In this thesis, the aim is to address the persistent challenges posed by differing perspectives despite the establishment of the TRIPS agreement, which serves as a shared foundation for addressing legal and practical gaps among jurisdictions worldwide. The focus is on analyzing the Bolar exemptions within TRIPS Flexibilities for pharmaceutical patents in three specific regions: the Republic of Finland, the People's Republic of China (China), and the United States (the US). By employing a hierarchical approach that incorporates deductive theory, examination of legal cases, and literature review, this research aims to identify and resolve disparities between these jurisdictions. Both international law and national legal systems are scrutinized to ensure comparability across the three continents. Ultimately, the study presents a comprehensive assessment of the advantages and disadvantages associated with implementing Bolar provisions in each country, particularly in the context of facilitating access to vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City of Arroyo Grande, California has a problem administering the regulations of five Planned Developments in the City. This problem arises from these regulations being included in a 167-page appendix at the back of the City’s Development Code. This appendix includes the original approvals for the Developments. It also includes amendments to those approvals. These amendments are only added to the appendix. Therefore, changes to the regulations governing the Planned Developments are not tracked. It takes City staff considerable amounts of time to research answers when members of the public have questions regarding development in one of these Developments. Because of the numerous pages that must be read through to track the changes to one of the districts, there is no guarantee that the information presented to the inquirer is accurate. This can lead to issues when the rules are not consistently applied. The purpose of this project is to investigate an appropriate method to address this problem.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries. In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the dispute. With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South African courts. This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie. In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat ‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël. Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige bewoonde strukture te sloop. Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.

Thesis (LLD )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”), an original method of acquisition of ownership, is regulated by two prescription acts. Prescription is mostly regarded as an unproblematic area of South African property law, since its requirements are reasonably clear and legally certain. However, the unproblematic nature of this legal rule was recently brought into question by the English Pye case. This case concerned an owner in England who lost valuable land through adverse possession. After the domestic courts confirmed that the owner had lost ownership through adverse possession, the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg found that this legal institution constituted an uncompensated expropriation, which is in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. This judgment may have repercussions for the constitutionality of prescription in South African law, despite the fact that the Grand Chamber – on appeal – found that adverse possession actually constitutes a mere (constitutional) deprivation of property. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate whether prescription is in line with section 25 of the Constitution. To answer this question, the dissertation investigates the historical roots of prescription in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, together with its modern requirements in South African law. The focus then shifts to how prescription operates in certain foreign systems, namely England, the Netherlands, France and Germany. This comparative perspective illustrates that the requirements for prescription are stricter in jurisdictions with a positive registration system. Furthermore, the civil law countries require possessors to possess property with the more strenuous animus domini, as opposed to English law that merely requires possession animo possidendi. The justifications for prescription are subsequently analysed in terms of the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s personality theory and law and economics theory. These theories indicate that sufficient moral and economic reasons exist for retaining prescription in countries with a negative registration system. These conclusions are finally used to determine whether prescription is in line with the property clause. The FNB methodology indicates that prescription constitutes a non-arbitrary deprivation of property. If one adheres to the FNB methodology it is equally unlikely that prescription could amount to an uncompensated expropriation or even to constructive expropriation. I conclude that prescription is in line with the South African property clause, which is analogous to the decision of the Grand Chamber in Pye. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verkrygende verjaring (“verjaring”), ‘n oorspronklike wyse van verkryging van eiendomsreg, word gereguleer deur twee verjaringswette. Verjaring word grotendeels beskou as ‘n onproblematiese aspek van die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg, aangesien die vereistes daarvan taamlik duidelik en regseker is. Nietemin is die onproblematiese aard van hierdie regsinstelling onlangs deur die Engelse Pye-saak in twyfel getrek. Hierdie saak handel oor ‘n eienaar wat waardevolle grond in Engeland deur adverse possession verloor het. Nadat die plaaslike howe die verlies van eiendomsreg deur adverse possession bevestig het, het die Vierde Kamer van die Europese Hof van Menseregte in Straatsburg bevind dat hierdie regsreël neerkom op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening, wat inbreuk maak op Artikel 1 van die Eerste Protokol tot die Europese Verdrag van die Reg van die Mens 1950. Hierdie uitspraak kan implikasies inhou vir die grondwetlikheid van verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ten spyte van die Groot Kamer se bevinding – op appèl – dat adverse possession eintlik neerkom op ‘n grondwetlik geldige ontneming van eiendom. Derhalwe was dit nodig om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met artikel 25 van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. Vir hierdie doel word die geskiedkundige wortels van verjaring in die Romeinse en Romeins- Hollandse reg, tesame met die moderne vereistes daarvan in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ondersoek. Daar word ook gekyk na hoe hierdie regsreël in buitelandse regstelsels, naamlik Engeland, Nederland, Frankryk en Duitsland, funksioneer. Hierdie regsvergelykende studie toon dat verjaring strenger vereistes het in regstelsels met ‘n positiewe registrasiestelsel. Verder vereis die sivielregtelike lande dat ‘n besitter die grond animo domini moet besit, wat strenger is as die Engelsregtelike animus possidendi-vereiste. Die regverdigingsgronde van verjaring word vervolgens geëvalueer ingevolge die Lockeaanse arbeidsteorie, Radin se persoonlikheidsteorie en law and economics-teorie. Hierdie teorieë illustreer dat daar genoegsame morele en ekonomiese regverdigings vir die bestaan van verjaring is in lande met ‘n negatiewe regstrasiestelsel. Hierdie bevindings word ten slotte gebruik om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met die eiendomsklousule. Die FNB-metodologie toon dat verjaring neerkom op ‘n geldige, nie-arbitrêre ontneming volgens artikel 25(1). Indien ‘n mens die FNB-metodologie volg is dit eweneens onwaarskynlik dat verjaring op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening – of selfs op konstruktiewe onteiening – neerkom. Gevolglik strook verjaring wel met die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsklousule, welke uitkoms soortgelyk is aan dié van die Groot Kamer in die Pye-saak.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 1989. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: English abstract not available / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tradisionele opvatting was dat Outeursreg gemoeid is met die beskerming van die materiele vorm waarin idees vasgele is. Sedertdien het die klem egter verskuif na die beskerming van die idee self mits dit egter in stoflike vorm vervat is. In hierdie tesis word ondersoek ingestel na wat presies die objek van Outeursreg is en watter rol stoflike aanbieding in Outeursreg sped. Ter aanvang word gekyk na die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van Outeursreg. Daar word gekyk na die pick wat Outeursreg in die regsisteem beklee met spesifieke verwysing na die tradisionele indeling van subjektiewe regte. Dit blyk hieruit dat Outeursreg, as bestaandeel van Immaterieel goedereg, 'n onstoflike regsobjek het nl. die produk van die outeur se geestesarbeid of dan sy idee. Die verwysing na die vereiste van stoflike aanbieding van idees verg egter nadere ondersoek. Die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1973 word ontleel met betrekking tot die aard van beskermde werke; vereistes vir Outeursregbaskerming; definisies van terme soos "outeur" en "maak" asook die van die onderskeie werke; die eiendomsregterminologie en skendingshandelinge. Regsvergelykend word oorsigtelik ook na die Amerikaanse Reg verwys. Uit hierdie ontleding blyk stoflikheid vir doeleindes van die tradisionele Outeursregwerke te verwys na tasbare aanbieding daarvan, mar dat sb 'n eng definisie nie gehandhaaf kan word ten opsigte van moderne tegnologiese ontwikkelings soos uitsendings en programdraende seine nie, aangesien hierdie werke van sä 'n aard is dat tasbare vasle:gging daarvan nie noodwendig altyd plaasvind nie. Onder die skrywers wat hierdie probleem bespreek is professors Copeling en Van der Merwe wat aan stoflikheid 'n alternatiewe, wyer betekenis toedig nl. kommunikeerbare of sintuiglik waarneembare aanbieding. 'n Botsing tussen die tradisionele en aanbevole definisie van stoflikheid in die regspraak word ook uitgewys. Ten einde tegnologie te akkommodeer word die wyer definisie van stoflikheid in hierdie tesis voorgehou. Die implikasies van hierdie wyer definisie van stoflikheid is egter verreikend. Professor Copeling bevestig dan ook dat dit die moontlikheid van Outeursreg in mondelinge kommunikasies inhou. Gevolglik word daar veral gekyk waarom idees as sulks beskerm word deur Onregmatige Mededinging, maar nie deur Outeursreg nie - 'n vraag wat beantwoord word met verwysing na die invloed van moderne tegnologie op die tradisionele indelings van die Immaterieel goederereg. Uit hierdie ondersoek blyk dit dat Onregmatige Mededinging berus op die Immaterieel goederereg in plaas van die Deliktereg. Die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid veroorsaak dat die bestaande indelings van Immaterie61 goedereregte versmelt. Dit ruim ook die huidige konflik rondom die vereiste van stoflikheid in die Wet op Outeursreg 93 van 1973 uit die weg. Laastens word kortliks gewys op die drastiese veranderinge in die spelreels vir inligtingsprodukte wat nodig sal wees om die balans tussen die aansprake van Outeursreghebbendes en die gemeenskap te handhaaf indien die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid aangewend word. Uiteindelik dien stoflikheid ook in sy uitgebreide vorm steeds die tradisionele doe om die werk af te skei van die maker se persoonlikheid en dit sodoende buite die mens gelee te maak.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial servitude that is established over neighbouring property in favour of landlocked property – that is, property without access to a public road. The purpose of granting the landlocked property a right of access to a public road is so that it can be put to efficient use. The servitude is created by operation of law and it binds the surrounding properties as of right at the moment when the property becomes landlocked. It can, however, be enforced only against a specific neighbouring property. This servitude can only be enforced by way of a court order, against the will of the owner of the neighbouring property. This servitude, specifically the manner in which it is established, may raise significant constitutional issues as regards the property clause of the South African Constitution. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity in view of section 25 of the Constitution. To this end, the study provides an overview of the law relating to the right of way of necessity and the general principles regulating this servitude in South African law. Subsequently, the justifications for the right of way of necessity and specifically for allowing the courts to enforce this servitude are analysed in terms of public policy, jurisprudential views and law and economics theory. The conclusion is reached that, in terms of these justifications, there are sufficient policy, social, and economic reasons for having the right of way of necessity and for the courts to enforce it without cooperation and against the will of the affected servient property owner. These justifications are used to examine the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity, specifically to determine whether the enforcement of this servitude by court order constitutes a section 25(1) arbitrary deprivation or even a section 25(2) expropriation of the affected owner’s property rights. The study concludes that the granting of the right of way of necessity will not amount to an expropriation and, following the FNB methodology, does not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property either. Therefore, if all the requirements are met, the granting of a right of way of necessity will be constitutionally compliant. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die saaklike serwituut wat ten gunste van grond wat van openbare verkeersweë afgesny is (blokland) oor naburige eiendom gevestig word, staan bekend as noodweg. Die rede waarom toegang tot ’n openbare pad aan blokland toegeken word, is sodat die grond effektief gebruik kan word. Hierdie serwituut word deur regswerking geskep en dit bind omringende eiendomme vanaf die oomblik dat die blokland van openbare verkeersweë afgesluit word. Dit kan egter slegs teen ’n spesifieke naburige eiendom afgedwing word. Die serwituut kan slegs deur middel van ’n hofbevel afgedwing word, teen die eienaar van die naburige eiendom se wil. Wat die eiendomsklousule van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet betref, kan hierdie serwituut en veral die wyse waarop dit gevesig word belangrike grondwetlike vrae opper. In die lig van artikel 25 van die Grondwet was dit dus nodig om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te toets. Om hierdie doel te bereik, verskaf die studie’n oorsig van die regsbeginsels aangaande noodweg en die algemene beginsels van hierdie serwituut in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Met verwysing na openbare beleid, regsfilosofiese benaderings en Law and Economics-teorie analiseer die tesis vervolgens die regverdigingsgronde vir noodweg, spesifiek vir die feit dat die howe dit afdwing. Die gevolgtrekking is dat daar ingevolge hierdie regverdigingsgronde genoegsame beleids-, sosiale en ekonomiese redes bestaan vir die serwituut van noodweg en vir die howe se bevoegdheid om dit sonder die dienende eienaar se medewerking en teen sy wil af te dwing. Hierdie regverdigingsgronde word gebruik om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te ondersoek, spesifiek om vas te stel of die afdwinging daarvan neerkom op ’n arbitrêre ontneming vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) of op ’n onteiening vir doeleindes van artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet. Hierdie studie kom tot die slotsom dat die toestaan van ’n noodweg nie as ’n onteiening kwalifiseer nie en dat dit, indien die FNB-metodologie nagevolg word, ook nie op ’n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom neerkom nie. Indien al die vereistes nagekom word, sal die toestaan van ’n noodweg dus aan die Grondwet voldoen. / South African Research Chair in Property Law (SARCPL) / National Research Foundation / Department of Science and Technology

Sedan 1973 då anläggningslagen (1973:1149) (AL) infördes har delägare i gemensamhetsanläggningar haft möjligheten att själva inträda i anläggningen genom en överenskommelse enligt AL 43 §. Denna överenskommelse måste godkännas av Lantmäteriet och används för att undvika att behöva göra en kostsam och tidskrävande omprövning av hela anläggningen enligt AL 35 §. 1998 infördes även AL 42 a §, vilket gav lantmätarna möjlighet att ta beslut om inträde för ny-/ombildad fastighet i en befintlig gemensamhetsanläggning under förrättningar. Båda paragraferna fungerar som åtgärder som kan användas istället för en omprövning. En överenskommelse är att föredra i dessa typer av förrättningar, men det billigaste och snabbaste alternativet skall alltid användas. Syftet med arbetet är kartlägga om det finns regionala skillnader i tillämpningen av AL 42 a § och 43 §, eventuella skäl för varför detta sker, samt analysera om detta överensstämmer med praxis och vad som står i förarbeten. Arbetet skall även ge en mindre inblick i hur ersättningsfrågan har hanterats i de olika förrättningarna, samt vilka typer av gemensamhetsanläggningar som behandlas. En kombination av juridisk och kvantitativ metod har använts med ett mindre inslag av kvalitativ metod. Kvantitativ metod för att samla in akterna och numeriskt jämföra akternas tillämpning i olika län. Juridisk metod för att tolka hur paragraferna skall tillämpas, och den kvalitativa användes i ett mailutskick för att få mer styrka till slutsatsen. Samtliga akter mellan 1998-2014 som använt AL 43 § eller 42 a § i elva län har inkluderats i statistiken. Av dessa akter har 221 granskats närmare för att svara på frågor om ersättningsskyldighet, typ av anläggning och förvaltningsform. Resultatet visade en stor variation i paragrafanvändningen mellan länen och även olika svar på mailutskicket från kommun till kommun. Exempelvis visade det sig att i 69 % av förrättningarna i Västra Götalands län mellan 1998-2014 har AL 43 § tillämpats, medan i Stockholms län har AL 42 a tillämpats i 66 % av de undersökta förrättningarna. Lantmätarna i kommunerna i dessa län uppgav helt olika skäl för varför de arbetar på detta vis. Göteborgs lantmäterikontor säger att de önskar främja samförstående (och därmed överenskommelser), medan Stockholms kommun sade kort att allt beror helt på omständigheterna. Ersättning i förrättningarna visade sig vara ovanligt, endast 26 % av åtgärderna var ersättningsskyldiga oavsett paragraf. Den vanligaste samfällighetstypen i undersökningen var vägsamfälligheter, som var med i 70 % av granskade akter. Den vanligaste åtgärden var inträden med 81 % och den vanligaste förvaltningsformen var föreningsförvaltning med 85 %. Skälen till varför regionala skillnader existerar är ännu inte helt kartlagt. Den insamlade data tyder på att vissa kommuner inom länen har en form av tradition i deras arbetsmetoder, vilket leder till att en av paragraferna tillämpas oftare. En undersökning med en mer kvalitativ inriktning; fokus på intervjuer med lantmätare och enkäter till de olika lantmäterikontoren behöver göras för att säkerställa detta. / Since 1973, when the Swedish equivalent to the joint facilities act (anläggningslagen [AL] 1973:1149) was signed into law, co-owners of jointly owned facilities have had the ability to enter, exit or change their properties share in these facilities by themselves through a mutual agreement. This agreement must be approved by the Swedish National Land Survey (Lantmäteriet), and is used for avoiding an otherwise necessary, though costly and time consuming, reappraisal of the entire facility, in accordance with AL § 35. In 1998 AL was changed to include § 42 a, which now allowed surveyors to decide who should enter, exit or change shares. This is done within a land survey ordinance and only for pre-existing joint facilities. Both sections of the law act as measures used instead of reappraisals. Usually, an agreement between property owners is the preferred method during land surveys, but Swedish law dictates that the cheapest, most efficient alternative is to be chosen at all times. The purpose of this essay is to map out whether or not there are any regional differences in the usage of § 42 a and § 43, as well as any potential reasons as to why this happens. The essay is also meant to give a glimpse into if the co-owners of these facilities are reimbursed, as well as what type of joint facilities are usually subjected to these changes in members and shares. The bulk of this investigation has been done using a combination of quantitative research and legal methodology, with some elements of qualitative research. All executory acts containing a decision based on § 43 or § 42 a between 1998 and 2014 from 11 counties have been included in the resulting statistics. Out of these acts, 221 of them have been subjected to closer investigation in order to answer questions relating to reimbursement and facility management, as well as type of joint facility. The results show a large difference in what section is favoured by what county, as well as differing approaches to these sections between municipalities. As an example, 69 % of all executory acts in Västra Götaland between 1998 and 2014, where these sections where applied, used § 43. Meanwhile, In Stockholm County, 66 % of the acts within the same time period applied § 42 a. The surveyors in the municipalities within the counties gave entirely different reasons for why they work in the manner of which they do: Surveyors in Gothenburg claims that they wish to "encourage understanding" (and therefore agreements), meanwhile, surveyors in Stockholm claimed that all they do depends upon the specific circumstances of the case in question. Reimbursements were deemed unusual, only 26 % of all acts contained demands for it, regardless of which section was used. The type of joint facility was also very uniform, 70 % of them were primarily formed to manage jointly owned roads. The reasons for why these regional differences occur are still unclear. The suspicion is a tradition within each county, where different cultures within the offices dominate and result in different approaches to each section of the law. A larger investigation into the matter with a greater focus on qualitative research, interviews with surveyors and inquiries into different surveying offices is needed to confirm this.

This thesis presents an account of attribution in unjust enrichment. Attribution refers to how and when two parties – a claimant and a defendant – are relevantly connected to each other for unjust enrichment purposes. It is reflected in the familiar expression that a defendant be 'enriched at the claimant's expense'. This thesis presents a structured account of attribution, consisting of two requirements: first, the identification of an enrichment to the defendant and a loss to the claimant; and, secondly, the identification of a connection between that enrichment and that loss. These two requirements must be kept separate from other considerations often subsumed within the expression 'enrichment at the claimant's expense' which in truth have nothing to do with attribution, and which instead qualify unjust enrichment liability for reasons that should be analysed in their own terms. The structure of attribution so presented fits a normative account of unjust enrichment based upon each party's exchange capacities. A defendant is enriched when he receives something that he has not paid for under prevailing market conditions, while a claimant suffers a loss when he loses the opportunity to charge for something under the same conditions. A counterfactual test – asking whether enrichment and loss arise 'but for' each other – provides the best generalisation for testing whether enrichment and loss are connected, thereby satisfying the requirements of attribution in unjust enrichment. The law is stated as at 15 March 2014.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit option droit des technologies de l'information" / Ce mémoire de maîtrise présente une situation dans laquelle un citoyen ordinaire tente de diffuser sur Internet une opinion critique qu'il dirige contre une grande entreprise commerciale et tente d'analyser les éléments favorables à la diffusion de cette opinion critique ainsi que les embûches qui sont à prévoir. Cet exemple permet d'illustrer les forces et les faiblesses d'Internet en matière de liberté d'expression. Il permet de poser une mise en garde concernant les dangers de transposer les limites actuelles à la liberté d'expression des citoyens au contexte d'Internet. La première partie de l'analyse souligne les caractéristiques d'Internet et les différentes façons d'aborder la question de la liberté d'expression sur Internet selon les approches libertaire, libérale ou interventionniste, pour finalement faire le point sur l'apport d'Internet en matière d'information et de communication. La deuxième partie de l'analyse aborde la question de l'efficience en identifiant les éléments qui encouragent l'exercice de la liberté d'expression et ceux qui découragent les utilisateurs de s'exprimer sur Internet. L'exemple des critiques dirigées contre les oligopoles permet d'illustrer la nécessité d'établir des règles propres à Internet en matière de liberté d'expression. Cet exemple fait ressortir le caractère inadéquat des limites actuelles à la liberté d'expression établies par le droit de la presse, le droit de la radiodiffusion, le droit de propriété et le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. L'auteur vient à la conclusion qu'en matière de liberté d'expression, il serait souhaitable: 1) Que Internet soit considéré comme un espace public de discussion; 2) Que la préséance des intérêts économiques sur les intérêts démocratiques au niveau du développement de la société de l'information soit avouée; 3) Que les inégalités en termes d'opportunités d'expression soient reconnues; 4) Que les limites imposées en vertu des règles du droit de la propriété soient reconsidérées à la lumière des caractéristiques d'Internet. / This master thesis presents a case in which an ordinary citizen tries to spread on the Internet a criticizing opinion aimed at a large company, and attempts to analyse what are the elements in favour of this criticism broadcasting, as weil as the obstacles to be expected. This example allows us to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Internet in matter of freedom of speech. It also allows to put forward a warning concerning the risks of transposing current Iimits of freedom of speech in an Internet context. The first part of the analysis underlines the Internet's characteristics and the different ways to broach the subject of freedom of speech over the Internet, following severaI approaches, to finally focus on the Internet's contribution in matter of information and communication. The second part of the analysis deals with the question of efficiency, while identifying the elements that encourage the exercise of freedom of speech and those that discourage Internet users from expressing themselves. The example of criticism aimed toward large companies allows to illustrate the need to establish the Internet's own rules in matter of freedom of speech. What emerges from this example is the inadequate character of current limits to freedom of speech as set up by freedom of the press, broadcasting law, property and intellectual property law. The author concludes that in matter of freedom of speech, it wouId be recommended: 1) that the Internet be considered as a public forum; 2) that the predominance of economic interests over democratic interests in the development of the information society be admitted; 3) that the inequalities in terms of expression opportunities be recognized; 4) that the limits imposed in accordance with property law be reconsidered in an Internet context.

Texas law regarding the legal status of women and their property rights developed from the mingling of Spanish and English laws. Spanish laws regarding the protection of women's rights developed during the centuries-long Reconquest, when the Spanish Christians slowly took back the Iberian Peninsula from the Moorish conquerors. Women were of special importance to the expansion of Spanish civilization. Later, when Spain conquered and colonized the New World, these rights for women came, too. In the New World, women's rights under Spanish law remained the same as in Spain. Again, the Spanish were spreading their civilization across frontiers and women needed protection. When the Spanish moved into Texas, they brought their laws with them yet again. Archival evidence demonstrates that Spanish laws in early Texas remained essentially unchanged with regard to the status of women. Events in the history of England caused its legal system to develop in a different manner from Spain's. In England, the protection of property was the law's most important goal. With the growth of English common law, husbands gained the right to control their wives's lives in that married women lost all legal identity. When the English legal system crossed the Atlantic and took root in the United States, little changed, especially in the southern states, when migrants from there entered Texas. When these Anglo-American colonists came into contact with Spanish/Mexican laws, they tended to prefer the legal system they knew best. Accordingly, with the creation of the Republic of Texas, and later the state of Texas, most laws derived from English common law. From Spanish laws, legislators adopted only those that dealt with the protection of women, developed on the Spanish frontier, because they were so much more suitable to life in Texas. Later lawmakers and judges used these same laws to protect the family's property from creditors, as well as to advance the legal status of women in Texas.