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Many interesting behaviours in the animal and human world involve cooperation among individuals. Yet, cooperating individuals are often susceptible to exploitation by cheaters. Because cheaters do better than the cooperators they exploit, the evolution and persistence of cooperation has been a challenging topic of study in biology, sociology and economics. Studies often abstract from real cooperative interactions, and construct simple games in which players can choose either cooperation with other players, or defection, e.g., the well known prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. In these games and other social dilemmas, mutual cooperation yields greater payoffs than mutual defection, but individuals are still tempted to defect (because of the possibility that if they cooperate, the other player will defect). Similar dilemmas also arise in situations where multiple individuals may be affected by the actions of one (such as volunteering for community service or evading taxes), and the main theme of this thesis is cooperation in groups. In chapter 2, we analyze pre-emptive vaccination for an outbreak of smallpox (following a bioterrorist attack or accidental release), from the public health (i.e., group) and individual perspectives. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with an extension of the snowdrift game to n interacting players and continuous strategy sets (where individuals decide on their degree of cooperation): in chapter 3, we analyze global evolutionary stability of cooperative strategies in a large class of n-player snowdrift games in infinite populations; chapter 4 analyzes general continuous n-person snowdrift games in finite populations, and compares the evolutionary dynamics with their infinite population analogues. In chapter 5, we present a general framework to model selection processes in finite populations, necessary for the analysis in chapter 4. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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No / This paper examines the concept of global public goods (GPGs) and in that context explores the extent of aid (ODA) presently being diverted to GPG provision and whether such diversion skews aid-flows towards some recipients. These are examined on the basis of OECD data for the late 1990s. The main argument of this paper is that ODA should not be used for financing GPG provision by developing countries. Instead, it is suggested that other sources of financing the provision of GPGs should be developed keeping in view the various technologies by which the GPGs can be produced and design principles for supra-national institutions. Various arguments from Sandler, Barrett and Kanbur are considered. In particular, Kanbur's suggestion of two tensions involving the principles of economies of scale, subsidiarity, economies of scope and specialisation, is explored further.

This research analyzes the long-lived public good/bad. The public good/bad is defined to ‘live long’ in the sense that the external effects of an action persist beyond the decision horizon of the actor. Thus, a very simple overlapping generations economy is modeled in which the agent lives for two periods while the public durable good/bad lasts indefinitely with deterioration/amelioration. Pareto optimality, the Lindahl equilibrium, and the theory of voluntary provision for this overlapping generations model are contrasted with those of the atemporal model. / Ph. D.

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According to social psychologists, we as a species are inequity averse. We prefer conditions that foster fairness and reject injustice against common good. At the same time, however, unequal power and status hierarchies color almost every aspect of our lives. Advantages are distributed asymmetrically based on hierarchical status processes. Life, in other words, is systematically unfair in addition to being populated by free riders. Are the outcomes of potential free riders correlated with status as well? Does status affect the individual’s ability to successfully free ride? Are higher status actors typically granted a greater degree of social leniency than lower status actors? Are they less likely to be marked as free riders? I conducted a simple vignette study to in which participants were presented with a hypothetical, one-shot interaction, involving a collectively oriented, task in order to investigate the relationship between status and free riding.

Cette thèse utilise le concept de bien public comme fil conducteur herméneutique permettant d’explorer la théorie et l’histoire de l’économie politique. Située à l'intersection de la philosophie politique et de l'histoire de la pensée économique moderne, cette thèse examine la question de recherche suivante: quels sont le rôle et le potentiel que peuvent avoir les biens publics pour favoriser plutôt qu’empêcher la capacité d’action individuelle et collective en politique et dans la vie sociale ? En réponse à cette question, la thèse soutient la primauté des biens publics de deux manières. Premièrement, puisque les biens publics pluriels constituent l’infrastructure essentielle de la vie sociale et des relations humaines, ils sont prioritaires par rapport aux deux autres modes, privé et commun, d’approvisionnement et de jouissance des biens. Deuxièmement, dans la mesure où ils reposent sur la coordination et la contrainte gouvernementales au sein de relations d’autorité politique inévitables et inéluctables, les biens publics priment également sur le bien commun conçu dans son acceptation moniste. / This dissertation takes up the concept of public goods as a hermeneutical thread with which to explore the theory and history of political economy. Situated at the intersection between political philosophy and the history of modern economic thought, this dissertation examines the following main research question: what is the role and potential of public goods to foster rather than disable individual and collective agency in politics and social life? In response to this question, the dissertation articulates the primacy of public goods in two senses: first, since plural public goods constitute the indispensable infrastructure of social life and human relationships, they have primacy over both private and common modes of providing and enjoying goods. Second, since they rely on governmental coordination and compulsion in inescapable and ineluctable relationships of political authority, public goods also have primacy over the common good in its monist conception.

O objetivo central desta pesquisa é contextualizar e debater a emergência de um novo mecanismo de governança das relações transnacionais: as regulações privadas. Por meio de uma ampla revisão bibliográfica, o trabalho se propõe, a princípio, a definir as principais abordagens teóricas e conceituais desenvolvidas pela literatura sobre o fenômeno, facilitando, assim a definição do objeto desta pesquisa. Posteriormente, serão apresentadas as principais respostas da literatura a questões relacionadas aos três principais momentos da consolidação de tais mecanismos: sua emergência, adesão por atores privados e resultados. Conforme verificado, nos três casos as duas grandes linhas explicativas apresentadas pela literatura relacionam-se (1) a abordagens baseadas em incentivos de mercado e (2) a abordagens político-culturais voltadas à análise do campo social em que as empresas atuam. Pretende-se assim, contextualizar, fornecer um amplo panorama teórico e determinar as principais variáveis explicativas para a análise da hipótese central deste trabalho de que mecanismos de regulação privada podem ser efetivos fornecedores de bens públicos. Tais variáveis serão, posteriormente, testadas pela parte empírica desta pesquisa. / The main objective of this research is to contextualize and debate the emergence of a new governance mechanism in the transnational relations: private regulations. Through a broad bibliographic review, this work intends, first, to define the most important theoretical and conceptual approaches developed by the literature, facilitating thus the the definition of the specificities of the research\'s object. Second, the main answers to questions regarding the three most crucial moments of private regulations mechanisms consolidation (emergency, adoption by private actors and results) will be presented. As observed in all three cases the two main explanatory approaches presented by the literature relate to (1) approaches based on market incentives, and (2) political-cultural approaches aimed at the analisis of the social field in which firms operate. Hence, the aim is to contextualize, provide a broad theoretical background and determine the main explanatory variables for the analysis of the central hypotheses of this study that both values and market incentives are crucial in the process of adopting private regulatory mechanisms and that such mechanisms can be effective providers of public goods. These hypotheses will then be tested by the empirical part of this research.