A dream can impact a person so profoundly that it may permanently alter his or her life, beliefs, or behaviour. Most of the time, these gifts of insight happen to only a rare few and usually occur without intention. These life-altering dreams are spontaneous and unpredictable. While most studies focus on the content or meaning of dreams after they occur, this study explores the possibility of using dreams to influence behavioural changes in the waking world. This study examined three of the dream elements associated with profound dreams that could potentially be used to develop a systematic method of using dreams to create behavioural changes. The three elements are (a) Emotion: the ability to generate high-emotion states within a dream; (b) Narrative: the formation of narratives within a dream; and (c) Reality: the ability of the dreamer to perceive and accept the dream as reality. This study was conducted using a qualitative research design with a narrative analysis approach in order to explore and understand the subjective experiences of two participants. Data were collected through the participants‘ interviews and dream journals to help determine themes emerging from each of the participants‘ individual experiences. The themes were then analysed for any information regarding the three elements of dreaming as well as the dreams‘ personal significance to the dreamer. Further analysis explored whether lucid or non-lucid dreaming was able to intentionally produce an experientially-based shift in a specific target behaviour. The results of this research study suggest that there is potential for using dreams to induce behavioural change. The research provided a preliminary inquiry into this new field of dream therapy. This exploration of key elements to a potential dream method may prove essential to defining a basic framework and the tools that may be required to implement a new dream method. Future studies are necessary to uncover the correct combination of elements that will produce profound dream experiences at will. / Psychology / Ph. D. (Psychology)

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-03-01Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:26:29Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 canal_r_me_mar.pdf: 674095 bytes, checksum: d8de33d90928175432162413a159cb42 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O problema da Intencionalidade da mente tem sido, por mais de duas décadas, objeto de intensa e persistente análise filosófica elaborada pelo filósofo americano John Rogers Searle (1932- ). Junto com o problema da consciência, não menos relevante no conjunto de sua teorização, sua visão acerca da natureza e das operações da Intencionalidade se constitui como um dos pilares centrais de seu programa filosófico de estudos dos fenômenos mentais. O objetivo principal desta dissertação é apresentar, discutir e avaliar criticamente sua concepção de Intencionalidade da mente. Com o fim de atingir esses três objetivos, que estruturam nosso trabalho, argumentamos que, para alcançar uma compreensão bem detalhada, ampla e profunda da concepção searleana de Intencionalidade da mente, é preciso explicar esta última tanto como um fenômeno mental (psicológico) quanto como um fenômeno natural/biológico. Expomos de modo pormenorizado as famílias de noções que definem a natureza, a estrutura, as formas mentais centrais, o funcionamento, bem como a maneira como Searle entende que devamos naturalizar a Intencionalidade, no capitulo 2 deste trabalho (respectivamente nas seções 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3,4, 3.5). Além disso, observamos que a ambição desse filósofo, no campo da filosofia da mente, não se limitou somente a ter desenvolvido uma visão sobre a natureza e o funcionamento da Intencionalidade da mente, e em mostrar como tratá-la naturalisticamente, mas consistiu também em apontar o que há de errado nos estudos filosóficos e científicos contemporâneos sobre o assunto, e propor correções. Nesse ponto, apresentamos os principais e gerais descontentamentos de Searle no Capítulo 1: das seções 2.1 à seção 2.6 apresentamos sua ambição de criticar e reformar os estudos atuais, os quais são focados na análise do materialismo contemporâneo no estudo da mente; subsequentemente (seção 2.7), explicitamos sua tentativa de rejeição da insolubilidade do aclamado e controverso problema mente-corpo e apresentamos as revisões propostas por ele para que essa insolubilidade desvaneça. No que diz respeito à avaliação crítica, procuramos identificar algumas dificuldades na visão de Searle sobre o que foi exposto nos capítulos 1 e 2. Buscamos analisar minuciosamente sua solução do problema mente-corpo, seu naturalismo biológico, e examinar como ele trata naturalisticamente a noção de Intencionalidade da mente com a estratégia redutiva denominada de redução causal. Partindo de algumas observações que o renomado epistemólogo da ciência Gilles-Gaston Granger (1994) fez acerca dos métodos - das regras e dos procedimentos - que regem as ciências naturais, afirmando que todo conhecimento científico, do que depende da experiência, consiste em esquematizar experiências, procuramos mostrar que a estratégia da redução causal possui as mesmas implicações negativas, apontadas por Granger, para o estudo da natureza e estrutura de nossa vida mental, em geral, e da natureza estrutural da Intencionalidade, em particular. Esperamos ter cumprido este último objetivo no capítulo 3 desta dissertação. / The problem of the intentionality of mind has been, by more than two decades, object of intense and persistent philosophical analysis prepared by American philosopher John Rogers Searle (1932 - ). Together with the problem of conscience, not least in the whole of its theorizing, his vision about the nature and of the operations of the intentionality is as a central pillars of its philosophical program studies of mental phenomena. The aim of this work is to discuss and evaluate John Searle`s conception of Intentionality. In order to carry out this task it was necessary first to show that to reach a more detailed, broader and more profound understanding of Searle`s conception of Intentionality it is necessary to explain Intentionality as a mental (psychological) phenomenon as well as a natural/biological one. We present in detail the families of concepts which define the nature, the structure, the central mental forms, operation, as well as how Searle believes that we should naturalize the Intentionality, in Chapter 2 of this work (respectively in sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). Furthermore, we emphasize that our philosopher`s ambition, as regards his investigations in the philosophy of mind is not limited to developing a theory of the nature and functioning of the intentionality of mind and to show how to naturalize it as a natural/biological phenomenon, but consists also in identifying, criticizing and correcting with a view to overcome various mistakes in the views of other thinkers (philosophers or scientists) about what he takes to be errors in the studies of mental phenomenon both in philosophy and in contemporary science. In that point, we present the main and general disagreements of Searle in Chapter 1: in the sections 2.1 of section 2.6 presenting its ambition to criticize and reform the current studies, which are raised in the analysis of materialism contemporary in the study of mind; subsequently (section 2.7), we describe its attempt to reject the insolubility of the acclaimed and controversial problem mind-body and present the proposed revisions by him for that insolubility disappear. As regards the critical assessment, we tried to identify some difficulties in the vision of Searle on what was exposed in chapters 1 and 2. We thoroughly consider its solution mind-body, its biological naturalism, and examine how it deals the notion of Intentionality of mind with the reductive strategy called causal reduction. On the basis of some remarks that the renowned thinker of science Gilles-Gaston Granger (1994) made about the methods - the rules and procedures - governing the natural sciences, affirming that the whole scientific knowledge, which depends on the experience, to outline experience, we attempt to show that the strategy of causal reduction has the same negative implications, Granger pointed out by, for the study of the nature and structure of our mental life, in general, and a structural nature of the intentionality, in particular. We hope to have fulfilled this last objective in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-12-16Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:53:23Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 alves_dz_me_mar.pdf: 953969 bytes, checksum: 976e357b345098e9424e02053aa842d0 (MD5) / O presente trabalho pretende delinear uma possível interpretação do behaviorismo radical como teoria da mente, o que significa, em outros termos, contextualizá-lo no âmbito da filosofia da mente. Para tanto, primeiramente apresentaremos as principais teorias que figuram na filosofia da mente contemporânea, incluindo suas teses centrais e seus respectivos problemas. Em seguida, trataremos dos fundamentos do behaviorismo radical enquanto filosofia da ciência e enquanto teoria do comportamento. Esses dois passos servirão ao propósito de estabelecer os parâmetros da discussão subseqüente entre behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente. Nesse sentido, o primeiro problema que pretendemos responder é: o que é a mente? Trata-se de um problema conceitual que envolve o mapeamento dos fenômenos normalmente caracterizados como mentais. Veremos que, para o behaviorismo radical, a mente é comportamento. Já o segundo problema que pretendemos responder é: qual a natureza da mente? – problema que, no contexto do behaviorismo radical, deve ser substituído pelo seguinte: qual a natureza do comportamento? Discorrer sobre a natureza de um fenômeno implica investigar quais são as características essenciais à sua existência. Trata-se, portanto, de um problema ontológico. Sugeriremos que as características essenciais para a existência do comportamento podem ser contempladas pelo posicionamento metafísico denominado relacionismo substancial. Em tempo, além dessas duas questões principais, discorreremos ao longo do trabalho sobre diversos problemas levantados pelas teorias da mente contemporâneas, tais como o problema da subjetividade, o problema do fisicalismo, o problema dos limites da ciência, o problema mente-corpo, o problema da causalidade mental, o problema do significado, o problema do reducionismo, o problema das qualidades das experiências, o problema do conhecimento... / The aim of this work is to delineate a possible interpretation of radical behaviorism as a theory of mind. That means putting radical behaviorism in the context of philosophy of mind. To do so, firstly we will present the main theories of contemporary philosophy of mind, including its central thesis and its respective problems. Next, we will present the principles of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science and as a theory of behavior. Those steps will serve to establish the parameters for subsequent discussion between radical behaviorism and the problems of philosophy of mind. The first problem with which we pretend to deal is the conceptual problem of mind: what is mind? As we will see, for radical behaviorism the mind is behavior. The second problem with which we pretend to deal is the ontological problem of mind: what is the nature of mind? In the radical behaviorist context, the question must be substituted by this: what is the nature of behavior? Discussions about the nature of things demands investigating what characteristics are essential to its existence. We will suggest that the essential characteristics of the existence of behavior can be contemplated by the metaphysical view denominated substantial relationism. Moreover, in addition to our two principal problems, we will discuss through this work several problems of philosophy of mind, such as the problem of subjectivity, the problem of physicalism, the problem of science limits, the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, the problem of meaning, the problem of reductionism, the problem of qualitative character of experiences, the problem of privileged knowledge, the problem of qualia, and others. In the end, we hope that this work may represent a step toward the construction of a radical behaviorist theory of mind

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2315.pdf: 835286 bytes, checksum: bb4fc006ed09b9b9f8cb1920ee0092de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-27 / The thesis main goal is to analyze the various forms of relationship between subjects and technical-objects, with emphasis on the use of digital computers and, particularly, softwares called smart agents. The thesis analyzes the space and its qualitative changes in actuality, from the concept of space as a human production, analyzing how the changes underway in the environment affect our subjectivities and, conversely, how we affect our environments. There are presented arguments about the possibilities of survival for the naked man in these new spaces, unless it is properly updated with the latest technology - sensory and motor prostheses. There is a discussion about the use of space as a part of the thought process and about the abstract space par excellence, the virtual worlds. From the discussions of space, the thesis proposes reflections about the body that will be included in these new spaces. There is presented a pattern for the use of artifacts by man and its effects on subjectivity. The body that is increasingly appropriating technical-objects, prosthetic body, establishing new relationships with technology and is a parabiotic system. Then, the thesis discusses the pattern applied to the use of intangible technical-objects (software). There are two conceptual proposals, about the possibility of considering the smart agents as one of the layers of dennett s model of consciousness (multiple drafts model). The second proposal, similar in approach, shows that smart agents can be considered as modules under the model of conscience of Fodor. The thesis brings thoughts about the possibility of considering smart agents as autonomous and independent the Artificial Intelligence. It presents a conceptual proposal, which is the definition of objective states that may not be objectively treated, as a possible root to the possibility of autonomy in computing machines. The conclusions of the thesis indicate a growing difficulty in discerning the boundaries between minds and digital machines, in a world of hybrids cognitive systems. / A tese tem como objetivo principal refletir sobre as várias formas de relação entre sujeitos e objetos-técnicos, com ênfase para a utilização dos computadores digitais e, particularmente, os softwares chamados agentes inteligentes. A tese analisa o espaço e suas mudanças qualitativas na atualidade, a partir do conceito do espaço como produção humana, analisando como as transformações em curso no ambiente afetam nossas subjetividades e, reciprocamente, como afetamos nossos ambientes. São discutidas as possibilidades de sobrevivência do homem nu nesses novos espaços, sem que esteja devidamente atualizado com as últimas novidades tecnológicas próteses sensoriais e motoras. O trabalho perpassa a discussão sobre o pensamento que se utiliza do espaço como elemento constituinte do próprio pensamento e reflete sobre o espaço abstrato por excelência, os mundos virtuais. A partir das discussões do espaço, a tese propõe reflexões sobre o corpo que vai se inserir nesses novos espaços. Discute-se o padrão de apropriação de artefatos pelo homem e seus efeitos na subjetividade. O corpo que se apropria crescentemente dos objetos técnicos, corpo protético, estabelece novas relações com a tecnologia, constituindo-se em um sistema parabiótico. Em seguida, a tese discute a manutenção do padrão de apropriação dos objetos-técnicos materiais em relação às formas de apropriação dos objetos-técnicos intangíveis (softwares). São apresentadas duas propostas conceituais inovadoras, quanto à possibilidade de se assumir os softwares (agentes inteligentes), entidades incorpóreas e autônomas, como uma das camadas da consciência, no âmbito do modelo dennettiano de uma consciência com múltiplas camadas (multiple drafts model). A segunda proposta, similar na abordagem, postula que os agentes inteligentes possam se configurar como módulos (faculdades verticais) no âmbito do modelo de consciência de Fodor. A tese traz reflexões sobre a possibilidade de autonomização completa dos agentes inteligentes e a sua instituição, ipso facto, como agentes a chamada Inteligência Artificial. Apresenta-se uma proposta conceitual original, que é a definição de estados objetais não objetiváveis como, possivelmente, uma primeira raiz para que se comece a discutir as possibilidades de singularização das máquinas computacionais. As conclusões da tese sinalizam para uma crescente dificuldade no discernimento das fronteiras entre mentes e máquinas digitais, em um mundo de sistemas cognitivos híbridos.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1684.pdf: 1154750 bytes, checksum: 1633dff45db74e09b4b96af809718c99 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-07 / The cyborg theme, concerning the combination of organisms and machines, has been extensively explored recently. In this text, the theme is once again discussed, first, through a brief historical overview and, then, through a shift in the paradigm, proposed by the philosopher of mind Andy Clark, known as Extended Mind or Activ Externalism: it s not necessary for a man to have implants or chips in his body, to receive a transplant or to use wearable computers to gain the status of cyborg. The human being is naturally a cyborg, because it has always incorporated tools that extend the mind. Therefore, there is a redefinition of the notion of mind, which frees it from the limits of the skull and extends it to the limits of human action, involving body, brain and world. The brain carries the fate of controlling this material mind, upon which its existence depends / O tema do ciborgue, da mistura dos organismos com as máquinas, tem sido bastante explorado nos dias atuais. Neste texto, o tema volta a ser discutido, primeiramente, através de um breve panorama histórico e, em seguida, através de uma quebra de paradigma, proposta pelo filósofo da mente Andy Clark, conhecida como Mente Estendida ou Externalismo Ativo: não é necessário que o humano porte implantes, chips, submeta-se a transplantes ou use computadores vestíveis para que ganhe o estatuto de ciborgue. O ser humano é, naturalmente, ciborgue, pois incorpora, desde sempre, ferramentas que ampliam sua mente. Portanto, há uma redefinição do conceito de mente, que a liberta dos limites da caixa craniana e a estende até os limites da ação humana, abarcando corpo, cérebro e mundo. Ao cérebro é dado o papel de controlador dessa mente material, de cuja existência ela depende

Genom detta kandidatarbete prövar vi på att testa ett annorlunda tillvägagångssätt inom spelutveckling och design, till att försöka skapa en mer innovativ och tilltalande spelprodukt. Med hjälp av termen Critical Play från Mary Flanagan, undersöker vi genom reflektion, diskussion och ifrågasättande, alternativa sätt att tolka världen på. Genom prövning skapar vi en underhållande gestaltning och analyserar ifall Critical Play som utveckling­ och designmetod även går att applicera tillsammans med teorier från medvetandefilosofi i åtanke. Vi ser möjligheter i att föra fram en avvikande spelupplevelse, genom att presentera spelvärlden och dess objekt på ett visuellt asymmetriskt sätt för alla spelare / In this bachelor’s thesis we explore alternative game­design and game­development methods and use them to try to create more innovative and publicly appealing games. Guided by Mary Flanagan’s Critical Play method, we investigate through reflection, discussion, and questioning the other interpretations of how we experience the world. Through tests, we build a video game and analyze whether or not Critical Play is a feasible method for creating games, even when philosophical tenets governs the underlying game mechanics. We discover possibilities to create unique game experiences by presenting game­objects as visually asymmetrical entities.

Cette dissertation rend compte de la théorie des premiers principes de la connaissance de Thomas Reid (1710-1796), plus particulièrement, de la théorie des premiers principes de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Dans le premier chapitre, je discute des engagements fondationnalistes de Reid dans la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Je soutiens qu'il est clairement un fondationnaliste en ce qui concerne la connaissance spéculative et morale, mais qu’il n'est pas clair qu’il conserve les engagements fondationnalistes en matière de savoir politique - les premiers principes de la politique ne sont pas des croyances évidentes en soi : ils ne sont pas justifiés depuis le début de la recherche. Par conséquent, ils n'ont pas ce qu'il faut pour être une croyance fondamentale dans une vision fondationnaliste de la structure de la connaissance. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je discute la compréhension de Reid des sources de la connaissance, à savoir, le sens commun et la connaissance de l'humanité. Je soutiens que si la philosophie de l'esprit et de la morale repose sur les premiers principes du sens commun (croyances immédiates et irrésistibles dues à la constitution originelle de l'esprit), la politique repose sur les premiers principes de la connaissance de l'humanité (croyances dues à un mélange de la sagacité et de l'expérience du philosophe politique qui vit parmi les êtres humains dans une société politique). Dans le troisième chapitre, j'essaie d'expliquer la compréhension de Reid des premiers principes de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Je m’efforce de répondre à ces questions : Qu'est-ce qu'un principe premier de la connaissance ? Comment expliquer la distinction entre les principes des vérités contingentes et les principes des vérités nécessaires ? Quelles sont les moyens que nous avons pour identifier les premiers principes de la connaissance ? Le quatrième et dernier chapitre est entièrement consacré à la discussion du sens commun. Plus particulièrement, je discute la manière dont Reid défend les premiers principes du sens commun contre l'attaque sceptique. / This thesis aims to discuss Thomas Reid’s (1710-1796) theory of the first principles of knowledge, more particularly, the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. In the first chapter, I discuss Reid’s foundationalist commitments in philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I argue that he is clearly a foundationalist about speculative and moral knowledge, but it is not clear if he keeps foundationalist commitments with regard to political knowledge – the first principles of politics are not self-evident beliefs: they are not justified from the start and, therefore, they do not have what is needed for being basic beliefs in a foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. In the second chapter, I discuss Reid’s understanding of the sources of speculative, moral and political knowledge, namely, common sense and knowledge of mankind. I argue that while philosophy of mind and morals are based upon the first principles of common sense – immediate and irresistible beliefs due to the original constitution of mind, politics is based upon first principles of the knowledge of mankind – beliefs that are due to a mixture of the sagacity and the experience of the political scientist who lives among other human beings in a political society. In the third chapter, I try to explain Reid’s comprehension on the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I try to explain what a first principle of knowledge is, how to understand the distinction between the principles of contingent and necessary truths and what the means we have to identify the first principles of knowledge are. The fourth and last chapter is entirely dedicated to common sense. More particularly, I discuss how Reid defends the first principles of common sense from the skeptical attack.

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This essay examines and analyzes the debate between David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett about the nature of consciousness and how to proceed to explain its existence. They are two of the biggest names of philosophy of mind today and have been on opposite sides of the debate since the nineties. Chalmers has long advocated a modern dualistic view of consciousness while Dennett's theories move in a more physicalist and functionalist direction. Today, Chalmers calls himself a realist as a clear opposite to Dennett's illusionism. The essay begins with a short summary of the history of modern philosophy of mind and a presentation of Chalmers and Dennett. Then it goes into some of their most noted older theories and arguments and move on to two of the most famous thought experiments of philosophy of mind before going into their most recent theories and work. It concludes with summary of their development and with an analysis of the sustainability and significance of their theories for the development of the debate today together with some personal reflections.

Le « problème difficile de la conscience » consiste à comprendre pourquoi certains processus physiques, comme ceux ayant lieu dans le cerveau humain, donnent lieu à de la conscience, c’est-à-dire à de l’expérience subjective. Ce mémoire se penche sur une théorie cherchant à répondre au problème difficile de la conscience : le monisme russellien. Cette théorie affirme en bref que la conscience est la nature intrinsèque de la matière. Le monisme russellien espère pouvoir expliquer l’existence de la conscience humaine en posant la conscience au niveau fondamental de la réalité. Toutefois, des critiques affirment que cette théorie est incapable d’expliquer comment la conscience présente dans la matière pourrait se combiner pour former la conscience humaine. Une telle objection se nomme le « problème de la combinaison ». Après une présentation du monisme russellien et du problème du la combinaison, la plausibilité de quatre différentes réponses au problème de la combinaison sera évaluée. Ces quatre réponses tâchent de rendre intelligible la manière dont la conscience présente dans la matière pourrait se combiner pour constituer la conscience humaine. / The "hard problem of consciousness" is the problem of understanding why certain physical processes, such as those taking place in the human brain, give rise to consciousness, or subjective experience. This thesis examines a theory that seeks to answer the hard problem of consciousness: Russellian monism. In short, this theory asserts that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter. Russellian monism hopes to explain the existence of human consciousness by positing consciousness at the fundamental level of reality. However, critics claim that this theory is unable to explain how consciousness present in matter could combine to form human consciousness. Such an objection is called the "problem of combination". After a presentation of Russellian monism and the combination problem, I critically evaluate the plausibility of four different answers to the combination problem. These four different answers try to make intelligible the way in which consciousness present in matter could combine to constitute human consciousness.