Ce mémoire veut rendre compte de la relation qu’entretient le Socrate historique avec la cité athénienne en tentant de dégager des témoignages de Platon, de Xénophon et d’Aristophane une pensée politique propre au personnage historique. Notre hypothèse consiste à affirmer que la philosophie socratique s’oppose aux valeurs du régime démocratique athénien dans la mesure où elle recherche l’excellence de l’âme. Constatant que les conditions nécessaires pour obtenir le meilleur jugement politique se font absentes de l’espace public démocratique, Socrate prône un désengagement des citoyens par rapport aux affaires publiques de leur cité. Nous défendons donc l’idée selon laquelle la pensée politique du Socrate de l’histoire peut se comprendre comme un « désengagement » politique puisque Socrate ne détient pas la science politique (vertu-science) et s’oppose à la conception de l’intérêt personnel que promeut sa cité.

<p>The process of scientific inquiry is critical for students to understand how knowledge is developed and validated. Representations of the process of inquiry have varied over time, from simple to complex, but some concepts are persistent – such as the concept of a scientific hypothesis. Current guidelines for undergraduate biology education prioritize developing student competence in generating and evaluating hypotheses but fail to define the concept and role of hypotheses. The nature of science literature points to the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry originated by Karl Popper as a widely accepted conception of scientific hypotheses. Popper characterized a hypothesis as a falsifiable explanation of observed phenomena deduced from previously established knowledge. Alongside hypotheses, Popper also emphasizes the role of predictions, which are logically derived from hypotheses and characterized as testable expectations regarding the outcomes of an experiment or study. Together, hypotheses and predictions are thought to provide a framework for establishing rigorous conclusions in scientific studies. However, the absence of explicit definitions of hypotheses, or predictions, in guidelines and assessment for biology higher education makes it difficult to determine the current relevance of this perspective on hypotheses and predictions in teaching and learning. This leaves us with an unanswered question – what do biology undergraduate students need to know about scientific hypotheses? We addressed this question over three studies each investigating conceptions of scientific hypotheses, and the related concept of predictions, in a different context – (a) contemporary biology research communications, (b) a case study of biology faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and undergraduate students at a single institution, and (c) a national survey of biology faculty members. We found that the terms “hypothesis” and “prediction” used in varied ways in biology research communication and, most notably, often not connected with each other. We also found variation in conceptions of both hypothesis and prediction among faculty members, both in our case study and in the national survey. Our results indicate that faculty members did not always distinguish between the terms hypothesis and prediction in research or teaching or approach them the same way in research contexts. However, they had largely consistent ideas of the underlying reasoning connecting these concepts to each other and to scientific inquiry. Among graduate teaching assistants and undergraduate students in the case study, we found variation in conceptions of both hypotheses and predictions that was different from conceptions held by faculty members. Both graduate teaching assistants and undergraduate students often did not connect the two concepts in terms of underlying reasoning. Overall, our results indicate that there are some misalignments between students’ and instructors’ conceptions of hypotheses and predictions and their role in inquiry. We further discuss these findings in the context of teaching implications for undergraduate biology.</p>

批判卡爾波普之批判理性 / The criticism of Popper's rational criticism.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 417830.pdf: 966598 bytes, checksum: 1a59cf0bda785b7836baa91d81ef7417 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-24 / Essa tese pretende defender o seguinte argumento: a filosofia de Popper, devido ao seu interesse primordialmente cosmol?gico, somente pode ser corretamente compreendida enquanto sistema, isto ?, enquanto explica??o global da realidade entendida em seus dois pontos basilares: Metaf?sica e Teoria do Conhecimento. No Cap?tulo I argumentaremos que na base da ci?ncia moderna temos Cop?rnico e Galileu. O primeiro n?o parte de problemas concretos nem de dados observacionais, na linguagem de Popper o heliocentrismo, como qualquer outra teoria cient?fica, ? fruto de uma intui??o criadora; essa intui??o produziu uma teoria que tem sua validade a partir de sua capacidade explicativa, da qual deduzimos certas predi??es pass?veis de teste. Popper percebeu que a relatividade ao derrubar a mec?nica newtoniana, o faz afirmando o ingrediente ontol?gico do realismo, e a tese da verossimilhan?a ainda que sob forma intuitiva. No Cap?tulo II procuraremos argumentar que as respostas modernas Hume e Kant - pressupunham, ainda que por raz?es distintas, o mecanicismo: Hume enquanto fundamento ontol?gico para suas infer?ncias indutivas psicol?gicas, o que, diga-se de passagem, ? insustent?vel, e Kant em seus ju?zos sint?ticos a priori. A resposta do Positivismo L?gico apresentava em sua base graves dificuldades: a id?ia de que o discurso cient?fico seja em si auto-sustent?vel, porque oriundo do m?todo indutivo transformava as leis cient?ficas em: a) enunciados carentes de sentido, pois sua infer?ncia n?o ? logicamente justific?vel; b) regras para a forma??o de enunciados, semelhantes a regras de infer?ncia, o que em nada ajudaria j? que a fundamenta??o das regras de infer?ncia na dedu??o se d? por sua capacidade de transmiss?o de verdade, isto ?, com base nessas regras de infer?ncia nunca teremos premissas verdadeiras e conclus?es falsas, como a indu??o n?o permite isso.... c) instrumentos preditivos, o que suprimiria o aspecto descritivo da ci?ncia. No Cap?tulo III buscamos argumentar que o dedutivismo falibilista, tal como o estamos interpretando, reconhece na refuta??o einsteiniana a afirma??o de um mundo independente, e a id?ia do conhecimento enquanto processo governado por conjecturas e refuta??es. Mediante a constata??o da assimetria existente entre as hip?teses universais intuitivamente criadas e os enunciados b?sicos delas dedut?veis, compreendidos como seus falseadores potenciais, temos um crit?rio de demarca??o entre ci?ncia e n?o-ci?ncia perfeitamente enquadrado na cosmologia preocupa??o central de Popper. No Cap?tulo IV vamos analisar como, a partir dos anos 50 e 60, Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn, Lakatos e Feyerabend tamb?m criticam a Filosofia da Ci?ncia de inspira??o neopositivista procurando demonstrar que uma an?lise meramente formal, quando estendida ? hist?ria da ci?ncia, se revela insuficiente. Dois s?o os seus pontos b?sicos de ataque: a indu??o e a id?ia de que a ci?ncia repousa sobre uma infal?vel base emp?rica. Em que pese todos constru?rem suas teses a partir da hist?ria da ci?ncia s?o, antes de tudo, fil?sofos, o que nos permite dizer que sua cr?tica a Popper est? centrada basicamente no seguinte ponto: a indissoci?vel imbrica??o teoria-experi?ncia n?o permite uma solu??o racional para o problema da base emp?rica. Procuramos argumentar que, quando admitimos como estamos propondo o reconhecimento da Metaf?sica Realista de base, essas cr?ticas podem ser superadas de maneira relativamente tranq?ila, sem que isso implique em um mergulho em busca de legitima??o na hist?ria da ci?ncia. No Cap?tulo V reconhecemos que, se at? aqui nos foi dado argumentar que o realismo enquanto metaf?sica ? um pressuposto necess?rio da epistemologia de Popper, cabe admitir que essa realidade independente ? dotada de regularidades, tornando necess?rio conciliar Realismo e Indeterminismo, meidiante a no??o de propens?o. Os Tr?s Mundos aqui s?o introduzidos partindo de uma reformula??o da perspectiva evolucionista, que ter? por ponto de partida a id?ia de que todos os organismos est?o permanentemente imersos na resolu??o de problemas, problemas esses que n?o se restringem t?o somente a sobreviv?ncia. Por um processo de ensaio e erro, toda a natureza ? homog?nea, radicando a especificidade humana na capacidade de desenvolvimento de uma linguagem descritiva e argumentativa. A capacidade de produzir a linguagem cria o M 3 e concomitantemente a possibilidade da constitui??o do sujeito humano enquanto Eu consciente.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rogerio Bettin.pdf: 901827 bytes, checksum: a7d6c66d907176975e5b667d88dcdc29 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims at analyzing the plurality of realities of worlds of knowledge in Karl Popper. In the first section, we have chosen to analyze the object studied respecting the chronological order of the Popperian publications, bearing in mind the verification of the development of the three worlds thesis in Popper. The author rejects both monistic and dualistic positions and hence proposes a notion of a tripartite reality, claiming that reality is made up by the interaction among three worlds: World 1, of physical objects and material states; World 2, of states of consciousness or mental states or, maybe, of behavioral willingness to act, the world of subjective knowledge; and World 3, of objective autonomous knowledge, which doesn't depend on the subject who knows. World 3 is inhabited by problems, critical arguments and theories, as a result of the evolution of human language. It contains the history of our ideas, of how we invent and react to such products of our own elaboration of objective contents of thinking. In the second section, aiming at better understanding the three worlds theory, even though it is metaphysical, we present a connection between this thesis and the Popperian epistemology, known as critical rationalism. For the author, scientific knowledge is fallible, correctable and provisional, thus making criticism assume a crucial role in the development of knowledge. Therefore, as we analyse the thesis of the three worlds inserted in Popperian epistemology, we can better understand some aspects of the theory of the three worlds, as well as how knowledge grows, according to the presuppositions defended by Karl Popper / Esta pesquisa tem o objetivo de analisar a pluralidade de realidades de mundos do conhecimento em Karl Popper. Na primeira seção, optamos por analisar o objeto aqui estudado respeitando a ordem cronológica das publicações popperianas, tendo em vista a verificação do desenvolvimento da tese dos três mundos em Popper. O autor não aceita as posições monistas e dualistas, por isso que ele propõe uma noção de realidade tripartite, ao afirmar que a realidade é composta pela interação de três mundos: mundo um, dos objetos físicos ou de estados materiais; mundo dois, de estados de consciência ou de estados mentais, ou, talvez, de disposições comportamentais para agir é o mundo do conhecimento subjetivo; e, mundo três, do conhecimento objetivo e autônomo que independe do sujeito que conhece. Este é habitado pelos problemas, argumentos críticos e teorias, como resultado da evolução da linguagem humana. O mundo três é a história de nossas ideias, de como a inventamos e reagimos diante desses produtos de nossas próprias elaborações de conteúdos objetivos de pensamento. Na segunda seção, com o intuito de melhor compreendermos a tese dos três mundos, mesmo sendo uma teoria metafísica, apresentaremos uma conexão desta tese em relação a epistemologia popperiana - o racionalismo crítico. Para o autor, todo conhecimento científico é falível, corrigível e provisório, tendo a crítica papel fundamental para o desenvolvimento do conhecimento. Portanto, ao analisarmos a o estatuto da tese dos três mundos inserida na epistemologia popperiana, nos será permitido compreender melhor alguns aspectos da teoria dos três mundos, assim como de que forma ocorre o crescimento do conhecimento, segundo os pressupostos defendidos por Karl Popper

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JoseFranciscoDosSantos.pdf: 504225 bytes, checksum: b64321575f0c0633cd31e11254e237a0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-06-21 / Peirce and Popper developed their philosophies in different times, and Popper had a very superficial contact with Peirce works, insufficient so that these could influence in a decisive way his thought. In spite of, both develop quite convergent theories concerning to the fallibility of the science. The present work compares some points of these two authors' theories, trying to detach their common and divergent points, above all in what it refers to the realism, that appears as necessary to the background theory of the fallibilism. The undertaken analysis allows to conclude that the background of the realism in Peirce appears in a much more solid way than in Popper, once the first faces the subject in a wider spectrum, which allows to propose solutions for problems that, for Popper, they are still considered a mystery. The including realism of Peirce strengthens his falibillism, while the realism of Popper, can t overcome the notion of the common sense, that makes his falseacionism presents gaps and inconsistencies, that are discussed during this work. So, it is concluded that the peircean fallibilism includes the Popper falseacionism, once it discusses very similar problems and it opens ways for a wider discussion and more including solutions of the problems faced by both / Peirce e Popper desenvolveram suas filosofias em épocas diferentes, e Popper teve um contato muito superficial com as obras de Peirce, insuficiente para que estas pudessem influenciar de modo decisivo o seu pensamento. Não obstante, ambos desenvolvem teses bastante convergentes acerca da falibilidade da ciência. O presente trabalho compara a teoria dos dois autores, buscando destacar seus pontos em comum e suas divergências, sobretudo no que se refere ao realismo, que aparece como fundamento necessário à tese do falibilismo. A análise empreendida permite concluir que o embasamento do realismo em Peirce aparece de modo muito mais consistente que em Popper, uma vez que aquele enfrenta a questão num espectro bem mais amplo, o que o permite propor soluções para problemas que, para Popper, ainda são considerados um mistério. O realismo mais abrangente de Peirce fortalece seu falibilismo, enquanto o realismo de Popper, que não consegue superar a noção do senso comum, faz com que seu falseacionismo apresente lacunas e inconsistências, que são discutidas durante o trabalho. Assim, conclui-se que o falibilismo peirceano engloba o falseacionismo de Popper, uma vez que discute problemas muito similares e abre caminho para uma discussão mais aprofundada e para soluções mais abrangentes dos problemas enfrentados por ambos

On peut sapercevoir, dans lhistoire de la philosophie, deux sens apparemment égaux mais réellement différents dans lemploi de lexpression sens commun. On propose de nommer sens commun naturel à lun deux et, à lautre, sens commun culturel, pour unifier raisonnablement chaque sens à lintérieur de sa pente, en considérant quil y a quelque chose de concret qui correspond à lun et à lautre, réciproquement, selon des définitions strictes. À partir de ces définitions, on étudie les rapports entre la philosophie et le sens commun, cherchant à établir jusquà quel point il sagit dune relation dantagonisme ou de dépendance, à la quête dune vraie connaissance. / Verifica-se, no correr da história da filosofia, dois sentidos próximos, mas divergentes, no emprego da expressão senso comum. Propõe-se a designação de senso comum natural para um e a de senso comum cultural para o outro, designações estas que unificam razoavelmente, dentro de suas próprias vertentes, os conceitos de senso comum e às quais corresponde algo de concreto, segundo definições estritas. A partir dessas definições, estuda-se o relacionamento entre a filosofia e o senso comum, procurando estabelecer até que ponto se trata de uma relação de antagonismo ou de dependência, na busca de um conhecimento que possa ser tido por verdadeiro.

La présentation analytique des travaux insiste sur trois points spécifiques. Dans un premier temps, elle revient sur la pertinence de l'individualisme institutionnaliste (Agassi) pour développer des explicaitions en économie et en sciences sociales. Elle détaille ensuite un bilan d'étape sur mes réflexions autour de l'articulation entre individuel et collectif en théorie des organisations. Enfin, elle présente quelques réflexions méthodologique sur la position du chercheur en institution, positionné en particulier au sein de la Défense. Les travaux sont regroupés à partir de trois thèmes: méthodologies individualistes et nature de l'explication en analyse économique ; information, connaissance, compétences et économie de la défense ; organisation industrielle et réseaux de connaissances.

The topic of this study is one specific area where the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality becomes prominent: the question whether we have a rational responsibility for nature or not. Such a responsibility cannot be derived from instrumental reason, but it is argued that it can be derived from discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The study begins with an examination of Georg-Henrik von Wright's cultural criticism. It is argued that his subjectivist view of values limits reason to the realm of instrumental rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of instrumental reason is examined. They claim that instrumental reason, through the negative dialectics of the enlightenment, have created a vacuum with regard to values. Marcuse's anthropological solution to the problem of values, and his theory of an emancipatory science and technology, are examined and rejected as Utopian. The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas is examined, and it is shown how he solves the problem of his predecessors through the dual framework of work and interaction. His hypothesis of three knowledge- constitutive interests is analyzed, and it is concluded that a general theory of communication is needed in order to solve the problem of value rationality. It is shown how Habermas later theory of communicative rationality and discourse ethics overcomes the shortcomings of his earlier theory. It is argued, among other things, that his theory of communicative rationality is compatible with a correspondence theory of truth, ontological realism and epistemological fallibilism. Discourse ethics makes a rational discussion of values and norms possible. It is argued that it solves the problem of value rationality, but without providing a definition of the good or the right. It is shown that revisabilty is an important part of discourse ethics. This is manifested in the hypothetical status of discourse ethics, and in the revisability of the norms proposed. It is argued that we are in fact able to rationally propose a norm, which demands responsibility for nature within the framework of communicative rationality and discourse ethics, although such a norm must be the result of the outcome of a rational discourse and is itself, revisable. / digitalisering@umu

The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences. A modern demarcation criterion should be sensitive towards the dynamic character of the sciences. Using, as an example, a case study of Traditional Chinese Medicine, I also suggest that the potential for conflict between demarcation conclusions and the empirical success of a pseudoscientific discipline is problematic. I question whether it is sensible to reject, as pseudoscientific, a discipline which seems to display empirical success in cases where the rival paradigm, contemporary western medicine, is not successful. Ultimately, I argue that there are both good theoretical and good pragmatic grounds to support further investigation into a demarcation criterion and that Laudan’s dismissal of the problem was premature. / Graduate / 0422 / 0402