Para considerar o livre-arbítrio da vontade, Agostinho deve mobilizar concepções já estabelecidas sobre a natureza divina, sobre a natureza do mal e também sobre a natureza da alma humana. À medida que tais concepções se modificam, o livre-arbítrio da vontade assume contornos diversos até obter sua forma mais acabada, na qual se revela como raiz do mal moral sem nada referir à autoria divina e na qual se revela também como essencialmente viciado sem ter outra alternativa senão a de aceitar a ajuda divina. Assim, se de um lado o livre-arbítrio da vontade não exige relacionar Deus com a causa do mal, de outro lado exige relacionar Deus com a única forma de corrigir o mal. Nosso trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar as tramas conceituais supostas na concepção de livre-arbítrio, vendo nesta uma chave de leitura com força de evidenciar certa lógica interna no movimento envolvendo a conversão de Agostinho ao cristianismo. / In order to consider the free choice of the will, Augustine has to mobilize concepts already established about the divine nature, the nature of evil and also the nature of the human soul. As such concepts change, the free choice of the will takes on different features until it reaches its most defined form, in which it is revealed as the origin of moral evil without reference to the divine authorship and in which it is also revealed as essentially vicious without any alternative but to accept divine aid. Therefore, if on the one hand the free choice of the will does not entail a relationship between God and the cause of evil, on the other hand it requires the relationship between God and the only way to stop evil. The objective of this work is to analyse the conceptual webs entailed in the concept of free choice, viewing it as a reading key capable of evidencing a certain internal logic in the movement involving Augustine\'s conversion to Christianity.

A obra de Michel Foucault destaca o corpo como expressão e sustentáculo das forças de poder e de saber, que se articulam estrategicamente, na história da sociedade ocidental. A corporeidade ocupa uma posição central na obra de Foucault, que a ressalta como realidade bio-política-histórica, isto é, como "interpenetrada de história" e ponto de apoio de complexas correlações de forças, sobre a qual incidem inúmeras conformações discursivas produtoras de "verdades" que tanto podem reafirmar como recriar o sentido do corpo presente, ou a sensibilidade individual/coletiva nele imanente. No caso, não é o sujeito epistemológico autônomo que produz um saber útil ou arredio ao poder, mas o poder-saber, os processos e as lutas que o atravessam e que o constituem que representam as formas e os campos possíveis do conhecimento. Na medida em que Foucault retira do sujeito autônomo de conhecimento seu papel central no processo de produção do saber, o corpo adquire uma importância renovada. O corpo é uma peça dentro de um jogo de dominações e submissões presente em toda a rede social, que o torna depositário de marcas e de sinais que nele se inscrevem, de acordo com as efetividades desses embates que, por sua vez, têm na corporeidade seu "campo de prova". Ora, se comparada com a genealogia de Foucault, a perspectiva merleau-pontyana é, por um lado, mais “psicológica", isto é, procura apreender “por dentro" como o corpo vive esses sentidos. Por outro, Merleau-Ponty visa à experiência sensível como uma região de sentidos que não se limita a seus significados histórico-culturais porque representa nossa abertura ao Ser em geral. É o que ele denomina de região do Ser bruto. Nesse sentido, as construções lingüísticas da “realidade", inclusive do próprio corpo, partem de uma experiência que elas não abriram e nem podem fechar, porque o sentido da experiência sensível encontra-se sempre além dos significados da linguagem, e por isso pensamos, construímos e “desenvolvemos" linguagens. Devido à importância crescente das noções de corpo tanto nos trabalhos de Merleau-Ponty como nos de Michel Foucault, este projeto de pesquisa visa comparar a ordem do discurso foucaultiano com a descrição do vivido por Merleau-Ponty, para avaliar em que medida sua perspectiva genealógica é capaz de dissolver a noção de subjetividade que reside, em Merleau-Ponty, na experiência do corpo próprio. Verificou-se que Foucault foi o filósofo do corpo enredado pelas forças de poder/saber na constituição da identidade histórica do sujeito, relacionando-o às rupturas e descontinuidades dos tensos embates que arruinam o corpo histórico. Em Merleau-Ponty, a enunciação da corporeidade se refere principalmente a brotamentos e a germinações, na articulação do corpo próprio enquanto estrato originário dos corpos científicos e cotidianos, em sua relação deiscente. Por sua vez, é somente Merleau-Ponty que propõe uma articulação entre enredamento e corpo germinado através da qual percepção e subjetivação podem se remeter mutuamente. Neste sentido, a tentativa de Foucault, em suas analíticas, de submeter o corpo germinante de Merleau-Ponty à mesma pressuposição discursiva do seu corpo enredado, é uma forma de desconsiderar as singularidades da paisagem enunciativa da corporeidade na fenomenologia merleau-pontyana. Através da leitura de bibliografia dos referidos autores, comentaristas e de outros autores da filosofia moderna, em um enfoque transdisciplinar, que se remete tanto ao campo da psicologia como da filosofia, na medida em que se analisa a complexa correlação entre o corpo vivido e o processo de construção da identidade sóciohistórica do sujeito moderno (Agência Financiadora: FAPESP). / Michel Foucault’s work highlights body as expression and support from forces of power and knowledge, which get strategically articulated, in occidental society’s history. Embodiment occupies a central position in Foucault’s work, which points it out as a bio-political-historical reality; that is, as “interpenetrated by history" and a point of support of complex forces correlations, over which fall upon multiple discursive conformations productive of truths that either can reaffirm as recreate the meaning of the present body, or an individual / collective sensibility immanent in it. In this case, it is not the autonomous epistemological subject who produces a useful or lonesome knowledge to the power, but the power-knowledge, the processes and fights which traverse it and that constitute it, and which represent the forms and possible fields of knowledge. In the proportion Foucault takes out from the autonomous subject of knowledge the central role in the process of knowledge production, the body acquires a renewal importance. The body is a piece within a domination and submission play which is present in the whole social net, which turns the body the depository of marks and signs that are inscribed in it, according to the impacts effectiveness, which for their turn has on embodiment its “rehearsal field". If compared with Foucault’s genealogy, Merleau-Ponty’s perspective is, for one side, more psychological; that is, it seeks to apprehend from inside as the body lives these senses. For the other side, Merleau-Ponty seeks the sensible experience as a region of senses that does not limit itself to historical-cultural meanings, as embodiment represents our opening to being in general. It is what he names as region of the raw Being. In this sense, the linguistic constructions of reality, also of the body itself, depart from one experience from which they cannot either open or close, as the meaning of the sensible experience always finds itself beyond language meanings; this would the reason we think, construct and “develop" languages. Due to the increasing importance of the body notions either on Merleau-Ponty’s or Michel Foucault’s work, this research project aims to compare Foucault’s discourse order with Merleau-Ponty’s lived description, to evaluate in which extent his genealogical perspective is capable to dissolve the subjective notion that resides on Merleau-Ponty’s proper body experience. It was verified that Foucault was the philosopher of the body entangled by power and knowledge forces, in the constitution of the subjects’ historic identity, relating it to the ruptures and discontinuities of tense collisions that ruin the historical body. In Merleau-Ponty, the embodiment enunciation refers to the grooming and the germinations, within the articulation of the proper body, while an originary stratum of the scientific and daily bodies, on their dehiscent relation. In another turn, it is only Merleau-Ponty that considers a joint articulation between entanglement and germinated body through which perception and subjetivation can be mutually alluded. In this direction, the attempt of Foucault, in his analytical, to submit Merleau-Ponty’s germinant body to the same discursive presupposition of his entangled body is a form of not considering the singularities of the enunciative landscape of the body in the Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Through bibliographic readings of the authors, commentators and other modern philosophy authors, through a transdisciplinar approach, which refers itself either to the Psychology or Philosophy field, as it analyzes the complex relation among the lived body and the process of the socio-historical construction of the modern subject. (FAPESP).

Descartes é considerado tradicionalmente como um racionalista estrito, sendo reconhecido pela clareza e distinção, pela certeza e pelo saber metódico, entretanto, existem conhecimentos que extrapolam tais critérios e mesmo assim ainda ocupam um lugar importante no seu pensamento: a criação das verdades eternas, a união substancial e o homem concreto. Nessa tese, pretendemos mostrar como tais objetos, que extrapolam um saber claro e distinto ou uma compreensão completa, podem ser reabilitados no sistema, como cada um deles mantém uma margem de inteligibilidade e uma margem de ininteligibilidade, como eles são bordas do saber, com uma face voltada para a clareza e distinção e outra voltada para a obscuridade. Deus e a criação das verdades podem ser entendidos mas sem ser compreendidos; já a união substancial é uma noção primitiva mas é da alçada da sensibilidade e não do entendimento. Para ressaltar a originalidade e complexidade do pensamento cartesiano frente aos limites do racionalismo, recorremos ao pensamento de Leibniz, mostrando como as saídas leibnizianas são muito mais tradicionais e condizentes com um projeto de racionalismo estrito. / Descartes is traditionally considered as a strict rationalist, being recognized by clearness and distinction, by certainty and by methodical knowledge, however, there are knowledges that go beyond those criteria and yet take up an important role in the thought of Descartes: the creation of eternal truths, the substantial union and the concrete man. On this thesis, we aim to show how these objects, which go beyond a clear and distinct knowledge or a whole understanding, may be rehabilitated in the system; we aim to show also how each one of those objects maintains an edge of intelligibility and an edge of inintelligibility, how they are borders of knowledge with one side turned to clearness and distinction and the other one turned to obscurity. God and the creation of truths may be understood but without being comprehended; the substantial union is a primitive notion, which, nevertheless, belongs to the sensibility, not to the understanding. To highlight the originality and complexity of Descartes thought front to the limits of rationalism, we recurred to Leibnizs thought, showing how the leibnizians solutions are much more traditional and suitable with a strict rationalism project.

The study called ILLESS AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO CARE AND CONSIDERATION Is fenomenologically focused on a variety of seeing the world affected by an illness. Bio-psycho-social-spiritual model of illness is generally understood as the integration of the figures concerning body,mind and socially-spiritual conditions. The solution is arranged in a multi-feature attitude to the therapy, involving bodywork and psychotherapy in terms of mindcare aiming to reach recovering changes, respectively metamorphosis.The basis is found in respect to the body-organism as a self-organizing system creating its own world coming from self-relating autopoiesis. Showing respect to patients brings unexpected theoretical and therapeutical options, concerning that issue there is the contraversion of traditional kartezian western thinking with radical contructivism, which as a new-age empirically advenced alternative of scientific positivism is apparently not fully practised in medicine nowadays. Illnes is seen as disaretation-exasperation,disbalance.Treatment in terms of techne on kartezian thesis puts emphasis on total organism rehabilitation but health in terms of physis cannot be brought back anymore.

Submitted by Fabricia Fialho Reginato (fabriciar) on 2015-07-16T23:16:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 JaneteBonfanti.pdf: 943505 bytes, checksum: 86753931ca9b8833e22583aac72c496c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-16T23:16:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JaneteBonfanti.pdf: 943505 bytes, checksum: 86753931ca9b8833e22583aac72c496c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / A tese objetiva mostrar nos Ensaios, de Michel de Montaigne, uma concepção original de felicidade, como experiência ética do homem - um ser finito e imperfeito. A finitude será identificada a partir de algumas de suas formas: a morte, a corporeidade, a dor, o prazer e a contingência (Fortuna). Malgrado o vazio e a finitude que marca o homem e sua condição, há a possibilidade de lhe restituir a plenitude na experiência de ser humano (comum e não deus), portanto. Na sabedoria da existência concreta e fugidia, atrelada à capacidade de julgar de cada um, reside a possibilidade de uma vida feliz apesar e mediante a passagem do/no tempo e a morte. O que significa dizer que a felicidade em Montaigne é uma questão de opinião e representação, mas também de experiência de união de corpo e alma a um só tempo coadunando prazer e virtude. A análise do tema será feita a partir da interpretação de capítulos escolhidos dos Ensaios: Apologia de Raymond Sebond (II, 12), Que o gosto dos bens e dos males depende em boa parte da opinião que temos deles (I, 14) e Da Experiência (III, 13) em diálogo com alguns dos seus intérpretes. / This thesis aims at showing, in Michel de Montaigne’s Essays, an original conception of happiness as an ethical experience of humans - finite and imperfect beings. Finiteness can be identified in different forms: death, corporeality, pain, pleasure and the contingency (fortune). Despite the emptiness and finiteness which define humans and their condition, there is a possibility to fill this existential void through the human experience itself (by simply being a regular human, not divine). Humans find a possibility of being happy while passing through time and death with the wisdom of concrete and ephemeral existence, together with one’s individual ability of judgment. This means that happiness, for Montaigne, is a matter of opinion and representation, but also the experience of union of body and soul in one time combining pleasure and virtue. This analysis will be made from the interpretation of selected chapters of the Essays: Apology for Raymond Sebond (II, 12), That the taste of goods or evils doth greatly depend on the opinion we have of them (I, 14) and Of experience (III, 13) in dialogue with some previous reflections by other authors.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Anna Maria Casoretti.pdf: 945336 bytes, checksum: ee2379563c74b2d965aa6b50139935b3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-30 / In the course of Greek Antiquity, there was a flourishing of certain movements that sought in the ascetic of the soul their purpose of life. In the religious domain, such conduct is characterized as the distinctive signature of orphic beliefs, whereas in the field of philosophy it reveals itself as a peculiarity of pythagorean communities. Thus, the trajectory marked by the pursuit of the ascesis of the soul enters into the History of Philosophy as an "orphic-pythagorean" category, influencing the thought of eminent philosophers of Antiquity which, in turn, shall exert a strong influence over the later medieval thought. This dissertation examines the reasons scarcely explained in specific literature - that led the aforementioned circles into such a path, considering that the orphic-pythagorean asceticism, while an exercise of the soul, is a choice of life that entails a rigorous transformation of life / Durante a Antiguidade grega, vicejaram determinados movimentos que buscavam na ascética da alma sua finalidade de vida. Em domínio religioso, tal conduta caracteriza-se como a assinatura distintiva das crenças órficas, enquanto, em campo filosófico, revela-se como peculiaridade das comunidades pitagóricas. Destarte, a trajetória marcada pela busca da ascese da alma entra para a História da Filosofia como categoria órfico-pitagórica , influenciando o pensamento de eminentes filósofos da Antiguidade que, por sua vez, exercerão forte ascendência sobre o posterior pensamento medieval. Esta dissertação examina as razões pouco explicitadas na literatura especializada que levaram os círculos em questão a percorrer tal caminho, posto que o ascetismo órfico-pitagórico, enquanto exercício anímico, é escolha de vida que implica em rigorosa transformação de vida

Ce travail porte sur deux mots particulièrement liés aux pensées religieuses anciennes : le mot « daimôn » dans la Grèce avant Platon et le mot « gui » dans la Chine pré-Qin. Comme le « daimôn » qui devient le « démon » maléfique, le « gui » aujourd’hui péjoratif ne l’est pas nécessairement dans la langue ancienne, mais ces deux termes sont intéressants notamment en raison de leur polyvalence et leur ambiguïté. Pour montrer tous les aspects importants du mot « daimôn » et du mot « gui » ainsi que les points de connexion entre ces deux mots à facettes, nous avons essayé de tracer le parcours de ces deux mots à travers les sources anciennes. Ces analyses montrent d’une part la vitalité et la créativité des traditions anciennes qui ont exercé de fortes influences sur l’emploi du mot « daimôn » et d’autre part, la création complexe et probablement relativement tardive de la tradition « gui-esprit/mânes ». Par l’intermédiaire de ces deux mots, la comparaison entre la Grèce et la Chine ancienne en ce qui concerne les traditions religieuses nous mène également à des réflexions sur la relation entre les langues et les traditions. La continuité des langues transforme les créations en traditions et elle apporte aussi la créativité aux traditions déjà créées. / This work concerns two words particularly connected to ancient religions: the word daimôn in the Greece before Plato and the word gui in pre-Qin China. The same as daimôn which becomes to be the malefic démon, gui usually pejorative today did not contain necessarily negative connotations in old Chinese, but these two terms are interesting especially because of their versatility and their ambiguity. To show all the important aspects of the word daimôn and the word gui as well as the connection points between these two words multifaceted, we tried to analyze these two words in ancient works. These analyses show on one hand the vitality and the creativity of old traditions which exercised strong influences on the uses of the word daimôn and on the other hand, the complexity of the « gui-spirit/manes » tradition probably created relatively lately. Owing to these two words, the comparison between Greek and Chinese religious traditions also leads us to think about the relationship between languages and traditions. Languages’ continuity transforms creations into traditions and it also brings the creativity to traditions already created.

Cette thèse porte sur l’étude de la notion du corps dans la philosophie arabe. Le corps a toujours été oublié en dépit de l’âme. Malgré le fait que les penseurs ont toujours été intéressés par l’étude de l’âme, le corps a toujours été présent. Ce travail de recherche montre l’importance du corps dans la falsafa et les problèmes qui y sont reliés. Ces problèmes soulignent les divergences entre la philosophie et l’islam. Le corps souligne deux problèmes majeurs, le premier en relation avec la psychologie et le second en relation avec l’eschatologie. C’est pourquoi notre travail de recherche est divisé en deux grandes parties : dans la première partie nous étudions la définition de l’âme et sa relation avec le corps pour enfin définir le corps, alors que dans la deuxième partie nous étudions la question de la résurrection des corps dans l’au-delà. Nous soutenons que le corps est un des problèmes majeurs entre la philosophie et la religion. C’est la source de plusieurs autres points de divergences. Pour le faire nous étudions les textes fondateurs de la falsafa spécialement ceux de Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ghazālī et Mullā Sadrā tout en les comparant aux textes coraniques. La conclusion que nous défendons c’est que c’est impossible de parler d’une philosophie arabe du corps sans une nouvelle compréhension de la religion et une nouvelle interprétation des textes sacrés islamiques. / This paper studies the notion of the body in the Arabic philosophy. The body was always forgotten. Despite the fact that most of the scholars were always more interested in the study of the soul, the body is always present. This research shows the importance of the body in the falsafa and the problems related to it that shows the abyss between philosophy and Islam. The body emphasizes two major problems, the first related to psychology and the second related to eschatology. That is why our research is divided into two major subjects: in the first one we study the definition of the soul and its relationship to the body to be able to find a definition to the body, and in the second one we study the question of the bodily resurrection in the afterlife. Our main claim is that the body is one of the major problem between philosophy and religion. It is the source of many other points of divergence. In order to do so, we study the writing of the falasifa especially Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ghazālī and Mullā Sadrā and compare then to Islamic sacred texts. The conclusion that we try to support is that it is not possible to talk about an Arabic philosophy of the body unless a new understanding of Islamic religion and the Islamic sacred texts is accepted.

Notre étude interroge de manière systématique ce qu’est l'âme humaine et comment elle constitue un individu dans la pensée de Fārābī. Nous y avons établi que la triade néoplatonicienne nature, âme et intellect structure sa pensée naturelle et qu’elle correspond en l'homme à la substantialité, la vie – en tant que principe général aux êtres vivants – et la pensée. Cette triade est liée à la notion de substantification et permet de comprendre la manière par laquelle différentes fonctions, naturelles, animées et intellectives, peuvent émaner d’une substance une. La constitution de l'individu humain se présente ainsi comme une substantification progressive par ces trois principes. Elle est marquée par une forte téléologisation qui assure l’unité substantielle de l’homme, puisque, lors de la génération de ce dernier, la substance réalisée par la nature puis par l'âme est dès le départ en vue de la réalisation de l'intellect et de sa perfection ultime, comprise comme un retour à soi. Face aux lectures dualistes de son époque, Fārābī revient à une compréhension particulière de l'âme comme forme du corps, et comme principe de l'unité le plus parfait dans le monde sublunaire. Sa compréhension originale de l'hylémorphisme permet de soutenir en même temps la séparabilité de l'intellect, à travers des éléments issus de la tradition néoplatonicienne, notamment l’organisation des fonctions et principes présents en l’homme en différents rangs intermédiaires. / Our work examines in a systematic way what is the human soul and how it constitutes an individual in al-Fārābī’s thought. We have shown in it that the Neoplatonist triad of nature, soul and intellect structures his natural thought and that it corresponds in man to substantiality, life – as a principle shared with all the living creatures – and thought. This triad is linked to the notion of substantification and allows us to understand the way different functions can emanate from what is a single substance. The way man is constituted by these three principles is presented as a progressive substantification characterized by a strong teleologisation. This teleologisation insures man’s substantial unity since, in the process of his generation, the substance realized first by nature and then by soul exists for the sake of its realization by the intellect and the attainment of man’s perfection, perceived as a return to the self. Facing the dualist positions of his time, al-Fārābī upheld a particular reading of the soul as the form of a body and as the most accomplished principle of unity in the sublunary world. His original comprehension of hylemorphism asserts the separability of the intellect through his usage of neoplatonist elements, notably the organization of the principles and functions that are present in the human substance into various intermediary ranks

O reassentamento involuntário é uma forma de intervenção que promove a remoção forçada de uma população de suas casas para uma nova casa em outra localidade, visando à implementação de um projeto de habitação. Sendo um processo que envolve mudanças de casa, espaço e comunidade, o presente trabalho busca uma maior compreensão sobre a dimensão psicológica do reassentamento involuntário a partir da perspectiva de famílias reassentadas sobre a sua experiência e os sentidos atribuídos ao processo. Assim, foram entrevistados quatro reassentados do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento/Projetos Prioritários de Investimento, do município de Pinhais do estado do Paraná, em diferentes estágios do reassentamento. Considerando o espaço como simbólico e a casa como referência do indivíduo no mundo, verificou-se a grande mobilização de conteúdos emocionais a partir da experiência do reassentamento para estes sujeitos. A ausência de participação na execução do programa e as perdas inerentes às mudanças exigidas, em especial da casa, mobilizaram imagens de sofrimento e morte por parte dos reassentados-independente de uma concordância anterior dos entrevistados pelo reassentamento. Assim, antes que possam se ver como beneficiários de uma casa nova, os reassentados enfrentam perdas profundas e uma morte simbólica, necessitando de uma elaboração da experiência para conseguir reconstruir a sua vida, seu lar e, por fim, renascer / Involuntary resettlement is a form of intervention that promotes the forced removal of a population from their homes to a new home in another location in order to implement a housing project. Being a process that involves home changes, and community space, this paper seeks a greater understanding of the psychological dimension of the involuntary resettlement from the perspective of resettled families about their experience and the meanings attributed to the process. Consequently, we interviewed four resettled PAC program / PPI in the city of Pinhais / Paraná, at different stages of resettlement. Considering the space as a symbol and the house as the individual reference in the world, there was a great mobilization of emotional content from the resettlement experience for these persons. The lack of participation in the program implementation and losses of the inescapable changes, especially the house, mobilized suffering and death images by the resettled - regardless of a previous agreement of the interviewed about the resettlement. So, before they can see themselves beneficiaries of a new home, the resettled must deal with deep losses and a symbolic death, requiring an elaboration of experience to be able to reconstruct their life, their home and finally reborn