This paper investigates the impact of related party transactions on a firm’s operating performance and market-based performance, as well as the impact of institutional ownership on the use of related party transactions. Using a sample of 1218 deals from S&P1500 firms from 2007 to 2018, we propose and examine three relevant hypotheses: (a) related party transactions, especially, “Red-flag” related party transactions are negatively related to firm’s operating performance, (b) related party transactions, especially, “Red-flag” related party transactions are negatively related with firm’s marketbased performance, (c) institutional ownership is negatively related with related party transactions. In summary, we do not find a significant relationship between related party transactions and firm’s operating performance, such as ROA, Profit Margin and COGS. As for firm’s market-based performance, we found related party transactions are positively related with Tobin’s-Q, but are not significantly related with 12-months buy and hold abnormal return. Finally, we do not find any significant relationship between overall institutional investors and RPTs, but we find short-horizon institutional investors reduce the use of related party transactions, but long-horizon institutional investors do not limit the use of RPT

With the rapid development of economy, Taiwan¡¦s enterprises become bigger and bigger. Hence, the huge business groups play an important role in business environment of Taiwan. However, enterprises collectivization usually causes earning management by cross-shareholding and the related party transaction between group enterprises. In addition, former research which discussing business groups did not include the factor of financial operating. Therefore, in order to confirm if the financial operating is the key factor of earning management, the study separates the total samples into ¡§active financial operating business groups¡¨ and ¡§inactive financial operating business groups¡¨ according to the relevant financial ratio. The period of research contains 2000~2009, and the total effective research tests are 570 copies. Finally, the study develops eight hypotheses in a basis of four kinds of common related party transactions in Taiwan and two kinds of financial operating business groups. The empirical results show that the percentage of disposal assets in active financial operating business groups and the percentage of purchase and sales in inactive financial operating business groups have positive impact on earning management. However, the rest hypotheses have no obvious significance. Therefore, the rest hypotheses will not established.

關係人交易因其特殊之交易性質，經常成為企業進行特殊交易安排之手段。隨著全球化及國際化的發展，企業的營運策略變得更加多元化，營運版圖、營業地點也擴及全球，關係企業間也可以透過關係人交易將所得移轉到低稅率地區，減少整體稅負。 本文以2002年到2013年之台灣上市公司非均衡追蹤資料 (Unbalanced panel data) 探討關係人交易或不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果指出進行較多關係人交易或較多複雜交易反而使企業租稅規避的程度降低，但進行關係人交易、(較多) 單純交易或複雜交易對企業租稅規避程度則無顯著影響。 本文也加入法人持股比率、獨立董事席次占董事會席次比率、董事長是否兼任總經理及是否委任大型會計師事務所等4種公司治理變數，檢驗公司治理結構是否會改變關係人交易及不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果顯示司治理結構並沒顯著改變進行 (較多) 關係人交易及進行 (較多) 不同性質關係人交易之企業的租稅規避程度。 / Related party transaction, with its special nature, has become a common source for firms to engage in many kinds of manipulation. With the trends of globalization and internationalization, business operating strategies have become more and more diversified, operating territory and operation location have also expanded all over the world. In order to reduce the overall tax payment, related parties can engage in income shifting from high-tax regions to low-tax regions through related party transactions. This study uses the data of the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2013 to investigate whether engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature influence corporation tax avoidance. The results indicate that firms engaging in more related party transactions and more complex transaction exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance, but engaging in related party transactions, simple transactions and complex transaction do not significantly influence the level of corporate tax avoidance. This study also uses four corporate governance variables- institutional ownership, the rate of independent directors in the board of directors, chairman as CEO, and big 5 accounting firms- to exams whether corporate government have impact on the relationship between related party transaction and corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that corporate governance does not significantly change the level of corporate tax avoidance of the firms engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature.

近年國內企業發生財務報表不實的舞弊，大多先涉及虛偽銷貨，爾後再透過各種手法加以掩飾。過去學者的研究指出，當財務報表舞弊為虛偽交易類型時，會計師被告之機會較大。當受查者的交易型態變得複雜，會計師查核財務報表之外在不確定性增加，審計失敗的機會增加；會計師面臨的審計風險變高，會計師事務所之營業風險提高。 因此，本研究為降低會計師未來因虛偽銷貨而冒之法律風險而分析我國上市櫃公司虛偽銷貨舞弊之手法及警訊，俾助會計師得評估虛偽銷貨之風險，規劃可偵出虛偽銷貨之查核程序。 本研究透過個案分析及問卷調查，歸納出以下結論： 1.目前企業進行虛偽銷貨之手法，皆以關係人為銷貨對象，可能以同一批貨在關係人間買賣（如勁永），或以假冒之商品出貨（如博達），亦可能根本沒出貨，以虛假之發票及資金的流動製造銷貨之假象（如皇統）。 2.企業於舞弊期間之警訊，則以營業項目及融資項目之變化最為明顯。前者包含企業於舞弊期間銷貨予關係人之比率異常增加，或外銷比率或外銷地區經年改變，亦可能主要客戶及供應商交易情形（如銷貨金額占總銷貨淨額百分比）變化大；後者則包含公司規模小，卻發行ECB，且發行條件異常（如閉鎖期過短），或該公司於舞弊期間之海外存款之比率異常增加。 3.針對虛偽銷貨會計師查核程序之規劃，則應先辨認出關係人，再規劃辨認異常物流狀況之查核程序。 / In recent years, management fraud in financial statements has been occurred in Taiwan. These reporting frauds were often related to fictitious sales, and then covered the frauds in other ways. Prior studies examined that auditors have higher risk of litigation when the fraud type is fictitious transactions. Auditors are more likely to be sued when the financial statement frauds are of a common variety, and then higher risk of managing the firms. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the patterns of fraud schemes used by management to perpetrate and conceal fraud and finds out the proper audit procedure of fictitious sales to decline the risk of litigation. After a series case-by-case analysis and questionnaire investigation, it can be concluded as follows: 1.The patterns of fraud schemes in fictitious sales used by management are selling the inventories to related parties. For instance, managements may transact the same inventories between related parties(勁永), sell the fake products(博達), or they might create fake documents such as fake purchase orders, fake invoices and fake shipping documents to conceal fictitious sales(皇統). 2.The most common implication of financial statement fraud is operating and financing activities. The former includes the increasing rate of transaction between the management and related party or varieties of overseas sales and areas with sales aboard; the latter contains the small-sized-firms issued ECB with abnormal conditions, and abnormal increasing ratio of overseas deposit during the fraud. 3.The audit procedure of fictitious sales, we should find out the related parties, and then draw up the audit procedure of indentifying abnormal transaction.

本研究探討關係人交易、公司治理與銀行利率之關聯性。根據我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定所揭露之相關關係人交易項目，以多元迴歸模型來解釋銀行在進行授信決策時，如何解讀企業財務報表中之關係人交易，以測試利益衝突假說。同時，為探求關係人交易與公司治理之關聯，將考量公司治理因素加入授信決策後，以多元迴歸模型解釋銀行對原關係人交易解讀是否產生改變。樣本取自於上市櫃公司，實證結果顯示關係人交易與銀行授信利率有顯著關係，且利益衝突假說成立。進一步探討後發現，當迴歸模型加入公司治理變數後，實證結果顯示公司治理變數對銀行授信利率有著非常顯著之影響，而關係人交易對銀行授信利率變成不顯著。 / This study investigates the relationship between the related party transaction and loan interest rate before/after the consideration of corporate governance mechanism. We also explain the effect of related party transaction on interest rate based on the conflict of interest hypothesis. The sample consists of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms. The result shows that the related party transaction has significant effect on loan interest rate. However, this effect disappears after considering the corporate governance.

關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。 台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下： 1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。 2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。 3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。 4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。 基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。 / The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows, 1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising. 2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction. 3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance. 4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out. In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company.

本研究將中國的上市企業區分為國有企業與民營企業，藉以檢視中國證監會對上市企業的行政處罰是否存有選擇性執法的現象。調查結果顯示，國有企業較不容易因其關聯方交易之揭露不實而遭受證監會的行政處罰。這個結果代表證監會對民營企業之行政處罰有較低的重大性門檻。且進一步的調查發現，國有企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額不一定高於民營企業因關聯方交易揭露不實所面臨的處罰金額。因此，本研究結果支持中國證監會的行政處罰存在選擇性執法的可能性。 / This study examines the relationship between the enforcement actions on misrepresentation of related party transactions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the state-owned enterprises. In order to test empirical evidence of selective enforcement, we divided our samples into state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises. The major findings are as follows:(1)the state-owned enterprises are not prone to be punished for misrepresentation of related party transactions by CSRC. (2) the state-owned enterprises fines on misrepresentation of related party transactions are not higher than the private enterprises. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove the consequences of selective enforcement by CSRC.

近期許多針對中國大陸的研究顯示，關聯交易除了是一個重要的盈餘管理工具外，也同樣是控制股東挹注與挪用公司資源的主要手段，此外中國與關聯方有關的資訊披露規定在近年來也有非常明顯的變化。基於前述兩項原因，本文首先整理相關法規的延革，接著引用一家上市企業的年度報告做為個案分析。此項個案分析的結果顯示上市公司很可能因控制股東的安排，而將資源輸往與控制股東有關的關聯方或形式上獨立的非關聯方。換言之，控制股東可藉隱匿關聯交易資訊或關聯交易隱形化的方式進行對上市企業的掏空行為。 / Recently, many studies have shown that related party transaction in China is an important tool of earnings management, and it also has been approved to be a primary mean for controlling shareholders propping up or tunneling the company. Therefore, because of the two reasons given above, the thesis studies and systematizes changes of related party disclosure requirements in China, and does analysis on a selected listed company’s annual report as an example of related party transaction disclousure. The analysis finds that, through related party transactions, controlling shareholder may tunnel the listed company and benefit the selected parties which are directly or indirectly controlled by controlling shareholder. That is, controlling shareholder can tunnel through invisible related party transactions or through concealment of transaction information from stakeholders.

公司因應「企業全球化」趨勢，追求全球資源最佳配置下，交易大多在集團內部進行。透過移轉訂價政策，作為集團企業間關係人交易價格的制定依據。 此趨勢之下，我國集團企業間關係人交易採用移轉訂價政策的情況為何？本研究以我國上市櫃公司之集團企業為研究對象，探討分析移轉訂價查核準則實施對我國集團企業間移轉訂價制定因素之影響，並彙整我國集團企業對移轉訂價查核準則規範內容的意見。 一、我國集團企業移轉訂價政策之運用現況及考量因素： 1、目前僅有五成的集團企業有建立明確移轉訂價政策作為關係人交易訂價的依據：公司規模愈大、對外投資期間愈長、關係人交易總額愈多、而關係企業家數在5家以下的集團企業，採用比例也愈高。 2、以移轉訂價查核準則規範之「可比較未受控價格法」及「成本加價法」之傳統交易基礎法採用為多。整體租稅負擔並非主要考量因素，各國移轉訂價法令規定及我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定為最主要的因素。規模越大、關係企業家數越多、越重視法令規定的企業，採用交易基礎移轉訂價法的機率愈高。惟，綜合集團整體內外經濟因素加以考量時，則偏向利潤基礎法。 二、我國集團企業受移轉訂價查核準則影響及意見： 1、透過組織管理架構的調整，將關係人交易價格的重心轉為事前規劃，進而考量移轉訂價稽查之因應。 2、目前我國集團企業多數認為準則並無不合理且頗具可行性。 / With the trend of globalization, companies use global resources to pursue best interest of the group enterprises as a whole within related party transactions. Through the transfer pricing policy, conglomerates can determine the prices for transactions between related parties. This study uses the conglomerate enterprises of Listed and OTC companies in Taiwan as questionnaire samples. The study analyses the impact of implement action of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations on conglomerate enterprises and the factors of transfer pricing among the conglomerates in Taiwan. The results of the research are as follows: 1.Nowadays, only 50% of the conglomerates in Taiwan establish a stated transfer pricing policy in determining the prices for transactions between related parties. We also focus that the larger size, the longer time of investment and the great investment amount, the higher proportion to adopt the transfer pricing policy. 2.The conglomerates in Taiwan tend to “The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method” and “The Cost Plus Method” . The groups do not regard world-wide tax burden as an important factor, rather they emphasize more on the other countries’ transfer pricing regulations and financial accounting standards No.6 as the main factors. 3.The larger size, the more related companies, and paying more attention to regulations, the higher probability of transaction-based transfer pricing method. When the comprehensive internal and external economic factors are considered, the conglomerate companies tend to adopt profit-based transfer pricing method. 4.Through the adjustment of the organizational structure, and planning the price for transactions between related parties in advance, the conglomerate enterprises take tax audit into account. 5.Most of conglomerates in Taiwan regard the criteria of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations as rational and feasible at present.

金融機構所經營之業務涵蓋種類繁多、型式各異並各有其相關之法令，而金融機構透過直接或間接投資方式，一般而言將構成金融集團間之關係人及其交易，本論文之目的在於分析各種金融集團關係人交易相關法令之缺漏，並進而提出建議。 本文首先從現行金融機構經營及投資規範及金融機構關係人交易法律規範，歸納整理出相關法規機制，並探討現行該等關係人及交易之法律規範之「過」與「不足」之處。 此外，本文也參考美國法及跨國性金融監理機構之相關規範，藉此與我國相關規範比較，以作為我國相關立法之參考方向。 接著，本文再以金融機構關係人之實際相關案例，深入分析本國實務上常見之問題，以探討實務上對關係人的認定標準，並釐清現行金融監理對關係人間非常規交易之管理缺漏。 最後本文以上述之分析結果，提出對現行金融機構關係人相關法規之建議，以提供未來修法之參考。 / Due to deregulation and globalization in banking system, financial institutions are increasingly burring traditional differences between banking, insurance, and other institutions. As results, intra-group transactions cause more concern about the conflicts of interests. From a legal point of view, different legal relationships will confer different rights and impose different duties on financial parties. Therefore, it is sensible to analyze the legal nature of the relationships of different participants and their roles in financial institutions’ related party transactions. This study presents an analysis of regulations of related party transactions within Financial Conglomerates, and proposes reforms to deal with conflicts of interest: Firstly, discusses the regulations about the business scope of financial holding company, bank, securities and insurance company. Then further analyzes the regulations of related party transactions within each above financial parties. Secondly, depicts the American regulatory scheme and the frames guidelines and principles of international financial supervisory institutions. The former focuses on the background of banking regulations and the latest issue about The Dodd-Frank Act. The later includes the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates. A comparative analysis of regulations of the above and Taiwan was made. Thirdly, further analyzes the controversial issues of intra-group transactions based on several judicial cases, and then discusses the operational deficiencies of financial institutions and flaws of law and regulations. Finally, summarizes the said issues and propositions about related party transactions of financial institutions.