Tesen att en fältherre hade små möjligheter att styra ett slag när det väl hade börjat har framförts av författaren Peter Englund. Denna tes delar forskare i två läger där det andra lägret menar att fältherren hade mycket stor betydelse för utgången av ett slag.   Syftet med denna uppsats är tvådelat. Den första delen i syftet är att undersöka om det fanns faktorer andra än fältherrens styrning som kunde avgöra ett dåtida slag och den andra delen i syftet är att se om det går att applicera moderna doktriner i analysen av dåtida fall.   Resultatet av undersökningen visar att fältherren hade små möjligheter att styra slaget men det fanns med ett energiskt och karismatiskt föregångsmannaskap möjlighet att påverka slaget. Det framgår tydligt faktorer i slagen som fältherren inte kunde styra över. Svaret är att en kombination av fältherrens påverkan och andra faktorer avgör ett slag, ingendera står ensam. Syftet uppfylls med att det finns andra faktorer identifierade och en modern doktrin går att använda vid analysen. / The thesis that a military commander had little opportunity to guide a battle when it had started has been proposed by the Author Peter Englund. This thesis divides researchers into two sides where the second side means that the Commander had a very big significance to the outcome of a battle.   The purpose of this essay is two-fold. The first part of the purpose is to examine whether there were factors other than the Commanders guidance that could determine a contemporary battle and the second part of the purpose is to see if it is possible to apply modern doctrines in the analysis of contemporary cases.The results of the study show that the Commander had little opportunity to control the battle but there was a possibility with an energetic and charismatic example to influence the battle. There are clearly factors in the battles that the Commander could not affect. The answer is that a combination of the Commanders influence and other factors determine a battle, neither stands alone. The purpose was met by that there are other factors identified and a modern doctrine can be used in the analysis.

Doctrines are by nature dogmatic and academic education is by nature skeptic. As the two perspectivesare opposites to each other it would be plausible to assume that the nature of their contradictionwould exist between doctrines and military academic education. Though no research has been madeon how or to what extent these contradictions exist.This thesis aims therefore to investigate the relation between Swedish doctrines and military academiceducation from dogmatic and skeptical perspectives. Consequently, explaining to what extentthey correspond to one another and how they can be compared. The result reveals that Swedish doctrines generally correspond to military academic education to alow degree, where deviations may range from very low to moderate. The analysis further displaysstrong multifaceted dissonance in their correspondence to one another, but also within Swedish doctrinesand military academic education separately.

The Swedish Defence bill of 2015 demonstrated a rapid change in policy objectives, consequently moving away from an expeditionary force and converging into a territorial defence force. Previous research has attributed and explained the quick shift to the geostrategic unbalance that followed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, major policy changes are often years in the making, indicating that there must be additional explanations to the rapid shift. By applying a modified version of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework on the case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy, this thesis examines the policy process that preceded the official policy decision. The thesis provides further explanation to why the rapid policy change occurred by utilising qualitative content analysis. The analysis shows that the new policy was adopted due to several factors: one being the attention brought to several problems pertaining to the previous policy, another one was found in the timing between focusing events and the on-going work process of the Swedish defence commission, and lastly, strong actors within the policy field were in favour of a change in policy. The thesis concludes that the presence of several factors within the processes of politics, policy and problems enabled the rapid policy change.

The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand why Russia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.

<p>The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse the Swedish policy towards the Korean Conflict 1947–1953. “Swedish policy” means primarily the Swedish Government’s policy, but also the action taken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Defence Staff. </p><p>When the UN treated the issue of Korea in the years before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the Swedish government abstained from voting for reasons of principle or legality, namely that the Korean issue belonged to the peace regulations after the Second World War, in which Sweden, as an ex-neutral state, considered that it should not participate. </p><p>During the Korean War 1950–1953 the Swedish government almost consistently and in many different ways supported the US-led coalition in defence of South Korea. Although never officially mentioned, this support was given with considerable uneasiness. This uneasiness stemmed not only from fears that the neutrality policy would be compromised in the eyes of the Soviet Union but also from fears of what the reaction would be like in Sweden. The fear concerned two things: that the public support for Sweden joining the Western alliance would be strengthened, and that there would be negative reactions among their own crack units, who were regarded as neutrality supporters. Certain elements in the policy adopted by the Government have been judged as attempts to try to counteract this. </p><p>Due to its status as non-aligned country without combat troops in Korea Sweden was given a number of assignments of a mediating and bridging nature during the Korean War. The Swedish government had worries that some of those assignments would be expensive and difficult to carry out. But Sweden had an obvious interest in putting an end to the war and the government also realized that the fact that Sweden was given such missions could be used to justify the Swedish policy of neutrality. </p><p>The Korean War broke out quickly and surprisingly and was initially mobile and fluctuating with several dramatic changes in the successes in the field. Throughout the war, also when the warfare had become more static and the armistice negotiations had started, there was a latent threat of escalation towards a major war between East and West. The Swedish foreign and security policy experts in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Staff could not predict the outbreak of the Korean War and all the dramatic shifts, but they had an accurate basic attitude concerning the two superpowers’ desire to avoid a world war and restrict the Korean War to Korea. </p>

The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse the Swedish policy towards the Korean Conflict 1947–1953. “Swedish policy” means primarily the Swedish Government’s policy, but also the action taken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Defence Staff. When the UN treated the issue of Korea in the years before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the Swedish government abstained from voting for reasons of principle or legality, namely that the Korean issue belonged to the peace regulations after the Second World War, in which Sweden, as an ex-neutral state, considered that it should not participate. During the Korean War 1950–1953 the Swedish government almost consistently and in many different ways supported the US-led coalition in defence of South Korea. Although never officially mentioned, this support was given with considerable uneasiness. This uneasiness stemmed not only from fears that the neutrality policy would be compromised in the eyes of the Soviet Union but also from fears of what the reaction would be like in Sweden. The fear concerned two things: that the public support for Sweden joining the Western alliance would be strengthened, and that there would be negative reactions among their own crack units, who were regarded as neutrality supporters. Certain elements in the policy adopted by the Government have been judged as attempts to try to counteract this. Due to its status as non-aligned country without combat troops in Korea Sweden was given a number of assignments of a mediating and bridging nature during the Korean War. The Swedish government had worries that some of those assignments would be expensive and difficult to carry out. But Sweden had an obvious interest in putting an end to the war and the government also realized that the fact that Sweden was given such missions could be used to justify the Swedish policy of neutrality. The Korean War broke out quickly and surprisingly and was initially mobile and fluctuating with several dramatic changes in the successes in the field. Throughout the war, also when the warfare had become more static and the armistice negotiations had started, there was a latent threat of escalation towards a major war between East and West. The Swedish foreign and security policy experts in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Staff could not predict the outbreak of the Korean War and all the dramatic shifts, but they had an accurate basic attitude concerning the two superpowers’ desire to avoid a world war and restrict the Korean War to Korea.

This essay is an analysis of the Swedish crisis management, as a policy subsystem using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. By applying a Causal Process Tracing method, the main issues of division within the policy subsystem will be examined, and the effects of the 2004 South East Asian tsunami as an incitement of policy change. The major finding is that the reforms that followed the tsunami investigations, to a large extent were planned prior to the tragic event, the main changes seem to have been halted by the 2006 election and change of Office. The cross-party coalitions that were found have theoretical implications for the ACF research.

The purpose of this essay is to investigate what kind of motives where behind the long term decisions for the Swedish military defense in 2000 and 2004. This leads to the questions that the essay is meant to answer; 1. Were the motives behind the two decisions for the Swedish military defense of economic character or an adjustment of security and defense policy? 2. Was the parliament united in the two decisions and if they were not, why? 3. Were there any differences in motive between the two decisions? To answer these questions I have investigated the government bills, private member bills and the parliament debate concerning the two decisions. The result of the essay is that the decision of 2000 was a compromise between security and state finances. The essay can’t define the motives for the later decision. There was a greater understanding in the parliament in the later decision and the biggest difference between both decisions is that the parties who made the decisions in the parliament were not the same at both events.

I denna uppsats undersöks förändringarna i Sveriges och Finlands försvarsekonomi i relationtill respektive lands säkerhetspolitiska doktrin under perioden 1989–2009, i syfte att analyserahur dessa samvarierar. Uppsatsen bidrar till ekonomisk-historisk forskning med en empirisktgrundad diskussion om hur försvar, hotbild och tillförda ekonomiska resurser relaterar tillvarandra. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att Sveriges försvarsdoktrin inte följs av enkoherent försvarsekonomi. Sverige kombinerar en realistisk försvarsdoktrin med en liberalförsvarsekonomi, och Finland gör tvärtom. Relationen mellan försvarsvarsekonomi ochförsvarsdoktrin är ett resultat av många komplexa processer. / This thesis treats the complex relationship between defence expenditures, defence doctrinein relation to the internal and external politics of a nation. The subject of the thesis is Sweden’sdefence policy and its defence expenditures compared to those of Finland during the turbulentyears between 1989 and 2009. The empirical part of the thesis is based on defence expendituresand the official statements made by both Finland’s and Sweden’s governments respectively.This thesis shows that both Sweden’s and Finland’s defence doctrine during the analysed periodis inconsistent with the development of the country’s defence expenditures. The politicallydecided defence expenditures are not consistent with the defence doctrine.

Försvarsmaktens viktigaste resurs är personalen, vilken påverkas i stor utsträckning av officerarnas ledarskap. Utvecklande ledarskap är ledarskapsmodellen som tillämpas i Försvarsmakten och den karaktäriseras av att ledaren uppträder som ett föredöme som inspirerar och motiverar. Ledaren stimulerar delaktighet, ger stöd och konfronterar i ett gott syfte. Den gemensamma och viktigaste tiden i en officers ledarskapsutveckling torde vara de tre år individen studerar vid Officersprogrammet (Försvarshögskolan) och genomför Försvarsmaktstid (MHS Karlberg, Försvarsmakten). I denna uppsats utreds under vilka betingelser en blivande officers ledarskap utvecklas under officersutbildningen. Kadetterna läser ledarskap i officersutbildningen dels genom akademiska studier vid Försvarshögskolan, dels genom ledarskapsutbildning i Försvarsmakten. Ledarskapet utvecklas även genom handledning och feedback av mentorer samt egen reflektion. Dessutom träffar kadetterna många föredömen att ta efter, i form av chefer, lärare och mentorer. Vår empiri visar att ledarskapskurserna vid Officersprogrammet ger en bra teoretisk kunskapsgrund för att förstå ledarskapsteorier och modeller. Dock innehåller utbildningen för lite praktisk tillämpning och övning, särskilt med extern trupp. Den verksamhetsförlagda utbildningen ger kadetterna möjlighet att sätta teoretisk utbildning i en militär kontext, men möjligheterna skiljer sig åt mellan olika VFU-skolor. Handledning från mentorer är ett viktigt verktyg i kadetternas ledarskapsutveckling och kvaliteten på denna håller inte alltid önskad nivå, på grund av personalbrist, personalomsättning eller att mentorn inte är lämplig. Det finns bra föredömen vid officersutbildningen, men även exempel på motsatsen. Ledarskapsutbildningarna håller hög kvalitet och ger en bra teoretisk grund, men vi rekommenderar att det genomförs en översyn av officersutbildningen i syfte att öka praktisk tillämpning av ledarskap. Mentorernas roll är viktig och vi anser att Försvarsmakten bör prioritera bemanning vid Kadettbataljonen och även bibehålla den förberedande utbildningen ”termin 0”. Vi rekommenderar att mentorernas roller och arbete utvärderas samt att arbetsuppgifter och ansvar tydligare dokumenteras. Vad avser kopplingen mellan Försvarshögskolans och Försvarsmaktens utbildningsdelar inom ledarskap, rekommenderar vi att det införs löpande samordningsmöten. Vår slutsats rörande kadetternas medinflytande över utbildningarna är att man bör fortsätta genomföra utveckling av kurser med stöd av de studerandes kursvärderingar och studeranderepresentanter, men att den begränsade möjligheten att påverka kursers innehåll innevarande år, är i sin ordning. / The Swedish Armed Forces’ most valuable resource is personnel, which is greatly influenced by the officer’s leadership. Transformational leadership is the leadership model applied in the Armed Forces and it is characterized by the leader acting as a role model who inspires and motivates. The leader stimulates participation, provides support, and confronts for a good cause. The common and most crucial time in an officer's leadership development is probably the three years the individual studies at the Officers' Programme majoring in War Studies (The Swedish Defence University) and completes the Armed Forces period (Military Academy Karlberg, Swedish Armed Forces). This essay investigates the conditions under which a prospective officer's leadership is developed during officer training. The students study leadership in officer training, partly through academic studies at the Swedish Defence University, and partly through leadership training in the Armed Forces. Leadership is also developed through self-reflection and development with the support of mentors who supervise and provide feedback. In addition, the cadets will gain many role models to follow, in the form of managers, teachers and mentors. Our empirical evidence shows that the leadership courses at the Officers’ program provide a good theoretical knowledge base for understanding leadership theories and models. However, the training includes too little practical application and practice, especially with external squads. The company-based training gives the cadets the opportunity to put theoretical training in a military context, but the possibilities differ between different schools. Supervision from mentors is a useful tool in the cadets' leadership development and the quality of this varies, depending on staff shortages, staff turnover or that the mentor is not suitable. There are good examples in officer training, but also examples of the opposite. The leadership training is of high quality and provides a good theoretical basis, but we recommend that a review of the officer training be carried out to increase the practical application of leadership. The role of the mentors is important, and we believe that the Armed Forces should prioritise staffing at the Cadet Battalion and also maintain the preparatory training "semester 0". We recommend that the mentors' roles and work are evaluated, and that tasks and responsibilities are documented more clearly. About the connection between The Swedish Defence University’s and the Swedish Armed Forces' training parts in leadership, we recommend that ongoing coordination meetings be introduced. Our conclusion regarding the cadets’ co-influence over the educations is that the development of courses should be continued with the support of the students' course evaluations and student representatives, but that the limited opportunity to influence the course content this year is in order.