Doctor Legum - LLD / The thesis finds that the majority of women affected by HIV and AIDS in South Africa still live in conditions of poor access to health services, inadequate access to housing, limited access to property and live amidst gender-based violence. Nevertheless, there exist legal protections and jurisprudential developments in the country that are significant for the realisation of women's rights in the context of HIV and AIDS. The thesis concludes that the law is not the ultimate site for change to improve women's lives, but that applied with other efforts, can be transformative. / South Africa

Legal concepts of administrative law restricting the right to property Within the legal order a lot of legal concepts can be found which restrict fundamental constitutionally guaranteed right to property, respectively which can restrict it. The dissertation focuses on analysis of selected legal concepts which are regulated by administrative law and through which is interfered with the right to property. In the Czech Republic the right to property is guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and at European level by the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The thesis is divided into three main chapters which are further divided into individual sub-chapters. The first chapter deals with the characteristic, definition and categorization of particular legal concepts restricting the right to property. The second chapter focuses on the right to property itself, especially on constitutional basis, limits and its protection. In the relation to the topic of the dissertation it is also important to define how these legal concepts are enshrined in the legal order and which form of administrative activities they result in. The third chapter describes the particular forms of administrative activities in relation to the right to property. The...

Magister Legum - LLM / Today corruption is a major concern for most countries.1 Civil forfeiture of the proceeds of corruption has been embraced as a key strategy by many states in recovering public funds lost through corruption.2 It may be defined as a remedial statutory device designed to recover the proceeds of a crime as well as its instrumentalities.3 Originally, asset recovery regimes adopted by most states were predominantly criminal forfeiture. This mode of forfeiture is preceded by a conviction, after which the state takes possession of the proceeds of the crime from a convicted individual.4 Its proceedings are in personam and the standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, actual forfeiture only takes place after the issue of a conviction order. As a consequence, it is always lengthy and often results in delayed realisation of the proceeds of crime. 5 The inherent weaknesses of criminal forfeiture gave birth to the idea of developing a civil forfeiture system.6 This mode is different from the former in that its proceedings are in rem. Hence the standard of proof is proof on a balance of probabilities and a conviction order is not required.7

Tide lands are owned by the Union, pursuant to art. 20, VII, of the Constitution of 1988. Despite this reference, the Constitution did not try to present the characteristic features of these assets, nor specifically ruled on its demarcation process, and these issues governed by constitutional legislation, in particular by Decree law No. 9760, issued in 1946. Since then, Brazil has owned four other beyond 1988. With this Constitution, rather than bring together the state of democratic experience, there was the so-called phenomenon of constitutionalization of Administrative Law. A new behavioral paradigm was established for Public Administration, which has been governed closely by constitutional rules, which elected the process as the primary form of performance of government agencies. The constituent power also took care to define the elements considered essential to the development of a fair trial, that beyond simple compliance to certain procedural specific regulations, is based on the firm commitment to carry out the fundamental rights of individuals. Given the new state model designed by the 1988 Constitution, imposed the need to promote a review of the various specific regulations on State processes in order to conform them to existing constitutional requirements. And this opportunity, especially the temporal distance from when edited Decree-Law No. 9,760 / 1946, as well as the anti-democratic context in the midst of which was issued, the review of the normative discipline of demarcation activity of tide lands appeared as urgent measure. Rereading promoted this work was guided by axiological vector announced from the constitutional preamble: the realization of justice and fundamental rights of individuals, in particular where the right to property and the procedural. Although that lacks Decree Law update, this measure does not seem essential, since their harmonization with the constitutional provisions and the provisions of Law No. 9,784 / 1999, which can be performed only from hermeneutical resources, which must honor the supremacy and the normative force of the Constitution. It follows, first of all, the requirement that the demarcation activity is promoted without remission or emptying of the procedural formula. Your result should pinpoint the location of tide lands with strict attention to the essential elements that make up the legal concept of this institute: the spatial framework, which is the line is the average of high tides, the temporal reference to the year 1831 and finally the systematic calculation of those averages. Should not interest the Union, as one of the entities that embodies the state, as its state even one square centimeter beyond what the Constitution gave it, as this would represent a breach of the duty of protection to which it is bound, and that overlaps any secondary interest, notably revenue collection. The due process of demarcation, which meets all requirements of legal and constitutional framework, is therefore the only instrument able to promote necessary and possible harmonization between the interests of the Union and individuals in general. / Os terrenos de marinha são de propriedade da União, conforme dispõe o art. 20, VII, da Constituição de 1988. A despeito dessa referência, o texto constitucional não tratou de apresentar os elementos característicos desses bens, nem dispôs especificamente sobre o seu processo de demarcação, estando essas questões disciplinadas pela legislação infraconstitucional, em especial pelo Decreto-lei n.º 9.760, expedido em 1946. Desde então, o Brasil já possuiu outras quatro, além da Constituição de 1988. Com esta, mais do que a reaproximação do Estado da experiência democrática, verificou-se o fenômeno que se convencionou chamar de constitucionalização do Direito Administrativo. Um novo paradigma de comportamento foi estabelecido para a Administração Pública, que passou a ser regulada bem de perto pelas normas constitucionais, as quais elegeram o processo como forma primordial de atuação dos órgãos do Estado. O Poder Constituinte também cuidou de definir os elementos que considerou essenciais para o desenvolvimento de um processo justo, que além da simples observância a determinados regramentos procedimentais, fundamenta-se no firme compromisso de realizar os direitos fundamentais dos indivíduos. Diante do novo modelo de Estado desenhado pela Constituição de 1988, impôs-se a necessidade de se promover uma revisão dos diversos regramentos dos processos estatais, de modo a conformá-los às normas constitucionais vigentes. E a este ensejo, sobretudo pela distância temporal desde quando editado o Decreto-lei n.º 9.760/1946, bem como pelo contexto antidemocrático em meio ao qual foi expedido, o reexame da disciplina normativa da atividade demarcatória dos terrenos de marinha se apresentava como medida inadiável. A releitura promovida neste trabalho foi orientada pelo vetor axiológico anunciado desde o preâmbulo constitucional: a realização da justiça e dos direitos fundamentais dos indivíduos, no caso especial o direito de propriedade e os processuais. Embora o referido Decreto-lei careça de atualização, tal providência não se mostra imprescindível, pois sua harmonização com as normas constitucionais e com as disposições da Lei n.º 9.784/1999, é passível de ser realizada apenas a partir de recursos hermenêuticos, os quais devem prestigiar a supremacia e a força normativa da Constituição. Disso decorre, antes de tudo, a obrigação de que a atividade de demarcação seja promovida sem a dispensa ou o esvaziamento da fórmula processual. O seu resultado deve apontar a localização dos terrenos de marinha com estrita atenção aos elementos essenciais que integram o conceito legal desse instituto: o marco espacial, que é a linha correspondente à média das preamares, a referência temporal ao ano de 1831, e, por fim, a sistemática de cálculo daquela média. Não deve interessar à União, como um dos entes que personifica o Estado, afirmar como seu sequer um centímetro quadrado além daquilo que a Constituição lhe conferiu, pois isso representaria o descumprimento do dever de proteção ao qual ela se encontra vinculada, e que se sobrepõe a qualquer interesse secundário, notadamente o arrecadatório. O justo processo de demarcação, que observe todos os requisitos estabelecidos no ordenamento jurídico-constitucional, é, portanto, o único instrumento apto a promover a necessária e possível harmonização entre os interesses da União e dos indivíduos em geral.

Plusieurs initiatives d’origines européenne et nationale ont contribué à l’émergence d’un nouveau concept en droit d’auteur : l’œuvre transformatrice. La récurrence et la persistance des débats en la matière prouvent que ce concept ne traduit pas qu’un phénomène conjoncturel. Ces raisons conduisent en conséquence à lui consacrer une étude afin de déterminer la pertinence de l’admission de ce concept en droit d’auteur. L’étude débute par le constat que certains auteurs travaillent en s’adossant volontairement à une ou plusieurs œuvres originelles créées par autrui, qu’ils intègrent à leur processus créatif, aboutissant ainsi à la création d'une œuvre nouvelle. Ces pratiques d’emprunt créatif à l’œuvre d’autrui ont désormais pris une dimension particulière. Celle-ci s’explique d’une part par le développement du numérique. D’autre part, une partie du public, soit les destinataires des œuvres, souhaite participer activement à la création et revendique le droit d’utiliser les œuvres d’autrui comme autant de moyens d’expression et de création. Le législateur a certes envisagé l’hypothèse dans laquelle une œuvre nouvelle procède d'une œuvre préexistante au travers de la catégorie légale des œuvres composites. Cependant, les dispositions éparses qui lui sont consacrées souffrent d’une terminologie et d’un régime imprécis qui n’ont jamais fait l’objet d’une étude juridique approfondie. L’émergence du concept d’œuvre transformatrice illustre l’importance théorique et pratique de remettre en cause cette catégorie légale des œuvres composites. Aussi, la délimitation du concept suppose, dans un premier temps, une nécessaire remise en cause des catégories traditionnelles qui constituent les piliers du droit d'auteur, ainsi que les impératifs auxquels la constitution de ce monopole doit répondre. Cette lecture renouvelée aboutit à circonscrire la notion fonctionnelle d’œuvre transformatrice. Loin de se cantonner à proposer une nouvelle version de l’œuvre originelle, l’auteur de l’œuvre transformatrice exprime une opinion sur l’œuvre d’autrui, en induisant un décalage avec celle-ci. Bien souvent, il a réalisé son œuvre sans l’autorisation de l’auteur de l’œuvre originelle, et leurs droits entrent alors en conflit. Dans un second temps, l’étude s’attelle à appréhender ce conflit de droits. Le droit positif s’avère limité, de sorte qu’il faut affiner l’analyse juridique du lien unissant ces deux auteurs en l’enrichissant de la comparaison avec des mécanismes extérieurs au droit d’auteur, et d’autres issus du droit comparé. En définitive, c’est par le mécanisme de l’exception au droit d’auteur que l’on trouvera le moyen de concilier de manière pérenne les droits de l’auteur originel et ceux de l’auteur de l’œuvre transformatrice. / Transformative work is a new concept in copyright law that is emerging from several recent initiatives across Europe. The recurring debate on this concept indicates that it is not short-lived and highlights the need for a strategy to define a suitable legal framework. The purpose of this study is to assess the relevance of including the concept of transformative works in French and European Union copyright law. The starting point is authors’ integration of original works created by third parties in their creative process so as to generate new pieces of work. These practices are increasing in occurrence, with the rise of the digital age being one explanation of their prevalence. Furthermore, the public appreciates the value of these works and wishes to maintain the right to use third party works as a means of creative expression. The legislator has envisaged categorising new work inspired from pre-existing work as derivative and composite work. Nevertheless, the scarce arrangements that have been developed lack a proper framework and a detailed legal study has yet to be undertaken. The emergence of the concept of transformative work highlights the practical and theoretical need to challenge the legal definition of derivative and composite work. Far from offering a new derived version of the original piece of work, the author of a transformative work expresses an opinion on the third party work, by inserting a differentiating element. Therefore, the format of expression and content justify the legal analysis between the author of the original piece of work and the author of the transformative work. As such, framing the concept involves in the first instance, questioning the traditional pillars of copyright law and their requirements. This new understudy leads to the framing of the definition of transformative work. Secondly, this study focusses on how several copyright laws can co-exist. The content of positive law is limited and therefore, the study helps develop the concept of transformative work by comparing external mechanisms of both copyright and comparative law.In conclusion, incorporating transformative work into copyright law is based on the exception mechanism of copyright law.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries. In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the dispute. With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South African courts. This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie. In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat ‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël. Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige bewoonde strukture te sloop. Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

La recherche vise à vérifier si et comment, au niveau de l’UE, la lutte contre la criminalité (surtout organisée) est conduite dans le respect de droits et libertés fondamentales, et si la coopération en matière entre les États membres peut promouvoir des standards de protection élevés et homogènes. La traditionnelle reluctance des États à confier les relatives compétences à l’Union a fortement entravé le développement d’un « espace de liberté, sécurité et justice » équilibré. Aujourd’hui le Traité de Lisbonne fournit des outils importants. Après avoir présenté la sécurité dans l’UE, j’aborde la coopération judiciaire pénale. J’analyse la riche production normative à finalité répressive, aussi que les mesures récemment adoptées à finalité protectrice et promotionnelle. Ensuite, je passe à la coopération policière et à l’intervention de l’EU en matière financière / patrimoniale, en tandem avec les droits à la protection des données personnelles et de la propriété privé. / The research aims to verify whether and how, at the EU level, the fight against crime (particularly organized crime) is perpetuated in full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, and whether cooperation among Member States in this field can promote high and homogeneous standards of protection.The historical reluctance of Member States to give the relative competences to the Union has strongly obstructed the development of an equilibrated “area of freedom, security and justice”. However, the Lisbon Treaty has provided important tools. After firstly presenting security in the EU, I discuss judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Both the rich normative production aimed at repression, and the more recently adopted measures finalized at guarantying and promoting individual rights are analyzed. Then, I pass to police cooperation and EU financial / patrimonial intervention, together with the right to protection of personal data and the right to property - the two most at stake.