A presente dissertação tem por objetivo compreender o sentido que Nietzsche confere ao riso no interior de seu pensamento. Para tanto, foi preciso considerar o riso à luz do conceito de vontade de potência, de modo a determinar o aspecto sob o qual Nietzsche o interpreta e o motivo pelo qual esse riso é digno de seus investimentos filosóficos. Deste modo, partimos com a noção de que o riso se exprime como um juízo avaliativo: atitude valorativa que, no caso da valoração nobre, manifesta (e quer) aumento de forças. A partir desse primeiro tópico, analisamos o conceito de gaia ciência [alegre saber], apresentado em livro homônimo, com o qual o riso se irradia pelo pensamento e se torna um fator imprescindível diante das questões e tarefas a que Nietzsche se coloca. Aqui, o riso atua como páthos afirmativo e efeito da elevação de potência; os pensamentos a ele correspondentes são igualmente afirmativos, o que, por sua vez, permite um vigor filosófico para a crítica radical dos valores. A idiossincrasia desse riso de Nietzsche, se vê, pois, realçada quando o cotejamos com temas tais como a linguagem, o estilo, a crítica e o conceito de tartufesco. Com efeito, a partir de tais considerações procuramos esboçar algumas linhas acerca da relação do riso com a ideia do além-do-homem, bem como compreender a inovação que Nietzsche promove na história do pensamento filosófico sobre o riso. / The present dissertation aims to comprehend the meaning that Nietzsche gives to laughter within his thought. Therefore, it was necessary to accept laughter under the concept of will to power in order to precise the aspect in witch Nietzsche interprets it and the motive that makes laughter worthy of his philosophical investments. Thus, we start with the notion of laughter as an evaluative judgment, an evaluative attitude, which in the case of noble valuation, manifests (and wants) increase of forces. From this topic, we analyzed the concept of a gay science(presented in the eponymous book); in witch, laughter became an important factor regarding the issues that Nietzsche arise. Here, laughter works as an affirmative páthos and effect of an elevation of power, the thoughts related to laughter are correspondingly affirmative, which in turns allows a philosophical strength towards the radical critics of values. The idiosyncrasy of Nietzsches laughter highlights when collated with themes as language, style, critics and the concept of tarffufe. Indeed, from these considerations we may be able to outline a conclusion on laughters relation with the idea of overman, and understand the innovation that Nietzsche promotes on the history of philosophical thought about laughter.

Orientador: Pedro Ângelo Pagni / Banca: Divino José da Silva / Banca: Leoni Maria Padilha Henning / Resumo: O discurso filosófico de Nietzsche percorre a vida em ampla gama de considerações, mas não é difícil visualizar nele uma preocupação educativa, traduzida no propósito de arrancar o homem do estado carente e inseguro a que o teria confinado a cultura moderna, apontando-lhe a saída em uma nova cultura afirmativa e superior. Vista assim, toda a filosofia nietzscheana poderia ser entendida como uma grande crítica à cultura moderna, que o filósofo vê doente e necessitada de médicos para salvá-la. E a cura há que vir daqueles que se proponham a educar a humanidade para aquela elevação, mediante rompimento com idéias, práticas e métodos obsoletos. Todavia, se focarmos o exame em algumas partes de sua obra, veremos existir nelas pensamentos voltados mais diretamente para o tema da educação, em que, sem esforço demasiado, poderíamos ver delineada, ainda que não de maneira sistemática, uma filosofia da educação. Sabemos todos os operadores da esfera educacional que a questão "em que se constitui a filosofia da educação" é objeto de não poucos debates, parecendo distante o consenso em torno de uma definição. Se nos ativermos, porém, às questões que são colocadas pelas pessoas credenciadas a falar sobre o tema, veremos que dizem respeito a se a educação é direito de todos, se seu objeto é transmissão de conhecimentos, a formação do indivíduo, o desenvolvimento de suas potencialidades, o seu preparo para o exercício de uma profissão, todas essas tarefas, ou a combinação delas. De tudo isso Nietzsche se ocupou em seus escritos, sobretudo naqueles que são considerados por alguns biógrafos e comentadores como os da primeira fase de seu pensamento. E no questionamento da educação pelo filósofo, subjacente à idéia da necessidade de se conduzir a humanidade a uma cultura superior e emancipadora se apresenta aquilo... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The philosophical Nietzsche's speech covers the life in ample gamma of considerations, but it is not difficult to visualize which is always present in its essence an educative concern, translated in the purpose to move the man from the destitute and unsafe state that it would have confined the modern culture, pointing it the exit that will be found in a new affirmative and superior culture. In this aspect, all the Nietzsche's philosophy could be understood it is a great critical to the modern culture, which the philosopher sees sick and needed of doctors to save it. The cure has to come from those who propose to educate the humanity for that elevation, by means of disruption with ideas, practical and obsolete methods that obstructs such mission. However, if we concentrate the examination in some parts of its work, we will see that there are more directly thoughts directed to the subject of the education, where, without too much effort, we could see delineated, yet not in a systematic way, an education's philosophy. We all operators of the educational sphere know that the question "what the education's philosophy constitutes" is object of not few debates, seeming far a consensus around a definition. If we guide ourselves, however by the subject placed about these questions, we will verify that we see placed by the credential people to talk about the subject are, for example, if the education is everyone's right, if its object is transmission of knowledge, the formation of the individual, the development of his or her potentialities, his or her preparation for the exercise of a profession, all these tasks, or the combination of them. Of all this Nietzsche occupied himself in his writings, over all in those considered by some biographers and commentators as the first phase of his. The questioning of the education by the philosopher, as we will try to evidence, it develops on the... (Complete abstract, click electronic address below) / Mestre

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between Nietzsche&rsquo / s perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power and to show that perspectivism is almost a direct and natural consequence of the doctrine of the will to power. Without exploring the doctrine, it is not possible to understand what Nietzsche&rsquo / s perspectivism is and what he trying to do by proposing it as an alternative to traditional epistemology. To this aim, firstly, Nietzsche&rsquo / s doctrine of the will to power is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the doctrine, its relation with Darwinism and the claims which say that it is a metaphysical principle are analyzed. Afterwards, Nietzsche&rsquo / s construction of the world as becoming out of will to power is investigated. Nietzsche&rsquo / s conception of interpretation as power struggle and its role in perspectivism explained. Then, how Nietzsche&rsquo / s construction of the world as becoming and his concept of interpretation as power struggle emerge as perspectivism is explained. After that, in order to present the differences between Nietzsche&rsquo / s perspectivism and traditional understanding of epistemology, Nietzsche&rsquo / s critiques of some of the fundamental assumptions of traditional epistemology, i.e., causality, logic, and subject-object and apparent-real world distinctions, are investigated. Finally, Nietzsche&rsquo / s understanding of truth based on his perspectivism is inquired. Its relation with correspondence, pragmatic and coherence theories of truth is explored to show that Nietzsche&rsquo / s understanding of truth could not be comprehended through these theories. Consequently, it is claimed that the tendency to attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche&rsquo / s perspectivism, which is prevalent in the current Nietzsche studies, stems from commentator&rsquo / s, consciously or unconsciously, ignoring of the relation between his perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

[pt] O presente estudo tem como foco o pensamento de Nietzsche a partir dos seus escritos destinados à publicação. Nosso objetivo geral consiste em apontar aproximações e distanciamentos entre as suas concepções de arte, linguagem e valor. Nesse percurso, nos dedicamos a interpretar a noção de vontade de poder, com a expectativa de que, na medida em que ela é apresentada como a hipótese de uma forma básica de vontade , seja possível trazer à tona o aspecto irreverente da filosofia de Nietzsche. A partir disso, nosso objetivo específico consiste em investigar a sua proposta de tresvaloração de todos os valores, para avaliar o aspecto volátil da sua concepção de hierarquia, tendo em vista a possibilidade de se afirmar que Nietzsche mesmo tenha consumado a sua proposta para a tarefa do filósofo e, portanto, tenha criado valores. / [en] This study focuses on Nietzsche s thought, on the basis of his writings that were destined for publication. Our general goal consists in pointing out the similarities and differences among his conceptions of art, language and value. The notion of will to power is approached on our route, hoping that, as this notion is presented as the hypothesis of a basic form of life , the irreverent aspect of Nietzsche s philosophy is highlightened. Then, our specific goal consists in investigating his proposal of transvaluation of all values, seeking to assess the volatile aspect of his conception of hierarchy, bearing in mind the possibility of claiming that Nietzsche himself had consummated the task of the philosopher and that, therefore, he created values.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2004-03-04Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:32:13Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 seabra_a_me_mar.pdf: 546685 bytes, checksum: eba46a300670629ef8653098d2c90e0b (MD5) / O discurso filosófico de Nietzsche percorre a vida em ampla gama de considerações, mas não é difícil visualizar nele uma preocupação educativa, traduzida no propósito de arrancar o homem do estado carente e inseguro a que o teria confinado a cultura moderna, apontando-lhe a saída em uma nova cultura afirmativa e superior. Vista assim, toda a filosofia nietzscheana poderia ser entendida como uma grande crítica à cultura moderna, que o filósofo vê doente e necessitada de médicos para salvá-la. E a cura há que vir daqueles que se proponham a educar a humanidade para aquela elevação, mediante rompimento com idéias, práticas e métodos obsoletos. Todavia, se focarmos o exame em algumas partes de sua obra, veremos existir nelas pensamentos voltados mais diretamente para o tema da educação, em que, sem esforço demasiado, poderíamos ver delineada, ainda que não de maneira sistemática, uma filosofia da educação. Sabemos todos os operadores da esfera educacional que a questão em que se constitui a filosofia da educação é objeto de não poucos debates, parecendo distante o consenso em torno de uma definição. Se nos ativermos, porém, às questões que são colocadas pelas pessoas credenciadas a falar sobre o tema, veremos que dizem respeito a se a educação é direito de todos, se seu objeto é transmissão de conhecimentos, a formação do indivíduo, o desenvolvimento de suas potencialidades, o seu preparo para o exercício de uma profissão, todas essas tarefas, ou a combinação delas. De tudo isso Nietzsche se ocupou em seus escritos, sobretudo naqueles que são considerados por alguns biógrafos e comentadores como os da primeira fase de seu pensamento. E no questionamento da educação pelo filósofo, subjacente à idéia da necessidade de se conduzir a humanidade a uma cultura superior e emancipadora se apresenta aquilo... / The philosophical Nietzsche's speech covers the life in ample gamma of considerations, but it is not difficult to visualize which is always present in its essence an educative concern, translated in the purpose to move the man from the destitute and unsafe state that it would have confined the modern culture, pointing it the exit that will be found in a new affirmative and superior culture. In this aspect, all the Nietzsche's philosophy could be understood it is a great critical to the modern culture, which the philosopher sees sick and needed of doctors to save it. The cure has to come from those who propose to educate the humanity for that elevation, by means of disruption with ideas, practical and obsolete methods that obstructs such mission. However, if we concentrate the examination in some parts of its work, we will see that there are more directly thoughts directed to the subject of the education, where, without too much effort, we could see delineated, yet not in a systematic way, an education's philosophy. We all operators of the educational sphere know that the question what the education's philosophy constitutes is object of not few debates, seeming far a consensus around a definition. If we guide ourselves, however by the subject placed about these questions, we will verify that we see placed by the credential people to talk about the subject are, for example, if the education is everyone's right, if its object is transmission of knowledge, the formation of the individual, the development of his or her potentialities, his or her preparation for the exercise of a profession, all these tasks, or the combination of them. Of all this Nietzsche occupied himself in his writings, over all in those considered by some biographers and commentators as the first phase of his. The questioning of the education by the philosopher, as we will try to evidence, it develops on the... (Complete abstract, click electronic address below)

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-01T12:21:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 822448 bytes, checksum: 0ae596f30b77b01cecdaf58f17c9db01 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-01T12:21:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 822448 bytes, checksum: 0ae596f30b77b01cecdaf58f17c9db01 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work aims to understand what the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideals and nihilism. This dissertation is the result of a research that tries to show it specifically from the work On the Genealogy of Morals. The following is an attempt to identify and characterize this issue in other works of this thinker and in the works of some Nietzsche‟s experts. The study begins with an overview of the meaning of ascetic ideals down the forms of expression in the world, through religion, philosophy and art. It presents the ascetic priest as the element from which you get the main understanding of the ascetic ideal; seeks to indicate that talk of the ascetic ideal in the priest‟s talk about how to be critical of the ascetic ideal. On the Genealogy of Morals, the ascetic ideals are characterized as being essentially form of nihilism. We resort to Nietzschean nihilism to show that and how the character will to nothingness intrinsic to nihilism is also present in the ascetic ideal as a form of decay. The conclusion is based on that fact that the ascetic ideals make the decadent will to power because make a will to value where value in this case is the value of nothing. Finally is used to understand the concept of creation as a possibility for overcoming these ideals through tragic art and lawmaker philosophy as a way of will to power. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo principal compreender o que o filósofo Friedrich Nietzsche chama de ideais ascéticos e de niilismo. Essa dissertação é o resultado de uma pesquisa que tenta mostrar isso especificamente a partir da obra Genealogia da moral. Segue-se buscando identificar e caracterizar este assunto também em outras obras deste pensador e em obras de alguns especialistas de Nietzsche. O estudo começa com um apanhado do significado dos ideais ascéticos estabelece as formas como se manifestam no mundo, através da religião, da filosofia e da arte. Apresenta-se o sacerdote ascético como o elemento a partir do qual se obtém a compreensão principal dos ideais ascéticos; procura-se indicar que falar do ideal ascético no sacerdote é falar do modo de ser fundamental do ideal ascético. Na Genealogia da moral, os ideais ascéticos são caracterizados como sendo essencialmente forma de niilismo. Recorre-se ao conceito nietzschiano de niilismo para mostrar que e como o caráter de vontade de nada intrínseco ao niilismo está presente também nos ideais ascéticos como uma forma de decadência. Conclui-se com base nesse fato que os ideais ascéticos tornam a vontade de poder decadente porque a tornam uma vontade de valorar em que valor neste caso é valor de nada. Por fim é empregada a compreensão do conceito de criação enquanto possibilidade de superação desses ideais através da arte trágica e da filosofia legisladora como forma da vontade de poder.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo compreender o sentido que Nietzsche confere ao riso no interior de seu pensamento. Para tanto, foi preciso considerar o riso à luz do conceito de vontade de potência, de modo a determinar o aspecto sob o qual Nietzsche o interpreta e o motivo pelo qual esse riso é digno de seus investimentos filosóficos. Deste modo, partimos com a noção de que o riso se exprime como um juízo avaliativo: atitude valorativa que, no caso da valoração nobre, manifesta (e quer) aumento de forças. A partir desse primeiro tópico, analisamos o conceito de gaia ciência [alegre saber], apresentado em livro homônimo, com o qual o riso se irradia pelo pensamento e se torna um fator imprescindível diante das questões e tarefas a que Nietzsche se coloca. Aqui, o riso atua como páthos afirmativo e efeito da elevação de potência; os pensamentos a ele correspondentes são igualmente afirmativos, o que, por sua vez, permite um vigor filosófico para a crítica radical dos valores. A idiossincrasia desse riso de Nietzsche, se vê, pois, realçada quando o cotejamos com temas tais como a linguagem, o estilo, a crítica e o conceito de tartufesco. Com efeito, a partir de tais considerações procuramos esboçar algumas linhas acerca da relação do riso com a ideia do além-do-homem, bem como compreender a inovação que Nietzsche promove na história do pensamento filosófico sobre o riso. / The present dissertation aims to comprehend the meaning that Nietzsche gives to laughter within his thought. Therefore, it was necessary to accept laughter under the concept of will to power in order to precise the aspect in witch Nietzsche interprets it and the motive that makes laughter worthy of his philosophical investments. Thus, we start with the notion of laughter as an evaluative judgment, an evaluative attitude, which in the case of noble valuation, manifests (and wants) increase of forces. From this topic, we analyzed the concept of a gay science(presented in the eponymous book); in witch, laughter became an important factor regarding the issues that Nietzsche arise. Here, laughter works as an affirmative páthos and effect of an elevation of power, the thoughts related to laughter are correspondingly affirmative, which in turns allows a philosophical strength towards the radical critics of values. The idiosyncrasy of Nietzsches laughter highlights when collated with themes as language, style, critics and the concept of tarffufe. Indeed, from these considerations we may be able to outline a conclusion on laughters relation with the idea of overman, and understand the innovation that Nietzsche promotes on the history of philosophical thought about laughter.

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.