The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

由於蘇聯解體所導致的核擴散，這個世界比起過去更加危險。新的安全威脅源自於俄羅斯核物質、武器與科學家的擴散。另一方面，俄羅斯軍事力量的下降導致俄羅斯提高了核武器在未來戰爭中的作用。俄羅斯國家安全構想與軍事學說的轉變可能升高核戰爭的可能性。在本文中，筆者將探討由俄羅斯所引起的核擴散風險。 / Because of the nuclear proliferation caused by the collapse of USSR, the world is more insecurity than before. The new security threat comes from the spread of Russian nuclear materials, weapons and scientists. On the other hand, the decline of Russian military leads Russia to pay much attention on the use of nuclear weapon in the future warfare. The change of the Russian national security concept and military doctrine may raise the possibility of nuclear war. In the paper, author will study the risk of nuclear proliferation caused by Russia.

The objectives of the study were to demonstrate that South Africa's decisions to develop and destroy its nuclear weapon capability were influenced by reactions to domestic security and other issues unrelated to security. South Africa obtained a nuclear weapon capacity because of an incremental approach to the nuclear weapon decision. The threat perceptions in the mind of the decision maker were also dominant factors, especially when the final decision for a nuclear deterrent was taken. The decision to destroy the nuclear weapon capacity was not primarily influenced by the growing non-proliferation norm, but by the changing security environment regionally as well as globally and possibly a realisation that a nuclear weapon capability was a significant security and financial liability for South Africa in the end. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

2002年元月，美國小布希總統宣稱北韓與伊拉克、伊朗，同屬「邪惡軸心」（Axis of Evil）國家，這些國家均係美國列入防止核武擴散之對象，於是北韓與美國關係旋墜落谷底，北韓之鬥爭策略是先昇溫，復加壓，然後迫使美國讓步；北韓復於2006年10月9日，正式對外宣布成功進行地下核武試驗，此舉無疑對東亞及國際安全均帶來衝擊。台灣基於同為亞太國家成員之一，應該理解北韓核武危機所牽動東北亞安全環境變化，以及美國、日本、中國及俄羅斯等國家多邊體系關係，倘北韓核武危機未能圓滿解決，擁核後之北韓除易成為東北亞潛伏威脅外，將引起日本加速武裝。北韓除製造核武問題外，北韓經濟困頓、民不聊生，朝鮮勞動黨為維繫獨裁政權統治，大肆販售飛彈等軍火牟取利益，甚至遭控訴涉及國際間多起販毒、製造假煙及偽造美鈔事件，而台灣位居東亞海空交通樞紐，台灣海峽為北韓船隻往來必經之路，因而有必要瞭解北韓政軍經現況，深入剖析北韓對於國際間衍生種種安全問題，訂定因應措施，以確保國家安全。 由於台灣外交情勢嚴峻，往往無法參與區域性國際組織，北韓乃伺機對台洽購精密儀器或刺探高科技產業技術，使得台灣容易成為北韓覬覦獲得國際管制性物品漏洞，本論文試圖探究並思索如何防止北韓向台灣採購可供軍事用途之精密儀器等用品，或可供生產提昇國防武器裝備之科技機器流向北韓，並配合國際反恐措施予以列管，這樣不僅符合國際利益，而且可以提昇台灣國際形象與國家地位；況且台灣亦有必要隨時瞭解國際上及美、歐等先進國家之最新出口管制措施，從而監督台灣廠商禁止將進口之高科技戰略性物品與生產之精密工具機，輾轉出口至管制地區（包括：伊朗、伊拉克、利比亞、北韓、中國、古巴、蘇丹等國），並配合國際防止擴散組織，共同防止大規模毀滅性武器擴散，形成全球安全之出口管制制度。 / In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as an “axis of evil”. These countries are regarded as subject to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the U.S. As a result, the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. has deteriorated. North Korea has attempted to gradually increase pressure to force the U.S. to concede; on October 9, 2006, North Korea officially announced the success of its secret nuclear weapon test, which undoubtedly made a tremendous impact on security in East Asia and the world. As a member of the Asia Pacific Region, Taiwan should understand how security in Northeast Asia changes due to the fact that North Korea is now a country with nuclear weapons. Taiwan should also be aware of the multilateral relations between the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. Without a satisfactory solution to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons, Japan may accelerate its military build-up in response to this lurking danger in Northeast Asia. Besides the nuclear weapon issue, North Korea has a poor economy and starving people. The Korean Workers’ Party has been accused of being involved in arms sale (such as missiles), international drug smuggling, counterfeit tobacco products, and counterfeit U.S. banknotes in order to maintain its dictatorship. As Taiwan’s geographic position is vital in the air and sea transport in East Asia, it is imperative for Taiwan to understand North Korea’s politics, armed forces, and economy. Taiwan must analyze and understand international security issues related to North Korea and map out corresponding actions so as to ensure national security. Due to its difficult diplomatic situation, Taiwan is unable to join many regional organizations. Therefore, North Korea takes this opportunity to purchase precision devices or pry into high technology from Taiwan. This makes Taiwan prone to become a legal loophole of which North Korea can take advantage to obtain international control items. This study investigates the ways for Taiwan to prevent North Korea from purchasing precision devices for military use or high-tech machinery that can improve defense weapons. In addition, the study also discusses how Taiwan can have better export control against North Korea by conforming to international anti-terror measures. To follow international principles is not only in line with global interests, but can also improve Taiwan’s international image and status. Therefore, Taiwan must keep itself updated of the latest export control measures implemented by the U.S., Europe, and other advanced countries. By doing so, Taiwan government can also prevent corporations in Taiwan from re-exporting strategic high-tech commodities and related production machinery to controlled territories, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan. With cooperation with international non-proliferation organizations, proliferation of WMDs can be stopped and a comprehensive export control network can be formed to maintain global security.

L’arme nucléaire, arme de destruction massive par excellence, est unique en son genre par son potentiel de destruction inédit et par le caractère indiscriminé de ses frappes. Véritable menace pour l’humanité, ce type d’arme se doit d’être encadré par un régime conventionnel international de non-prolifération et de désarmement des armes nucléaires fort et complet. Dans les faits, celui-ci comporte des lacunes. Ce mémoire s’intéresse au mécanisme de retrait de ce régime conventionnel international. Plus particulièrement, nous proposons une analyse de la procédure de dénonciation retrouvée dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires de 1968 (TNP), pièce maîtresse du régime, et dans le Traité New Start de 2010, seul traité en vigueur entre les deux superpuissances nucléaires, les États-Unis et la Russie. L’étude du retrait de la Corée du Nord du TNP en 2003 ainsi que des enseignements du régime général de droit international introduit par la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 viennent approfondir l’examen. On dévoile un mécanisme de retrait somme toute peu contraignant reposant largement sur le pouvoir arbitraire de l’État partie, malgré la menace importante pour la paix et pour la sécurité internationales engendrée par une telle décision. Jumelée à des mesures de suivi quasi inexistantes pour donner suite au retrait d’un État du TNP, cette situation laisse la communauté internationale face à une situation hautement dangereuse. À la lumière du mécanisme de retrait retrouvé dans l’Union européenne et tel qu’illustré par le récent cas du Brexit, ce mémoire propose de possibles pistes de solution pour renforcer le mécanisme de retrait du cadre juridique international de non-prolifération et de désarmement des armes nucléaires. / Nuclear weapons, the apex of weapons of mass destruction, are unique in the facet that they have an unprecedented potential for destruction, as well as in the fact that nuclear strikes are indiscriminate. This type of weapon, which represents a real threat to humanity, must be regulated by a strong and complete international conventional regimen of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, the latter suffers from deficiencies. This master’s thesis focuses on the withdrawal mechanism found in this international legal field. The spotlight is more specifically directed on its cornerstone treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT), and on the New Start Treaty of 2010, the only agreement which regulates the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear superpowers, Russia and the United States of America. The analysis is enhanced by the study of the 2003 North-Korean withdrawal from the NPT and of the principles introduced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. A rather soft withdrawal mechanism, which relies largely on the discretion of the State party, is revealed, despite the threat to international peace and security a decision to withdraw represents. This deficiency, paired with inexistent follow-up measures, leaves the international community facing a highly dangerous situation. The examination of the more substantiated withdrawal mechanism found in the European Union’s body of law, as illustrated by the Brexit, allows us to suggest possible solutions to strengthen the NPT withdrawal mechanism as well as potential follow-up measures to be implemented following the withdrawal of a State party.