic of Dasein and the destruction of the history of ontology, or, as I broadly construe it, the transcendence of Dasein and the transcendence of being. The study of the problem of transcendence is approached phenomenologically, that is to say, with a concern for the lived experience as such and the conditions of possibility of this experience, as well as the close and critical reading of Heidegger’s works. I bring this approach to bear on my investigation of the problem of transcendence in Heidegger’s corpus and to the debate between analytic (especially pragmatist) and continental scholarship within which I situate my study of Heidegger. I present a phenomenology of the problem of transcendence that is also a phenomenology of meaning, possibility and normativity. Taking my lead from continental readers of Heidegger, I argue that the meaning of being can be understood as the problem of transcendence. The history of philosophy must be disrupted, deconstructed, and rethought such that the unthought path of philosophy is released. The way to the other beginning must be sought in transcendence as such – from the null- based call of conscience, to the authentic encounter with death and the disclosure of temporality, from the historical happening of being, and ultimately, to the refusal of being and the withdrawal of the nothing. The event of being is therefore a self-surpassing process from which the transcendence of being – indeed, the end of questions, as Heidegger puts it – is possible.

Absente en tant que telle dans le discours des juristes civilistes français, la normativité précontractuelle constitue un phénomène juridique à part entière, dont l'appréhension suppose de suspendre provisoirement le raisonnement habituel par lequel le juriste appréhende la période précontractuelle.Signalée par les fautes précontractuelles, la normativité précontractuelle est distincte de la normativité générale et abstraite, inhérente à la période précontractuelle, que des différents dispositifs du Code civil (p. ex. art. 1109 et s.) et des principes jurisprudentiels (p. ex. la bonne foi) indiquent. Concrète, la normativité précontractuelle apparaît dans un premier temps tel un rapport normatif, établi entre les précontractants en situation de négociation. Décelable en rétrospective d'un contrat critiqué à l'occasion d'une faute simple ou qualifiée, ce rapport se constate également dans la perspective d'un contrat en négociation et constitue la réalité matérielle de cette normativité particulière. Dans un second temps, la normativité précontractuelle renvoie, dans l'ordre des concepts, à une norme. Endogène, celle-ci se manifeste dans l'environnement évolutif, au sein duquel les précontractants se placent volontairement pour déterminer le contenu de leur contrat futur.Point de jonction d'une norme spécifique précontractuelle et d'un rapport noué entre les précontractants, la normativité précontractuelle tient en échec la théorie des sources d'obligations, dans la mesure où celle-ci, considérée comme répertoriant les sources de normativité, ne parvient pas à expliquer celle-là par une seule source. Éclectique et complexe, la normativité précontractuelle échappe, quant à sa représentation, à une construction juridique. Fabriquée dans une discussion normative qui suppose d'envisager les précontractants dans le rapport qui les unit l'un à l'autre, la norme précontractuelle concrète se réalise, au cas par cas, sous l'action originale du juge, lorsque celui-ci reconnaît, rétrospectivement, sa présence ou non, à l'issue d'une bataille argumentative à laquelle les précontractants, parties au procès, participaient, pour mettre en avant l'intérêt qui les animaient lors des négociations et qu'ils entendent désormais faire privilégier par le juge, dans la pesée des intérêts.Hypothèse de quasi-droit, la mise en évidence de la normativité précontractuelle et sa mise à l'épreuve invitent le juriste à repenser les chemins de la normativité pour faire entièrement place à l'irréductible sociabilité qui caractérise le droit. / Absent as such in the discourse of French civil lawyers, the pre-contractual normativity is a legal phenomenon. Its comprehension supposes temporarily suspending the usual reasoning by which a jurist apprehends the pre-contractual period.Revealed through mistakes committed during pre-contractual negotiations, pre-contractual normativity is distinct from general and abstract normativity of the pre-contractual period and indicated in various provisions of the Civil Code (art. 1109 et seq.) and jurisprudential principles (e.g. good faith). As it is concrete, pre-contractual normativity firstly appears as a normative relationship, established between negotiators in the process of negotiating, whether the contract is finally signed or not. This relationship is the material reality of this particular normativity. Secondly, pre-contractual normativity sends back to a norm. As it is endogenous, it is revealed in the evolving environment, in which the negotiators voluntarily place themselves to settle the content of their future contract.Pre-contractual normativity is where a specific pre-contractual norm and a relationship forged between negotiators meet. It renders ineffective the theory of sources of obligations, since the latter, which is known for listing the sources of normativity, fails to explain the former with a single source. Pre-contractual normativity is eclectic and complex and thus, defies a single theorization in the way it is presented. Created in the process of a normative discussion which supposes considering negotiators in the relationship that unites them to one another, the concrete pre-contractual norm is achieved, case-by-case, under the supervision of a judge, who afterwards recognizes a presence or absence of such a norm at the end of a debate in which the negotiators – who have become party to the case - actively take part. The aim is to put forward the interests that stir them during the negotiations and that they now intend to have the judge's favor in his balancing of interests.The demonstration of pre-contractual normativity and its modus operandi are hypothesis of quasi-law and invite jurists to rethink the paths to normativity to give way to the completely inherent sociability that characterizes the law.

Os estudos jurídicos devem se orientar pela vivência do direito e não pelas teorias e sistematizações de uma suposta ciência jurídica. Direito é vivência humana e como tal deve ser tematizado. Abordar o direito requer olhar para as práticas reais dos protagonistas reais da vivência jurídica, na provocação e tomada de decisões. Adentrar às sessões dos tribunais e atentar aos bastidores das adjudicações. As tentativas de conformação de específica ciência do direito, encarregada de sistematizar e interpretar o assim-chamado direito válido se revelam vazias de juridicidade. Tomam como realidade conjuntos de abstrações. Direito não é ente, devendo ser abordado em seu constante devir, como continuum, no fluxo de processos que rumam para a o desfecho de casos trazidos a juízo, clamando por decisão tendencialmente definitiva. Não se pode insistir em abordagens estáticas do direito. Cumpre assumir o desafio de encará-lo na sua processualidade e dinamicidade, tematizando-lhe a travessia, das situações conflitivas da vida em grupo às decisões judiciais de última instância aptas a se revestir de força de coisa julgada. Carece de sentido a postulação de cisão gnoseológica entre planos de ser (Sein) e dever ser (Sollen) na abordagem do direito. Afigurando-se como vivência, não se constitui como espécie de normatividade (idealidade) situada em plano diverso do da realidade, ainda que se sujeitem os jurisdicionados à autoridade das manifestações judiciais decisórias, restando vinculados a elas. O dogma da normatividade e síndrome do normativismo devem ser afastados, fazendo perceber que inexiste algo como um direito válido a ser aplicado, anteriormente à interpretação e decisão dos julgadores. A variabilidade e mutabilidade do direito deve ser assumido, rechaçando-se perspectivas sistematizantes, quer as insistentes em afirmar a sistematicidade do direito, quer as preocupadas em construir conhecimento sistemático sobre as disposições jurídicas. A aprendizagem jurídica requer vivência. Impõe-se lançar nuamente ao direito, a fim de vivenciá-lo em permanente câmbio, situando-se sempre entre o não ainda e o não mais. A partir da inspiração da poesia de Czesaw Miosz, esta dissertação, escrita sob a forma de ensaios, pretende oferecer subsídios para desbancar algumas teses bastantes difundidas no interior da designada ciência jurídica, negando-lhe cientificidade e juridicidade, bem como sugerir algumas idéias a ter em conta na tematização do direito, procurando contribuir para uma reestruturação dos estudos jurídicos. / Juridical analisys must follow law experience instead of theories and systematizations regarding to a hypothetical Science of Law. Law refers to human living and ought to be studied from this point of view. Broaching law demands looking into the real practices of the juridical experiences real protagonists, when dealing with decison making and stimulation. Entering Court sessions and observing judgment backstage. The attempts directed to shape a specific law science in charge of systematizing and interpreting the alleged valid law come out legally hollow. They consider as reality a collection of abstractions.. Law is not an entity, so that it should be tackled on its constant becoming, as a continuum, inside the flow of processes which wend to the ending of lawsuits, claiming for a tendential definitive decision. There must not be a static law analisys. It is necessary to take up the challenge of facing it on its own dynamics and procedural manner, in a way to analyse the path from conflictive situations regarding to life in group up to last instance court decisions, which are able to reach judicial estoppel. The postulation for a gnoseologic rupture between ontological (Sein) and deontological (Sollen) ambits lacks of meaning. Appearing as a experience, law is not a normativity species (ideality) located on a place disattached from reality, even when considering people submited to judicial judgments authority, which are capable of obliging them. Normativity dogma and normativism syndrome must be repelled, in a way to show that, before judges interpretation and decision, there is no such thing like a valid law to be applied. Laws variability and mutability must be assumed, rejecting systematic perspectives, either those which insist on defending law as a system, or those willing to build a sistematic knowledge concerning to juridic dispositions. Juridic apprenticeship requires experience. It has to be totally inserted into law, in order to experience it in constant change, and always locate it between the not yet and the not even more. Based on Czesaw Miosz poetry inspiration, the present dissertation, written in essays format, intend to offer subsidies to overthrow some widespread theories localized in what they call science of law, in a way to deny its scientificity and juridicity, as well as suggest some ideas to be considered in law thematization, planning on contributing to a reorganization of juridic studies.

Dans le cadre de l’exercice de ses activités professionnelles, le médecin développe avec ses interlocuteurs des liens d’intérêts susceptibles d’influencer ses décisions et la manière dont il pratique la médecine. Ces influences peuvent s’avérer bénéfiques lorsqu’elles lui permettent de perfectionner ses connaissances et ses compétences. Toutefois, lorsqu’elles sont contraires à l’intérêt supérieur des patients, ces influences sont constitutives d’un conflit d’intérêts que le droit médical se fait un devoir d’encadrer avec plus ou moins de succès. Par ailleurs, les autorités institutionnelles sanitaires et les acteurs de la relation médicale sont également à l’origine de la production des normes de droit souple, a priori sans valeur coercitive, que le droit va faire sienne et intégrer à la norme juridique. Ainsi, les autorités éthiques, sanitaires et scientifiques, mais également les acteurs de la relation de soin et leurs représentants influencent la norme juridique médicale. L’étude du droit médical démontre, en résumé, une ambivalence de la matière à l’égard des influences exercées par les acteurs du système de santé sur la pratique de la médecine et sur les sources des normes qui l’encadre. / During the exercise of his professional activities, physician develops with his interlocutors links of interests likely to influence his decisions and the way he practices medicine. These influences can be beneficial when they allow him to perfect his knowledge and skills. However, when they are contrary to the best interests of patients, these influences constitute a conflict of interest that medical law try to manage with more or less success. In addition, the health institutional authorities and the actors of the medical relationship are also produce soft laws, without coercive value, that the law will adopt and integrate them into the legal norm. Thus, the ethical, health and scientific authorities, but also the actors of care relationships and their representatives influence medical law. In short, the study of medical law shows an ambivalence of the subject with regard to the influences exerted by the actors of the health system on the practice of medicine and on the sources of the norms that frame it.

Os estudos jurídicos devem se orientar pela vivência do direito e não pelas teorias e sistematizações de uma suposta ciência jurídica. Direito é vivência humana e como tal deve ser tematizado. Abordar o direito requer olhar para as práticas reais dos protagonistas reais da vivência jurídica, na provocação e tomada de decisões. Adentrar às sessões dos tribunais e atentar aos bastidores das adjudicações. As tentativas de conformação de específica ciência do direito, encarregada de sistematizar e interpretar o assim-chamado direito válido se revelam vazias de juridicidade. Tomam como realidade conjuntos de abstrações. Direito não é ente, devendo ser abordado em seu constante devir, como continuum, no fluxo de processos que rumam para a o desfecho de casos trazidos a juízo, clamando por decisão tendencialmente definitiva. Não se pode insistir em abordagens estáticas do direito. Cumpre assumir o desafio de encará-lo na sua processualidade e dinamicidade, tematizando-lhe a travessia, das situações conflitivas da vida em grupo às decisões judiciais de última instância aptas a se revestir de força de coisa julgada. Carece de sentido a postulação de cisão gnoseológica entre planos de ser (Sein) e dever ser (Sollen) na abordagem do direito. Afigurando-se como vivência, não se constitui como espécie de normatividade (idealidade) situada em plano diverso do da realidade, ainda que se sujeitem os jurisdicionados à autoridade das manifestações judiciais decisórias, restando vinculados a elas. O dogma da normatividade e síndrome do normativismo devem ser afastados, fazendo perceber que inexiste algo como um direito válido a ser aplicado, anteriormente à interpretação e decisão dos julgadores. A variabilidade e mutabilidade do direito deve ser assumido, rechaçando-se perspectivas sistematizantes, quer as insistentes em afirmar a sistematicidade do direito, quer as preocupadas em construir conhecimento sistemático sobre as disposições jurídicas. A aprendizagem jurídica requer vivência. Impõe-se lançar nuamente ao direito, a fim de vivenciá-lo em permanente câmbio, situando-se sempre entre o não ainda e o não mais. A partir da inspiração da poesia de Czesaw Miosz, esta dissertação, escrita sob a forma de ensaios, pretende oferecer subsídios para desbancar algumas teses bastantes difundidas no interior da designada ciência jurídica, negando-lhe cientificidade e juridicidade, bem como sugerir algumas idéias a ter em conta na tematização do direito, procurando contribuir para uma reestruturação dos estudos jurídicos. / Juridical analisys must follow law experience instead of theories and systematizations regarding to a hypothetical Science of Law. Law refers to human living and ought to be studied from this point of view. Broaching law demands looking into the real practices of the juridical experiences real protagonists, when dealing with decison making and stimulation. Entering Court sessions and observing judgment backstage. The attempts directed to shape a specific law science in charge of systematizing and interpreting the alleged valid law come out legally hollow. They consider as reality a collection of abstractions.. Law is not an entity, so that it should be tackled on its constant becoming, as a continuum, inside the flow of processes which wend to the ending of lawsuits, claiming for a tendential definitive decision. There must not be a static law analisys. It is necessary to take up the challenge of facing it on its own dynamics and procedural manner, in a way to analyse the path from conflictive situations regarding to life in group up to last instance court decisions, which are able to reach judicial estoppel. The postulation for a gnoseologic rupture between ontological (Sein) and deontological (Sollen) ambits lacks of meaning. Appearing as a experience, law is not a normativity species (ideality) located on a place disattached from reality, even when considering people submited to judicial judgments authority, which are capable of obliging them. Normativity dogma and normativism syndrome must be repelled, in a way to show that, before judges interpretation and decision, there is no such thing like a valid law to be applied. Laws variability and mutability must be assumed, rejecting systematic perspectives, either those which insist on defending law as a system, or those willing to build a sistematic knowledge concerning to juridic dispositions. Juridic apprenticeship requires experience. It has to be totally inserted into law, in order to experience it in constant change, and always locate it between the not yet and the not even more. Based on Czesaw Miosz poetry inspiration, the present dissertation, written in essays format, intend to offer subsidies to overthrow some widespread theories localized in what they call science of law, in a way to deny its scientificity and juridicity, as well as suggest some ideas to be considered in law thematization, planning on contributing to a reorganization of juridic studies.

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Si certains héritiers de la phénoménologie ont cherché à libérer l'apparaître des normes qui lui étaient imposées, il en allait autrement chez Husserl. Les normes étaient d'abord appliquées aux visées de sens elles-mêmes, lesquelles étaient dites « correctes» ou « incorrectes». Autre façon de dire que la phénoménologie ne pouvait faire l'économie des normes : point de description sans prescription, et sans prescription à la description. Dire que le projet phénoménologique est essentiellement descriptif, c’est cependant admettre que les normes s'y tiennent en retrait. Le premier défi d'une phénoménologie des normes est donc de les mettre au jour. De plus, en son versant critique, la phénoménologie des normes doit justifier notre droit de les poser et de les appliquer normativement. À ce titre, elle sera une phénoménologie du caractère normatif des normes . Suivant les traces de Husserl, nous considèrerons d'abord les enjeux normatifs liés à la logique, puis les autres normes reconnues par lui. Ces normes étant assimilées à l'obtention d'une évidence ou d'un certain type d'évidence, elles avaient toutes un usage théorique. Nous ferons cependant l'hypothèse que certaines normes peuvent avoir un usage pratique. Cette hypothèse se heurtera à un obstacle de taille chez Husserl, qui proposait de justifier les devoirs pratiques grâce aux valeurs et non par les normes. Déconstruisant chacun des présupposés normatifs ayant conduit Husserl à recourir aux valeurs en éthique, nous paverons la voie à une éthique phénoménologique, normative et suspensive. / If some of phenomenology's heirs sought to free that which appears from the norms imposed upon it, it was not Husserl's main concern. He applied norms foremost to sense itself, which was then said to be «correct» or «incorrect». This was another way of saying that phenomenology could not avoid norms: no description without prescription, and without prescription to description. To say that the phenomenological project is essentially descriptive is to admit that norms keep out of the limelight in phenomenology. The first challenge of a phenomenology of norms is therefore to shine a spot upon them. Moreover, in its critical orientation, a phenomenology of norms must justify our right to posit and apply them normatively. As such, it is a phenomenology of the normative character of norms. Following Husserl's reflection, I will first consider the normative stakes linked to logic and then the other norms he recognized. As norms were assimilated to evidence or to some type of evidence, they all had a theoretical use. I will assume, however, that some norms may have a practical function. This hypothesis will encounter a major obstacle, as Husserl proposed to justify practical ougths by means of values instead of norms. By deconstructing each of the normative presuppositions that led Husserl to rely on values in ethics, I will pave the way for a phenomenological, normative and suspensive ethic.

Le constat est aujourd’hui unanime. Le principe de légalité criminelle est affaibli par les évolutions du droit. En effet, la loi pénale n’est plus l’unique source du droit pénal, sa qualité est en déclin et le juge joue désormais un rôle incontestable en droit pénal. Ces évolutions sont ancrées dans le droit pénal, dont elles sont des paramètres. Il est impossible de revenir en arrière afin de retrouver un droit pénal conforme au principe de légalité criminelle, tel que proclamé par les révolutionnaires de 1789. Il convient alors de le faire évoluer. Ainsi, ces paramètres ont en commun d’être à l’origine de la norme pénale. Contrairement à la loi pénale, la norme pénale intègre toutes les évolutions du droit pénal. Cette norme pénale est au cœur du droit pénal dont elle en est la source. Le principe de légalité criminelle n’est donc plus configuré autour de la loi pénale, mais autour de la norme pénale. Par conséquent, il convient de parler de principe de normativité criminelle. Cette reconfiguration est ainsi la solution face à un principe de légalité criminelle et une loi pénale en déclin. Elle permet de garantir la protection des droits et liberté individuelle tout en tenant compte des évolutions du droit. Il convient dès lors d’affirmer « qu’il n’y a pas d’infraction sans norme pénale ». / The consensus today is unanimous. The principle of criminal legality has been weakened by developments in law. Statute law is no longer the sole source of criminal law ; its influence is declining and judges will play an indisputable role in criminal law. These developments are rooted in criminal law, of which they are parameters. It is impossible to find a criminal law in history that conforms to the principle of criminal legality such as that proclaimed by the revolutionaries of 1789. It is therefore appropriate that it should evolve. Therefore, these parameters are together the origin of the criminal standard. Contrary to statute law, this standard integrates all developments in common law. This standard is at the core of the common law for which it is the source. The principle of criminal legality is therefore no longer configured with reference to statute law but the criminal standard. As a consequence, we should speak of the principle of the standardisation of criminal law. This reconfiguration is therefore the solution to a principle of criminal legality and a statute law in decline. It allows for the guaranteed protection of individual rights and liberties taking into account developments of law. From now on, it shoudl be affirmed « that there is no crime without the criminal standard ».