臺北市勞動檢查處為配合近年來「宣導、檢查、輔導」三合一策略提升防災效能，自民國87年開始將檢查業務部分轉換為「自主管理」模式，並將臺北市的營建工地分級管理，依不同等級有不同的自主檢查頻率，並派員實施不同程度的稽查。 依相關自主管理計畫的規定，若某營造廠加入計畫獲得「優等」或「特優級」的認證標章，除非發生災害、遇專案檢查及市民檢舉等情形外，檢查員不主動前往實施勞動檢查，但仍由機關中技正層級以上人員組成機動小組，不定期以輔導方式實施督導；所以該營造廠只要依規定之檢查流程及制式表格填寫按時回報，就幾乎不受規範所拘束。 但是近年參加自主管理計畫的營造工地發生職業災害的頻率，並未如預期下降，不符機關績效目標；因此，本研究重點在探究勞動檢查運用自主管理政策工具績效不佳的原因，是否這些營造廠的工地在申請獲得「優等」或「特優級」認證後，負責職業安全衛生工作的人員或主管，其責任及權限的移轉後造成行為與態度轉趨鬆懈？ 研究結果發現在實施自主管理計畫後，在營造廠中依不同的層次有不同的結果，部分負責人確實發生了道德風險（Moral Hazard）行為，而負責職業安全衛生工作的人員，礙於利潤及工期等眾多因素，鬆懈了安全衛生工作，部份發生了道德風險行為，致未達組織預設的目標。 / Taipei Labor Inspection Office adopted a strategy that combined advocacy, inspection and counseling to enhance the effectiveness of occupational hazards prevention. Since 1998, it began to change the policy from “inspection strengthening” to “self-management”. With hierarchical management of the construction sites in Taipei according to this strategy, construction sites of different levels have different inspection frequency and different degrees of inspection. In accordance with the self-management program, if an construction site in Taipei who joined this program obtains "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, unless occupational accident happened, or special inspection project is launched, or citizens report, or other dangerous situations occur, the inspection personnels will not do labor inspection, but will still occasionally provide unscheduled counseling by official chief. As long as the construction company fills out the report form on time according to the program of the standard inspection flow, this company is nearly unregulated. But the occupational accident rate of those sites who applied to self-management program did not fall as expected, it does not achieve the goal as set by official performance indicators; therefore, this study aims to explore the reasons why those sites who obtain "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, have shown that their behaviors and attitudes toward occupational safety and workers’ health have become more lax after joining the program? This study found that after the implementation of self-management program, moral hazard behaviors occur in different hierarchical levels of organizations. Construction company’s directors do show moral hazard behavior, while those in charge of occupational safety and health work, some do have moral hazard behavior, out of profit motive and time concern of the construction project among many other factors. All together explains why this self-management program does not achieve the goal set by official performance indicators.

都市更新條例於民國87年11月發佈實施至今已九年，但成果有限，其主要問題在於人與資訊不足。都市更新條例規定土地及合法建築物所有權人（下稱地主）得委託都市更新事業機構擔任實施者實施都市更新事業，惟都市更新體系並無完整規範「地主－實施者」委託實施之配套機制，產生委託實施雙方因資訊不完全、不對稱及不確定環境因素，致無法全盤掌握未來整合推動可能發生的狀況下，基於各自利害關係考量，產生投機主義，形成「隱藏與逆選擇」的對立角色，衍生高昂的交易成本，影響都市更新事業整合推展，故亟需就「委託實施」課題加以建構機制規範之必要。 本研究旨就都市更新事業重建「推動方式與實務層面」為主題，以都市更新事業委託發起至實施完成之過程為軸線，經由（1）以交易成本及代理理論為基礎的印證，（2）對都市更新法制程序與規範的認知、（3）對政府、地主及實施者等三個參與主體特性的瞭解、（4）對民間推動實務與現行法制規範存在相互影響造成推動障礙的探討、（5）對實施推動的交易成本內容分析等等相關文獻面、法制面、實務面、個案案例，以及對參與推動都市更新事業人士進行問卷調查訪問之綜合研究可知：地主與政府本身皆存在相關影響都市更新事業推動的問題，以及地主對實施者可能存在疑慮的委託實施代理問題。 本研究針對影響委託實施都市更新事業推動的問題，嘗試建構可為地主提供服務並兼顧實施者利益的「整合代理機制」，包含（1）實施者實施需具備之資格條件規範、（2）地主委託實施內容與實施者作業規範等二項機制，並建議政府從「政策」、「法制」、「資訊」、「推動」、「執行」等五個構面提供配套措施，協助排除推動障礙。 本研究冀期建構「整合代理機制」，強化都市更新體系委託實施機制內涵，提供地主與實施者雙方作為委託實施的推動模式，並透過市場機制促進多元實施者參與機會，公開揭露都市更新資訊，消彌雙方認知差距，降低或消除都市更新事業交易成本及解決代理問題，加速建立都市更新推動共識及委託實施契約簽訂，落實履行與監督控管，以促進民間參與都市更新事業推動。 / It has been nine years since the Urban Renewal Act took effect in November 1998. Except for limited accomplishment, the major problems it encountered are inadequate manpower and insufficient information. The Act requires the owner (landowner for short) of the land and legal buildings entrusting property to an urban renewal business or agency as an enforcer or entrusted agent to carry out the renewal project. Yet, the urban renewal system lacks a complete package of standards or mechanism for the practice of “landowner—enforcer” entrustment relationship; due to incomplete, asymmetric and uncertain supply of information, both sides are unable to have an overall control of any possible incident in future integrated actions. Because of different concern, this entrustment relationship creates opportunism in which produces confronting positions of “concealment and adverse-selection”; as a result of the negative atmosphere in the relationship, the operation needs more transaction cost which has great effect on the integrated development of urban renewal project. Therefore, it is essential to establish a mechanism regulating the issue of “entrusted enforcement”. Based on the subject of “promotion mode and practice level” in urban renewal and reconstruction, this study intends to examine the process of urban renewal from the beginning of entrustment relationship to its completion, including (1) demonstration on the basis of transaction cost and representation theory; (2) comprehending the procedures and standards in urban renewal legal system; (3) understanding the characteristics of three participants, namely government, landowner and the enforcer; (4) investigating the obstacles caused by the conflict between promotional practices in non-government agency and the existing regulations; (5) analyzing the transaction cost of promotion in terms of literature review, legal system, practice, individual case and a questionnaire survey on the person who participate in urban renewal project. Research results show: problems of promoting urban renewal exist on both sides of landowner and government; the landowners also may have doubts for the enforcer regarding the representation issue of entrusted enforcement. This study focuses on the problems encountered when promoting the entrusted enforcement of urban renewal business and intends to construct an “integrated representation mechanism” which provides service to landowner and, on the other hand, also consider the benefit of enforcer, including (1) the qualification, terms and standards of the enforcer; (2) the entrusted task content from landowners, and the operational standards of the enforcer. We also propose necessary measures in five aspects as follows: “policy”, “legal system”, “information”, “promotion”, “implementation” for government so as to eliminate obstacles of promotion. We hope to construct an “integrated representation mechanism” and strengthen the mechanism content of the entrusted enforcement in urban renewal system; this design aims to provide landowner and enforcer a promotional model in entrusted enforcement, increase diverse participation through market mechanism, publicly disclose urban renewal information, eliminate cognitive discrepancy on both sides, reduce or remove transaction cost for urban renewal business and resolve the issues of representation, increase common sense on urban renewal promotion and accelerate the processing of entrusted enforcement contract, implement practically and monitor with supervision for promoting the participation of non-government agencies in urban renewal business.

本文研究問題為：為何習近平在十八大後會展開大規模人事調動？為何人事調動會出現某些特徵與規律？又要從何種角度去進行分析？由於習近平所面對的外部環境與胡錦濤剛接班時相比更為嚴峻，傳統的派系理論已不足以提供解釋。本文藉由委託代理理論進行分析，主要論點在於人事調動有助於減緩代理問題，可區分為頻繁的調動、排除不合格者和甄補具有同質性者。分析資料則從中共政治菁英資料庫匯出十八大以來的所有正部級幹部，並進一步分成省委書記、省長和中央部會幹部三個群體。研究結果顯示調動幹部的幅度極大，除了部份幹部晉升速度極快之外，整體戰略上傾向於掌控更多中委會席次；不適任幹部或與薄、周政變集團有所交集的幹部，不是落馬就是快速退居二線職務；與習近平具同質性的幹部，多數均在兩年內快速從副部級晉升至正部級。結論部份以十九屆中央委員評估作為習近平五年來的成果總結，發現習近平將能在十九大上佔據半數以上席次，顯示出透過人事調動來減緩代理問題有其效果。最後，從中共政治推導出的結論除了可以與委託代理理論對話之外，也有助於其他大型組織的領導人思考如何處理代理問題。

速食食品不但在我們的生活中扮演重要的角色，在台灣，其亦是最重要的餐飲產業之一。文獻上有關於加盟總部與加盟商之間的決策背後的模型，各個因子如何影響彼此，最後加盟總部與加盟商皆能極大化他們的效用，達到一個最適加盟的平衡點。然而，未看到有使用校準分析(Calibration)的方式回推出無法觀察到變數之合理區間的文獻。本研究使用此方法及台灣麥當勞的資料來解開加盟與否決策背後模型的面紗。在最基本的經濟模型中，我們發現加盟商努力的重要性增加時會導致加盟率的下降。再者，都會區的加盟商風險趨避程度以及市場風險較非都會區高。為了針對麥當勞總部的市場策略，延續上個模型的設定，我們在生產函數中另外加入健康食品的產品線以建設出較細緻的第二種模型。此延伸模型相較於第一個模型能解釋更多資料。我們亦觀察到當健康食品佔麥當勞產能提高時，模型的適配度會下降。此現象可解釋為在其他條件不變下，當麥當勞在菜單內加入更多比重的健康食品時，加盟商與加盟主的獲利將低於現階段的水準。 關鍵字: 速食產業，委託代理理論，校準分析，加盟 / Fast food restaurants play an important role in our daily life; they are also one of the most important restaurant business types in Taiwan. The literature posits and examines models behind how franchisors and franchisees reach their franchising decisions, and how different factors affect optimal franchising rates. On that basis, they derive the optimal franchising rates, at which both franchisors and franchisees can maximize their utility. However, there is no literature on determining the reasonable range of variables in the model that we cannot observe in the real world. This study takes the initiative to unveil the model behind the franchising decision with proxies of variables by calibrating a basic economic model using data from McDonald’s Taiwan. Our finding are that a higher importance level of effort results in a higher optimal franchising rate, and the level of franchisees’ risk aversion and the market risk in metropolitan areas are higher than in non-metropolitan areas. In accordance with McDonald’s Taiwan’s strategy in the past years, we construct a more detailed model to capture the characteristics more accurately by adding a healthy food product line into the production function. The extended model can explain the real-world data better than the previous model. On the strategy side, we find that if healthy products account for a higher proportion of the production capacity, the model fitness level drops. In other words, the profit for both the franchisor and franchisees decreases when McDonald’s Taiwan introduces more healthy food to the menu. Key Words: fast-food industry, principal-agent model, calibration, franchising

都市更新權利變換運作過程中的土地權利人與實施者的關係，是現代經濟活動典型的專業分工委託代理關係。土地權利人與實施者基於都市更新法制下相關的權利義務契約，執行都市更新事業，由於訊息不對稱、目標不一致與風險偏好之差異，實施者基於機會主義的決策或行動，經常不利於土地權利人的利益，於是產生代理問題、增加代理成本，雙方無法產生高度互信的基礎，而成為都市更新延宕與成效不彰的主因。本論文從土地權利人與實施者之間，於都市更新條例機制下的互動契約中，探討分析雙方之委託代理關係，並從土地權利人的角度設計監督方式，以維護土地權利人的權益，促進都市更新事業之實施。 當土地權利人與實施者，共同於一都市更新單元，組成生產團隊時，土地權利人初期擁有較強的提議與同意之控制權，隨著實施者握有超過都市更新法定之同意書門檻後，實施者掌握較強的執行控制權，土地權利人擁有較弱的監督控制權。又現行都市更新權利變換的價值分配，是實施者投入共同負擔費用，並以更新完成後之土地與建築物部分折價抵付，其餘土地及建築物則分配與原土地所有權人，因此土地權利人得到大部分的剩餘索取權。這樣的控制權與剩餘索取權分離狀態下，其權利變換價值分配模式，是否為適當的產權安排？對於都市更新參與人能否有所激勵？能否促進都市更新之推動效率？是本論文主要的探討分析重點。 此外，同一更新單元之土地權利人與實施者，具有短期且為一次性合作的特性，依現行都市更新法律規範，交易雙方以簽訂同意書做為實施都市更新事業的關鍵契約，由於契約簽定後，交易雙方所投入的特殊投資比例不相同，因而普遍引起期初契約簽署的遲疑，甚而契約簽定後，仍有權利義務不明確之爭議。本論文透過不完全契約理論的思維，探討分析土地權利人與實施者的契約關係與特殊投資關係，並建議一個新的交易契約模式，以降低雙方之機會主義行為，進而希能促進都市更新事業之推動。 / In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a「Production Team」on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.

近年來，國際間政府推動資訊公開蔚為風潮，伴隨著資訊通信科技的發展，電子化政府和政府網站更普遍被各界視為一個低成本且高效率的透明化途徑。台灣的政府網站長期受到國際間高度評價，在發展中國家更是名列前茅。然而，既有的研究與調查大多數僅片面側重於政府供給面的探究，通常以化約且可標準化的指標來評鑑特定政府網站的介面資訊功能。相形之下，鮮少有關注民眾的需求認知、機關政策執行以及網站內容評估等較全面的研究成果供參。因而無法更深入地釐清政府網站、法制和政策執行績效不彰等困境與透明化治理之間的關聯。 在委託代理理論的運用之下，本研究兼顧政府治理中委託方民眾的認知以及代理方政府機關的經驗與成效。目的在於釐清網站資訊公開供給和需求的現況與問題，並更具體地檢證政府網站資訊公開對機關施政資訊揭露、績效衡量和政府課責的影響。爰此，研究者參與多項網站資訊公開相關研究，以蒐集多元化次級資料，包括：量化的網路民眾問卷調查，各級機關的跨年度問卷調查，機關網站內容評估比較，以及質性的個別訪談、焦點團體座談。藉由理論聚焦與多重研究方法的交叉檢證分析，以達研究綜效。 研究結果分為網站資訊公開對政府施政資訊揭露，施政績效衡量，以及政府課責的影響三個部分來討論。首先，相較於法制，網站資訊公開更有助於揭露政府施政資訊，特別是網站資訊公開實施過程可呈現出政府治理內、外部的多重代理關係及代理問題，甚至可緩和部分的代理問題。其次，網站資訊公開可具體地呈現並衡量施政績效，以因應傳統官僚體系內各層代理績效難以衡量的困境。但囿於目前整體制度缺乏績效誘因設計，而限制了此效益。最後，因整體資訊公開績效制度的匱乏，也使得網站資訊公開對政府課責的效益備受限制。 整體而言，本研究揭示了代理理論應用於政府治理的價值，並檢證政府資訊公開、績效和課責等三項治理要件的關聯。研究成果可彌補實務與研究的落差，並對相關文獻做出貢獻。 / In recent years, governments from around the world have adopted Freedom of Information Act to increase transparency in their governance. With advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs), e-Government has been seen as a cost-effective and possible mean to promote openness and transparency. Taiwan’s efforts to develop e-Government services have been well-recognized; especially, have made remarkable advantages among developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches in evaluating e-Government service are based on supply-side indicators and often assess websites alone; as yet, little information is available on the demand aspect of e-Government. The paper aims to explore the potential and practice of government website information disclosure in terms of the perspective of end user and government agencies. The results show the significance of three aspects in information disclosure of Taiwanese government websites through the application of quantitative and qualitative methodology, including self-administered questionnaire, website evaluation, individual interview, and focus group interview. First, government website information disclosure benefits the revelation of government information, manifestation of multi-agent relationships in internal and external governance of government, and alleviation of partial ageny problems. Second, government website information disclosure enhances revealing and measuring the performance of government agencies; nevertheless, in which the effectiveness is limited due to the absence of institutional incentives. Third, under the circumstances of unsound institution, the effectiveness of accountability has difficulties to be thoroughly realized through government website information disclosure. In sum, the finding contributes to a valuable reference for other countries in implementing information transparency of e-Government, and has significant implications for policy makers, government agencies, and system designers.

政府隨時更新建設以因應各式公共建設及政策，但並非所有建設都能如預期 使用，審計機關適時扮演著監督者之角色，因此，行政機關與審計機關在決算時 的互動，成為可以適時督促政府的管道。在過去文獻中，鮮少有人討論審計機關 與行政機關在決算互動之情況，本研究先探討良好的決算為理論基礎，共分三層 次：決算目標、決算使用審計方式及審計人員能力為架構，以探討行政與審計兩 者間互動時之反應，並以我國頂尖大學計畫為例，運用訪談法及二手資料分析， 以解釋決算的過程、成果之重要性，及雙方互動後的結果。 本文藉由訪談頂尖大學及審計機關，針對研究問題提出下列實務上之政策建 議： 一、放寬法規上之規定：頂大計畫之經費之流用應加寬彈性，畢竟頂大計畫僅是 達成計畫的手段。 二、決算進行時，審計機關與行政機關開拓新溝通管道：利用電子化溝通平台減 少審計與行政機關溝通之時間。 三、審計機關與行政機關嘗試以和平互惠角度共存：本研究認為在往後之行政審 計互動關係應嘗試以和平互惠之關係進行，而此使兩者之間能夠以互惠面合 作的前提 四、重視頂大計畫工作圈意見：在未來工作圈會議時，將以頂大辦公室及會計人 員共同進行討論，有利於雙方之瞭解。 / The administrative organizations renew infrastructures based on public and policy, but now all infrastructures can be anticipated to use. The audit plays the supervisor to the administrative organizations. Therefore, the reaction of financial statement will be a good way to surprise the administrative organizations. The documents seldom discuss this issue in the past. This research discusses how to attain the theory of good financial statement with three levels: the goal of financial statement, the way audit organizations to use and the ability of the auditors. This research takes “The Aim for the Top University Project” for example to discuss the reactions of two organizations, and use In-depth interviews and researching secondary materials to explain the process, the importance and the outcome after reactions. First, broaden the rules: the expenditure should be more flexible. The project is just a method approach to the goal. Second, the two organizations should explore new communication channel: use E-communication medium to decrease time. Third, the two organizations should try to stay in peace for collaborating. Fourth, respect the opinion form the teams of top universities. Let staffs of both sides discuss, which will make them understand each other.

【研究動機與目的】「公私協力」已成為當代政府運作與學術研究風潮，然協力研究實際上忽略一重要議題，即公私部門管理者對於協力究竟抱持著什麼樣的態度。由於態度會決定人的行為模式，對於在制度與組織層面提出各項能左右協力成效的要件，但也不能忽略運用這些遊戲規則的卻是代表組織的公私部門管理者。再者，對於公私協力的研究多採單一經濟途徑，較缺乏整全跨學科領域的實證模型。基於上述，本研究主要分從公私部門管理者角度，建構融合經濟與社會-心理的理論途徑，探究公私部門管理者在契約管理上的態度意向「為何」與「如何」對協力行為產生影響(正式契約與關係治理)。並以目前公私協力中最具爭議且重要的長期照顧制度做為研究個案。 【研究設計】本研究主要研究目的有二，其一，探討現階段長期照顧制度中，公私部門管理者對於委託代理的預期、協調運作機制以及對於績效的看法。這個部份將透過質化訪談方式進行資料蒐集；其二，藉由結構方程模式循證公私部門管理者對於委託代理的態度，及此態度如何影響管理者的契約管理行為(正式契約與關係治理)，及此行為如何影響協力成效。而本研究實證模型將整合經濟與社會心理途徑，希冀涵容跨學科及實務現象。 【研究結果】本研究主要貢獻在於以公私部門管理者為分析單位，建構融合經濟與社會途徑的公私協力成效模式。同時以質量化方式驗證協力成效理論模式與實務間的契合度。主要研究發現如下：1、官僚體制在面對行政變革時會產生心態與行為上的不一致性；2、公部門希冀透過正式契約作為契約運作機制；然私部門則較偏向於關係治理機制；3、影響契約研擬因素中以社會心理因素較重要於經濟因素的影響；4、從質量化資料驗證正式契約與關係治理是互補關係而非抵換關係；5、居家服務委外呈現公私部門雙方的資源互賴，在互動中也透過社會交換行為以維繫互賴關係的穩定。針對以上發現，在未來實務建議上，可透過組際信任的培植，來厚植公私協力的理想治理情境；建議將長期照顧管理中心定位為正式機關而非臨時的任務編組；透過組織文化的潛移默化調整官僚體對於去人性化的本質，而從重視正式契約轉向關係治理的培植；為求關係治理機制的培育與應用，契約規範應跳脫交易成本的假定。在未來研究上，建議以時間遞移為主軸，縱貫式解構協力的動態過程；官僚體制中的組織文化，對於協力本質與行為的影響將是值得深入討論的議題。