The argument of this dissertation is that a critical reading of the concept of "covenant" in early American writings is instrumental to understanding the paradoxes in the American political concepts of freedom and equality. Following Slavoj Zizek's theoretical approach to theology, I trace the covenant concept in early American literature from the theological expressions and disputes in Puritan Massachusetts through Jonathan Edwards's Freedom of Will and the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson, showing how the covenant theology of colonial New England dispersed into more "secular" forms of what may be called an American political theology. The first chapter provides an overview of recent attempts to integrate theology and theory, specifically comparing Jacques Derrida and Zizek to better understand the latter's theology of materialism which relies on as well as informs the Reformed Protestant covenantal dichotomy of grace and works. The second chapter establishes the complicated architecture of the covenant concept within seventeenth-century New England Reformed Protestantism, and uses church membership transcripts along with Ann Hutchinson court trial documents to demonstrate how this inherently unstable theology created unintended slippage between God's grace and mankind's works, resulting in a theological formulation remarkably open to Zizek's analysis of political ideology. The third chapter demonstrates how Jonathan Edwards, through his ingenious counter-argument in Freedom of Will, provides a theoretical foundation for an uneasy but necessary alignment of the covenants of works and grace, releasing the subjunctive potential of grace to operate through history as a predeterminer of meaning and, potentially, freedom. In the last chapter, I argue that Emerson finally converts the covenant from a politically conceptualized theological framework for radical grace into a personal institutionalization of grace itself. Stanley Cavell's exploration of Emerson's "constitution" in light of the covenant motif demonstrates the political (im)possibilities inherent in America's self-conceptions of personal liberty and civic equality. In the end, complexities inherent in the concept of the covenant, especially its creative failure to control the radical nature of "grace," are determinative factors in our contradictory American egalitarian ideals.

The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology. / Hur gränsen mellan det egna och det främmande ska dras är en central fråga inom den fenomenologiska traditionen, en fråga som här undersöks i ett religionsfilosofiskt sammanhang. På vilket sätt kan vi överskrida oss själva mot det främmande och ogripbara, och på vilket sätt är denna möjlighet förbunden med vår egen kroppslighet? Dessa teman utvecklas i en serie diskussioner av filosofer som Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler och Edith Stein. Redan i Husserls analyser av transcendensen, tidsmedvetandet och kroppsligheten framträder en bestämd gräns för den objektiverande kunskapen, även om han i sista hand alltid uppfattade den som ett ideal. I Schelers och Steins religionsfilosofier utvecklas därefter en kritik av denna kunskapssyn, bland annat i form av en analys av kärleken (Scheler) och mystiken (Stein), men hos ingen av dem får kroppsligheten en central ställning. I den avslutande delen, som analyserar den mystika erfarenhetens uttryck hos den medetida beginen Mechthild von Magdeburg, utvecklas en fenomenologi som förbinder transcendens med kroppslighet och sinnlighet. Därmed undersöks en gränsens fenomenologi snarare än fenomenologins gräns. Jonna Bornemark är forskare och lärare på Södertörns högskola. Boken är hennes doktorsavhandling.

The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, there is the general concern to investigate and demonstrate clearly that there are relationships between certain superficially unrelated disciplines, namely philosophy, aesthetics and literary criticism. Second, by way of accomplishing the first aim, there is an attempt made to synthesize and explicate the contributions of a significant twentieth century intellectual. The particular procedure employed to attain these ends is the consideration of an academic field which is continually being reshaped by other separate but related disciplines. For my purposes the figure of Jean Paul Sartre and the field of literary criticism are both, as shall be demonstrated, appropriate for this investigation. The format for analyzing Sartre’s literary criticism shall be as follows. (1) There is an investigation of Sartre’s philosophical claims. (2) There follows a discussion of Sartre’s view of literature, its value, significance, and role in society. (3) The next section relates Sartre’s views of literature to traditional problems in literary criticism. (4) In the final portion there is a brief evaluation of Sartre’s contributions to a contemporary literary criticism.

Ce mémoire se propose d’étudier la manière nouvelle dont se présente la croyance religieuse à l’âge séculier dans la philosophie de la religion du philosophe Charles Taylor. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à démontrer que la croyance et l’incroyance possèdent les mêmes fondements phénoménologiques, qui sont à trouver du côté des questions identitaires. Afin d’y arriver, nous commençons par analyser sa redéfinition de la sécularité afin de comprendre pourquoi l’âge séculier n’est pas en soi un âge irréligieux. Nous montrerons en quoi, selon Taylor, les Occidentaux partagent un même « arrière-plan » moral et spirituel – le « cadre immanent », que nous appréhendons comme le contexte au sein duquel émergent les positions croyantes et athées. Nous présentons ensuite une brève analyse des éléments historiques et phénoménologiques du cadre immanent ainsi que de sa fonction « transcendantale », ce qui nous permet d’expliquer la raison pour laquelle Taylor soutient que la croyance et l’incroyance relèvent avant tout de l’identité morale et des considérations éthiques qui soutiennent notre vision du monde. Ici nous suivons Taylor en affirmant que ce sont toutes deux des expériences vécues qui a priori s’équivalent sur le plan rationnel. Enfin, au cœur de notre réflexion se trouve la mise en valeur d’un concept très important que Taylor développe à partir des travaux de William James, à savoir l’« espace ouvert jamesien ». Cette ouverture, rendue possible par la sécularité elle-même, vise à rendre compte d’un état de lucidité par lequel nous pouvons ressentir la force des deux options. / This paper aims to describe how Charles Taylor articulates his philosophy of religion in his major work, A Secular Age. We argue that belief and unbelief share the same phenomenological fundamentals, which can be found in the constituents of identity. In order to do that, we shall first analyse his redefinition of secularity in order to see how the secular age is not irreligious in itself. What will emerge of this preliminary investigation is the Taylorian idea that all Westerners share the same spiritual and moral “background”, the “immanent frame”, which must be understood as the context in which we form our beliefs. Then we develop an analysis of the historical elements of the immanent frame and of its “transcendental” function, which makes it possible to explain why Taylor conceives belief and unbelief as questions of moral identity. We follow Taylor in arguing that they are both lived experiences of equal rational value. At the heart of our paper, there is an important concept that Taylor has developed from William James’s work, which is the “Jamesian open space”. This openness illustrates a state of lucidity that is characterised by the ability to feel the force of both options, belief and unbelief.

Le présent mémoire porte sur la question de la mort de Dieu dans la philosophie allemande du XIXe siècle. Plus précisément elle entend mettre en lumière le rôle qu’un auteur comme Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) a pu jouer dans la réception d’un tel événement pour la philosophie de cette époque. On observe en effet chez Hegel et Nietzsche, certainement les deux philosophes les plus importants à s’être intéressés au thème de la mort de Dieu, deux manières tout à fait différentes, voire antinomiques, d’interpréter un tel événement. Ce qui fera dire à certains auteurs comme Deleuze et Foucault notamment, qu’entre Hegel et Nietzsche il ne saurait y avoir qu’une coupure radicale tant leurs compréhensions de la mort de Dieu diffère. Un tel geste trahit cependant un certain arbitraire qui empêche de comprendre la genèse philosophique d’un tel déplacement, entre Hegel et Nietzsche, dans la manière d’aborder la mort de Dieu. C’est ici que l’étude de la philosophie feuerbachienne s’avère fructueuse, car si elle demeure dans un dialogue critique par rapport à la conception hégélienne de la mort de Dieu, sa réponse opère cependant un déplacement qui anticipe certains aspects de la pensée nietzschéenne. C’est à partir de l’analyse de sa critique de la religion chrétienne et de l’anthropologie philosophique nouvelle qui l’y oppose que l’on sera en mesure de saisir la nature de ce déplacement feuerbachien. / This Master’s Thesis focuses on the topic of the death of God in the nineteenth century German philosophy. More specifically, it highlights the role played by Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) in the development of this problematic, i.e. his influence on the way this decisive “death” has been interpreted philosophically. The two major philosophical figures who have reflected on the death of God, namely Hegel and Nietzsche, have done so in very different, some would say antinomian, ways. Authors such as Deleuze or Foucault have even argued that between Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s way of addressing the question of the death of God there can be no common ground, but only an irrevocable clash. Unfortunately, such a statement forbids further investigations enabling a more rigorous understanding of the philosophical development that occurs between Hegel and Nietzsche on that specific topic, that is, on the death of God in nineteenth century German philosophy. Here, I shall argue, the study of Ludwig Feuerbach’s thought becomes essential to such an understanding, since it develops a critical dialogue with Hegel’s stance on the death of God, while at the same time anticipating some aspects of Nietzsche’s approach to the problem of the death of God.

Fisher of Men tells the story of an ancient and secretive group of supernatural balance keepers. When God goes missing, it is up to them to locate him before the armies of Heaven and Hell lay siege to the earth, but they have their own problems. When knowledge of a secret weapon surfaces, they are tasked to find it and destroy it before it falls into the hands of either side. The secret weapon is Charitie Newman, a young woman from rural Indiana who moved to New Orleans with her sister. Charitie has special abilities that have no limits, and after her sister is brutally murdered, she agrees to join forces with the group in order to find God--and her sister's murderer.

The question of religion has caused much strife among mankind in the past, and even the present is not without its spiritual prejudices. In any phase of life the individual who departs too far from the accepted order is almost certain to be brought up sharply against the criticism and even ridicule of his contemporaries. Alexander Campbell is no exception to this rule. His life was one of strife and conflict in the field of religion. His leadership in the “Reformation Movement” of the early Nineteenth Century has left an indelible impression upon the minds of thousands of men and women.

Este trabalho apresenta o argumento que Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274) oferece como a quinta das vias para demonstrar a existência de Deus na Suma de Teologia. O foco desta apresentação não é explorar o contexto histórico em que o argumento se originou, nem examinar as fontes gregas, latinas e islâmicas sobre as quais Tomás teria se baseado, mas sim analisar a possibilidade de sustentá-lo de modo atemporal como um argumento plausível a favor da existência de Deus. Minha intenção é oferecer boas razões em seu favor e rebater as objeções mais notórias em contrário, apontando os limites explicativos do argumento e oferecendo sugestões para fortalecê-lo. Inicio distinguindo diferentes tipos de teleologia e de argumentos teleológicos pela existência de Deus, comparando a quinta via com os demais argumentos teleológicos de Tomás e com o argumento de William Paley pelo projeto inteligente (Intelligent Design). Em seguida, passo à análise da própria via, mostrando evidências das inclinações e tendências a fins a que Tomás faz referência e tratando das teses metafísicas que defende a partir da observação destas inclinações. Também ofereço respostas às objeções que pretendem que esta teleologia seja redutível a leis de natureza ou ao acaso. No último capítulo, considero a segunda parte da quinta via, que afirma que tais inclinações em direção a fins dependem em última instância de uma inteligência ordenadora que seria Deus. Analisando, ao fim, em que medida procedem as objeções de que esta conclusão não passa de um antropomorfismo injustificado e de que Tomás vai além do que lhe permite a conclusão ao considerar que esta inteligência é Deus. / This work presents the argument Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) offers as the fifth of his ways to demonstrate the existence of God in the Summa Theologiae. The main point of this presentation is not to explore the historical context in which the argument was written, neither to examine the Greek, Latin and Islamic sources upon which Thomas could have based himself, but rather to analyze the possibility of sustaining it timelessly as a plausible argument in favor of God’s existence. My purpose is to offer good reasons in its favor and to rebut the most notorious objections against it, pointing out the explanatory limits of the argument, and providing suggestions to strengthen it. I start by distinguishing different sorts of teleology and of teleological arguments for the existence of God, then I compare the Fifth Way with others teleological arguments formulated by Thomas and with the argument of William Paley for the “inteligente design” hypothesis. I also analyze the way itself, pointing out evidences for the inclinations and tendencies towards ends that Thomas refers to, also dealing with the metaphysical theses that Thomas defends based on the observation of these inclinations. Moreover, I offer answers to objections that intend to reduce teleology to laws of nature or to chance. In the last chapter, I consider the second part of Fifth Way, which affirms that those inclinations towards ends ultimately depend on an ordering intelligence that would be God. Lastly, I examine to what extent are valid the objections that claim this conclusion is simply an unjustified anthropomorphism and that Thomas goes beyond what his conclusion allows him when he takes this intelligence to be God.

The extent to which conscious and unconscious mental processes contribute to our experiences of learning and the subsequent knowledge has been subject to great debate. Dual process theories of implicit learning and recognition memory bear many resemblances, but there are also important differences. This thesis uses subjective measures of awareness to explore these themes using the artificial grammar learning (AGL) and remember/know (R/K) procedures. Firstly, the relationship between response times associated with intuition and familiarity based responding (conscious judgment of unconscious structural knowledge) compared to rule and recollection based responding (conscious structural knowledge) in AGL were found to be strikingly similar to remembering and knowing; their R/K analogues. However, guessing (unconscious judgment knowledge) was also distinct from intuition and familiarity based responding. Secondly, implicit learning in AGL was shown to occur at test, which would not be expected in R/K. Finally, wider theories of cognition, unconscious thought and verbal overshadowing, were shown to have measurable effects on AGL and R/K respectively. The approach used in this thesis shows the merits of both in-depth analysis within a given method combined with the synthesis of seemingly disparate theories. This thesis has built upon the important distinction between conscious and unconscious structural knowledge but also suggests the conscious-unconscious division for judgment knowledge may be as important. Implicit learning and recognition memory tasks differ in the kinds of mental processes that subjective measures are sensitive toward; particularly so in situations where judgment knowledge is unconscious. Different theories and methods divide nature in different ways; the conscious-unconscious judgment distinction may prove an important one.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Christian David Soares Bitencourt.pdf: 891899 bytes, checksum: 810cbaf0da70b6609701449a81495ab3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-02 / Instituto Presbiteriano Mackenzie / This study addresses the postliberal theology of George Lindbeck, presented in his book The Nature of Doctrine, as a theory of religion and religious doctrine. It presents the life, thought and work of Lindbeck, reflecting on his three key influences: Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the importance given to language; Clifford Geertz, and semiotic perspective of culture; and Hans Frei, and the role of narrative. It discusses the culturallinguistic proposal of a non-theological theory of religion as an option to cognitivepropositional and experiential-expressive approaches. It introduces the regulative theory of religious doctrines, which is constructed from the two models as opposed to traditional theories of the doctrine, called by Lindbeck propositionalist and symbolist. It reflects on the postliberal theology, which is presented as the successor to both the classical model pre-liberal, and of theological liberalism, as judged by three criteria: fidelity as intratextuality, applicability as futurology, and intelligibility as a skill. It analyzes, finally, the various arguments presented by Lindbeck favorable to its culturallinguistic approach, and the critical reception to the project, suggesting contributions of his approach to a theory of religion. / Este trabalho aborda a teologia pós-liberal de George Lindbeck, apresentada em seu livro The Nature of Doctrine, como uma teoria da religião e da doutrina religiosa. Apresenta a vida, o pensamento e a obra de Lindbeck, refletindo sobre suas três influências fundamentais: Ludwig Wittgenstein, e a importância dada à linguagem; Clifford Geertz, e a perspectiva semiótica de cultura; e Hans Frei, e o papel fundamental da narrativa. Discute a proposta cultural-lingüística de uma teoria não-teológica da religião como opção às abordagens cognitivo-proposicional e expressivo-experiencial. Introduz a teoria regulativa das doutrinas religiosas, que é construída a partir da oposição aos dois modelos tradicionais de teorias da doutrina, denominados por Lindbeck proposicionalista e simbolista. Reflete sobre a teologia pós-liberal, que se apresenta como sucessora tanto do modelo clássico pré-liberal, quanto do liberalismo teológico, sendo julgada por três critérios: fidelidade como intratextualidade, aplicabilidade como futurologia, e inteligibilidade como habilidade. Analisa, por fim, os vários argumentos apresentados por Lindbeck favoráveis à sua abordagem culturallingüística, bem como a recepção crítica ao projeto, sugerindo contribuições de sua abordagem a uma teoria da religião.