This paper examines the Ontario Securities Commission's regulation of poison pills as well as several proposals to reform the current regulatory regime. In particular, the paper argues that regulation and reforms should be viewed within the context of two fundamental, normative questions that underlie much of corporate law: what is the purpose of the corporation, and who should determine whether these goals are being met. After outlining several competing theories, the paper explains why a corporate model based on the shareholder-centric, wealth maximization theory is best suited for hostile takeover situations. Additionally, the paper argues that a structural bid reform that would require hostile bidders to include minimum tender conditions and additional opportunities for target company shareholders to tender following a successful bid would provide the best way to incorporate this corporate model into Ontario securities regulation.

This paper examines the Ontario Securities Commission's regulation of poison pills as well as several proposals to reform the current regulatory regime. In particular, the paper argues that regulation and reforms should be viewed within the context of two fundamental, normative questions that underlie much of corporate law: what is the purpose of the corporation, and who should determine whether these goals are being met. After outlining several competing theories, the paper explains why a corporate model based on the shareholder-centric, wealth maximization theory is best suited for hostile takeover situations. Additionally, the paper argues that a structural bid reform that would require hostile bidders to include minimum tender conditions and additional opportunities for target company shareholders to tender following a successful bid would provide the best way to incorporate this corporate model into Ontario securities regulation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-118). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

No description available.

No description available.

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2018-04-03T15:23:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 YuriGomesPaivaAzevedo_DISSERT.pdf: 534625 bytes, checksum: f1f04067c2b7559d6f332d54207948a0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-04-10T23:15:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 YuriGomesPaivaAzevedo_DISSERT.pdf: 534625 bytes, checksum: f1f04067c2b7559d6f332d54207948a0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-10T23:15:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 YuriGomesPaivaAzevedo_DISSERT.pdf: 534625 bytes, checksum: f1f04067c2b7559d6f332d54207948a0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-26 / Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar se as poison pills exercem influ?ncia no n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados das companhias listadas na B3. Para isso, foram coletados dados referentes ? presen?a desse dispositivo anti-takeover bem como de cl?usulas acess?rias ?p?treas? associadas ?s poison pills nos estatutos sociais de 225 companhias n?o-financeiras. As informa??es necess?rias para estima??o dos accruals discricion?rios pelo modelo proposto por Dechow, Sloan e Sweeney (1995), assim como as vari?veis de controle inseridas no modelo econom?trico, foram obtidas por meio da base de dados Bloomberg?, compreendendo o per?odo 2010-2016. Com base nos resultados, verificou-se que a ado??o das poison pills n?o exerce influ?ncia significativa no n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados. Entretanto, a inexist?ncia dessa rela??o n?o sinaliza que essas companhias n?o est?o envolvidas em pr?ticas de gerenciamento de resultados, uma vez que a dummy Poisonpill n?o se apresenta estatisticamente distinta do grupo base, composto por companhias que n?o adotam poison pills e que apresentam rela??o negativa e significativa com os accruals discricion?rios. Por fim, no contexto nacional, foram encontradas evid?ncias de que as cl?usulas ?p?treas? podem ser inseridas nos estatutos sociais visando exacerbar o n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados, visto que os achados demonstram que as poison pills com cl?usulas ?p?treas? efetivamente se diferenciam das poison pills, apresentando rela??o positiva e estatisticamente significativa com os accruals discricion?rios. / This study aims to investigate if the poison pills influences on the earnings management level of the companies listed in B3. For this, data were collected regarding the presence of this antitakeover device as well as of ?eternity? accessory clauses associated with the poison pills in the bylaws of 225 non-financial companies. The informations that are necessary to estimate the accruals discretionary by the model proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), as well as the control variables inserted in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg? database, comprising the period 2010-2016. Based on the results, it was verified that the the adoption of the poison pills doesn?t have a significant influence on the earnings management level. However, the non-existence of this relationship doesn?t indicate that these companies are not involved in earnings management practices, since the Poisonpill dummy is not statistically distinct from the base group, which is composed by companies that do not adopt poison pills and that present negative and significant relation with the discretionary accruals. Finally, in the national context, evidence has been found that "eternity" clauses can be inserted into the bylaws to exacerbate the level of earnings management, since the findings demonstrate that poison pills with "etenity" clauses effectively differentiate themselves of the poison pills, presenting a positive and statistically significant relation with discretionary accruals.

This dissertation contains four essays on various topics in the fields of corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay, entitled Corporate Governance and Ownership, presents an overview of the causes and consequences of, and possible remedies for, the separation of ownership and control in corporations. In particular, the essay addresses the costs and benefits of ownership concentration. A specific purpose is to put the role of ownership into perspective, while bringing the reader up to date with some recent developments. Essay number two, Shareholder Gains from Equity Private Placements: Evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange, contains an empirical investigation of the stockmarket’s reaction to announcements of equity private placements and rights issues. The essay sets out to test a range of hypotheses put forward in the literature. Extensive cross-sectional analyses of private placement discounts and abnormal returns are performed. The third essay is named Optimal Deterrence and Inducement of Take-overs: An analysis of Poison Pills and Dilution. This essay models how the ex ante wealth of shareholders could be increased with customized contractual provisions that affect takeover probabilities and premia. The proposed provisions resemble anti-takeover defense measures in the form of poison pill plans, and conversely, voluntary dilution schemes in the fashion prescribed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980). Finally, the fourth essay models the wealth effects of a particular takeover regulation, The Mandatory Bid Rule. This rule requires a potential bidder for a control position in a target firm to extend the offer to include any or all of the outstanding shares. Although the mandatory bid rule is aimed at the protection of minority shareholders, the essay argues that this regultion is not generally in the best interest of the shareholders. Each essay is self-contained and could, in principle, be read in any order chosen by the reader. However, for readers less familiar with the corporate finance literature, the first essay may also serve as a helpful introduction to the following three essays. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Dentre os atuais desafios do direito societário brasileiro, a estrutura da propriedade acionária das sociedades por ações de capital aberto e a identificação daqueles que as comandam merecem destaque. O aquecimento das transações realizadas via mercado de capitais e a consolidação dos segmentos especiais de governança corporativa no Brasil resultaram no chamado fenômeno de dispersão acionária, que evidenciou certa ruptura na tradicional estrutura de propriedade acionária exclusivamente concentrada, até então predominante nas companhias brasileiras. Diante desse cenário contrastante, de mudanças no perfil do poder de controle sobre as companhias brasileiras, o presente trabalho apresentará em seu capítulo terceiro, após breve análise das estruturas de capital identificadas em diferentes economias e de retrospectiva sobre a propriedade acionária das companhias brasileiras (a serem apresentadas em seu segundo capítulo), extensa pesquisa empírica realizada com o propósito de identificar a atual estrutura de propriedade acionária predominante entre as companhias brasileiras listadas no segmento especial do Novo Mercado da BMF&BOVESPA (Novo Mercado), e com o objetivo de averiguar a existência do chamado controle societário minoritário entre tais companhias, conforme detalhado nos apêndices desta dissertação. Referida pesquisa empírica representa, ainda, rico processamento da base de dados e informações divulgadas à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) pelas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, e serve de base para a avaliação da necessidade de eventuais mudanças nos conceitos adotados pelo Direito Societário pátrio, tendo em vista entendimento divergente identificado na doutrina e em julgados da CVM no âmbito da possibilidade de existência de um controle societário exercido por acionista ou grupo de acionistas não detentores da maioria do capital social votante, conforme detalhado no quarto capítulo deste estudo. Por fim, serão apresentadas, no quinto e último capítulo, as considerações finais à análise proposta, com destaque para as principais conclusões obtidas na elaboração dos capítulos terceiro e quarto descritos acima, dentre elas a existência do controle societário interno não majoritário (controle minoritário) entre companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, bem como os reflexos dessa constatação no âmbito da prática do Direito Societário. / Among the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.

Dentre os atuais desafios do direito societário brasileiro, a estrutura da propriedade acionária das sociedades por ações de capital aberto e a identificação daqueles que as comandam merecem destaque. O aquecimento das transações realizadas via mercado de capitais e a consolidação dos segmentos especiais de governança corporativa no Brasil resultaram no chamado fenômeno de dispersão acionária, que evidenciou certa ruptura na tradicional estrutura de propriedade acionária exclusivamente concentrada, até então predominante nas companhias brasileiras. Diante desse cenário contrastante, de mudanças no perfil do poder de controle sobre as companhias brasileiras, o presente trabalho apresentará em seu capítulo terceiro, após breve análise das estruturas de capital identificadas em diferentes economias e de retrospectiva sobre a propriedade acionária das companhias brasileiras (a serem apresentadas em seu segundo capítulo), extensa pesquisa empírica realizada com o propósito de identificar a atual estrutura de propriedade acionária predominante entre as companhias brasileiras listadas no segmento especial do Novo Mercado da BMF&BOVESPA (Novo Mercado), e com o objetivo de averiguar a existência do chamado controle societário minoritário entre tais companhias, conforme detalhado nos apêndices desta dissertação. Referida pesquisa empírica representa, ainda, rico processamento da base de dados e informações divulgadas à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) pelas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, e serve de base para a avaliação da necessidade de eventuais mudanças nos conceitos adotados pelo Direito Societário pátrio, tendo em vista entendimento divergente identificado na doutrina e em julgados da CVM no âmbito da possibilidade de existência de um controle societário exercido por acionista ou grupo de acionistas não detentores da maioria do capital social votante, conforme detalhado no quarto capítulo deste estudo. Por fim, serão apresentadas, no quinto e último capítulo, as considerações finais à análise proposta, com destaque para as principais conclusões obtidas na elaboração dos capítulos terceiro e quarto descritos acima, dentre elas a existência do controle societário interno não majoritário (controle minoritário) entre companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, bem como os reflexos dessa constatação no âmbito da prática do Direito Societário. / Among the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.

Opérations particulièrement complexes, les offres publiques d'acquisition ne cessent de faire parler d'elles, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société visée. De nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Ces dernières ont par ailleurs développé un certain nombre de mécanismes de défense anti-OPA particulièrement efficaces, mais se révélant le plus souvent insuffisants face à l'ingéniosité dont peut faire preuve l'initiateur. Le droit positif montre ainsi ses limites face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. L'analyse prospective du droit anti-OPA permet d'observer les nouvelles mutations que subit le droit positif au regard des nouveaux enjeux économiques. Elle permet également d'envisager de nouveaux modes d'appréhension des OPA hostiles. Il est ainsi possible d'observer que le gouvernement d'entreprise prend une place considérable dans la vie des sociétés cotées. De même, la montée en puissance de la régulation et l'interventionnisme de l’État sont de plus en plus marqués ; et les salariés s'impliquent de plus en plus dans la gestion de l'entreprise. L'ensemble de ces paramètres marquent un glissement progressif vers une réorganisation du mode de fonctionnement des sociétés, ce qui a amené au développement du soft law, un droit à la frontière du droit positif et des pratiques des sociétés. Le soft law constitue à ce titre une approche inédite des OPA hostiles, dont l'analyse permet de cerner les apports liés à la mutation du droit positif et d'envisager l'émergence de nouveaux moyens de défense. Celui-ci doit toutefois demeurer complémentaire au cadre législatif et réglementaire existant. / No abstract