Den svenska fastighetsmarknaden är en högaktuell och attraktiv marknad med en högefterfrågan. Det finns därför ett stort intresse av värdering av fastigheter, vilket är en viktigdel av en fastighetsförsäljning, ett fastighetsköp eller belåning. Hur arbetar då en värderarepå den kommersiella fastighetsmarknaden för att värdera en fastighet, på en marknad därasymmetrisk information gör att de olika aktörerna sitter på olika mycket information? Syftet med detta arbete är att undersöka hur en värderare på den kommersiellafastighetsmarknaden arbetar för att kompensera för den asymmetriska information som blandannat en försäljning genom fastighetspaketering medför. Studien kommer även undersöka omdet finns någon skillnad i processen om värderingen utförs av ett företag med entransaktionsavdelning kopplad till den, eller då värderingsföretaget inte har entransaktionsavdelning. Syftet uppnås i denna studie genom intervjuer utförda med några avde mer etablerade aktörerna inom fastighetsvärdering på den kommersiellafastighetsmarknaden. Studien visar på att det finns klara likheter i hur arbetsprocessen vid värdering av enkommersiell fastighet ser ut, men den visar även på att det finns skillnader företagen emellan,framför allt skillnader mellan företagen med en transaktionsavdelning och de utan en sådanavdelning. Värderare på ett företag med en transaktionsavdelning verkar förlita sig i en relativtstor utsträckning på sin egen transaktionsavdelning vid insamlandet av information,någonting som kan leda till psykologiska begränsningar i informationsinsamlandet. Värderarepå företag som inte har en transaktionsavdelning tenderar att gå mer informella vägar vidinsamlingen av information. / The Swedish property market is a highly current and attractive market with a high demand.Therefore there is a high interest in valuation of properties, which is an important part of realestate sales, buying property or taking loans from the bank. How does a property appraiserwork on the commercial property market, which is known for its asymmetric informationwhere the parties have different amounts of information? The purpose of this study is to examine how a property appraiser on the commercial real estatemarket compensates for the asymmetric information which real estate packaging brings. Thisstudy will also look into whether there is any difference in the process if the valuation isperformed by a company which has a transaction department or if it ́s performed by acompany which does not have a transaction department. The purpose in this study is fulfilledthrough interviews with some of the more established commercial property appraisers. The study shows similarities in the process of valuing a commercial property between thedifferent companies, however, it also shows differences in the process. The differences mainlyshow between the companies with a transaction department and the companies that doesn ́thave this department. Appraisers in a company with a transaction department seems to relyto a wider extent on its own transaction department, when it comes to gather information,something that may lead to psychological restraints in the information gathering. Theappraisers in the companies without a transaction department, take more informal ways togather the information.

Inom ekonomistyrning utgår ekonomer oftast från att målöverensstämmelse existerar och att de anställda arbetar utifrån de uppställda målen med perfekt information. Men informationsasymmetri finns överallt och kan leda till ökade kostnader, att fel uppstår och försenade leveranser. Detta är särskilt intressant inom gruvindustrin eftersom den karakteriseras av komplexitet vilket ökar svårigheter med att förmedla styrningen. Frågan blir; under vilka förutsättningar uppstår informationsasymmetri inom styrning och målöverensstämmelse samt hur kan asymmetrin reduceras inom gruvindustrin? Syftet med examensarbetet blir därmed att öka förståelse och analysera hur informationsasymmetri påverkar ekonomistyrning och målöverensstämmelse inom gruvindustrin samt hur asymmetrin kan reduceras. Arbetet utgår ifrån principal-agent teorin som grundas på antaganden om informationsasymmetri och egen nyttomaximering. Utifrån den målkonflikten grundas hypoteserna om de begrepp som ökar och reducerar målöverensstämmelse genom ökad och minskad informationsasymmetri. De olika teoretisk begreppen som undersöktes var missanpassad information, opportunism, återkoppling, internutbildning och tid. Examensarbetet utfördes genom att använda oss av Cavaye (1996) modell för flerstudieansats (eng. Multifaceted research approach) där vi har först gjort Studie 1 som grundas på kvalitativa intervjuer för att få mer information om företaget och industrin. Sedan i Studie 2 testas begreppen genom en kvantitativ enkät som skickades ut till personer inom företaget utifrån ett strategisk urval. Resultatet från undersökningen var att hypoteserna bekräftades och att agenterna anser att målen är viktiga och internutbildning var de starkaste faktorerna för att reducera informationsasymmetri och öka målöverensstämmelse. / In management control systems economist usually assume perfect information and goal congruence from the top to the bottom of the organization. But information asymmetry is everywhere and often leads to increased costs, missed deadlines and other mistakes. This is particularly interesting in the mining industry as it’s characterized by complexity which increases the difficulty of communicating the control system throughout the organization. The research question then becomes; under which circumstances does information asymmetry occur in control systems and goal congruence and how can the asymmetry be reduced in the mining industry? The purpose of the study is therefore to increase the understanding and analyze how information asymmetry impact control systems and goal congruence in the mining industry and how the asymmetry can be reduced. The study is based on the principal-agent theory is based on the assumptions of information asymmetry and self-interest between the two parties. Based on that goal conflict our hypothesis of the variables that increase and reduce goal congruence through increased and decreased information asymmetry is formed. The investigated variables were miss adapted information, opportunism, feedback, workplace education and time. The study was conducted by using Cavaye (1996) model for multifaceted research approach by starting off with Study 1, which was based on qualitative interviews to get more information about the company and the mining industry. Study 2 later tested the variables impact by conducting a quantitative study though the use of a survey that was sent to people of interest within the company though a strategic selection. The result of the study was that the hypotheses were confirmed and that workplace education training and valuing the importance of the goals where the most important variables to reduce information asymmetry and increase goal congruence.

The overall purpose of this thesis is to gain further knowledge of how the Swedish local government level is affected by requirements to use public procurement through competitive tendering and, more specifically, understand the actions taken by included actors when public procurement is required in implementation of public transport goals. Through case study method, an in specific process tracing, various implementation processes have been examined. One studied process complied with the procurement regulations, while the others included elements that circumvented them. In each process, the actions taken by involved actors have been the focus. The findings are presented in four papers. An overall conclusion is that, when public procurement is required in implementation at the local government level, several actors need to interact. These actors may use procurement to expand, maintain, or restrain their discretion towards others actors. In addition, various control mechanisms, such as e.g. monitoring, are used to restrain an actor’s discretion when the actor is circumventing procurement legislation. / Det övergripande syftet med denna avhandling är att öka kunskapen om hur den lokala nivån i Sverige är påverkad av kravet på att använda offentlig upphandling, och mer specifikt att förstå de handlingar som olika aktörer vidtar vid implementering av kollektivtrafik mål, då konkurrensutsatt upphandling är ett krav. Genom fallstudie metod har olika implementeringsprocesser undersökts. I en process har upphandlingsreglerna följts, medan i de andra har upphandlingslagen kringgåtts. Resultaten har analyserats utifrån principal-agent teori och presenteras i form av fyra artiklar. I studien konstateras det att flera aktörer är beroende av varandra i implementeringen. Aktörerna kan använda upphandling för att både behålla och expandera sitt handlingsutrymme gentemot andra aktörer, men upphandling kan även vara begränsande. I studien diskuteras även olika kontrollmekanismer som användas då aktörer kringgår upphandlingslagstiftningen.

Inom EU pågår ett ständigt arbete med harmonisering av lagar i syfte att utforma och införa lagstiftning av högsta kvalitet, samtidigt som hänsyn tas till att de administrativa bördorna står i proportion till deras nytta. Med detta som bakgrund har EU arbetat med att främja lättnader för små och medelstora företag på internationell såväl som nationell nivå, vilket resulterade i en revision av de egna direktiven. Som en följd av Europaparlamentet och Rådets direktiv av 2013 gällande årsbokslut, koncernredovisning och rapporter i vissa typer av företag, tillsattes i slutet av 2012 en utredning av regeringen. Utredningens uppgift var att lämna förslag till de lagbestämmelser som i svensk rätt skulle krävas för att genomföra direktivet. Utöver själva direktivet behandlade utredningen även frågan om de befintliga årsredovisningslagarna bör utformas på ett mer överskådligt och tydligt sätt. Utredningen resulterade i ett delbetänkande som behandlade genomförandet av EU:s nya redovisningsdirektiv, samt ett slutbetänkande som innefattade en översyn av årsredovisningslagarna. Remiss på slutbetänkandet skickades ut till 57 instanser och svaren på denna skulle vara Justitiedepartementet tillhanda senast den 1 december 2015. Totalt inkom det svar från 36 instanser gällande slutbetänkandet.Syftet med studien är att undersöka och redogöra för de attityder de olika remissinstanserna har till de förslag som angivits av utredningen. Genom att skapa en modifierad intressentmodell kategoriserar vi instanserna i olika intressentgrupper och undersöker om det finns samband i remissvaren baserat på vilken intressentgrupp respektive instans är kategoriserad i, samt vilka frågor som är av störst vikt för instanserna. Studien är av kvalitativ karaktär och empirin är baserad på de inkomna remissvaren.Studien visar att de flesta remissinstanserna ser positivt på ett införande av en ny företagskategori, mikroföretag. Då den svenska utredningen föreslår lägre gränsvärden för denna kategori än vad EU-direktivet gör, gav detta upphov till diskussion. Utredningen menar att det underlättar att ha samma gräns som för revisionsplikt, medan de som förespråkar högre gränsvärden anser att det medför mer svårigheter för svenska företag jämfört med deras europeiska jämlikar. Även den kostnadsbesparing som presenterats av utredningen ifrågasätts av ett flertal instanser då de anser att kalkylen är för snävt beräknad, och menar att kostnaderna kommer att bli högre både för det enskilda företaget och för samhället. Gällande moderniseringen av ÅRL och BFL är alla instanser överens om att det är något som ligger i tiden, baserat på att lagarna idag är allt för komplexa och saknar logisk struktur. Förslagen gällande fastställandet av årsredovisningen samt fastställelseintyget har renderat i minst yttranden från remissinstanserna. De instanser som svarat är också de som påverkas mest av de nya reglerna.De slutsatser vi drar är att de flesta instanserna är positiva till de förslag som presenterats av utredningen. Debatten angående gränsdragningen kommer med stor sannolikhet att fortgå även efter det att kategorin mikroföretag har införts i lagstiftningen. Vi anser att det är av vikt att Sverige tillämpar de gränsvärden som EU-direktivet förespråkar, bland annat av harmoniseringsskäl. I kostnadsfrågan ser vi att det i det långa loppet är viktigare att lättnader införs för de mindre företagen än att det på kort sikt kommer innebära merkostnader för myndigheterna. Gällande förslaget till en modernisering av ÅRL och BFL så är vi precis som remissinstanserna positiva till det då vi anser det vara av största vikt att förbättra tydligheten i lagtexten. / Within the EU, the work with harmonization of laws is an on-going process. The aim is to design and implement legislation of the highest quality, while taking into account that the administrative burdens are proportionate to their advantage. Against this background, the EU has worked to promote relief for small and medium-sized entities at the international as well as the national level, resulting in an audit of its own directives. As a result of the European Parliament and Council Directive of 2013 concerning the annual accounts, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types, an investigation was added by the government at the end of 2012. The investigators task was to submit proposals to the legislative provisions of Swedish law that would be required to implement the Directive. In addition to the Directive itself, the investigation treated the question whether the existing annual accounts legislation should be redesigned in a more transparent and clear manner. The investigation resulted in an interim report that dealt with the implementation of the new EU accounting directives, as well as a final report, that handled a review of the annual accounts act. The consultation on the final report was sent to 57 agencies and the answer to this was to be at the Ministry of Justice no later than 1 December 2015. Answers were received from 36 agencies.The purpose of this study is to examine and report on the attitudes of the various consultative agencies regarding the proposals set forth by the investigation. By creating a modified stakeholder model, we categorize instances of the various stakeholders and examine whether there is a correlation in the responses based on the stakeholder group each instance is categorized into, and what issues are of most importance to the instances. The study is qualitative in nature and the empirical data is based on the submitted consultation responses.The study shows that most agencies welcome the introduction of a new business category, micro-entities. There are some concerns regarding the limits for this category, since the limits suggested by the Swedish investigation are lower than the limits suggested by the EU. The investigation believes that it is helpful to have the same limit as for auditing duty, while those who advocate higher levels believes it will cause more problems for Swedish companies compared to their European peers. The cost saving estimated by the investigation are believed to be too narrowly calculated by several agencies, who argue that the costs will be higher for both the individual entity as well as for society. Regarding the modernization of the annual accounts acts all agencies agree that it is something that needs to be done, based on that the laws are too complex and lack logical structure. The proposals regarding the establishment of the annual report and approval certificate has rendered the least opinions of the consulted agencies. The replying agencies are the ones most affected by these new rules.The conclusions that we draw are that most of the agencies are positive towards the proposals presented by the investigation. The debate over the limits for micro-entities will likely continue after the category has been introduced to legislation. We believe that it is important for Sweden to apply the values that the EU directive advocates, for harmonization reason among other things. Regarding the cost issue we see that it is more important to promote relief for the smaller companies, than the meaning of increased costs in the short term. Regarding the modernization of the annual account acts we are, just as the consultative agencies, in favour of it because we believe it to be of utmost importance to improve the clarity of the legal text.(This essay is written in Swedish)

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

區段徵收為目前政府大規模進行土地整體開發，促進都市發展，以及無償取得公共設施用地的重要舉措之一，為一種具有高度自償性之土地開發事業。由於區段徵收需要投入大量的資金與人力，在政府財政困窘及國內不動產市場自民國81 年以來，長期處於不景氣之故，其非但無法達成原先設定之有效減低公共支出之目的，反而需要額外編列預算以支應財務缺口。爰此，造成縣市政府往往視區段徵收為畏途，但礙於相關政策規範及都市發展須盡速取得必要之公共設施用地，而不得不予執行，從而導致惡性循環，因此，如何解決區段徵收財務問題，乃成為政府必須面對的最大困境與挑戰。 在政府財政狀態日益惡化，短期內又無法籌措區段徵收開發過程中龐大的資金需求，再加上地方專業人力不足之困境下，使得區段徵收之辦理型態有所演變，部分地方縣（市）政府遂逐步引進民間資源與活力（即BT模式），朝向由民間機構自行籌措資金並由該機構專業人員負責規劃與執行開發工作，政府從旁提供必要之行政協助。此外，開發所需總費用均先由民間機構墊付，而政府再以剩餘可建築土地來償付費用，藉此創新開發模式，以有效解決區段徵收有關資金籌措及開發後土地去化等至為關鍵之癥結問題。 然而BT模式在實務執行過程時，仍存在著法令、政策制定及實施方式等相關爭議，以致於無法有效大量推廣實施，本文藉由研究相關法令、文獻記載、分析目前實施案例、並透過訪談專家學者及整理相關問題等，說明區段徵收業務在走向政府委託民間機構、引進民間資源辦理區段徵收BT開發模式時，所需面對與管理之委託-代理關係，藉由代理理論，探討區段徵收實務執行層面中，可行的解決措施（包括誘因與監督機制），並建議區段徵收應與時俱進地檢討與修正相關配套措施，以利此項善用民間資源與活力，並具有突破性的土地開發委外機制能夠更臻完備，並可作為後續土地整體開發學術研究之重要參考。 綜合本研究之結論與建議，謹分述如次： 一、結論 （一）區段徵收機制基於政策、民意與制度之可行性，可以作階段性創新改革。 （二）現行區段徵收委外機制相關法制，尚欠完備。 （三）區段徵收委外辦理機制，應同時配套建構監控制度。 （四）區段徵收委外過程，應運用誘因機制，以避免代理問題產生。 （五）區段徵收BT開發模式，應可進一步強化學術研究與應用探討。 二、建議 （一）限期檢討修正區段徵收BT開發模式法制化工作。 （二）由中央與地方成立專案小組，全力協助BT得標廠商。 （三）加強BT開發模式之宣導，建構良好的溝通協調機制。 （四）根據現有兩案例開發結果，審慎評估策訂推廣實施計畫。 / Zone expropriation is presently the large-scale integrated land development carried out by the government to promote urban development. Acquiring land for public facilities without compensation is also an important measure to have high self-liquidation of land development enterprise. Because zone expropriation needs to invest in a great deal of funds and manpower, the government finance and the domestic real estate market were in a long-term depression from 1981 until 1992. Not only unable to reach the targeted profit margin to reduce the public expenses, additional budget is needed to deal with financial gap. Therefore, it makes the county and city government often look at zone expropriation as a dangerous choice to take. But hindrance related to policy standardization and urban development must acquire the necessary land for public facilities as soon as possible because there's no choice but to implement it. As a result, it leads to a vicious circle. Therefore, the government needs to face the greatest dilemma and challenge on how to settle the zone expropriation financial problems. The financial status of the government is worsening day by day. Within a short time the government was unable to raise funds for the huge financial requirement of the zone expropriation. In addition, professional manpower is also a dilemma, causing the handling pattern of zone expropriation to evolve to some extent. Partially the local county and city government gradually brings in non-government resources and vitality (private participation-BT mode). Non-government organizations voluntarily raise funds and professionals in private sectors manage the plans and implementation, while the government provides necessary administrative assistance. In addition, the development necessary for the total costs is paid first by the non-government organization, and the government excess land will be liquidated, thereby creating modes in effect of settling the zone expropriation's fund raising and developed land key problems. However in the implementation of the BT mode process, the decrees, policymaking and implementation methodology related to disputes are still kept. Because of the incapability to take effect the large number of widespread implementation, this writing discuss about the laws, research about decrees, document records, analysis of present case studies, and interviews of professional scholars and arrangements related to the problems. Zone expropriation business is illustrated in moving towards the government's entrusting of non-government organizations. The introduction of non-government resources to handle the zone expropriation BT development method is necessary for facing with the management of principal-agent relationship. By means of principal-agent theory, probing into the implementation dimension, feasible resolutions (including incentive and monitoring mechanism), and recommending the steady advancement of zone expropriation to review and amend about the formation of a complete set of measures, these are all for making good use of non-government resources and vitality, as well as to have a break through in the land development outsourcing mechanism to make them more perfect, and may make a follow-up for the land integrated development academic study of important references. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation: 1. Conclusions: (1)Gradual improvements can be made on the zone expropriation mechanism based on policy, public opinion and system feasibility. (2)The legal system regarding the current zone expropriation mechanism is still incomplete. The external committee handling zone expropriation should simultaneously form a complete construction monitoring system. (3)The external committee handling zone expropriation should utilize a financial incentive mechanism to avoid any problems. (4)A zone expropriation based on the BT model should go further in strengthening academic research and application 2. Recommendations: (1)Establish a deadline for reviewing the legal work for zone expropriation in the BT development model. (2)Allow the national and local relevant groups to fully assist the winning bidder for the BT project. (3)Strengthen guidance for the BT development model; construct a good communication mechanism. (4)Based on the development results of the above case studies, carefully appraise the presented implementation plan . Keywords: Zone Expropriation、Private Participation(BT Mode)、Principal-Agent Theory、Incentive Mechanism

Cette thèse présente l’évolution temporelle du lien entre les variables politiques et la mobilité des élites administratives dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada. Considérant la relation entre le gouvernement et l’administration comme une relation mandant-mandataire (principal-agent), la littérature en administration publique décrit l'influence de diverses dynamiques politiques – par exemple un changement de parti au pouvoir – sur le degré d’intervention des gouvernements dans la dotation du personnel administratif. S’appuyant sur la notion de marché bureaucratique (Public Service Bargain) de Hood et Lodge (2006), la présente thèse estime que la relation entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité des fonctionnaires s’inscrit dans un contexte sociohistorique. Plutôt que de percevoir l’ensemble des relations politico-administratives comme présentant les caractéristiques de la théorie mandant-mandataire, avec de nombreux conflits pour l’atteinte des objectifs et une grande asymétrie des informations, cette thèse suggère que la mesure dans laquelle diverses dynamiques politiques poussent les gouvernements à procéder à des mises à pied ou à des nominations stratégiques varie avec le temps, en suivant les changements dans ce qui entoure les relations politico-administratives. Les statistiques descriptives et la régression logistique sont principalement utilisées pour analyser l’association entre les variables politiques et la mobilité, à l’aide d’une base de données originale repostant des changements de sous-ministres dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada de 1920 à 2013. Les résultats empiriques permettent de conclure que l’influence des dynamiques politiques sur la mobilité des fonctionnaires varie en fonction des différents marchés bureaucratiques. Avant la mise en place d’une fonction publique professionnelle, où les relations politico-administratives s’inscrivaient dans un spoils bargain, les changements de gouvernement entraînaient une importante rotation des fonctionnaires. Cette pratique est conforme à un marché bureaucratique où les critères de compétences des fonctionnaires sont indéfinis, et où les fonctionnaires sont loyaux au parti au pouvoir. Dès la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, jusqu’aux années 1980, l’association entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité diminue grandement. Cette pratique correspond au marché bureaucratique de Schaffer (Schafferian bargain), où les gouvernements favorisent la connaissance technique des politiques et la bonne volonté des fonctionnaires à donner des conseils avisés aux membres du gouvernement, peu importe le parti au pouvoir. Dès les années 1980, les dynamiques politiques sont de nouveau associées à la mobilité. Or, non seulement les changements de parti, mais également l’élection de nouveaux chefs à la tête de ceux-ci entraînent une plus grande mobilité. Cette pratique va dans le sens du managerial bargain, où les nominations sont utilisées pour encourager l’allégeance à l’agenda gouvernemental et la compétence est comprise comme étant la bonne gestion du personnel et des ressources dans le but de répondre aux directives du gouvernement. Étudiant les actions stratégiques des gouvernements dans leur contexte sociohistorique, cette étude contribue de manière originale à l’administration publique et à la politique canadienne, en démontrant que les dynamiques politiques jouent un rôle quant à la mobilité des fonctionnaires, bien que la nature de ces dynamiques et l’étendue de leurs effets varient selon les époques, qui présentent des marchés bureaucratiques distincts. / This dissertation studies temporal variances in the relationship between political variables and the mobility of administrative elites in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies. Conceptualizing the association between the government and the bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship, research in public administration has identified how various political dynamics – such as a transition in the governing party – affects the extent to which governments interfere in the staffing of bureaucratic personnel; removing incumbents and replacing them with persons who are believed to be loyal to government’s policy agenda. This dissertation contributes to this literature by identifying the historical contingencies with which political dynamics effect mobility. Drawing upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain (PSB), the relationship between political dynamics and mobility is situated within a more precise social-historical context. Rather than approaching political-administrative relationships as universally reflecting the specifications of principal-agent theory – exhibiting a high incidence of goal conflict and information asymmetry – this work claims that the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically dismiss and appoint personnel has varied over time, in tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships; specifically, the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and its loyalty. Primarily using descriptive statistics and logistic regression the association between political variables and mobility is tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility has varied over time across distinct PSBs. Prior to the development of the modern professional bureaucracy, where political-administrative relationships reflected a spoils bargain, transitions in the governing party resulted in increased mobility. Such actions are congruent with a PSB where the nature of governance is of a minimal character; there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy’s competency; and the bureaucracy’s loyalty is of a partisan nature towards the governing party. Starting in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, the association between political dynamics and mobility is significantly reduced. Such is congruent with a Schafferian bargain where governments encourage technical knowledge of policies and a willingness amongst bureaucrats to provide frank counsel to government office holders, regardless of the party in power. Starting in the 1980s however, political dynamics are once again positively associated with mobility. Yet now, not only transitions in party, but all newly elected heads of government lead to increased mobility. This is consistent with a managerial bargain where appointments are used to encourage loyalty to the government’s policy agenda and competency is understood as the ability to manage personnel and resources to realizing the directives dictated by the government. Situating the strategic actions of governments within their social-historical context, this work makes original contributions to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics by showing that when it comes to bureaucratic mobility, political dynamics matter; but which dynamics, and the extent of their effects, vary over time across distinct PSBs.

Background: On January 3, 2018, the discussed MiFID II directive was implemented. The proponents argue that MiFID II increases transparency and benefits the end customers. The critics argue that smaller players are driven out from the market and that companies lose coverage. Although a year has passed, there are few studies on how financial players perceive the effects and how research, that in theory contributes to reduce information asymmetry on the financial market, is affected. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of how the Buy and Sell side of equity analysis experience the aftermath of MiFID II one year after the implementation, and what continued impact the directive is expected to have in the long run. This study will more specifically study how equity research, operations, the market and its players got effected by MiFID II. Method: In order to answer the purpose of this study a qualitative method is being used. Moreover, the study has an abductive approach and a case study design in which eight semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to answer the research questions and capture the phenomenological perspective. Conclusion: The study shows that the biggest change that the Buy and Sell side observe MiFID II has had is the unbundling cost of research and execution. This change has led to a decrease in demand, a fall in prices and a decrease in the overall quality of analyzes. The Buy side has reduced the number of counterparties, while the Sell side experienced reduced revenues. / Bakgrund Den 3 januari 2018 infördes det omdiskuterade MiFID II direktivet. Förespråkarna menar att MiFID II ökar transparensen och gynnar slutkunderna. Kritikerna menar att mindre aktörer slås ut och att bolag tappar bevakning. Trots att ett år passerat finns få studier av hur finansiella aktörer såsom fondförvaltare och aktieanalytiker upplever MiFID II:s följder, samt hur aktieanalyser, som i teorin bidrar till att minska informationsasymmetrin på den finansiella marknaden, påverkats. Syfte Syftet med denna studie är att öka förståelsen för hur köp- och säljsidan av aktieanalyser aktieanalyser upplever att MiFID II har haft för följder ett år efter implementeringen, samt hur MiFID II förväntas ha för fortsatt påverkan på sikt. Mer specifikt ämnar studien att undersöka hur verksamheten, marknaden, aktörerna och aktieanalyser påverkats. Metod För att besvara studiens syfte används en kvalitativ metod. Vidare har studien en abduktiv ansats och en fallstudiedesign, där åtta semistrukturerade intervjuer genomfördes för att kunna besvara studiens forskningsfrågor och fånga studiens fenomenologiska perspektiv. Slutsats Studien visar att den största förändringen som respondenterna på köp- och säljsidan upplever att MiFID II haft är uppdelningen av kostnaden för analys och exekvering. Denna förändring har bland annat lett till att efterfrågan minskat, priset sjunkit och den generella kvalitén på analyserna minskat. Köpsidan har dragit ned på antal parter och säljsidan upplever problem medminskade intäkter.

Wir befassen uns mit Gleichgewichtsproblemen, die bei dem Zusammentreffen von Märkten und Marktteilnehmern entstehen, zuerst in einem Modell mit konkurrierenden Märkten mit Feedback und asymmetrischer Information und dann mit strategisch interagierenden Händlern. Zudem untersuchen wir spezielle Richtungsableitung im Kontext des pfadweisen Malliavinkalküls. Im ersten Kapitel analysieren wir ein Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem mit einem monopolistischen Dealer, der mit einem Crossing-Netzwerk (CN) um den Handel mit Agenten mit privater Information konkurriert. Wir untersuchen die gewinnmaximierenden Angebote des Dealers für unterschiedliche Outside-Optionen und formulieren hinreichende Bedingungen für die Existenz und Eindeutigkeit einer optimalen Lösung. In unserem Modell ist die Einführung des CN für die Agenten vorteilhaft und ein Gleichgewichtspreis existiert. Im zweiten Kapitel analysieren wir den Einfluss vergleichender Leistungsbewertung von Händlern auf die Preisfindung im Marktgleichgewicht. Ein Derivat soll einen markträumenden Preis bekommen unter Beachtung der strategisch handelnden Agenten. Das Risiko eines Händlers setzt sich aus dem eigenen Risikoprofil und dem Erfolg des Handelns relativ zum durchschnittlichen Handelserfolg aller zusammen und er wird durch eine BSDE gemessen. Wir bestimmen einen repräsentativen Agenten und zeigen so die Existenz und Eindeutigkeit eines Gleichgewichtspreises. Weiterhin können wir diesen charakterisieren und im Spezialfall von entropischen Risikomaßen konkret berechnen. In diesem Spezialfall führen wir auch eine Parameteranalyse durch. Das dritte Kapitel verknüpft klassischen und pfadweisen Malliavinkalkül. Wir definieren und analysieren pfadweise Richtungsableitungen mit Hilfe von Perturbationen mit Cameron-Martin-Funktionen, mit (Hölder-)stetigen Funktionen, mit unstetigen Funktionen und mit Maßen. Somit sind sowohl die klassische Malliavin-Ableitung als auch Dupires vertikale Ableitung als Spezialfälle enthalten. / We analyze equilibrium problems arising from interacting markets and market participants, first competing markets with feedback and asymmetric information, then strategically interacting traders; moreover we analyze a new notion of a pathwise directional derivative in the context of pathwise Malliavin calculus. The first chapter analyzes a principal-agent game in which a monopolistic profit-maximizing dealer competes with a crossing network (CN) for trading with privately informed agents. We analyze the structure of the dealer’s offered pricing schedules for different outside options. We give sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the dealer’s problem and show that in our setting the introduction of the CN is beneficial for the agents. Additionally, we discuss existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price for the feedback between dealer and CN. In the second chapter we analyze the impact of performance concerns on a problem of equilibrium pricing. A derivative is priced such that the market clears, given strategically behaving agents. Their risk stems from a risky position in the future and the relative trading gains compared to all other agents. The risk measure of each agent is specified by a BSDE. In spite of the strategic interaction, we are able to apply a representative agent approach to obtain existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium market price of external risk. In the special case of entropic risk measures, we perform a parameter analysis. The third chapter provides a link between classical and pathwise Malliavin calculus. We define and analyze pathwise directional derivatives via perturbations with Cameron-Martin functions, (Hölder-)continuous functions, discontinuous functions and measures, thereby including both the traditional Malliavin derivative and the vertical derivative from Dupire’s work.

Diese Dissertation enthält drei Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Untersuchungsgegenstand sind die Auswirkungen individueller Fairnesspräferenzen auf die Ausgestaltung und Eignung verschiedener Anreizmechanismen, welche in realen wirtschaftlichen Situationen Anwendung finden. Alle Arbeiten analysieren Umgebungen moralischen Risikos, in denen eine Firma zwei ungerechtigkeitsaverse Mitarbeiter beschäftigt, deren individuelle Arbeitsleistung zwar beobachtbar, jedoch nicht kontrahierbar ist. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht die Effekte von Ungerechtigkeitsaversion auf relationale Anreizverträge. Als Leistungsmaß eines Agenten dient sein individueller Beitrag zum Firmenwert. Abweichend von der Literatur zeigt sich, dass Ungerechtigkeitsaversion vorteilhaft sein kann: Für bestimmte Zinssätze können relationale Verträge mit neidischen Agenten profitabler sein, wenn sie nicht sogar nur mit solchen implementierbar sind. Der zweite Aufsatz vergleicht relationale Individual- und Gruppenbonusverträge. Durch das Vermeiden ungleicher Löhne sind letztere profitabler, solange sich die Firma keinem Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenübersieht. Dies kann sich jedoch umkehren, da Individualboni vergleichsweise kleiner sind und somit die Selbstdurchsetzung des Vertrags fördern. Ursachen dafür sind das Vermeiden des Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives Leistungsturnier gegenübergestellt. Im Gegensatz zum Bonusvertrag unterliegt das Turnier keiner Glaubwürdigkeitsbeschränkung. Dennoch ist ersteres Anreizschema profitabler, solange das Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem der Firma nicht zu groß ist. Dies liegt an der zwingenden Auszahlung ungleicher Löhne im Turnier und den daraus resultierenden hohen Kosten für Ungleichheitsprämien. Weiter wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten steigt. / This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the impact of fairness concerns among agents on the design of real-world incentive contracts used to mitigate moral-hazard problems under non-verifiable performance. All papers consider situations in which a firm employs two inequity averse workers whose individual performances are, albeit observable by the contracting parties, not contractible. The first paper studies the effects of inequity aversion on relational employment contracts. Performance is evaluated via an agent’s individual non-verifiable contribution to firm value. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents. In the second paper, I compare group to individual performance pay. Avoiding payoff inequity, the group bonus contract is superior as long as the firm faces no credibility problem. The individual bonus contract may, however, become superior due to two reasons: The group bonus scheme is subject to a free-rider problem requiring a higher incentive pay and impeding credibility of the firm. Moreover, with individual bonuses the firm benefits from the incentive-strengthening effect of envy, further softening the credibility constraint. The third paper contrasts a rank-order tournament with independent bonus contracts. Whereas the bonus scheme must be self-enforcing, the tournament is contractible. Yet the former incentive regime outperforms the latter as long as credibility problems are not too severe. This is due the fact that the tournament requires unequal pay across peers with certainty and thus imposes large inequity premium costs on the firm. For a simple example, I show that the more envious the agents are the larger is the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme dominates the tournament.