The rapid change within the South African workplace and competitiveness of organisations required employed and unemployed individuals to be trained and retrained as a large number of the South African population is unskilled. In the chemical industry employability of individuals is of extra ordinarily importance to both employer and individual. One of the main focuses of the Chemical Industries Education and Training Authority (CHIETA) is to enable learners through the promotion of employability to enter into learnerships to develop the necessary skills to develop sustainable livelihoods (CHIETA, 2011). There are high expectations of the learnerships system which was implemented during 2001 in South Africa. This system is set as a key strategic component of the National Skills Development Strategy, 2011-2016. Learnership programmes are implemented in South African organisations which is a great platform for employee development. Employees are afforded the opportunity to broaden their knowledge in the studied field and gain the needed skills within the organisation (Department of Labour, 1997). Learnerships are seen as a demand driven formal labour market tool, to address the existing need for critical, scarce - high and intermediate - skills levels. Simultaneously, it is seen as an employment-creation mechanism at the low and intermediate skills levels. This statement is a fundamental principle of a survey done on learnerships (Smith, Jennings, & Solanki, 2005). Researchers concluded that learnership programmes are the ideal for employees to acquire the needed skills to become competent and to provide jobs for the unemployed and in this manner enhance employability (Smith et al., 2005). The main aim of article one was to determine the differences in the levels of the psychological contracts, violation of the psychological contract, learners‟ expectations, employability, life satisfaction and work engagement between individual variables (type of learnership contracts, gender, race, age, date of commencement of learnership, date of completion of learnership). A cross-sectional survey design was used. A total of 237 learners completed the questionnaire. The psychological contract scale, violation of the psychological contract scale, learners‟ expectations scale, employability scale, life satisfaction scale, work engagement scale and biographical scale were administered. The results indicated that a statistically significant difference was obtained for age, date of commencement of learnership and date of completion of learnership, but no relationship exists with type of learnership contract, gender and race. The aim of the second article was to determine the relationship between learners within learnership psychological contract, state of the psychological contract, expectations and violations of psychological contract, employability, work engagement and life satisfaction. Furthermore, the study strives to determine whether violation of the psychological contract, learners‟ expectations and employability could predict life satisfaction of learners. A practically significant relationship with a medium effect exists between violation of the psychological contract, state of psychological contract (negative), and employability (positive). A positive practically significant relationship exists between state of psychological contract and work engagement. No relationship was found between employability, life satisfaction and work engagement. A positive practically significant relationship with a medium effect exists between life satisfaction and work engagement. Employer obligations and employability predict life satisfaction. The state of the psychological contract (trust) and life satisfaction predict work engagement of learners. / MA (Labour Relations Management), North-West University, Vaal Triangle Campus, 2014

La relation médicale est en permanente mutation du fait des évolutions techniques ou des changements de mentalité. La charte des droits de la personne hospitalisée a reconnu des droits aux patients qui deviennent alors des partenaires incontournables de la relation médicale prenant un rôle de plus en plus actif. Ces droits ont profondément marqué les esprits des professionnels de santé qui se sentent stigmatisés par une société de consommation et de preuve. La relation de confiance perd de son intérêt au profit de l'information, du recueil du consentement, du respect de la dignité et de la confidentialité. Parler d'obligations et de devoirs n'est pas anodin. Ce concept a un double intérêt vu le contexte et les enjeux de notre société et il pourrait trouver tout naturellement une application dans le domaine sanitaire, notamment lors d'une hospitalisation. La réelle question est de savoir s'il existe, dans ce dernier cas, des obligations et des devoirs à la charge de la personne hospitalisée. Une première approche permettra de rechercher des éléments de réponse alors qu'une seconde approche aura pour but de recenser les obligations avec leurs sanctions éventuelles. Mettre en parallèle les droits et les obligations des personnes hospitalisées devrait permettre de relier enfin le praticien au patient, d'équilibrer la relation et reconnaître ainsi un contre poids aux droits, un complément et non un opposant à la Charte. Faut-il encore que ces obligations soient connues… / Medical relation is in permanent mutation due to technical evolutions or mentality changes. Patients have been awarded rights by the Charter of hospitalized people's rights that make them major partners in the medical relation taking a more and more active role. These rights have profoundly marked the minds of health professionals who feel stigmatized by a consumption and proof society. The trust relation loses its interest for the benefit of information, obtaining consent, dignity's respect and confidentiality. Talking about obligations and duties is not insignificant. This concept has a dual interest in view of the context and the stakes of our society and it could naturally find a scope in the sanitarian field, especially during hospitalization. The real question is to know if, in the latter case, obligations and duties dependent on the hospitalized people exist. A first approach will permit to search for answers, while a second approach will try to list obligations and their possible penalties. To draw a parallel between the rights and obligations of hospitalized people should finally permit to link practitioner and patient, to balance the relation and so to acknowledge a counterbalance to the rights, a complement not an opponent to the Charter. Still, these obligations have to be known...

Le contrat de travail fonde la relation de travail et institue le rapport de subordination qui se concrétise par la concession d’un pouvoir à l’employeur. C’est donc aux parties qu’il revient de définir l’étendue, le domaine et les limites du pouvoir patronal. Le salarié ne consent qu’à une subordination strictement définie et encadrée par le contrat. Une analyse objective de la volonté implicite des contractants, au regard de leurs attentes légitimes et de la finalité du pouvoir institué, et à la lumière des exigences du droit commun des contrats (notamment l’exigence de détermination de l’objet des obligations) et des droits fondamentaux (en premier lieu le droit à la protection de la santé) permet d’identifier leurs droits et obligations réciproques : quelles sont les prérogatives que l’employeur est habilité à exercer ? Quelles sont les données du rapport d’emploi qui ne peuvent être remises en cause unilatéralement ? Par ailleurs, le salarié tire du contrat plusieurs pouvoirs d’initiative (exception d’inexécution, prise d’acte) lui permettant de réagir à un manquement de l’employeur. Ceux-ci concourent à l’effectivité des prévisions contractuelles et témoignent d’une réhabilitation du salarié en tant que contractant : contractant subordonné, certes, mais contractant à part entière avant tout. / The employment agreement establishes the work relationship and institutes the relation of subordination which is reflected by a grant of power to the employer. It is thus up to the parties to define the extent, scope and limits of the employer’s authority. The employee only consents to a subordination strictly defined and controlled by the contract. An objective analysis of the implicit will of the contracting parties, with regard to their legitimate expectations and the finality of the authority instituted, and in light of requirements of contract law (notably the requirement to determine the object of obligations) and fundamental rights (primarily the right to health protection) enables to identify their mutual rights and obligations: which prerogatives the employer is entitled to exercise ? Which elements of the employment relationship cannot be altered unilaterally ? Besides, there are several powers of initiatives which the employee derives from the contract (exception of non-performance, constructive dismissal) allowing the employee to react to a breach by the employer. These contribute to the effectiveness of the contractual provisions and reflect a reinstatement of the employee as contractor : a subordinate contracting party, certainly, but a contracting party in its own right first and foremost.

De la volonté des parties de s’accorder sur les éléments essentiels d’un contrat, naît tout un processus contractuel qui se traduit par la création d’obligations, éléments susceptibles d’être à l’origine d’un désaccord. Dès lors qu’un juge est saisi d’un litige, les opérations d’interprétation et de qualification du contrat litigieux auxquelles il se consacre se définissent par une double fonction. Dans un premier temps, l’interprétation du contenu du contrat permet au juge de repérer les éléments de fait qui ont été déterminants de la volonté des parties de contracter. Dans un second temps, une fois déterminés, ces éléments qui sont porteurs du sens du contrat, vont permettre au juge d’apporter, une solution au désaccord qui oppose les parties. Or, la solution ne trouvera son efficacité que si le juge applique aux éléments de fait qu’il a identifiés le droit approprié ; il faut pour cela qualifier le fait au sens où la qualification, consiste à déterminer la catégorie dans laquelle s’inscrit le contrat, afin de lui appliquer le régime juridique qui lui correspond. Elle est en cela le préalable à l’application d’une règle juridique. Opération intellectuelle, la qualification fait ainsi office de charnière entre les deux fonctions attachée à l’opération d’interprétation que sont l’interprétation des données de fait et la solution apportée par le juge sur le contenu contractuel litigieux. / A contractual process begins with the intention of the parties to agree on the essential elements of a contract. This process which results in the creation of obligations, may be the cause of a disagreement. When a judge has to rule on a contractual dispute, the processes of interpretation and characterization of the contract which he has to perform have a double function. First, the interpretation of the contents of the contract allows the judge to identify the factual elements which are evidence of the intention of the parties to enter into a contract. Secondly, once identified, these elements which contain the meaning of the contract, will allow the judge to find a solution to the disagreement between the parties. However, this solution will only be efficient if the judge applies the appropriate law to the facts which he has identified. To do so, the judge will have to characterize the contract, which consists in determining the category in which the contract falls in order to apply the relevant legal framework. Thus, characterization is a prerequisite to the application of a legal provision. The intellectual process of characterization is the link between the two functions involved in the interpretation process, i.e. the interpretation of the factual elements and the solution provided by the judge to the disputed contractual terms.

L'activité bancaire comporte nécessairement certains risques. Or, face au risque, le refus possède fondamentalement une vertu protectrice et est source de sécurité. Parce que le banquier est le premier à s’exposer aux risques, il semble naturel que la matière bancaire soit dominée par un principe de liberté, liberté de contracter, liberté d'entreprendre, liberté de prendre des risques et, partant, liberté de refuser. Toutefois, une propension du banquier à se surprotéger se révèlerait nocive pour le public, le refus étant naturellement source d’exclusion économique et sociale. En effet, il est impossible de nier le caractère indispensable des services bancaires pour tous les acteurs de la société. La liberté de refus du banquier doit donc être tempérée par la recherche d’un équilibre entre sa propre protection et la protection de sa clientèle réelle ou potentielle. De cette recherched’équilibre résultera alors une restriction certaine mais délimitée de sa liberté de refus de sorte qu'il sera, dans certaines hypothèses, débiteur d'un devoir de ne pas refuser. Dès lors, la liberté demeure le principe auquel il est dérogé par exception.Pour autant, le banquier n'est pas seul à prendre des risques. En effet, les contrats bancaires comportent des risques supportés par les cocontractants mais également par leurs créanciers, pourtant tiers aux contrats. C’est pourquoi, les cocontractants, souvent moins rompus que le banquier aux risques inhérents aux opérations de banque, et les tiers, ignorant généralement l’existence de ces risques, méritent d'être protégés. La recherche de sécurité pourrait alors prendre la forme d'une obligation au refus à la charge du banquier. Or, toute obligation au refus porte une atteinte évidente aux libertés du banquier et de ses cocontractants que seule la protection de l'intérêt général est véritablement en mesure de justifier. Toutefois, s’il existe, en droit positif, des hypothèses obligeant le banquier à refuser certaines opérations trop risquées, il semble qu’une obligation au refus en matière de crédit soit difficile voire impossible à dégager. Du reste, une telle obligation, pour morale qu’elle paraisse, ne serait pas souhaitable en ce qu’elle pourrait avoir pour conséquence de porter atteinte aux intérêts qu’elle prétendrait protéger. / Banking Business is subject to specific risks. Against these risks, the banker’s refusal seems to be an adequate means of protection and security.Since the banker is the first to expose himself to those risks, it seems natural that banking law is governed by a principle of freedom: freedom of contract, entrepreneurial freedom, freedom to take risks and consequently freedom to refuse. However, a banker’s tendency to overprotect himself would turn out to be detrimental to the public as such refusal can be a source of social and economic exclusion. Indeed, it is absolutely impossible to deny how vital the banking services are for all society actors. The banker’s freedom of refusal shall therefore be tempered by the search for an appropriate balance between his own protection and his existing or potential customers’ protection. Thus, certain and defined limitations to the banker’s freedom of refusal should result from this search for balance so that, under certain circumstances, a duty not to refuse could be imposed on the banker. In any event, freedom remains the principle while exceptions may be justified.Furthermore, the banker is not the only one to take risks. Indeed, banking contracts involve risks borne by his co-contractors and by their creditors, even though they are third parties to the agreement. That is why the co-contractors, often less experienced than the banker regarding the risks attached to bank operations, as well as the third parties to the agreement who are unaware of the existence of such risks deserve in this respect to be protected. The search for security could take the form of a refusal obligation imposed on the banker. However, as any obligation of refusal infringes on the banker’s and his co-contractors’ freedom, only the protection of the general interest would actually be able to justify such infringement. Though, even if there are indisputable assumptions where such an obligation of refusal exist under positive law, it appears that a general obligation of refusal shall be difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Such an obligation, although deemed moral, is undesirable as it could result in affecting the interests it sought to protect.

The rapid change within the South African workplace and competitiveness of organisations required employed and unemployed individuals to be trained and retrained as a large number of the South African population is unskilled. In the chemical industry employability of individuals is of extra ordinarily importance to both employer and individual. One of the main focuses of the Chemical Industries Education and Training Authority (CHIETA) is to enable learners through the promotion of employability to enter into learnerships to develop the necessary skills to develop sustainable livelihoods (CHIETA, 2011). There are high expectations of the learnerships system which was implemented during 2001 in South Africa. This system is set as a key strategic component of the National Skills Development Strategy, 2011-2016. Learnership programmes are implemented in South African organisations which is a great platform for employee development. Employees are afforded the opportunity to broaden their knowledge in the studied field and gain the needed skills within the organisation (Department of Labour, 1997). Learnerships are seen as a demand driven formal labour market tool, to address the existing need for critical, scarce - high and intermediate - skills levels. Simultaneously, it is seen as an employment-creation mechanism at the low and intermediate skills levels. This statement is a fundamental principle of a survey done on learnerships (Smith, Jennings, & Solanki, 2005). Researchers concluded that learnership programmes are the ideal for employees to acquire the needed skills to become competent and to provide jobs for the unemployed and in this manner enhance employability (Smith et al., 2005). The main aim of article one was to determine the differences in the levels of the psychological contracts, violation of the psychological contract, learners‟ expectations, employability, life satisfaction and work engagement between individual variables (type of learnership contracts, gender, race, age, date of commencement of learnership, date of completion of learnership). A cross-sectional survey design was used. A total of 237 learners completed the questionnaire. The psychological contract scale, violation of the psychological contract scale, learners‟ expectations scale, employability scale, life satisfaction scale, work engagement scale and biographical scale were administered. The results indicated that a statistically significant difference was obtained for age, date of commencement of learnership and date of completion of learnership, but no relationship exists with type of learnership contract, gender and race. The aim of the second article was to determine the relationship between learners within learnership psychological contract, state of the psychological contract, expectations and violations of psychological contract, employability, work engagement and life satisfaction. Furthermore, the study strives to determine whether violation of the psychological contract, learners‟ expectations and employability could predict life satisfaction of learners. A practically significant relationship with a medium effect exists between violation of the psychological contract, state of psychological contract (negative), and employability (positive). A positive practically significant relationship exists between state of psychological contract and work engagement. No relationship was found between employability, life satisfaction and work engagement. A positive practically significant relationship with a medium effect exists between life satisfaction and work engagement. Employer obligations and employability predict life satisfaction. The state of the psychological contract (trust) and life satisfaction predict work engagement of learners. / MA (Labour Relations Management), North-West University, Vaal Triangle Campus, 2014

No description available.

La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a, en 1968, dès son cinquième arrêt au principal, établi que des droits civils et politiques pouvaient générer des obligations d'action à la charge des États. Cette affirmation venait remettre en cause la définition traditionnelle de ces droits. En effet, ils étaient classiquement considérés comme mettant à la charge des États uniquement des obligations négatives. En revanche, les droits économiques sociaux et culturels étaient présentés comme imposant seulement des obligations positives. Le juge européen a, depuis lors, mis au jour un nombre croissant d'obligations positives prétoriennes. Plusieurs techniques ont été développées pour ce faire. Cette étude vise à analyser ce que nous avons dénommé la technique des obligations positives, c'est-à-dire l'usage par la Cour des termes « obligations positives » ou « mesures positives ». Cette technique permet non seulement au juge européen de dégager des obligations d'action à la charge des États, mais également de reconnaître sa compétence pour contrôler l'exécution de ses propres arrêts, de conférer un effet horizontal à la Convention ou encore d'étendre la notion de juridiction au sens de l'article 1 CEDH. Elle est également un moyen de moduler son contrôle en permettant tantôt d'accorder une large marge nationale d'appréciation, tantôt de la réduire à néant. Cette diversification croissante de l'usage de la technique dans la jurisprudence européenne est toutefois source d'incohérences.La thèse défendue vise à démontrer que la technique des obligations positives est un outil d'adaptation de la norme juridique conventionnelle à l'évolution des États démocratiques et libéraux européens. / As early as 1968, the fifth merits judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established that civil and political rights could generate action obligations on the European States. This judgment was challenging the usual definition of those rights, which were traditionally considered as charging the public authorities with only negative obligations. In contrast, economic, social and cultural rights were positioned as imposing positive obligations on the public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has since created an increasing number of positive obligations and several techniques were developed for this purpose. This study aims to explore the “positive obligations technique”, that is to say, the Court's use of the terms “positive obligations” or “positive measures”. This technique not only allows the Court judge to impose action obligations on the European States, also recognizes the Court judge's competence to monitor the implementation by the public authorities of its own decisions, to give a horizontal effect to the Convention and to extend the concept of "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This technique also permits to modulate the Court's control over the European States, granting a wide margin of appreciation or reducing it to nothing. The increasing diversification of the use of this technique in European case law is however a source of discrepancy.. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the technique of positive obligations is a tool for adaptation of the conventional norma to the changes of the democratic and liberal European States.

Le droit de l’environnement est un droit relativement jeune, dont la filiation naturelle à l’intérêt général en a fait l’affaire exclusive des pouvoirs publics. Mais aujourd’hui, alors que « toute personne a le devoir de prendre part à la préservation et à l’amélioration de l’environnement » (article 2 de la Charte de l’environnement), il ne saurait rester cantonné dans les bastions du droit public. La tendance contemporaine à la contractualisation du droit, traversant de nombreuses branches, touche le droit de l’environnement qui y puise les ressources de son déploiement. A cette fin, parler de « contractualisation du droit de l’environnement » recouvre deux réalités. C’est, d’abord, constater que le droit de l’environnement investit le contrat, qu’il s’agisse de diversifier son objet environnemental ou laisser y proliférer des obligations environnementales. La stratégie est simple. Le droit de l’environnement se place dans le contrat. Et le contrat, tel un « cheval de Troie », le fait pénétrer dans l’enceinte des relations interindividuelles. Vecteur de diffusion du droit de l’environnement, le contrat en devient un outil de gestion favorisant sa réception par les individus. C’est, ensuite, remarquer que le contrat agit sur le droit de l’environnement. Son action est, en premier lieu, créatrice de droit. A cet égard, la contractualisation recoupe, pour une part, l’hypothèse du droit négocié portant une dimension collective dans l’élaboration du droit et soulève, pour une autre part, la question débattue du potentiel normatif du contrat individuel, qui paraît pleinement se déployer en matière environnementale. L’action du contrat est, en second lieu, réformatrice. Une profonde mutation structurelle du droit de l’environnement est en effet à l’oeuvre, posant les fondations d’un ordre juridique environnemental, dont l’architecture glisse « de la pyramide au réseau ». Un tel changement de physionomie s’accompagnerait d’un changement de philosophie, vers un droit du développement durable. Mais c’est davantage au soutien d’un développement durable du droit de l’environnement que la dynamique de contractualisation trouvera sa pertinence. Dans le contrat et par le contrat, le droit de l’environnement prend de l’envergure : il rayonne et il s’impose, prêt à relever le défi de sa « modernisation ». / Environmental law is a relatively young law. Due to its natural filiation to public interest, it was exclusively governed by the public authorities. But today, while "everyone has the duty to participate in the conservation and in the improvement of the environment" (article 2 of the Charter for the environment), it could not remain quartered in the realm of public law. The contemporary trend to the law contractualization, crossing lots of branches, concerns environmental law which draws from it the resources of its deployment. To this end, speaking about "contractualization of the environmental law" covers two realities. It is, at first, to notice that environmental law moves into the contract, whether it is a question of diversifying its environmental object or of letting proliferate environmental obligations there. The strategy is simple. Environmental law takes place in the contract. And the contract, like a Trojan horse, makes it penetrate the enclosure of the interpersonal relations. Like a vehicle for dissemination of environmental law, the contract becomes one management tool favoring its reception by individuals. It is, then, to notice that the contract acts on environmental law. In this connexion, the contractualization overlaps, for one part, the hypothesis of the negotiated law carrying a collective dimension in the elaboration of the law, and for another part, that of the spontaneous law revealing the normative potential of the individual contract. A profound structural transformation of environmental law is at work, putting the foundations of an ecological public order, the architecture of which slides "from the pyramid to the network". Such a change of face comes along with a change in philosophy, towards a sustainable development law. But it is more in the support of a sustainable development of environmental law that the dynamics of contractualization will find its relevance. In the contract and by the contract, environmental law expands: it shines and it stands out, ready to take up the challenge of its "modernization".

La procéduralisation des droits substantiels est un phénomène désormais incontournable du système conventionnel qui ne cesse de se développer et de s’étendre. Néologisme d’origine doctrinale, cette notion semble pourtant difficilement saisissable. La procéduralisation des droits substantiels appelle en ce sens différentes interrogations liées tant à sa définition qu’à sesimplications pour le mécanisme conventionnel. Que désigne cette notion complexe et hétérogène ? Comment le juge a-t-il réussi à la mettre en place alors que ce procédé était initialement totalement absent du texte de la Convention ? À quoi est-elle destinée ? L’hypothèse retenue est que la procéduralisation des droits substantiels est une technique juridique spécifique au sein du mécanisme conventionnel, qui permet au juge d’atteindre une meilleure effectivité des droits. Toutefois, loin d’être limitée à ce seul cadre, la procéduralisation s’avère inscrite au contraire dans une dimension beaucoup plus vaste touchant à des aspects institutionnels en étant au service de la réalisation d’un projet politique particulier. / The “procéduralisation” - or procedural processing - of substantial rights has become an unavoidable phenomenon in the conventional system and it keeps growing and spreading. Originally a doctrinal concept, this neologism seems somehow hard to grasp. The “procéduralisation” of substantial rights raises many questions about both its definition and implications for the conventional process. What is this complex and heterogeneous notion refering to ? How did the judge succeed to establish it, whereas this process was initially totally ignored by the European Convention ? What is it intended for ? We argue that the “procéduralisation” of substantial rights is a specific legal technique in the European case law, which enables the judge to achieve a better effectiveness for the rights. Nevertheless, the “procéduralisation” is not bounded inside this framework, but has proven on the contrary to fit into a much wider dimension related to institutional questions, being dedicated to the fulfilment of a specific political project.