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Ensaios sobre a economia dos transplantes renais no Brasil : incentivos e eficiênciaCosta, Cássia Kely Favoretto January 2012 (has links)
A tese trata de questões referentes à economia dos transplantes renais, enfocando os mecanismos institucionais e de incentivos relacionados à captação de órgãos no Brasil, bem como a eficiência dos estados brasileiros que captam e realizam tais transplantes. A questão investigada na tese por meio dos ensaios foi analisar os efeitos e as implicações da estrutura de incentivos sobre o número de órgãos (inclusive rim) captados, ou seja, sobre o comportamento do sistema público de transplantes. Buscou-se também avaliar a eficiência desse sistema e sua tendência de comportamento ao longo do período 2006-2011. Foi conduzida inicialmente uma apresentação de alguns fatos estilizados para a possível elaboração de estratégias referente ao problema de pesquisa, entre os quais se destacaram: i) o tamanho e o tempo de espera nas filas por transplante de órgãos, no período recente, vêm apresentando uma tendência crescente; ii) o Brasil ocupa o segundo lugar no número absoluto de transplantes renais, atrás apenas dos Estados Unidos; iii) o país apresenta o maior programa público de transplantes de órgãos sólidos; iv) o processo de captação de órgãos tem-se apresentado uma atividade com elevada variabilidade entre os estados brasileiros, gerando um desequilíbrio entre a oferta e a demanda por órgãos e v) o sistema de transplante renal é classificado como uma modalidade terapêutica eficiente. No segundo ensaio da tese, analisaram-se os mecanismos de incentivos oferecidos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de rim para transplantes no Brasil. A abordagem teórica usada foi o modelo Principal-Agente, num contexto de informação assimétrica. No modelo, o SUS foi classificado como o Principal (receptor de órgãos captados) e os hospitais captadores, como Agentes. O SUS, por meio de um contrato, busca maximizar o seu objetivo de obter o maior número de órgãos para transplante e, para atingi-lo, delega ações aos hospitais. Os Agentes decidem se lhes interessam criar uma estrutura e condições para a captação de tal órgão. De acordo com os resultados do modelo Agente-Principal, verificou-se que o SUS (Principal) tem adotado diversas medidas de incentivos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de órgãos, tais como: criação de um fundo específico para financiamento dos transplantes (FAEC - Fundo de Ações Estratégicas e Compensação); pagamento uniforme para hospitais universitários e não universitários; expansão dos tipos de procedimentos hospitalares a serem pagos pelo SUS; reajuste frequente das remunerações pagas por procedimento da Tabela de Procedimentos do Sistema de Informações Hospitalares do Sistema Único de Saúde; cursos e/ou encontros com os profissionais da saúde que atuam no processo de doação-transplante e criação de novos incentivos financeiros para hospitais que realizam transplantes na rede pública. Portanto, se os profissionais recebem maiores incentivos, esses podem agir com eficiência no processo de captação do órgão e, consequentemente, contribuem para que ocorra uma redução no tempo e nas filas de espera por transplantes. Objetivando avaliar a eficiência dos estados brasileiros no sistema de transplante renal e a produtividade deles ao longo do tempo, fez-se uso do ferramental da Análise Envoltória de Dados-DEA e do Índice de Malmquist e suas decomposições (efeito Emparelhamento e Deslocamento de Fronteira). Utilizou-se uma amostra de 22 estados no período 2006-2011. O método DEA com Retornos Variáveis de Escala (BCC) orientado no sentido do produto foi aplicado nesse estudo. Cada estado foi considerado como Unidade de Tomada de Decisão (DMU). Os dados classificados como inputs (recursos) foram os seguintes: gastos (nominal) totais com transplantes renais, gastos (nominais) com serviços hospitalares e gastos (nominais) com serviços dos profissionais relacionados ao setor. Como output (produto) foi usado o número de rins transplantados. Os resultados indicaram que existe entre os estados brasileiros uma discrepância significativa em relação à captação e o número de transplantes de rins. Isso gerou uma ineficiência no sistema de transplante renal no país e pode estar ocorrendo em virtude do funcionamento não adequado da gestão; do não seguimento das regras nacionais (como por exemplo, vinculação das equipes a centros transplantadores; distribuição adequada de imunossupressores; encaminhamento de órgãos não aproveitados para estados próximos; execução da tipagem HLA de toda a lista de espera de rim) que causam prejuízos aos pacientes; das comissões intra-hospitalares não ativas e das equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. Portanto, alguns estados que participam do processo de captação e doação de rins para transplante estão apresentando ineficiência em termos de ordem administrativa e operacional. / The thesis is about the economy of kidney transplants, focusing on the institutional mechanisms and incentives related to organ harvesting in Brazil, as well as the efficiency of the Brazilian states that perform such transplants. The essays investigated the effects and implications of the incentives structure on the number of organs (including kidney) harvested by the transplants public system. The efficiency of this system and its performance over the 2006-2011 period was also evaluated. Firstly some stylized facts related to the subject were presented, among which stand out: i) the size of queues and waiting times for organ transplantation in recent years have grown; ii) Brazil ranks second in the absolute number of kidney transplants, behind only the United States, iii) the country has the largest public program for solid organs transplantation, iv) the process of organ harvesting has high variability among Brazilian states, creating an imbalance between supply and demand for organs and v) the kidney transplantation system is as an effective therapeutic modality. In the second essay the mechanisms of incentives offered to hospitals that perform kidney harvesting in Brazil were analyzed. The theoretical model used was the Principal-Agent in a context of asymmetric information. In the model, SUS was rated as the Principal (receptor of harvested organs) and the harvesting hospitals, as agents. SUS seeks to maximize the number of organs for transplantation in a contract through which it delegates the harvesting to hospitals. Agents decide whether they are interested in creating a framework and conditions for harvesting organs. The results of the Principal-Agent model indicate that SUS (the Principal) has adopted various incentives to hospitals that perform organ harvesting, such as creating a specific fund to finance transplants (FCSA - Fund for Compensation and Strategic Actions); same payment for university and non-university hospitals, expanding the types of hospital procedures to be paid by SUS; frequent remuneration raises of the amount paid by the procedures in Table of Procedures of the Hospital Information System of the Unified Health System; courses and / or meetings with health professionals working in the donation-transplantation process and creation of new financial incentives to hospitals that perform transplants for the public system. So, if the professional receives stronger incentives, he will act more effectively in the organ harvesting and will thereby contribute to a reduction in waiting lines for transplantation. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the Brazilian states in kidney transplant and their productivity over time, the Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA was used and the Malmquist index and its decomposition (Pairing effect and Boundary Displacement) to a sample of 22 states over five years (2006-2011). The DEA model with variable returns to scale (BCC) directed towards the product was applied in this study. Each state was considered a Decision Making Unit (DMU). Data classified as inputs (resources) were the following: total amount spent (nominal) with kidney transplants, amount spent (nominal) with hospital services and amount spent (nominal) with the professional services related to that sector. As output (product) was used the number of transplanted kidneys. The results indicated that there is a significant discrepancy among the Brazilian states in harvesting and transplanting kidneys. This fact has led to inefficiency in the country’s kidney transplant system and it may be so due to inadequate management, to ignoring natiimmunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.onal directives (eg, vinculating teams to transplant centers; proper distribution of immunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.
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[en] EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN BRAZIL: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND PERFORMANCE IN THE NOVO MERCADO / [pt] REMUNERAÇÃO DE EXECUTIVOS NO BRASIL: RELAÇÃO ENTRE REMUNERAÇÃO E PERFORMANCE NO NOVO MERCADOALEXANDRE VITAL LEAO 05 March 2018 (has links)
[pt] O objetivo desse estudo é identificar as práticas de remuneração adotadas para os executivos no Brasil e medir a relação entre a performance das companhias e a remuneração desses executivos. Ao analisar a relação entre remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias, deveríamos observar uma relação positiva e estatisticamente (e economicamente) significante entre as duas variáveis, caso a elaboração dos contratos de remuneração dos executivos endereçassem os problemas mencionados na teoria do Agente-Principal. Foram utilizadas diversas regressões para medir a sensibilidade entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance das companhias. Podemos observar pelos resultados que, em algumas das regressões encontramos uma relação estatisticamente significante entre a remuneração dos executivos e a performance da companhia a um nível de significância de 5 por cento, no entanto, com um significado econômico muito baixo, o que parece inconsistente com o problema do Agente-Principal. / [en] This paper seeks to identify and describe the executive compensation practices in Brazil, and measure the relationship between company performance and executive compensation in Brazil. When analyzing the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, we should observe a positive and statistically (and economically) significant relation between the two variables, in case the compensation contracts addressed the problems involved in the Principal-Agent theory. Several regressions were used to measure the sensibility between executive compensation and company performance. In some of the regressions we found a statistically significant relation between executive compensation and company performance at a 5 percent significance level, but not economically significant, which seems to be inconsistent with the Principal-Agent theory.
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Ensaios sobre a economia dos transplantes renais no Brasil : incentivos e eficiênciaCosta, Cássia Kely Favoretto January 2012 (has links)
A tese trata de questões referentes à economia dos transplantes renais, enfocando os mecanismos institucionais e de incentivos relacionados à captação de órgãos no Brasil, bem como a eficiência dos estados brasileiros que captam e realizam tais transplantes. A questão investigada na tese por meio dos ensaios foi analisar os efeitos e as implicações da estrutura de incentivos sobre o número de órgãos (inclusive rim) captados, ou seja, sobre o comportamento do sistema público de transplantes. Buscou-se também avaliar a eficiência desse sistema e sua tendência de comportamento ao longo do período 2006-2011. Foi conduzida inicialmente uma apresentação de alguns fatos estilizados para a possível elaboração de estratégias referente ao problema de pesquisa, entre os quais se destacaram: i) o tamanho e o tempo de espera nas filas por transplante de órgãos, no período recente, vêm apresentando uma tendência crescente; ii) o Brasil ocupa o segundo lugar no número absoluto de transplantes renais, atrás apenas dos Estados Unidos; iii) o país apresenta o maior programa público de transplantes de órgãos sólidos; iv) o processo de captação de órgãos tem-se apresentado uma atividade com elevada variabilidade entre os estados brasileiros, gerando um desequilíbrio entre a oferta e a demanda por órgãos e v) o sistema de transplante renal é classificado como uma modalidade terapêutica eficiente. No segundo ensaio da tese, analisaram-se os mecanismos de incentivos oferecidos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de rim para transplantes no Brasil. A abordagem teórica usada foi o modelo Principal-Agente, num contexto de informação assimétrica. No modelo, o SUS foi classificado como o Principal (receptor de órgãos captados) e os hospitais captadores, como Agentes. O SUS, por meio de um contrato, busca maximizar o seu objetivo de obter o maior número de órgãos para transplante e, para atingi-lo, delega ações aos hospitais. Os Agentes decidem se lhes interessam criar uma estrutura e condições para a captação de tal órgão. De acordo com os resultados do modelo Agente-Principal, verificou-se que o SUS (Principal) tem adotado diversas medidas de incentivos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de órgãos, tais como: criação de um fundo específico para financiamento dos transplantes (FAEC - Fundo de Ações Estratégicas e Compensação); pagamento uniforme para hospitais universitários e não universitários; expansão dos tipos de procedimentos hospitalares a serem pagos pelo SUS; reajuste frequente das remunerações pagas por procedimento da Tabela de Procedimentos do Sistema de Informações Hospitalares do Sistema Único de Saúde; cursos e/ou encontros com os profissionais da saúde que atuam no processo de doação-transplante e criação de novos incentivos financeiros para hospitais que realizam transplantes na rede pública. Portanto, se os profissionais recebem maiores incentivos, esses podem agir com eficiência no processo de captação do órgão e, consequentemente, contribuem para que ocorra uma redução no tempo e nas filas de espera por transplantes. Objetivando avaliar a eficiência dos estados brasileiros no sistema de transplante renal e a produtividade deles ao longo do tempo, fez-se uso do ferramental da Análise Envoltória de Dados-DEA e do Índice de Malmquist e suas decomposições (efeito Emparelhamento e Deslocamento de Fronteira). Utilizou-se uma amostra de 22 estados no período 2006-2011. O método DEA com Retornos Variáveis de Escala (BCC) orientado no sentido do produto foi aplicado nesse estudo. Cada estado foi considerado como Unidade de Tomada de Decisão (DMU). Os dados classificados como inputs (recursos) foram os seguintes: gastos (nominal) totais com transplantes renais, gastos (nominais) com serviços hospitalares e gastos (nominais) com serviços dos profissionais relacionados ao setor. Como output (produto) foi usado o número de rins transplantados. Os resultados indicaram que existe entre os estados brasileiros uma discrepância significativa em relação à captação e o número de transplantes de rins. Isso gerou uma ineficiência no sistema de transplante renal no país e pode estar ocorrendo em virtude do funcionamento não adequado da gestão; do não seguimento das regras nacionais (como por exemplo, vinculação das equipes a centros transplantadores; distribuição adequada de imunossupressores; encaminhamento de órgãos não aproveitados para estados próximos; execução da tipagem HLA de toda a lista de espera de rim) que causam prejuízos aos pacientes; das comissões intra-hospitalares não ativas e das equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. Portanto, alguns estados que participam do processo de captação e doação de rins para transplante estão apresentando ineficiência em termos de ordem administrativa e operacional. / The thesis is about the economy of kidney transplants, focusing on the institutional mechanisms and incentives related to organ harvesting in Brazil, as well as the efficiency of the Brazilian states that perform such transplants. The essays investigated the effects and implications of the incentives structure on the number of organs (including kidney) harvested by the transplants public system. The efficiency of this system and its performance over the 2006-2011 period was also evaluated. Firstly some stylized facts related to the subject were presented, among which stand out: i) the size of queues and waiting times for organ transplantation in recent years have grown; ii) Brazil ranks second in the absolute number of kidney transplants, behind only the United States, iii) the country has the largest public program for solid organs transplantation, iv) the process of organ harvesting has high variability among Brazilian states, creating an imbalance between supply and demand for organs and v) the kidney transplantation system is as an effective therapeutic modality. In the second essay the mechanisms of incentives offered to hospitals that perform kidney harvesting in Brazil were analyzed. The theoretical model used was the Principal-Agent in a context of asymmetric information. In the model, SUS was rated as the Principal (receptor of harvested organs) and the harvesting hospitals, as agents. SUS seeks to maximize the number of organs for transplantation in a contract through which it delegates the harvesting to hospitals. Agents decide whether they are interested in creating a framework and conditions for harvesting organs. The results of the Principal-Agent model indicate that SUS (the Principal) has adopted various incentives to hospitals that perform organ harvesting, such as creating a specific fund to finance transplants (FCSA - Fund for Compensation and Strategic Actions); same payment for university and non-university hospitals, expanding the types of hospital procedures to be paid by SUS; frequent remuneration raises of the amount paid by the procedures in Table of Procedures of the Hospital Information System of the Unified Health System; courses and / or meetings with health professionals working in the donation-transplantation process and creation of new financial incentives to hospitals that perform transplants for the public system. So, if the professional receives stronger incentives, he will act more effectively in the organ harvesting and will thereby contribute to a reduction in waiting lines for transplantation. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the Brazilian states in kidney transplant and their productivity over time, the Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA was used and the Malmquist index and its decomposition (Pairing effect and Boundary Displacement) to a sample of 22 states over five years (2006-2011). The DEA model with variable returns to scale (BCC) directed towards the product was applied in this study. Each state was considered a Decision Making Unit (DMU). Data classified as inputs (resources) were the following: total amount spent (nominal) with kidney transplants, amount spent (nominal) with hospital services and amount spent (nominal) with the professional services related to that sector. As output (product) was used the number of transplanted kidneys. The results indicated that there is a significant discrepancy among the Brazilian states in harvesting and transplanting kidneys. This fact has led to inefficiency in the country’s kidney transplant system and it may be so due to inadequate management, to ignoring natiimmunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.onal directives (eg, vinculating teams to transplant centers; proper distribution of immunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.
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I skolreformernas kölvatten : Statligt kontrollbehov och synen på skolan som agent / The aftermath of the Swedish school reforms : Governmental need for monitoring and its view of schools as agentsLiniver, Marcus January 2013 (has links)
This thesis examines the effects of the Swedish school reforms that took place in the early 1990’s. Theories such as Principal-Agent, Stewardship and Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy are discussed as well as New Public Management (NPM). These reforms were heavily influenced by NPM, causing an increased level of street-level bureaucracy, and according to Principal-Agent theory some outcomes could have been predicted. The predictions that Principal-Agent theory argues is that the changes that took place could spark an increased level of distrust and desire to monitor Swedish schools. To measure these reactions this thesis examines both national surveys on citizens level of trust towards Swedish elementary schools as well as government expenses for monitoring. The findings of this thesis indicate a clear increase in degree of need for government monitoring yet no increase in the citizens distrust in the elementary schools. This discrepancy cannot however be explained by this thesis but are discussed whether it relies on which type of questions was used in the study. In a concluding discussion the thesis ponder about how increased monitoring affects teacher discretion and presents two possible scenarios for future studies.
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台灣麥當勞加盟策略之校準分析 / A Calibration Analysis of McDonald’s Franchising in Taiwan樊蘊婕, Fan, Yun Chieh Unknown Date (has links)
速食食品不但在我們的生活中扮演重要的角色,在台灣,其亦是最重要的餐飲產業之一。文獻上有關於加盟總部與加盟商之間的決策背後的模型,各個因子如何影響彼此,最後加盟總部與加盟商皆能極大化他們的效用,達到一個最適加盟的平衡點。然而,未看到有使用校準分析(Calibration)的方式回推出無法觀察到變數之合理區間的文獻。本研究使用此方法及台灣麥當勞的資料來解開加盟與否決策背後模型的面紗。在最基本的經濟模型中,我們發現加盟商努力的重要性增加時會導致加盟率的下降。再者,都會區的加盟商風險趨避程度以及市場風險較非都會區高。為了針對麥當勞總部的市場策略,延續上個模型的設定,我們在生產函數中另外加入健康食品的產品線以建設出較細緻的第二種模型。此延伸模型相較於第一個模型能解釋更多資料。我們亦觀察到當健康食品佔麥當勞產能提高時,模型的適配度會下降。此現象可解釋為在其他條件不變下,當麥當勞在菜單內加入更多比重的健康食品時,加盟商與加盟主的獲利將低於現階段的水準。
關鍵字: 速食產業,委託代理理論,校準分析,加盟 / Fast food restaurants play an important role in our daily life; they are also one of the most important restaurant business types in Taiwan. The literature posits and examines models behind how franchisors and franchisees reach their franchising decisions, and how different factors affect optimal franchising rates. On that basis, they derive the optimal franchising rates, at which both franchisors and franchisees can maximize their utility. However, there is no literature on determining the reasonable range of variables in the model that we cannot observe in the real world. This study takes the initiative to unveil the model behind the franchising decision with proxies of variables by calibrating a basic economic model using data from McDonald’s Taiwan. Our finding are that a higher importance level of effort results in a higher optimal franchising rate, and the level of franchisees’ risk aversion and the market risk in metropolitan areas are higher than in non-metropolitan areas. In accordance with McDonald’s Taiwan’s strategy in the past years, we construct a more detailed model to capture the characteristics more accurately by adding a healthy food product line into the production function. The extended model can explain the real-world data better than the previous model. On the strategy side, we find that if healthy products account for a higher proportion of the production capacity, the model fitness level drops. In other words, the profit for both the franchisor and franchisees decreases when McDonald’s Taiwan introduces more healthy food to the menu.
Key Words: fast-food industry, principal-agent model, calibration, franchising
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Vliv problému pána a správce na vznik finanční krize / The impact of the principal-agent problem on the genesis of the global financial crisisMach, Milan January 2013 (has links)
The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.
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予算配分メカニズムの設計に関する研究 / ヨサン ハイブン メカニズム ノ セッケイ ニカンスル ケンキュウ渡邊, 章好, Watanabe, Fumiyoshi 29 February 2008 (has links)
博士(商学) / 乙第395号 / 63p / 一橋大学
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Offentlig-Privat Samhällssäkerhet : En principal-agentstudie om svenska kommuners samverkan med privata aktörer inom krisberedskap- och hanteringWidman, Erik January 2021 (has links)
Med bakgrund av de satsningar som görs på Sveriges civila försvar och beredskap samt trenden av offentlig-privat samverkan för samhällssäkerhet, undersöker den här pilotstudien hur sju svenska kommuner samverkar med privata aktörer inom krisberedskap- och hantering. Studien utgår ifrån ett principal-agentperspektiv där kommunen är principal och privata aktörer är agent. Genom sju semistrukturerade informantintervjuer med säkerhetschefer på Haninge, Huddinge, Nacka, Norrtälje, Salem, Solna och Värmdö kommun undersöks former för samverkan samt om det uppstår några principal-agentproblem i samverkan med privata aktörer. Analysen görs genom kvalitativ tematisk textanalys på det transkriberade materialet och finner att samverkan med privata aktörer i kommunerna befinner sig i en uppstartsfas och att det finns utvecklingspotential. Formerna för samverkan är informell och dialogbaserad. Några principal-agentproblem kan inte beläggas vilket kan härledas till formerna för samverkan samt att de intervjuade kommunerna nyligen kommit igång med samverkansarbetet.
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Share repurchase announcements and abnormal returns for Swedish listed real estate companiesAxelsson, Lars, Brissman, Philip January 2011 (has links)
Asymmetric information in the management-investor relationship implies that the management’s actions will give signals to investors. According to the signalling hypothesis, an announcement of a share repurchase program is interpreted by investors that the management is putting its money where its mouth is, i.e. signalling that the stock is currently undervalued. Using the event study methodology to analyze share repurchases of listed Swedish real estate companies, we find significant short-term abnormal returns of 1,96% on the announcement day and cumulative abnormal returns of 2,32% (although not significant on conventional levels) for the ten first days subsequent to the announcement. At the most fundamental level of corporate finance theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis stipulates that the whole value of the announcement should be discounted in the stock price immediately. On the other hand, it might be rational for investors to await certainty that the share repurchase program will be executed, before discounting its full value. We find indications of underreaction as the analysis suggests long-term positive stock price reactions to the announcement. The Jensen’s alpha approach utilized in the long-term analysis suggests an average abnormal return of 10,30%, although insignificant on conventional levels, the year following a share repurchase announcement. From a stock investor point of view, the results from this study suggest that buying real estate stocks that announce share repurchase programs can yield positive abnormal returns for investment horizons of 10 days as well as 12 months.
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From Cubicles to Collaboration : A study on the Transformation of Government Office Spaces Driven by Cost-Efficiency, Digitalization, and Modernization / Från kuber till samarbete : En studie om omvandlingen av statliga kontorslokaler driven av kostnadseffektivitet, digitalisering och moderniseringGhaemi Flores, Sara January 2023 (has links)
Over time, the office spaces of authorities have evolved, with external influences like pandemics accelerating the transition towards flexible, activity-based workplaces. Despite resistance, attitudes are slowly becoming positive towards modern, adaptable offices. This transformation is driven by value creation, efficiency improvements, market condition shifts, and changing norms within public and private sectors. The office space design within authorities has transitioned from reflecting organizational hierarchies to open office spaces. Optimal space requirement has become complex due to flexible work arrangements. Sustainability is a guiding principle in office space design, highlighting social trends shaping institutional norms and practices. The increasing demand for security within authorities presents a conflict between maintaining openness for citizens and ensuring information security. Security and confidentiality have become influential factors affecting work methods, digital tool utilization, and physical premise design. The Swedish government's digitalization ambition significantly influences authorities' work processes and organizational structures. With remote work adoption and reduced business travel, authorities offering flexible work solutions are seen as attractive employers. Geographical location remains important, with central places like Stockholm's main station still considered desirable. Despite that, A key trend is authorities choosing locations in Solna and Sundbyberg over central Stockholm, adapting to market conditions with surging rents. / Över tid har myndigheters kontorsutrymmen utvecklats, påverkade av yttre faktorer som pandemi som påskyndar övergången mot flexibla, aktivitetsbaserade arbetsplatser. Trots motstånd håller attityderna mot aktivitetsbaserade kontor på att långsamt bli mer positiva inom myndigheterna. Denna förändring drivs av värdeskapande, effektivitetsförbättringar, förändringar i marknadsförhållandena samt skiftande normer inom den offentliga och privata sektorn. Kontorsutformningen inom myndigheter har övergått från att spegla organisationshierarkier till öppna kontorslandskap. Att fastställa optimalt utrymmesbehov har blivit komplext på grund av flexibla arbetsarrangemang. Hållbarhet är en vägledande princip i utformningen av kontorsutrymmen, vilket belyser hur sociala trender formar institutionella normer och praxis. Den ökande efterfrågan på säkerhet inom myndigheter skapar en konflikt mellan att upprätthålla öppenhet för medborgare och att säkerställa informationssäkerhet. Säkerhet och konfidentialitet har blivit inflytelserika faktorer som påverkar arbetsmetoder, användning av digitala verktyg och utformningen av fysiska lokaler. Regeringens ambitioner kring digitalisering påverkar myndigheters arbetsprocesser och organisatoriska strukturer avsevärt. Med möjlighet till stor andel distansarbete och minskade affärsresor betraktas myndigheter som attraktiva arbetsgivare när de erbjuder flexibla arbetslösningar. Geografiskt läge förblir viktigt, närhet till Stockholms Centralstation betraktas fortfarande som attraktivt. Trots detta är en nyckeltrend att myndigheter väljer platser i Solna och Sundbyberg framför centrala Stockholm, för att anpassa sig till marknadsförhållanden med stigande hyror.
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