<p>Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Mach expressed his worries about obscurities and metaphysical elements in scientific knowledge, and consequently contributed to the development of a Viennese tradition. Later on, Vienna Circle further extended Mach's ideas and led to the development of the logical positivist movement. Among the main tenets of this movement is the view that scientific theories are to be reduced to an empirical base capable of conclusive verification. But scientific theories are usually based on unverified and occasionally unverifiable hypotheses and principles. Thus, once this is realized, positivism in spite of itself will contribute to the development of scepticism about scientific knowledge.</p> <p>In reaction to the verificationism, however, Karl Popper developed his thesis of falsificationism or fallibilism; but this principle also leads to scepticism at least about certainty claims, with far reaching consequences. This chain of events leads to the development of Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchisma a rejection of all rules and methods in science in an attempt to reduce science to the level of irrationality and mythology.</p> <p>Against the negativist conclusions of these positions about science, the integrity of scientific knowledge is defended in this thesis. It is shown how scientific knowledge can be defended against scepticism of the type to which verificationism tends: this is done by examining one recent and rigorous sceptical position which undermines not only certainty and rationality of knowledge claims, but the very possibility of knowledge. By examining Popper's fallibilism, it is shown that science can also be defended against the negativist conclusions of fallibilism. Similarly, it is shown that Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism cannot either undermine scientific knowledge.</p> <p>These negativist positions, though they have received strong criticisms in some quarters, yet have not been examined all together, from the standpoint of their impact on the integrity of scientific knowledge. This task is undertaken in this thesis; we thus arrive at a positive and correct evaluation of scientific knowledge in the context of contemporary negativist epistemological trends. It has been shown that in spite of all the negativist arguments of the above positions, we can obtain certainty, justification, and truth in science, and thus we can obtain knowledge. But my rejection of negativism in science does not entail, and should not be construed as an advocacy of a return to, positivism.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(人間・環境学) / 甲第25387号 / 人博第1129号 / 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科相関環境学専攻 / (主査)教授 内本 喜晴, 教授 田部 勢津久, 教授 吉田 鉄平, 教授 雨澤 浩史 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Human and Environmental Studies / Kyoto University / DFAM

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Pouco se conhece da obra de Popper entre os psicólogos à parte alguma informação sobre as suas contribuições à Filosofia da Ciência. Todavia as relações que Popper manteve com a disciplina, seja a sua formação inicial nesta área, ou seus escritos em que abordava matéria psicológica, foram várias e profícuas. Em sua pretensão mais modesta este trabalho é uma retomada do estudo destas relações, entretanto ele pretende não só recapitulá-las, mas também argumentar em favor da atualidade das contribuições de Popper para a Psicologia em diversos níveis: do metateórico à sugestão de hipóteses para testagem empírica. Os principais resultados aos quais a pesquisa conduziu foram: a) o rastreamento de Bühler e Selz como principais influências do campo da Psicologia sobre a obra de Popper. A Psicologia da Aprendizagem de Selz inspirando suas idéias sobre o problema do crescimento do conhecimento, e a solução pluralista de Bühler para a crise da psicologia, associada à sua Teoria da Linguagem, colaborando para a criação do pluralismo metodológico; b) a identificação do pluralismo metodológico popperiano como base de uma epistemologia interacionista. Seu pluralismo tem grande potencial para repercussões na Psicologia, especialmente na forma da Teoria dos Mundos e do papel concedido ao Mundo 3 tanto na constituição do psiquismo, quanto na mediação da relação entre seres autoconscientes; c) as incursões de Popper na Teoria da Evolução, como o modelo popperiano do Dualismo Genético, e a proposição de que seu esquema tetrádico do crescimento do conhecimento pode ser entendido como uma generalização da evolução darwinista enriquecem, colaboram com debate corrente no campo da Psicologia Evolucionista no que se refere ao papel desempenhado pelo comportamento ativo dos organismos na evolução e do alcance do dawinismo universal; d) A idéia de que o eu pode em grande medida ser entendido como um objeto de Mundo 3, com todas as suas propriedades, resulta em um fértil campo de especulação que lança luz sobre problemas contemporâneos em Psicologia Cultural, como o da interobjetividade, e a complementariedade dos processos de internalização e externalização; e) algumas propostas concretas de hipóteses a serem testadas são apresentadas ao conjugar-se a idéia popperiana de que a ciência é a um só tempo uma atividade criativa e crítica, com a perspectiva do Self-Dialógico. Eu- Crítico, e Eu- Criador, poderiam ser entendidos como I-positions dos cientistas concretos; f) a Epistemologia da maturidade de Popper, com sua ênfase na crítica do indutivismo e em determinado ethos científico, podem nos ajuda a enfrentar o problema da Crise da Psicologia. Apesar dos resultados acima não esgotarem toda a possibilidade de diálogo que se pode estabelecer entre a obra de Popper e a Psicologia (pois haveria ainda outros aspectos que poderiam ser abordados, como a relação de Popper com a Psicanálise; o problema do individualismo metodológico e suas conseqüências para a Psicologia Social; novas maneiras de se pensar o inconsciente a partir do entendimento do eu como um objeto do Mundo 3, etc.), acredita-se que o presente trabalho representa ganhos substanciais ao debate teórico acerca das relações que se propõe discutir / Popper oeuvre is mostly unknown among psychologists, besides a piecemeal of information about his contributions to Philosophy of Science. Nevertheless, Popper has always been in close and productive contact with Psychology, since his first academic studies in the area, to his later works on Mind Philosophy. The minor goal of this work is to retake from the History books the study of these relations, although it intends to go further defending their value to the contemporary Psychology, in different levels: from the metalevel, to the formulation of empirically testable hypothesis. The main results of my research are: a) identify Bühler and Selz as the main psychological influences over Poppers work. Selzs Learning Psychology had served as an inspiration to Popper thoughts about the nature of the processes involved on the growth of knowledge, as Bühlers pluralistic solution to the Crisis in Psychology problem, and his also pluralistic Language theory, had helped in the creation of his methodological pluralism; b) pointing Popperian methodological pluralism as the ground to an interactionist epistemology. His pluralism has great potential repercussions to Psychology mainly the form of his Worlds Theory, and the role given to the third world in the constitution of the psyche and mediation of the communication of sentient beings; c) Poppers flirts with evolutionary theory, as the genetic dualism model, and the proposition that his knowledge growth scheme could be understood as a general formula of the Darwinian evolution, contribute to the current discussion in Evolutionary Psychology about the role of the active behavior of the organism upon the evolutionary pathways, and the reach of the universal darwinism; d) the idea that the I can be understood as a world 3 object, results in a fertile field of speculation on contemporary Cultural Psychology problematic, as the concept of interobjectivity and the complementary nature of internalization and externalization processes; e) some concrete proposal of empirical testable hypothesis are presented trying to connect the Popperian idea that the scientific activity is at the same time a creative an critic activity with the Dialogical-Self perspective. I- Critic and I-Creator could be taken as concrete scientists I-positions; f) Poppers maturity philosophy, with its emphasis on the criticism of inductivism and in the prescription of a certain scientific ethos, can help us to face the old problem of the Crisis of Psychology. Although the results present dont exhaust all the possibility of dialogue between Poppers work and psychological inquiry (once there still being other aspects that could be explored, as the relationship among Popper end Psychoanalysis; the problem of the methodological individualism and its consequences to the Social Psychology; new ways to look at the unconscious from the Popperian assumption of the world 3 nature of the Self), we believe the present work represents substantian improvements to the theoretical debate about the relationships it discuss

Pouco se conhece da obra de Popper entre os psicólogos à parte alguma informação sobre as suas contribuições à Filosofia da Ciência. Todavia as relações que Popper manteve com a disciplina, seja a sua formação inicial nesta área, ou seus escritos em que abordava matéria psicológica, foram várias e profícuas. Em sua pretensão mais modesta este trabalho é uma retomada do estudo destas relações, entretanto ele pretende não só recapitulá-las, mas também argumentar em favor da atualidade das contribuições de Popper para a Psicologia em diversos níveis: do metateórico à sugestão de hipóteses para testagem empírica. Os principais resultados aos quais a pesquisa conduziu foram: a) o rastreamento de Bühler e Selz como principais influências do campo da Psicologia sobre a obra de Popper. A Psicologia da Aprendizagem de Selz inspirando suas idéias sobre o problema do crescimento do conhecimento, e a solução pluralista de Bühler para a crise da psicologia, associada à sua Teoria da Linguagem, colaborando para a criação do pluralismo metodológico; b) a identificação do pluralismo metodológico popperiano como base de uma epistemologia interacionista. Seu pluralismo tem grande potencial para repercussões na Psicologia, especialmente na forma da Teoria dos Mundos e do papel concedido ao Mundo 3 tanto na constituição do psiquismo, quanto na mediação da relação entre seres autoconscientes; c) as incursões de Popper na Teoria da Evolução, como o modelo popperiano do Dualismo Genético, e a proposição de que seu esquema tetrádico do crescimento do conhecimento pode ser entendido como uma generalização da evolução darwinista enriquecem, colaboram com debate corrente no campo da Psicologia Evolucionista no que se refere ao papel desempenhado pelo comportamento ativo dos organismos na evolução e do alcance do dawinismo universal; d) A idéia de que o eu pode em grande medida ser entendido como um objeto de Mundo 3, com todas as suas propriedades, resulta em um fértil campo de especulação que lança luz sobre problemas contemporâneos em Psicologia Cultural, como o da interobjetividade, e a complementariedade dos processos de internalização e externalização; e) algumas propostas concretas de hipóteses a serem testadas são apresentadas ao conjugar-se a idéia popperiana de que a ciência é a um só tempo uma atividade criativa e crítica, com a perspectiva do Self-Dialógico. Eu- Crítico, e Eu- Criador, poderiam ser entendidos como I-positions dos cientistas concretos; f) a Epistemologia da maturidade de Popper, com sua ênfase na crítica do indutivismo e em determinado ethos científico, podem nos ajuda a enfrentar o problema da Crise da Psicologia. Apesar dos resultados acima não esgotarem toda a possibilidade de diálogo que se pode estabelecer entre a obra de Popper e a Psicologia (pois haveria ainda outros aspectos que poderiam ser abordados, como a relação de Popper com a Psicanálise; o problema do individualismo metodológico e suas conseqüências para a Psicologia Social; novas maneiras de se pensar o inconsciente a partir do entendimento do eu como um objeto do Mundo 3, etc.), acredita-se que o presente trabalho representa ganhos substanciais ao debate teórico acerca das relações que se propõe discutir / Popper oeuvre is mostly unknown among psychologists, besides a piecemeal of information about his contributions to Philosophy of Science. Nevertheless, Popper has always been in close and productive contact with Psychology, since his first academic studies in the area, to his later works on Mind Philosophy. The minor goal of this work is to retake from the History books the study of these relations, although it intends to go further defending their value to the contemporary Psychology, in different levels: from the metalevel, to the formulation of empirically testable hypothesis. The main results of my research are: a) identify Bühler and Selz as the main psychological influences over Poppers work. Selzs Learning Psychology had served as an inspiration to Popper thoughts about the nature of the processes involved on the growth of knowledge, as Bühlers pluralistic solution to the Crisis in Psychology problem, and his also pluralistic Language theory, had helped in the creation of his methodological pluralism; b) pointing Popperian methodological pluralism as the ground to an interactionist epistemology. His pluralism has great potential repercussions to Psychology mainly the form of his Worlds Theory, and the role given to the third world in the constitution of the psyche and mediation of the communication of sentient beings; c) Poppers flirts with evolutionary theory, as the genetic dualism model, and the proposition that his knowledge growth scheme could be understood as a general formula of the Darwinian evolution, contribute to the current discussion in Evolutionary Psychology about the role of the active behavior of the organism upon the evolutionary pathways, and the reach of the universal darwinism; d) the idea that the I can be understood as a world 3 object, results in a fertile field of speculation on contemporary Cultural Psychology problematic, as the concept of interobjectivity and the complementary nature of internalization and externalization processes; e) some concrete proposal of empirical testable hypothesis are presented trying to connect the Popperian idea that the scientific activity is at the same time a creative an critic activity with the Dialogical-Self perspective. I- Critic and I-Creator could be taken as concrete scientists I-positions; f) Poppers maturity philosophy, with its emphasis on the criticism of inductivism and in the prescription of a certain scientific ethos, can help us to face the old problem of the Crisis of Psychology. Although the results present dont exhaust all the possibility of dialogue between Poppers work and psychological inquiry (once there still being other aspects that could be explored, as the relationship among Popper end Psychoanalysis; the problem of the methodological individualism and its consequences to the Social Psychology; new ways to look at the unconscious from the Popperian assumption of the world 3 nature of the Self), we believe the present work represents substantian improvements to the theoretical debate about the relationships it discuss

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-12T11:31:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Augusto Ciola de Almeida.pdf: 1437913 bytes, checksum: 6113d6dd4c49a1225406ed98f85729a5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-12T11:31:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Augusto Ciola de Almeida.pdf: 1437913 bytes, checksum: 6113d6dd4c49a1225406ed98f85729a5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-11-28 / The philosophers are insightful in capturing the great changes in mainly of human activities such as economy, policy, science, religion and ethic. It doesn't only change the world we live but also man comprehension about themselves and the place ourselves occupy in universe. It doesn't mean the philosopher will make a well-succeeded reflection about the problems which cross his way. In fact, it happens the opposite: we commit more mistakes than right perceptions. Because of this according to Popper we must be criticals including about ourselves. In addition, Popper realized the scientifical revolution that would be with the coming of Einstein's science and he produced a new pattern of limit between science and non-science with the falsificacionism as well as he reinterpreted the value of scientifical and philosofical knowledge from a non-optimistic epistemology. On political philosophy, Popper inspired himself on Scandinavian counries and United Kingdom to build what he called openned society which means a tolerable society, not ready and over but under reformation on gradually and full time. Identifying the gradual and slow reformations of the open society is the thesis of this dissertation / Os filósofos são perspicazes em captar mudanças nas principais atividades humanas: economia, política, ciência, religião e a ética que não apenas mudam o mundo em que vivemos, mas também a própria compreensão de homem e o espaço que ocupa no universo. Isso não significa que o filósofo elaborará uma reflexão bem sucedida aos problemas que os interpela, na verdade ocorre o contrário: nós mais erramos do que acertamos, por essa razão segundo Popper devemos ser críticos e autocríticos. Com efeito, Popper percebeu a revolução cientifica que viria com o advento da ciência de Einstein e elaborou um novo critério de demarcação de ciência e não ciência com o falsificacionismo, bem como reinterpretou o valor do conhecimento cientifico e da filosofia a partir de uma epistemologia não otimista. Na filosofia política, Popper inspirou-se nos países escandinavos e no Reino Unido para construir o que chamou de sociedade aberta, isto é, uma sociedade tolerante, que não está pronta e acabada, mas que constantemente e gradualmente se reforma. Identificar as reformas graduais e lentas da sociedade aberta é a tese desta dissertação

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Numerous studies have attempted to measure scientists' influence by measuring the quantity of citations to their works. The problem with "citation counting," as it is called, is that it assumes that each listing of an author in a citation index is equal to another without bothering to explore the substantive uses of citations in the source article. The present study attempts to alleviate this problem by content analysis of citations in a limited sphere: reference to major philosophers of science by sociologists. In just over 100 sociology journals, citations to Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Ernst Nagel, and Carl Hempel (overall, the most frequently cited philosophers of science) from 1971-1982 were randomly sampled. Each citation was classified according to the following criteria: 1) philosopher cited; 2) work cited, 3) exclusivity (whether cited with others); 4) multiplicity (number of citations by the philosopher in the same article); 5) type of article; and 6) purpose of citation. Purposes of citation included seven categories: 1) listing as relevant literature; 2) definition of a concept; 3) modification or extension of a philosopher's theory; 4) formulation of a research problem; 5) interpretation of results; 6) critical of philosopher's work; and 7) other. Analysis of these data revealed the following conclusions: 1) the major use of philosophy was the furnishing of concepts and their definitions; 2) philosophy of science played little or no role in directing research or interpreting results; 3) the use of citations differed greatly among the philosophers; 4) simple citation counting would have severely distorted the relative influences of each philosopher; and 5) the dialogue between sociology and the philosophy of science has, in the last decade, been dominated by Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions.