A presente tese realiza uma análise interdisciplinar dos contratos de aliança, arranjos colaborativos desenvolvidos a partir do início da década de 90, cujo objetivo é a implantação de projetos complexos industriais e de infraestrutura. Este trabalho investiga a percepção do autor de que o modelo proposto pelos contratos de aliança, em regra, promove um esvaziamento voluntário da função do contrato como ferramenta de aplicação, ainda que potencial, de sanções a comportamentos culposos, justamente com o fim de não prejudicar a construção natural de uma relação cooperativa. Busca-se ainda compreender a função desempenhada pelo contrato e pelo direito contratual, nesse contexto colaborativo, e qual a relação entre os mecanismos formais e informais de garantia de cumprimento contratual. Sustenta-se que, nesse universo, o aparato formal do contrato auxilia as ferramentas informais de enforcement, fornecendo o arcabouço de troca de informações essencial à criação endógena de confiança. Ademais, a fim de não prejudicar o ambiente cooperativo, sustenta-se a aplicação de sanções contratuais formais somente em situações excepcionais, geralmente caracterizadas pelo elemento de quebra de confiança. Sugere-se, ao longo da tese, que uma abordagem processual de regulação do contrato a qual permite sanção de comportamentos que descumpram o procedimento contratual acordado seria mais adequada do que uma abordagem estritamente substantiva que proteja a relação inicial de troca. Ao final, amparada pelas percepções construídas ao longo da pesquisa, é realizada uma reflexão jurídico-dogmática, na qual, após a contextualização jurídica dos contratos de aliança, lhes são sugeridas interpretações de aplicação de conceitos da teoria obrigacional, e de ferramentas de organização de interesses intracontratuais, como a boa-fé, o conflito de interesses e os deveres fiduciários. / This thesis conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of project alliancing, collaborative arrangements developed as of the beginning of the 90s, whose goal is the implementation of complex industrial and infrastructure projects. This work investigates the perception of the author that the model proposed by alliance contracts, in general, promotes a voluntary emptying of the role of the contract in punishing, even potentially, unintentional contractual defaults, as a means of not harming the natural construction of a cooperative relation. The work seeks to understand the role played by the contract and the contractual law, in such collaborative environment, and what is the relation between formal and informal mechanisms of contractual enforcement. It argues that, in this universe, formal contractual apparatus supports informal contractual enforcement mechanisms, providing a governance framework that allows information exchange, which is essential to the endogenous creation of trust. Moreover, in order not to jeopardize the cooperative environment, this thesis suggests the suitability of formal contractual punishment only in exceptional circumstances, often characterized by the breach of trust. It is suggested, along the thesis, that a procedural approach of contract regulation which allows punishment of behaviors that deviates from agreed contractual procedures may be more suitable than a strictly substantive approach that protects the initial exchange relation. At the end, supported by the perceptions constructed along the research, some legal-dogmatic considerations are made, in which, after legally qualifying the alliance contracts, it is suggested to it some applicative interpretations of concepts of obligational theory, and organizational tools of intracontractual interests, such as good faith, conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties.

A presente tese realiza uma análise interdisciplinar dos contratos de aliança, arranjos colaborativos desenvolvidos a partir do início da década de 90, cujo objetivo é a implantação de projetos complexos industriais e de infraestrutura. Este trabalho investiga a percepção do autor de que o modelo proposto pelos contratos de aliança, em regra, promove um esvaziamento voluntário da função do contrato como ferramenta de aplicação, ainda que potencial, de sanções a comportamentos culposos, justamente com o fim de não prejudicar a construção natural de uma relação cooperativa. Busca-se ainda compreender a função desempenhada pelo contrato e pelo direito contratual, nesse contexto colaborativo, e qual a relação entre os mecanismos formais e informais de garantia de cumprimento contratual. Sustenta-se que, nesse universo, o aparato formal do contrato auxilia as ferramentas informais de enforcement, fornecendo o arcabouço de troca de informações essencial à criação endógena de confiança. Ademais, a fim de não prejudicar o ambiente cooperativo, sustenta-se a aplicação de sanções contratuais formais somente em situações excepcionais, geralmente caracterizadas pelo elemento de quebra de confiança. Sugere-se, ao longo da tese, que uma abordagem processual de regulação do contrato a qual permite sanção de comportamentos que descumpram o procedimento contratual acordado seria mais adequada do que uma abordagem estritamente substantiva que proteja a relação inicial de troca. Ao final, amparada pelas percepções construídas ao longo da pesquisa, é realizada uma reflexão jurídico-dogmática, na qual, após a contextualização jurídica dos contratos de aliança, lhes são sugeridas interpretações de aplicação de conceitos da teoria obrigacional, e de ferramentas de organização de interesses intracontratuais, como a boa-fé, o conflito de interesses e os deveres fiduciários. / This thesis conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of project alliancing, collaborative arrangements developed as of the beginning of the 90s, whose goal is the implementation of complex industrial and infrastructure projects. This work investigates the perception of the author that the model proposed by alliance contracts, in general, promotes a voluntary emptying of the role of the contract in punishing, even potentially, unintentional contractual defaults, as a means of not harming the natural construction of a cooperative relation. The work seeks to understand the role played by the contract and the contractual law, in such collaborative environment, and what is the relation between formal and informal mechanisms of contractual enforcement. It argues that, in this universe, formal contractual apparatus supports informal contractual enforcement mechanisms, providing a governance framework that allows information exchange, which is essential to the endogenous creation of trust. Moreover, in order not to jeopardize the cooperative environment, this thesis suggests the suitability of formal contractual punishment only in exceptional circumstances, often characterized by the breach of trust. It is suggested, along the thesis, that a procedural approach of contract regulation which allows punishment of behaviors that deviates from agreed contractual procedures may be more suitable than a strictly substantive approach that protects the initial exchange relation. At the end, supported by the perceptions constructed along the research, some legal-dogmatic considerations are made, in which, after legally qualifying the alliance contracts, it is suggested to it some applicative interpretations of concepts of obligational theory, and organizational tools of intracontractual interests, such as good faith, conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties.

Le contrat de franchise organise la transmission d'un savoir-faire et prépare la réitération d'un succès commercial. Compte tenu de la nature complexe de la prestation caractéristique, les parties au contrat deviennent au fil du temps des véritables partenaires, si bien que le contrat de franchise acquiert une dimension relationnelle. Malgré cette spécificité, le droit français appréhende encore le contrat de franchise en utilisant le modèle cognitif classique offert par la théorie générale du contrat. Une telle démarche risque d'ignorer la réalité des problèmes que les partenaires peuvent rencontrer, ce qui peut conduire à l'application de solutions inadaptées. La proposition d'une analyse relationnelle vise à réduire un tel risque. En se fondant principalement sur les travaux de la doctrine nord-américaine, l'analyse relationnelle séduit de plus en plus les juristes français notamment parce que les raisonnements proposés sont souvent compatibles avec le droit positif. En envisageant le contrat de franchise grâce à la grille de lecture fournie par l'analyse relationnelle, il devient possible d'appréhender l'intégralité du contexte dans lequel ce contrat s'insère et de proposer des règles de droit en harmonie avec les besoins et préoccupations des partenaires contractuels. / The franchise agreement organizes the transmission of trade secrets and business plans. Given the complex nature of this performance , the contracting parties over time become true partners , so that the franchise agreement acquires a relational dimension. Despite the existence of a relational dimension, French contract law still rule the franchise agreement using the standard cognitive model offered by classic contract theory. Such an approach risks ignoring the real problems that partners can meet , which may lead to the application of inappropriate solutions. The proposal for a relational analysis aims to reduce such a risk. Based largely on the work of the North American contract law doctrine , the relational analysis is attracting more and more French scholars especially because the proposed arguments follow the French legal system's evolution. The relational analysis allows us to understand the franchise agreement's context and propose solutions in harmony with the needs and concerns of contractual partners.

Diese Dissertation enthält drei Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Untersuchungsgegenstand sind die Auswirkungen individueller Fairnesspräferenzen auf die Ausgestaltung und Eignung verschiedener Anreizmechanismen, welche in realen wirtschaftlichen Situationen Anwendung finden. Alle Arbeiten analysieren Umgebungen moralischen Risikos, in denen eine Firma zwei ungerechtigkeitsaverse Mitarbeiter beschäftigt, deren individuelle Arbeitsleistung zwar beobachtbar, jedoch nicht kontrahierbar ist. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht die Effekte von Ungerechtigkeitsaversion auf relationale Anreizverträge. Als Leistungsmaß eines Agenten dient sein individueller Beitrag zum Firmenwert. Abweichend von der Literatur zeigt sich, dass Ungerechtigkeitsaversion vorteilhaft sein kann: Für bestimmte Zinssätze können relationale Verträge mit neidischen Agenten profitabler sein, wenn sie nicht sogar nur mit solchen implementierbar sind. Der zweite Aufsatz vergleicht relationale Individual- und Gruppenbonusverträge. Durch das Vermeiden ungleicher Löhne sind letztere profitabler, solange sich die Firma keinem Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenübersieht. Dies kann sich jedoch umkehren, da Individualboni vergleichsweise kleiner sind und somit die Selbstdurchsetzung des Vertrags fördern. Ursachen dafür sind das Vermeiden des Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives Leistungsturnier gegenübergestellt. Im Gegensatz zum Bonusvertrag unterliegt das Turnier keiner Glaubwürdigkeitsbeschränkung. Dennoch ist ersteres Anreizschema profitabler, solange das Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem der Firma nicht zu groß ist. Dies liegt an der zwingenden Auszahlung ungleicher Löhne im Turnier und den daraus resultierenden hohen Kosten für Ungleichheitsprämien. Weiter wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten steigt. / This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the impact of fairness concerns among agents on the design of real-world incentive contracts used to mitigate moral-hazard problems under non-verifiable performance. All papers consider situations in which a firm employs two inequity averse workers whose individual performances are, albeit observable by the contracting parties, not contractible. The first paper studies the effects of inequity aversion on relational employment contracts. Performance is evaluated via an agent’s individual non-verifiable contribution to firm value. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents. In the second paper, I compare group to individual performance pay. Avoiding payoff inequity, the group bonus contract is superior as long as the firm faces no credibility problem. The individual bonus contract may, however, become superior due to two reasons: The group bonus scheme is subject to a free-rider problem requiring a higher incentive pay and impeding credibility of the firm. Moreover, with individual bonuses the firm benefits from the incentive-strengthening effect of envy, further softening the credibility constraint. The third paper contrasts a rank-order tournament with independent bonus contracts. Whereas the bonus scheme must be self-enforcing, the tournament is contractible. Yet the former incentive regime outperforms the latter as long as credibility problems are not too severe. This is due the fact that the tournament requires unequal pay across peers with certainty and thus imposes large inequity premium costs on the firm. For a simple example, I show that the more envious the agents are the larger is the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme dominates the tournament.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcus Vinicius Fernandes Andrade da Silva.pdf: 1699688 bytes, checksum: b4d040259bdd9483f71b1b30c921ae25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-04-15 / From something seen as clear-cut and uncontroversial this doctoral thesis intends to scrutinize in-depth the viability of the Judge s ex officio, ie, without the need of previous provocation by any of the litigants (ex officio), of the unfair terms in consumer-related contracts, and as corollary of such a possibility, of what was intended by the legislator of Consumer Protection Law when qualifying such a rule as a public one. The controversy was underestimated by this candidate. This underestimation has never been caused by disrespect or contemptuous treatment of the legal controversy, on the contrary. The challenges and difficulties arisen as something thought not possess such profound implications, not only within the material law, but also in procedural law (feared), only made the study and the search for answers more enticing. The Judge s expression in itself (ex officio) about the material law turned itself to certain immanentism of the material law with procedural law. So, as researcher of the Consumer Protection Law, it arises impacts or not on the Judge s expression of an unfair terms or any other contra legem interpretation it is not as simple as it might seem. Modulations, forces and various decisional effects had to be addressed in the search for a better answer. Variation which is amplified both on individual as well as on class actions. In parallel with such a confrontation (discovery), also came the complicating element of demystifying what would be the definition of public order. In Brazilian law, the rule is to perceive public order as something imperative, law binding, unattainable. Those features do not cover encompass all situations of the Brazilian Consumer Law (CDC) and forced the researcher to seek more details in foreign sources. The search for definitions, characteristics and effects in foreign law systems widened up even more what the research sought to analyze. Nevertheless the research s scope, it was realized the confrontation of the features of public order would of use to Brazilian law in itself as the focus on different foreign systems would aggrandize and justify the option for the CDC. Finally, as during this investigation the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) pronouncement number nº. 381, whose content goes against this thesis, came to light, its analysis and confrontation turned out to be inevitable / De algo tido como claro e pacífico a tese de doutorado que se propõe busca estudar a fundo a possibilidade da decretação de ofício, ou seja, sem provocação das partes, das cláusulas abusivas nos contratos relacionais de consumo e, como corolário a tal possibilidade, o que pretendeu o legislador do Código de Proteção e Defesa do Consumidor ao qualificar tal norma como de ordem pública. É confessado por este candidato que o tema, a controvérsia, foi subestimado. Tal subestimação jamais foi causada por um possível desrespeito ou um tratamento desdenhoso da controvérsia estritamente jurídica. Muito pelo contrário. Os desafios e as dificuldades que surgiram com algo que se imaginava não possuir um grau tão profundo de implicações não só dentro do direito material, mas principalmente, e mais desafiador sob o direito instrumental (temido) só tornaram o estudo e a busca por resposta mais apaixonantes. Da decretação em si sob o direito material retornou-se a certo imanentismo do direito material com o direito processual. Logo, como materialista do direito consumerista surgem impactos que a mera decretação de ofício ou não de uma cláusula ou qualquer outro ato jurídico contra legem não é simples como aparenta. Modulações, forças e diversos efeitos sentenciais tiveram que ser tratados na busca de uma melhor resposta. Variante que se amplifica tanto nas ações individuais, quanto nas coletivas. Paralelo a tal enfrentamento e a reboque do mesmo veio o complicador de desmistificar o que define a ordem pública. No direito pátrio as doutrinas só preveem a ordem pública como algo imperativo, norma cogente, indisponível. Característica que não engloba todas as situações do CDC e que obrigou o pesquisador a buscar fontes estrangeiras. As buscas no direito estrangeiro por definições, características e efeitos ampliaram mais ainda o que sempre se buscou delimitar na tese. Não obstante, ao olhar sobre a delimitação da tese, cientificamente, percebeu-se que o enfrentamento das características da ordem pública seria de grande valia ao direito pátrio e que o estudo sobre sistemas estrangeiros diferentes só engradeceria e justificaria ainda mais a opção do CDC. Por fim, como no decorrer do estudo surgiu à edição da Súmula 381 do STJ, cujo teor vai de encontro a presente tese, inevitável tornou-se seu estudo e enfrentamento

L'arbitre du commerce international peut-il, en l'absence de clause contractuelle expresse, procéder à l'adaptation du contrat lorsque survient un changement de circonstances qui modifie de façon substantielle l'équilibre contractuel initial? La complexification des schémas contractuels et l'émergence correspondante de nouvelles valeurs contractuelles favorisent la réception du principe rebus sic stantibus dans le droit commercial international. Les deux phénomènes permettent également d'envisager dans une nouvelle perspective les objections traditionnelles à la révision pour imprévision. Les arbitres du commerce international sont appelés à jouer un rôle, bien que modeste, dans le mouvement d'harmonisation privé du droit commercial international. Le contexte international de l'arbitrage et de la relation contractuelle, la volonté d'apaisement inhérente à ce mode de résolution des différends et le rapport particulier qu'entretient l'arbitre du commerce international avec le droit national permettront à ce dernier de privilégier, dans certaines circonstances, une option comme l'adaptation du contrat pour cause de hardship. Plusieurs facteurs devront cependant être examinés attentivement par le tribunal arbitral avant que ne soit prise la décision de procéder à l'adaptation du contrat. D'autres remèdes pourront être envisagés si une telle solution ne convient pas. / Is the arbitrator of international commerce entitled to adapt the contract when the parties did not provide so expressly and a supervening event provokes a substantiel change in the initial contractual equilibrum? The complexification of contractual schemes and the corresponding emergence of new values in contract theory made the reception of the rebus sic stantibus principle highly probable in international commercial law. These two phenomenas supplied keys for a revised perspective of the traditional objections to the application of the rebus sic stantibus principle. Arbitrators have a role to play in the movement of private harmonization of international commercial law. The international context in which they proceed, the inherent quality of appeasement in arbitration and the particularity of the relation between arbitrator and national law are making it possible for international arbitrators to give priority to adaptation of the contract when the circumstances are right. Many factors will have to be analysed by the arbitrator before he chooses to adapt the contract because adaptation is not always the best solution. Other remedies will have to be devised if it is the case. / "Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Mi tesis utiliza la noción de contrato relacional para explicar pautas aparentemente contraintuitivas de organización vertical. El primer capitulo muestra que, cuando existen externalidades entre empresas, la integración vertical reduce la tentación de sus ejecutivos de bajar el esfuerzo, haciendo sus promisas de cooperar más creibles. El segundo capitulo muestra que, cuando una regulación europea prohibió los territorios exclusivos en la distribución de automóviles, los fabricantes impusieron estándares de servicio y precios maximos, estos últimos para reducir la tentación de los concesionarios de romper pactos informales para no competir. El tercer capitulo muestra que, pese a la asignación simétrica de derechos de decisión en sus contratos de franquicia, los fabricantes de coches dictan estándares a los concesionarios, remunerandolos con descuentos discrecionales. Eso sugiere que los fabricantes son delegados informalmente para tomar decisiones, y usan sus podéres contractuales como recurso extremo contra la tentación de los concesionarios de rechazarlas. / My thesis applies the notion of relational contracts to explain seemingly counterintuitive vertical arrangements. The first chapter shows that, in the presence of spillovers between an upstream and a downstream firm, vertical integration reduces the downstream manager's present gains from shirking, making her promise to cooperate with the upstream firm credible. The second chapter shows that, after a European regulation prohibited exclusive territories, car dealership contracts switched to a mix of service standards and price ceilings, and argues that price ceilings were introduced to reduce the dealers' short-run profits from reneging on an informal "no-compete" agreement. The third chapter shows that, despite the even allocation of decision rights in dealership contracts, car manufacturers dictate performance standards ex post, and reward dealers through discretionary discounts. This suggests manufacturers are informally delegated to set standards, and use formal decision rights as a last resort against the dealers' temptation to overturn their decisions.

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline. / L'arbitre du commerce international peut-il, en l'absence de clause contractuelle expresse, procéder à l'adaptation du contrat lorsque survient un changement de circonstances qui modifie de façon substantielle l'équilibre contractuel initial? La complexification des schémas contractuels et l'émergence correspondante de nouvelles valeurs contractuelles favorisent la réception du principe rebus sic stantibus dans le droit commercial international. Les deux phénomènes permettent également d'envisager dans une nouvelle perspective les objections traditionnelles à la révision pour imprévision. Les arbitres du commerce international sont appelés à jouer un rôle, bien que modeste, dans le mouvement d'harmonisation privé du droit commercial international. Le contexte international de l'arbitrage et de la relation contractuelle, la volonté d'apaisement inhérente à ce mode de résolution des différends et le rapport particulier qu'entretient l'arbitre du commerce international avec le droit national permettront à ce dernier de privilégier, dans certaines circonstances, une option comme l'adaptation du contrat pour cause de hardship. Plusieurs facteurs devront cependant être examinés attentivement par le tribunal arbitral avant que ne soit prise la décision de procéder à l'adaptation du contrat. D'autres remèdes pourront être envisagés si une telle solution ne convient pas. / Is the arbitrator of international commerce entitled to adapt the contract when the parties did not provide so expressly and a supervening event provokes a substantiel change in the initial contractual equilibrum? The complexification of contractual schemes and the corresponding emergence of new values in contract theory made the reception of the rebus sic stantibus principle highly probable in international commercial law. These two phenomenas supplied keys for a revised perspective of the traditional objections to the application of the rebus sic stantibus principle. Arbitrators have a role to play in the movement of private harmonization of international commercial law. The international context in which they proceed, the inherent quality of appeasement in arbitration and the particularity of the relation between arbitrator and national law are making it possible for international arbitrators to give priority to adaptation of the contract when the circumstances are right. Many factors will have to be analysed by the arbitrator before he chooses to adapt the contract because adaptation is not always the best solution. Other remedies will have to be devised if it is the case.