Debatten om den kontroversiella signalspaningslagen är högst aktuell och det diskuteras öppet och intensivt om huruvida den är ett skydd mot hot utifrån eller om den hotar medborgarna i det svenska samhället. När uppsatsen avslutas har lagen trätt i kraft den 1 januari 2009, men kommer inte att träda i full kraft förrän i oktober 2009. Terrorism är ett fenomen som har fått en ny betydelse för människor i det globala samhället. Det har alltid funnits i samtid som det demokratiskt politiska samhället, men betydelsen av detta fenomen, detta begrepp har varierat. Den har skiftat under åren från att vara en terrorism där grupper som IRA och ETA figurerade för att frigöra territorium från de stora länderna till att handla om att påverka politiska beslut genom att skrämma civila. Cyberterrorism är ett nyare fenomen inom begreppet och har en annan verkan då den riktar sig mot det nya informationstekniska samhället som har blivit allt mer sårbart ju längre utvecklingen går. Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att undersöka vilket sorts inflytande som cyberterrorism har haft i utformandet av lagen, om lagen är ett hot mot Sverige eller ett skydd för Sverige samt huruvida signalspaning rättfärdigas av ändamålet, det vill säga att ge Sverige ett fungerande säkerhetsskydd. Slutsatsen av denna uppsats är att cyberterrorism har ett visst samband med hur lagen har utformats, men det är inte en avgörande eller ensam faktor. Huruvida lagen är ett hot mot Sverige eller ett skydd för och om ändamålet helgar medlen har det kommit fram till att den till viss del kan vara ett hot, men att ändamålet att politikerna vill  kunna ge Sverige ett fungerande säkerhetsskydd väger upp till en viss del vad lagen vill stå för. Det är fortfarande en hel del motsättningar mot lagen och det kommer det alltid att vara. / This thesis has its origins in the controversial debate about the signals intelligence law that has been a highly intensive debate since the law was passed on June 18 2008. The debate mainly is about whether or not the law is a protection against threat towards the Swedish nation-state or if the law is at threat against the citizen of the Swedish society. The law will have been put in to force on January 1 2009, but won't be in full force until October 2009. Terrorism is not a phenomena that is new, but it has gotten a new meaning to people in the global society. Though it has always existed with the democratic political society, it's meaning has been a target for change. The meaning has shifted from being about groups like IRA and ETA that fight for their own territories to be about influencing political decisions through scarring civilians. One of the more newer phenomena within terrorism is cyber terrorism and it has another effect because it directs itself towards the information technology of the modern society. The IT society has become more vulnerable because of the development and that is what cyber terrorism is attacking the vulnerability. The purpose of this thesis is to examine what kind of influence that cyber terrorism has had in the design of the law, if the law is a threat against Sweden or a protection for Sweden, that is what arguments surrounds this case, and do the aim, that is protecting the society, justify the means, that is signals intelligence in giving Sweden a functional security. The conclusion in this thesis is that cyber terrorism has had an indirect connection to how the law has been designed, but the threat of cyber terrorism has not been a deal breaking or alone factor. Whether the law is a threat or not depends on who you talk to, but it might be a threat to a certain extent if the lawmakers don't hear the critics and change the law to the extent that it involves a fully protection for the privacy of the citizens. In the end it is partly true that the aim does justify the means. / Presentation av uppsats har redan ägt rum.

Sedan radar började användas under första hälften av 1900-talet har duellen mellan radar och signalspaning pågått. Genom att utnyttja radar har alltid en medveten risk tagits, risken att bli upptäckt av motståndarens signalspaning. Duellen gavs möjlighet att ta en paus då radarsystem med låg uteffekt introducerades på marknaden under slutet av 1980-talet, nu fanns plötsligt en möjlighet att använda radar samtidigt som de samtida signalspaningssystemen inte kunde upptäcka dessa radarsystem. I föreliggande magisteruppsats i krigsvetenskap med militärteknisk inriktning undersöks räckviddsförhållanden mellan dessa radarsystem och signalspaningssystem. Genom scenarier i den marina arenan försöker jag värdera de taktiska vinster en användare av radar med låg uteffekt kan göra. Analysen visar på att det fram till dess att signalspaningssystem med förmåga att upptäcka radar som utnyttjar låg uteffekt finns tillgängligt är det möjligt att nå taktiska fördelar med dessa system. / Since the advent of radar during the early 20th century the duel between radar and electronic support measurement systems has been practised. Using radar has always been associated with a risk of being detected by an opponent’s electronic support measurement systems. The duel came to a halt when radar systems using low output power were introduced on the market during the late 1980s, now it was possible to use radar without being detected by contemporary electronic support measurement systems. The present master of science (one year) thesis in war science with specialization in military technology looks into the range relationships between radar and electronic support measurement systems. Through scenarios in the naval domain, I seek to assess the tactical benefits a user of low probability of intercept radar may have. The analysis indicates that until electronic support measurement systems with the ability to detect radar systems using low output power are available it is still possible to gain tactical advantages with such systems.

The ability to use electronic warfare and conduct operations within the electromagnetic spectrum has since the 20th century gained a prominent role in modern warfare and is today largely viewed as a vital part of it. This view though is based on a field of research which mainly consists of studies lacking a problematizing or critical standpoint. This study therefore undertakes the task to question the consensus of electronic warfare as a vital part of the modern battlefield, to gain an understanding whether this view is only based on theoretical suggestions or due to it also being successful when applied in conflicts. This is done by investigating two cases: The Gulf War and Russia’s war in Georgia, by a qualitative research from a theoretical standpoint off Antoine Bousquet’s theory of military technology and its creation of perception.  The result show that electronic warfare has been mostly successful when applied in conflicts, while demanding to apply with great success. The study opens to a broader field for future studies with questions which remains unanswered. Was its successfulness due to technical developments, tactical applications or an enemy who lacks experience and education to effectively handle it?

The need to collect electronic communications for foreign intelligence purposes has increased in the past two decades, primarily due to the increase of international threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, digitalization and technical innovation have given rise to new possibilities for government surveillance and expanded the scope of the types of communications that may be collected. This gives rise to issues concerning the balance between effective foreign intelligence activities and the protection of personal integrity. This thesis performs a comparative analysis of the protection of personal integrity in signals intelligence in Sweden and the United States, by examining the protection of personal integrity under the Swedish Instrument of Government and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention) compared to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the requirements for signals intelligence under the Swedish Act (2008:717) on Signals Intelligence in Defense Intelligence Operations (the Surveillance Act) and § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA, as amended). The analysis further includes a review of the safeguards adopted in each legal system to limit the collection of communications and to ensure that personal integrity is considered in signals intelligence operations. In regard to the protection of personal integrity, the analysis concludes that Swedish law, combined with the European Convention, offers a wider and more extensive protection for individuals when compared to the United States’ framework. However, all provisions include a requirement of proportionality or reasonableness intended to balance the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of personal integrity. The analysis further concludes that the Fourth Amendment has limited impact on signals intelligence carried out under § 702 FISA due to its limitations to the people of the United States, and that individuals' ability to exercise their rights is greater under the European Convention. The European Convention further offers protection beyond Sweden's borders, resulting in some protection for non-Swedish persons. As for the signals intelligence conducted under the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA, several similarities and differences are identified. Both regulations limit the signals intelligence to be carried out for certain purposes. However, a notable difference is that, while signals intelligence under both the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA are limited to foreign conditions, Swedish signals intelligence may be conducted on communications that cross Sweden’s borders. Meanwhile, collection under § 702 FISA may only target non-US persons outside of the United States. Despite this difference, signals intelligence under both regulations result in the collection of communications of the country’s own citizens. To limit the collection, both the Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment (Sw. Försvarets Radioanstalt, FRA) and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) apply certain safeguards. These include the use of search terms in Swedish signals intelligence and selectors in American signals intelligence. While they are both used to make relevant selections in the collection of communications, there are some notable difference between the two. For example, selectors consist of, inter alia, an email address or phone number, while search terms should not, as a general rule, target a specific individual. Further, there is no warrant requirement for collections under § 702 FISA compared to the Surveillance Act, which requires court approval. Lastly, in regard to the control and review of Swedish and American signals intelligence, the analysis concludes that such activities are conducted in different manners in both legal systems. This includes both internal and external controls. However, the Swedish control units appear to have greater opportunities to intervene by, for example, controlling the FRA's access to signal carriers and interrupting an ongoing collection if needed.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has in its case law been strict in its approach towards Member States’ legislative measures providing for retention of and access to data relating to electronic communications. In recent case law the Court has made clear that also such provisions with the object of safeguarding national security need to comply with EU law and the Court’s jurisprudence. This might mean that the Swedish cable-based signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law contrary to the previous conception. It is decisive for whether the Swedish signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law whether the requirement on the providers of electronic communications systems to transfer all signals crossing the Swedish border to collaboration points, in order for the signals intelligence to be carried out, is to be interpreted as a requirement on the providers to process personal data. If within the scope of EU law, a great majority of the Swedish signals intelligence could be disproportionate in the light of the Court’s case law and thus contrary to EU law. Since the signals intelligence is considered to be an indispensable tool to solve all tasks the Swedish foreign intelligence encompasses this could affect the capability of the foreign intelligence.