Stimuli caused by our own voluntary actions receive a special treatment in the brain. In auditory processing, the N1 and/or P2 components of the auditory event-related brain potential (ERP) to self-initiated sounds are attenuated compared to passive sound exposure, which has been interpreted as an indicator of a predictive internal forward mechanism. Such a predictive mechanism enables differentiating the sensory consequences of one´s own actions from other sensory input and allows the mind to attribute actions to agents and particularly to the self, usually called the “sense of agency”. However, the notion that N1 and/or P2 attenuation effects to self-initiated sounds reflect internal forward model predictions is still controversial. Furthermore, little is known about the relationship between N1 and/or P2 attenuation effects and the sense of agency. Thus, the aim of the present thesis was to further investigate the nature of the N1 and/or P2 attenuation effect to self-initiated sounds and to examine its specific relationship to the sense of agency. The present thesis provides evidence that N1 and/or P2 attenuation effects to self-initiated sounds are mainly determined by movement intention and predictive internal motor signals involved in movement planning and rules out non-predictive explanations of these effects. Importantly, it is shown that sensory attenuation effects in audition are directly related to the feeling of agency, but occur independent of agency judgments. Taken together, the present thesis supports the assumptions of internal forward model theories.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein selbst-adaptives modellbasiertes Entscheidungsunterstützungssystem zur Anpassung von Modellen an eine dynamische Umwelt im Rahmen des betriebswirtschaftlichen Planungsprozesses beschrieben. Das Prinzip der Selbst-Adaption wird genutzt, um Modelle innerhalb eines Entscheidungsunterstützungssystems kontinuierlich realitätsnah zu repräsentieren, damit ein Entscheider stetig bestmöglich unterstützt werden kann. Hierfür wird eine Architektur entwickelt, die ein modellgetriebenes Entscheidungsunterstützungssystem auf Grundlage des Prinzips der Selbst-Adaption konzeptionell erweitert und prototypisch realisiert. Die konzipierte Model-/System-Controller Architektur besteht aus vier zentralen Komponenten: Dem Modell als Abbild der Realität, dem System-Controller zur Anwendung des Modells sowie zur Unterstützung des Anwenders, dem Observer zur Überwachung der Modellvalidität und dem Model-Controller zur Erstellung von Modellanpassungsvorschlägen im Fall einer Abweichung. Der Observer überwacht das Modell und prüft kontinuierlich, ob eine Modellaktualisierung notwendig ist. Der Model-Controller sorgt durch ein dynamisches Vorgehen beim Erstellen von Experimentalmodellen sowie eine vielschichtige Evaluation auf Modell- und Variablenebene für eine Reduktion der Komplexität. Das Zusammenspiel der Komponenten sorgt für eine kontinuierliche Evaluation und, sofern es die Umweltbedingungen bedürfen, für eine ständige Anpassung des Modells. Forschungsmethodisch orientiert sich die Arbeit an Design Science Research. Die gestaltungsorientierten Forschungsschritte werden durch eine ex ante und ex post Evaluation überprüft. Die ex ante Evaluation überprüft die Architektur auf Vollständigkeit und Korrektheit und bestätigt im Rahmen einer Umfrage, dass die entwickelten Komponenten sowie ihre Funktionen die Probleme von Entscheidungsunterstützungssystemen in einer dynamischen Unternehmensumwelt lindern können. Die ex post Evaluation weist mittels eines Laborexperimentes die Effektivität und Effizienz bei der Abweichungs- und Ursachenanalyse des Prototyps nach und zeigt die Gebrauchstauglichkeit für verschiedene Nutzungsszenarien auf.

A characteristic challenge of software development is the management of omnipresent change. Classically, this constant change is driven by customers changing their requirements. The wish to optimally leverage available resources opens another source of change: the software systems environment. Software is tailored to specific platforms (e.g., hardware architectures) resulting in many variants of the same software optimized for different environments. If the environment changes, a different variant is to be used, i.e., the system has to reconfigure to the variant optimized for the arisen situation. The automation of such adjustments is subject to the research community of self-adaptive systems. The basic principle is a control loop, as known from control theory. The system (and environment) is continuously monitored, the collected data is analyzed and decisions for or against a reconfiguration are computed and realized. Central problems in this field, which are addressed in this thesis, are the management of interdependencies between non-functional properties of the system, the handling of multiple criteria subject to decision making and the scalability. In this thesis, a novel approach to self-adaptive software--Multi-Quality Auto-Tuning (MQuAT)--is presented, which provides design and operation principles for software systems which automatically provide the best possible utility to the user while producing the least possible cost. For this purpose, a component model has been developed, enabling the software developer to design and implement self-optimizing software systems in a model-driven way. This component model allows for the specification of the structure as well as the behavior of the system and is capable of covering the runtime state of the system. The notion of quality contracts is utilized to cover the non-functional behavior and, especially, the dependencies between non-functional properties of the system. At runtime the component model covers the runtime state of the system. This runtime model is used in combination with the contracts to generate optimization problems in different formalisms (Integer Linear Programming (ILP), Pseudo-Boolean Optimization (PBO), Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) and Multi-Objective Integer Linear Programming (MOILP)). Standard solvers are applied to derive solutions to these problems, which represent reconfiguration decisions, if the identified configuration differs from the current. Each approach is empirically evaluated in terms of its scalability showing the feasibility of all approaches, except for ACO, the superiority of ILP over PBO and the limits of all approaches: 100 component types for ILP, 30 for PBO, 10 for ACO and 30 for 2-objective MOILP. In presence of more than two objective functions the MOILP approach is shown to be infeasible.

Der Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Untersuchung von photoinduzierten Energietransferprozessen (EET) und Elektronentransferprozessen (ET) in Modellsystemen, die als potentiell geeignet für eine Nutzung in der artifiziellen Photosynthese angesehen werden. Den beiden wesentlichen Zugängen zur Architektur artifizieller Photosynthese-Systeme entsprechend wurden vergleichend kovalente und sich selbst organisierende Systeme untersucht. In beiden Zugängen wurden ähnliche chemische Komponenten als optisch aktive Moleküle eingesetzt, insbesondere Phthalocyanine mit einem Silizium-Zentralatom (SiPc). Durch eine Kombination von stationären und zeitaufgelösten optisch-spektroskopischen Methoden konnten die lichtinduzierten ET- und EET-Prozesse identifiziert und quantifiziert werden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wurden mehrere kovalent gebundene Triaden und eine Pentade untersucht. In allen Systemen finden sehr effiziente ET und EET Prozesse statt. Es wurde gezeigt, dass das Lösungsmittel großen Einfluss auf die photophysikalischen Eigenschaften der Systeme ausübt. Die Lebensdauer des ladungsseparierten Zustandes variiert von 1,7 ns in Toluol bis 30 ps in DMF. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wurde erstmals gezeigt, dass sich in wässriger Lösung ein supramolekularer Komplex, bestehend aus einem Beta-Cyklodextrin (CD), einem konjugierten Subphthylocyanin (SubPc), einem Porphyrin (Por) und einem SiPc bilden kann. Letzteres wurde über unterschiedliche Ketten an zwei CDs kovalent gebunden. Die Selbstorganisation wird über hydrophobe Wechselwirkungen vermittelt und die Bildung der Komplexe ist sehr effizient. Nach selektiver Anregung von SubPc finden sequenzielle ET- und EET-Prozesse von SubPc zu SiPc statt. Das Por spielt die Rolle einer energetischen und elektronischen Brücke und ermöglicht die ET und EET-Prozesse von SubPc zu SiPc. Die Ladungsrekombination in den Grundzustand geschieht innerhalb von 1,7 ns. / The main objective of the present thesis was to conduct investigations of photo-induced electron transfer (ET) and excitation energy transfer (EET) processes in model compounds that are considered potentially appropriate for use in artificial photosynthesis. Two approaches have been used to construct the artificial photosynthetic systems, namely covalent and supramolecular approach. In both systems similar optically active molecules have been employed, particularly silicon-based phthalocyanines (SiPc). A comparative study between the covalently-linked and self-assembled systems had been conducted. For these purposes, thorough spectroscopic measurements in the UV/Vis range had been performed on these conjugates. A combination of steady-state and time-resolved experiments allowed an identification and quantification of the photo-induced ET and EET processes. In the first part of the work several covalently bound triads and a pentad bearing a central SiPc unit were studied. In all systems highly efficient ET and EET processes take place. It was found that the solvent exerts great influence on the photophysical properties of the systems. The lifetime of the charge-separated state varied from 1.7 ns (toluene) down to 30 ps (DMF). In the second part of the thesis, for the first time the formation of ternary supramolecular complexes consisting of a beta-cyclodextrin (CD), a conjugated subphthalocyanine (SubPc), a porphyrin (Por) and a series of SiPcs substituted axially with two CDs via different spacers was shown. These components are held in water by host-guest interactions and the formation of these host-guest complexes was found to be very efficient. Upon excitation of the SubPc-part of the complex sequential ET and EET processes from SubPc to SiPc take place. The Por dye acts as a transfer bridge enabling these processes. The probability of ET is controlled by the linker between CD and SiPc. Charge recombination to the ground state occurs within 1.7 ns.

Die Elektrochemie und die Spektroelektrochemie von selbst-organisiererten Monoschichten (selfassembled monolayers, SAMs) gebildet aus 2-Mercaptopyridin (2MP) und 4-Mercaptopyridin (4MP) wurden an polykristallinen Goldelektroden in wässrigen Elektrolytlösungen untersucht. Folgende Untersuchungsmethoden wurden angewandt: zyklische Voltammetrie, elektrochemische Impedanzmessungen (EIM) und oberflächenverstärkte Raman Streuung (surface-enhanced Raman scattering, SERS). Die elektrochemischen Untersuchungen von 2MP und 4MP in wässriger saurer Lösung (0.5 M H2SO4) zeigten, dass 2MP stärker adsorbiert wird als 4MP aufgrund der Bildung eines S-Au-N Chelates, wobei die S-Au-Interaktionen bei 4MP stärker sind. Die Bildung eines Chelates im Falle von 2MP verringert die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Bildung eines Dimers. In sauren Lösungen wird das N-Atom von 2MP protoniert, was zu einer schwächeren Bindung von 2MP-Molekülen zur Substratoberfläche führt. Die Ergebnisse der SERS-Untersuchungen stimmen mit den Resultaten aus der zyklischen Voltammetrie überein. Man erhält eine Au-S-Streckschwingungsbande für 2MP zwischen 225 bis 250 cm-1 bei Abscheidung aus wässriger oder saurer Lösung und für 4MP bei ca. 263 cm-1 in beiden Lösungen. Die SERS-Experimente ergaben eine senkrechte Orientierung zur Goldoberfläche sowohl für 2MP als auch für 4MP. Die Thion-Thiol-Tautomerie von 2- Mercaptopyridinen wurde ebenfalls in Betracht gezogen. Die Unter- und Überpotentialabscheidung von Kupfer auf einer polykristallinen Goldelektrode in wässriger 0.1 M Schwefelsäure in An- und Abwesenheit von SAMs von 2- und 4- Mercaptopyridin wurde mit zyklischer Voltammetrie untersucht. Es zeigte sich, daß bei Vorhandensein der SAMs die Elektrodeposition von Kupfer verhindert wird, was auf starke Wechselwirkungskräfte zwischen dem Adsorbat (MP) und der Goldoberfläche zurückzuführen ist. 2MP zeigt eine grössere Inhibierung, was höchstwahrscheinlich auf die Bildung der Chelatstruktur zurückzuführen ist. Es wurden ebenso Untersuchungen zum Einfluss von 2MP und 4MP auf die abgeschiedene Kupfermonolage auf der Goldelektrode durchgeführt. Es zeigte sich, daß die Kupfermonolage teilweise durch 2MP oder 4MP ersetzt wird. Die Elektronenaustauschgeschwindigkeit für das Fe2+/Fe3+-Redoxsystem in An- und Abwesenheit von 2MP- oder 4MP-Monolagen wurde mit zyklischer Voltammetrie und elektrochemischen Impedanzmessungen (EIM) untersucht. Es stellte sich heraus, dass der Elektronenaustausch höchstwahrscheinlich über Defektstellen in der Monolage (Pinholes) erfolgt. In einer wässrigen Lösung verringert 4MP den Elektronenaustausch stärker als 2MP. Da die Packungsdichte bei 4MP größer ist als bei 2MP ist wahrscheinlich auch die Zahl der Pinholes geringer in der 4MP-Monolage. In saurer Lösung liegen die N-Atome protoniert vor. Man kann davon ausgehen, dass in saurer Lösung zwei Prozesse gleichzeitig ablaufen, die für den Elektronenaustausch entscheidend sind. Erstens kommt es zu einer Abstoßung zwischen der positiv geladenen Monolage und den positiv geladenen Redoxionen. Und zweitens erfolgt eine Abstoßung zwischen den positiv geladenen Molekülen der SAMs, was zu einer geringeren Packungsdichte führt. Der Ladungsaustausch wird dominiert durch den zweiten Effekt. Mit Hilfe von EIM wurden die Elektronenaustauschgeschwindigkeit und der Bedeckungsgrad bestimmt. Die korrosionshemmende Wirkung von 2MP und 4MP auf Stahl in 3.5 % wässriger NaCl-Lösung wurde mit Hilfe der EIM untersucht. 2MP zeigte eine grössere Hemmung als 4MP. / The electrochemistry and spectroelectrochemistry of the self-assembled monolayers (SAMs) prepared of 2-mercaptopyridine (2MP) and 4-mercaptopyridine (4MP) dissolved either in water or 0.1 M H2SO4 have been investigated at polycrystalline gold electrodes in aqueous electrolyte solutions using cyclic voltammetry, electrochemical impedance measurements (EIM) and surface enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS). Electrochemical studies of 2MP and 4MP monolayers in aqueous acidic solution (0.5 M H2SO4) suggest that 2MP is adsorbed more strongly than 4MP due to the formation of S-Au-N chelate. However, the S-Au bond was found to be stronger in 4MP as compared with 2MP. The formation of the chelate in case of 2MP diminishes the probability of dimer formation. In the acidic solvent, the N-atom of 2MP molecule will be protonated leading to a weaker interaction of 2MP molecules with the substrate surface. The SERS results are in good agreement with the cyclic voltammetry results. The Au-S stretching band was obtained in the region from 215 to 245 cm-1 for 2MP deposited from water and acidic solvent and around 263 cm-1 for 4MP in both solvents. The SERS measurements showed also a perpendicular orientation of both 2MP and 4MP on the gold surface. In explaining the SERS results, the thione-thiol tautomerisations of the mercaptopyridines were also taken into consideration. The under- and overpotential deposition of copper on a polycrystalline gold electrode in aqueous 0.1 M sulfuric acid in the presence and in the absence of SAMs of 2- and 4-mercaptopyridine has been studied using cyclic voltammetry. In general, the presence of these SAMs has been found to inhibit the electrodeposition process of copper, suggesting very strong interactions between these adsorbates and the Au surface. 2MP shows a higher degree of inhibition, which is due to a stronger interaction probably due to the formation of the chelate structure. Studies have also been made of the influence of mercaptopyridines SAMs on the copper monolayer electrodeposited on the gold surface. The copper adlayer was found to be partially displaced by 2MP and 4MP monolayers. The rate of electron transfer for the Fe3+/2+ redox system on the gold electrode has been probed in the absence and presence of 2MP and 4MP monolayers by cyclic voltammetry and electrochemical impedance measurements (EIM). The charge transfer process was suggested to occur through the defects (pinholes) in the monolayer. In case of aqueous solvent 4MP decreases the electron transfer reaction stronger than 2MP. Since the packing density for 4MP is higher than that of 2MP the number of pinholes might be lower in 4MP monolayer. In acidic solvent the N-atoms of the mercaptopyridines will be protonated. It is proposed that two effects, which exist at the same time, are responsible for the electron transfer process in acidic solution. First, there will be a repulsive interaction between the positively charged monolayer and the positively charged redox probe. Second, there is a repulsion among the positively charged monolayer molecules that results in a less compact monolayer. The charge transfer is dominated due to the latter effect. With the EIM the rate of electron transfer and the surface coverage were determined. 2MP and 4MP were examined as steel corrosion inhibitors in 3.5% aqueous NaCl solution using EIM. 2MP shows higher inhibition efficiency than 4MP.

No description available.

A study of students’ mathematical identity was carried out in February 2009 involving participants from two colleges of education, one in Dublin (Republic of Ireland) and one in Belfast (Northern Ireland). All participants were pre-service primary school teachers in the third year of their B.Ed. programme, having chosen to specialize in mathematics. Data was gathered using a questionnaire (with, mainly, open-ended questions) followed by focus groups, involving the same participants, on each campus. This paper considers how students’ exploration of their mathematical identity led them to deepen their insight into learning and teaching mathematics. Recommendations are made for how the methods used in this research might be beneficial on a larger scale, in different environments.

A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.

A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.

A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.