This research examined the legal nature of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the South African Tax Admiration Act and considered whether or not its practical application violates the taxpayer’s fundamental right contained in section 35(3) of the Constitution, which gives every accused taxpayer the right to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent. The research also provided clarity on the constitutionality of this presumption because it has been widely criticised for unjustifiably violating the taxpayer's constitutional right to a fair trial. The conclusion reached is that the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act constitutes an evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus. It does not create the possibility of conviction, unlike a reverse onus where conviction is possible, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not violate the accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent and hence it is constitutional. Accordingly, the chances that the accused taxpayer will succeed in challenging the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Act are slim.

L'autore analizza i punti salienti della nuova disciplina del lavoro a progetto introdotto con il D. Lgs. 10 settembre 2003, n. 276. L'analisi muove dall'individuazione delle ragioni sottese alla introduzione del lavoro a progetto che riguardano, l'inadeguatezza dei tradizionali modelli di subordinazione ed autonomia a rappresentare l'attuale mondo del lavoro e dell'impresa e l'incremento dell'abuso dei rapporti di collaborazione coordinata e continuativa, sottolineando che il legislatore, con il D. lgs. 276/2003 si è concentrato principalmente sul problema di abuso della legalità e per fronteggiarlo, ha lavorato sulla fattispecie, configurando una specifica tipologia contrattuale, caratterizzata da un tenore letterale spesso incerto e discutibile. L'A. evidenzia come la scelta del legislatore si dimostra inefficace, in primo luogo, a causa dell'indeterminatezza dell'elemento del progetto, programma o fase di esso ed inoltre, perché il sistema sanzionatorio di conversione in rapporto di lavoro subordinato in caso di assenza del progetto, non può che essere interpretato nel senso di una presunzione relativa a causa dei palesi vizi di incostituzionalità che si presenterebbero in caso contrario. Inoltre il sistema di tutele predisposto per i collaboratori coordinati e continuative a progetto appare leggero. / The Author points out the new statutory features of self-employed project contract, introduced with the D. Lgs. September 10, 2003, No 276. The analysis begins from the identification of the reasons of the introduction of this contract, which concern, on one hand, the inadequacy of conventional patterns of subordination and autonomy within the current world of work and enterprise and, on the second hand, the increasing abuse of the collaboration coordinated and continuous contract. The A. underlines that the new statutory has been focused mainly on the issue of the abuse of law and, in order to face it, has worked on the legal case specification, setting up a specific type of contract, featured by a uncertain and questionable wording. The A. underlines that the choice of the legislature is ineffective anyway. First of all, because the "project, program or phase of it" is a too much generical expression and second of all, because the sanctionative system can only be interpreted as a refutable presumption. Moreover, the system of safeguards provided for the coordinated and continuous project workers is very light.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

Les personnes morales sont pleinement assujetties à une responsabilité pénale du fait de l'activité médicale à laquelle elles participent. Dotées en effet d'une personnalité morale punissable, il faut également constater que le domaine de l'imputabilité s'étend aux infractions médicales ou apparentées. Toutefois, le mode d'imputation indirect de l'infraction prévu par l'article 121-2 du Code pénal est identifié comme la principale cause du confinement de la responsabilité dans ce domaine. Il apparaît en effet que les professionnels de santé, dont les médecins, ne peuvent commettre une infraction pour le compte de l'entité, ceux-là ne disposant pas de la qualité d'organe ou de représentant requise par le texte. Le mécanisme impose également de rapporter la preuve de l'implication de la figure décisionnelle, ce qui se révèle particulièrement délicat. Aussi, la responsabilité doit être considérée comme inadaptée à la matière médicale. Le déploiement de la responsabilité passera donc par l'application d'un nouveau modèle d'imputation de l'infraction. Le premier, fondé sur une présomption d'implication des organes ou représentants, devra finalement être écarté en raison des nombreuses faiblesses qu'il comporte. Un second modèle, fondé sur une imputation directe de l'infraction et sur l'identification d'une faute médicale fonctionnelle, donnant lieu à une responsabilité fonctionnelle, sera finalement retenu. Un tel choix nécessitera cependant de modifier les termes de l'actuel article 121-2 du Code pénal. / Legal persons are fully subject to criminal responsibility resulting from their activities related to medical matters. Having a punishable legal personality, the scope of imputation covers all crimes in the medical domain and its neighboring crimes. Nevertheless, the indirect mode of liability adopted in article 121-2 of the French Penal Code is considered the main reason of limiting the responsibility in this area. It seems that professionals working in the health domain, including doctors, could not commit a crime for the account of the institution as they are not enjoying the quality of being an organ or representative which is required by the text to engage responsibility of legal persons. This mechanism requires also the proof of the involvement of a figure on the level of decision-making in the institution, something that is particularly sensitive. The responsibility, as such, is to be considered not well adapted to medical matters. The maintenance of a meaningful criminal responsibility calls for the application of a new model of imputing criminal liability for crimes in the medical domain. First to be mentioned is that this new model shall exclude any presumption of involvement of organs or representatives of the health institution ; such a model could be attacked from different angles. Second, the model to be adopted shall depend on direct imputation based on the identification of a functional mistake that leads to functional responsibility. However, it is to be noted that adopting this model requires a modification of the wording of article 121-2 of the French penal code.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-03-27T14:46:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Duarte de Oliveira Junior.pdf: 957011 bytes, checksum: 3a2470b245c01a0d0f208a3a6b53011e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-27T14:46:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Duarte de Oliveira Junior.pdf: 957011 bytes, checksum: 3a2470b245c01a0d0f208a3a6b53011e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-01-31 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar a relação existente entre mídia, processo penal e controle social. Isso para saber a razão que fundamenta a exploração da notícia sobre o crime e sobre o investigado, pelos meios de comunicação de massa, bem como os reflexos deste trabalho da imprensa no resultado do processo, na sociedade, na pessoa do investigado e na política criminal. O método escolhido para o desenvolvimento do estudo foi o fenomenológico-hermenêutico e o seu resultado foi verificação de que a mídia explora a notícia sobre o crime com o único objetivo de atrair consumidores para os produtos de seus anunciantes. Contudo, desta conduta resulta a violação de muitos direitos de quem faz parte do processo penal, uma vez que a mídia mitiga a presunção de inocência e os direitos e garantias individuais do acusado. Isso porque promove julgamentos antecipados, que resultam na estigmatização de determinados cidadãos e na seletividade operada pelo próprio Estado, através de uma legislação simbólica, desenvolvendo o que se denomina de processo penal do inimigo. Por fim, a única saída para minimizar os reflexos da atuação midiática no processo é a veiculação da notícia sempre com esteio na presunção de inocência, ampla divulgação das sentenças absolutórias e condenações para as hipóteses de ilícitos causados pelo abuso do direito de informar. / The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between media, criminal and social control. That to know the reason underlying the exploitation of the crime and the investigation by means of mass communication as well as the reflections of this work of the press in the process output, in society, in the person of the investigation and criminal policy. The method chosen for the development of the study was the phenomenological-hermeneutic. And the result was the finding that the media operates on news of the crime with the sole purpose of attracting consumers to the products of their advertisers. However, this behavior results in the violation of many rights who is part of the criminal proceedings, since the media mitigates the presumption of innocence and the rights and individual guarantees of the accused. This is because it promotes early trials, which result in the stigmatization of certain citizens and selectivity operated by the state itself, through a symbolic legislation, developing what is called the prosecution of the enemy. Finally, the only way to minimize reflections of the media work in process is the placement of news always stay with the presumption of innocence, full disclosure of convictions and acquittals sentences for cases of illicit caused by abuse of the right to inform.

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms drawn up in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force in September 1953, consolidated the minimal standarts of human rights protection which are equally binding for all democratic Europe countries. Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair trial – one of the favourable condition to realize human rights. It is the fundamental right and the guarantee of other human rights protection. The aim of the master thesis is to scrutinize the conception of the right to a fair trial under the Article 6 of the European Convention, its content and the practice of The European Court of Human Rights on this question. It is considering especially urgent questions of the Article‘s 6 application. On that ground the position of the Court is formed and the analysed regulations becomes the part of theory. The master thesis should create the basis for the further analysis of the Article 6 and promote the publication of the problem on human rights and safeguard them in Lithuania. In the Article 6 there is determined the right that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reaonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. In the Convention sense the right to a fair trial is interpreted widely because of its significance in the democratic society. Otherwise the narrow interpretation of Article 6 would not answer the purpose. The right to a fair trial should be analysed as the whole... [to full text]

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

Le thème de la protection pénale de l'accusé, connu des pénalistes, mérite aujourd'hui d'être renouvelé sous un angle essentiellement probatoire, au regard de l'évolution actuelle du procès pénal. Situés au confluent de l'innocence et de la culpabilité, les droits et garanties accordés à l'accusé, entendu dans son acception conventionnelle, doivent être analysés en considération des principes fondateurs que sont la présomption d'innocence et les droits de la défense. L'évolution continue de ces deux principes, dans un sens diamétralement opposé, rejaillit inévitablement sur l'intensité et les modalités de la protection dont bénéficie toute personne suspectée ou poursuivie dans le cadre d'une procédure pénale.La présente étude, volontairement limitée à la phase préparatoire du procès pénal, se propose d'appréhender, dans un souci pratique et technique, les différentes évolutions jurisprudentielles et législatives opérées en la matière. Y seront ainsi abordées les principales problématiques actuellement rencontrées en procédure pénale telles que la question du statut juridique du suspect ou encore l'effectivité du principe du contradictoire dans l'avant-procès pénal. S'il peut être tentant, au premier abord, de conclure à un renforcement indiscutable de la protection pénale accordée à l'accusé, il conviendra alors de reconsidérer cette question à l'aune de l'étude des limites procédurales attachées au procès pénal. Loin d'aborder ce thème dans une optique partisane, il sera question de modération dans les propos tenus. En effet, peut-être plus que sur toute autre question de procédure pénale, il est impératif de savoir raison garder. / The theme of the criminal protection of the accused, well-known to criminal specialists, today deserves to be renewed under a probationary essentially angle, in the light of current developments in the criminal trial. Located at the confluence of innocence and guilt, the rights and guarantees granted to the accused understood in its conventional sense, must be analyzed in consideration of the founding principles of presumption of innocence and the rights of the defense. The continuing evolution of these two principles, in a sense diametrically opposite, inevitably reflects the intensity and the terms of the protection afforded any person suspected or prosecuted under criminal proceedings.This study deliberately limited to the pre-trial phase, proposes to understand, in a practical and technical problems, the various case law and legislative developments carried out in the field. Will thus addressed the key issues currently faced in criminal proceedings such as the question of the legal status of the suspect or the effectiveness of the adversarial principle in the preliminary criminal trial. While it may be tempting, at first, to conclude an indisputable strengthening the criminal protection afforded to the accused, then it will be necessary to reconsider this issue in terms of the study of procedural limitations attached to the criminal trial. Far from addressing this issue in a partisan way, it will be about moderation in the remarks. Indeed, perhaps more than any other issue of criminal procedure, it is imperative to keep a sense of proportion.