Cross selling is the practice of selling additional products to an existing customer. It has the potential to boost revenues and can be beneficial for both the company and the customer. For many multi-divisional companies with product or service oriented organizational structures the attempt to realize the benefits of cross selling generates incentive problems. In this thesis, three problems spread over three business levels are identified. Firstly, management needs to (financially) motivate business units in fostering their cross selling efforts. Secondly, in order to make cross selling happen, business units need to cooperate and to exchange product-related information. Finally, in order to increase their short-term benefits business units might act opportunistically by selling products or services of other business units without paying attention to adding value for their customers. These incentive problems are theoretically examined by applying principal-agent theory and the theory of repeated games. Our findings suggest that an optimized incentive structure is required to make both the business units and the management better off. The thesis also analyses the circumstances and necessary prerequisites under which cross selling initiatives are beneficial for all involved parties. Apart from that cross selling sometimes may turn out to be non-beneficial. In addition to the elaborations above, risks and hazards of cross selling are presented in detail and applied for the extension of the underlying model. Bottom line, the work underlines that cross selling is to be realized holistically to ensure durable success. (author's abstract)

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:15:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2000-04-13T00:00:00Z / Trata do problema principal-agent entre investidor e administrador de fundos no Brasil. Aborda as evidências de conflitos de interesses, os efeitos positivos e negativos da competição de mercado, as formas de controle via regulamentação e auto-regulamentação no Brasil e em outros países. Explora os mecanismos utilizados por uma amostra de instituições administradoras de fundos no Brasil para lidar com a questão, com suas vantagens e fraquezas.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 guilhermesanchesturma2003.pdf.jpg: 18091 bytes, checksum: fc3161dc0ad5e4fd3a746921dbea5095 (MD5) guilhermesanchesturma2003.pdf: 311787 bytes, checksum: 4f7eeecb22b5945b99a72be3bb9bde39 (MD5) guilhermesanchesturma2003.pdf.txt: 92492 bytes, checksum: 411ad5e61d1c0024cd2009325a3bfd28 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-02-17T00:00:00Z / O trabalho ora apresentado busca elaborar um roteiro analítico para a estruturação de um modelo de governança corporativa particularmente em firmas sem fins lucrativos. Tal roteiro, elaborado com base em instrumental teórico, é ilustrado por meio da Teoria da Agência. Procura-se acrescentar à determinação das figuras de Agente e Principal a determinação dos outros stakeholders que influenciam a governança das firmas. Mostram-se as características que diferenciam as firmas presentes nos três setores da economia, a saber, firmas privadas com fins privados, firmas públicas com fins públicos e finalmente firmas privadas com fins públicos. Devido às características mais complexas das firmas sem fins lucrativos no âmbito da governança, baseamo-nos no modelo de Glaeser como referência central. Além do framework descrito e analisado, propomos uma agenda de estudos para o Brasil regulamentar melhor as firmas do Terceiro Setor. / This paper seeks to elaborate an analytical framework for the study of a firm governance model, particularly a non-profit one. The framework is based on Agency Theory concepts and considers the influence of other possible stakeholders beside the Principal-Agent figures. This work also explores some main and specific characteristics of the firms in the sectors of the economy, i.e., private for profit firms, estate owned firms (either for profit or not) and finally private not-for-profit firms. Given the more complex characteristics of the governance system for non-profit firms, the Glaeser governance model is used as the central reference. In addition to the suggested analytical framework, I propose an agenda for research and studies in the Brazilian environment in order to better rule the domestic third sector.

[pt] A estrutura de contratos de Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPP) tem como característica o compartilhamento de riscos do projeto entre o governo e investidor. PPPs têm longo prazo de maturação, volumes elevados de investimentos iniciais e incerteza quanto às receitas. O comportamento futuro de agentes públicos e privados pode transmitir um risco adicional, tornando projetos pouco atrativos quando informações relevantes não ficam evidentes em um contrato. A teoria dos jogos tem sido um instrumento amplamente utilizado para trazer soluções analíticas quando o problema de assimetria de informação está presente. Portanto, este trabalho utiliza os conceitos de teóricos de mecanismos compatíveis com incentivos para PPPs objetivando: (i) aprimoramento de falhas contratuais ex-post via condições ex-ante ; (ii) aprimorar um modelo de jogo de renegociação de PPPs, mostrando como o comportamento oportunista pode ser evitado. Analisa-se o processo de concessão do Complexo Maracanã, como caso ilustrativo via uso de proposições, lemas e teoremas, mostrando que o edital do Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro é sub-ótimo do ponto de vista da Teoria de Desenho de Mecanismos. / [en] The Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) contract structure is characterized by the sharing of project risks between the government and the investor. PPPs have long maturation maturities, high initial investment volumes and revenue uncertainty. The future behavior of public and private agents may carry an additional risk, making projects unattractive when relevant information is not evident in a contract. Game theory has been a widely used instrument to provide analytical solutions when the problem of information asymmetry is present. Therefore, this thesis uses the concepts of mechanism theorists compatible with incentives for PPPs, aiming: (i) improvement of ex-ante and ex-post contractual failures; (ii) to improve a PPP renegotiation game model, showing how opportunistic behavior can be avoided. It analyzes the concession process of the Maracanã Complex as illustrative case via use of propositions, lemmas and theorems, showing that the State Government s announcement of Rio de Janeiro is sub-optimal from the point of view of the mechanisms of Design Theory.

Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation. We question this dogma from the perspective of relations between developed and developing countries from a legal and economic perspective, and make a modern and fair proposal for tax treaties. We will show under which conditions a developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully and whether they should share revenues. Moreover, we will demonstrate how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

VOVES, Petr. Úloha Světové zdravotnické organizace v případu epidemie viru eboly na území západní Afriky v roce 2014. Praha, 2017. 95 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut politologických studií. Katedra mezinárodních vztahů. Vedoucí diplomové práce PhDr. Irah Kučerová, Ph.D. Abstract The M.A. thesis deals with the World Health Organization's response to the outbreak of the ebola virus disease in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014. The spread of the disease is mapped from its very beginning at the end of December 2013 until the creation of UNMEER in September 2014, which was the first international medical mission ever created by UN Security Council. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the particular problems, which limit WHO's role in a timely and effective response to the public health threats of international concern (PHEIC) under the reformed International Health Regulations (IHR). The response of WHO representatives to the spread of the disease is evaluated taking into account the available material and competence capacities of the organization as well as its previous practice in this field. The specific misconduct of WHO representatives is explained in the context of longstanding WHO's problems, which are mainly linked to the vertical fragmentation...

The diploma thesis deals with the process of prison privatization in the United Kingdom particularly in England and Wales especially in the form of PFI deals, in which the private sector not only manages prison facility but also designs and constructs the buildings. Due to transfer of this kind of service we can look at the relationship between state and private provider trough the lenses of Principal-agent theory. This theory, in its purest form, is constituted of one principal and one agent to whom the performance of the service is transferred, part of the risks associated with it and also a certain decision-making power are transferred as well. According to the theory, the basic precondition for the relationship between the principal and the agent is a discrepancy in the goals of the actors and the agent's effort to act opportunistically at the expense of the performance of the service for the principal. In this sense, the thesis examines the decision from 2018 not to launch new PFI or its successor PF2 projects. In this scenario, England and Wales are the principal and the prison operators are the agents. The hypothesis of the thesis is that this decision not to launch new PFI projects is related to problematic aspects of the relationship between the principal and the agent and that the control...

In this thesis, I apply the sophisticated tools made available by the econometrics of panel data and treatment models to a range of different issues. In the first Chapter, an ECM model is used to test on the existence of financing constraints in firms’ investment and R&D, taken a proxy for the efficiency of market institutions and governance rules in different countries. In the second chapter we test an agency model linking pay-performance contracts of CEOS to the financial situation of a firm by using a UK panel data. In the third chapter I use a sophisticated treatment model to evaluate the effectiveness of Italian public subsidies to R&D. Finally, in the fourth chapter I try to evaluate the efficiency of Italian regional systems of public healthcare by controlling for socio-economic factors and quality of healthcare in a composite model using panel data estimation and efficient frontier techniques.<p>The first Chapter analyzes the investment behavior of a sample of R&D intensive firms which are quoted on the stock market from USA, UK and Japan for the period 1990-1998. By using an error correction model we test the elasticity of investment and R&D to cash flow in these countries to see by which measure different market institutions and corporate governance rules affects the cost of external financing. Contrary to previous studies, we find significant differences in the sensitivity to cash flow of the two types of investment, with R&D expenditure being much less sensitive than ordinary investment. This is not surprising given the more long-term nature of R&D expenditures. For what concerns the comparison between the different systems/countries, the USA stock markets confirms as the most efficient market providing outside financing at a much lower cost compared to other markets, especially for young, smaller firms.<p>The second Chapter is a joint work with Biagio Speciale. It uses the data on a panel of quoted UK firms over the period 1995–2002 to study the effects of financial leverage on managerial compensation. The change in the investors’ expectations that caused the recent collapse of the stock market tech bubble is a perfect example of natural experiment that has been used as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in the firm’s debt. The estimates show that pay-for-performance sensitivity is increasing in financial leverage, with the exception of the 10% most levered firms, giving rise at the end to a non-linear (inverted U-shape) relationship between the two variables. The chapter includes also a theoretical model accounting for this relationship where an higher leverage increases both the expected returns and the expected variance of investment returns: the first effect (determining increased pay-performance sensitivity) prevails for low leverage values and the second effect (determining decreased pay-performance sensitivity) prevails for high leverage values.<p>The third Chapter undertakes an empirical estimation of the additionality of public funding on both the propensity to initiate R&D activity and the intensity of R&D spending of Italian enterprises for the period 1998-2000, using data from the Third Community Innovation Survey and from firms' financial accounts. The chosen methodology (Endogenous Switching Type II-Tobit) takes into account the possibility that decisions about both starting an R&D activity (sample selection effect) and applying for/obtaining public funding (essential heterogeneity) are influenced by private knowledge of enterprises' idiosyncratic propensities in R&D spending. The present analysis shows that both these effects are indeed important and that they contribute to explain most of the additionality found with less sophisticated models.<p>The fourth Chapter investigates the underlying causes of variability of public health expenditure per capita (SSPC henceforth) between Italian regions. A fixed-effect panel data estimate on the SSPC (for the period 1997-2006) is used in the first part of the paper to account for regional differences in terms of physical, demographic, socio-economic characteristics and in terms of other variables that affect demand and supply of health services. In the second part, we take the ‘adjusted’ SSPC and proceed to estimate an "efficient production function" of the quality of health services through Data Envelopment Analysis. This procedure allows us to separate the share of expenditure used for the improvement of the quality from the one that can be traced only to an inefficient use of financial resources. A comparison of regional SSPC after factoring out the socio-economic factors and the quality of healthcare shows that big differences still remain and are even exacerbated, signalling big pockets of inefficiency and correspondingly a huge potential for cost savings. Finally, a preliminary analysis shows a positive correlation between the efficiency of regional public spending in healthcare and the level of social capital. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

En hållbar värld blir mer och mer viktigt för världens befolkning. Det märks inte minst genom ett EU-direktiv från 2014. Direktivet innebär att en del företag i medlemsländerna blir tvingade, genom egna lagar, att upprätta hållbarhetsredovisningar. I Sverige infördes lagen under 2016 och gäller för räkenskapsår som inleds 2017. Frågan som undersöks i denna studie är om det finns någon skillnad mellan frivilliga och lagstadgade hållbarhetsredovisningar gällande aktiepris och finansiella nyckeltal. Studien tar hänsyn till förändringarna i justerat aktiepris (RI), price-to-earnings och price-to-book för att uttala sig om företagen som enbart har lagstadgade hållbarhetsredovisningar påverkas mer eller mindre än företagen som haft hållbarhetsrapporter för samtliga undersökta år. Fokuset ligger i brytpunkten mellan perioden 2015–2016 och 2017–2018 och undersöker om de olika grupperna av företag har en förändring som är signifikant skilt från varandra, vilket skulle innebära att lagstadgade hållbarhetsredovisningar tas emot annorlunda är frivilliga rapporter. Vidare kommer studien också  att undersöka huruvida olika företagsfaktorer ökar sannolikheten för en frivillig hållbarhetsrapport. Det finns tidigare studier som undersöker hållbarhetsredovisningars effekter. Bland annat studerade Lo och Sheu (2007) amerikanska bolag om samband fanns mellan hållbart företagande och marknadsvärde. Deras resultat visar att hållbara amerikanska bolag hade en högre värdering än företag som inte var hållbara. Andra forskare som ifrågasätter hållbarhetsredovisningarnas effekter är Lys et al.(2015) som undersökte om det finns någon relation mellan företagens avkastning och dess kostnader för hållbarhetsarbete. Deras slutsats var att de inte kunde avgöra om det fanns ett positivt samband mellan de två. De teoretiska perspektiven som denna studie baseras på är intressentmodellen, principal-agentteorin, signalteorin, disclosure-teorin och effektiva marknadshypotesen. Resultatet visar ingen statistisk signifikans mellan grupperna. Studiens resultat antyder dock att företag med frivilliga hållbarhetsredovisningar har högre förändring i finansiell avkastning än företag med enbart lagstadgade rapporter. Resultatet tyder på att det inte finns någon anledning för företagen att invänta lagkrav och att det inte heller finns möjlighet att generera överavkastning på företag vid införandet av lagkrav på rapporterna. Resultatet visar även att företagsfaktorerna storlek och tillväxt är av betydelse för sannolikheten att företaget upprättat en frivillig hållbarhetsrapport. En viktig aspekt som inte får glömmas är att området fortfarande behöver mer forskning och att denna studie är enbart en del i att förklara effekterna av lagstadgad hållbarhetsredovisning.

Korruption lässt sich als ökonomische Austauschbeziehung mit den Akteuren Prinzipal, Agent und Klient darstellen. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Faktoren das Ausmaß der Schädigung des Prinzipals durch Korruption beeinflussen und mit welchen Mitteln der Prinzipal entgegen steuern kann. Neben den Auswirkungen von Kontrollen, Strafandrohung, kulturellen und individuellen Faktoren wird insbesondere der Einfluss der Entlohnungsgestaltung untersucht. Die Zusammenhänge werden mit Hilfe formaler Modelle dargestellt und durch eine Auswertung empirischer Untersuchungen ergänzt.:1. Einleitung 2. Korruption als gesellschaftliches Phänomen 3. Verbreitung und Auswirkungen von Korruption 4. Korruption als ökonomische Austauschbeziehung 5. Wirkung von Aufdeckungsmechanismen und Bestrafung 6. Individuelle und kulturelle Ein üsse auf die Korruptionsentscheidung 7. Korruptionsvermeidende Entlohnungsverträge 8. Zusammenfassung