O presente estudo propõe uma análise sobre o tema da usura no pensamento de São Tomás de Aquino de forma a determinar sua aplicabilidade à questão dos juros remuneratórios tal qual se apresenta hodiernamente no Direito Brasileiro. Inicialmente a concepção de Aquino é avaliada à luz da tríplice base que a compõe: a Lei Natural, segundo a qual se considera a esterilidade do dinheiro e a justiça natural; a Lei Humana, tida aqui como o Direito Romano, do qual se absorve a noção de fungibilidade do dinheiro e a conceituação dos contratos de mútuo; e a Lei Divina, tomada por São Tomás de forma a corroborar aquilo que se depreende das demais leis. Na sequencia, a problemática dos juros e da sua extrapolação usurária é avaliada no âmbito do ordenamento jurídico pátrio, tanto sob o prisma de sua evolução histórica quanto das discussões que envolvem a matéria em nossos dias. Finalmente, partindo de uma conceituação de juros e usura compatível com o pensamento do Doutor Angélico, avaliaremos o que viria a determinar o preço justo nos contratos de mútuo financeiro com vistas a estabelecer parâmetros indicativos para a limitação das taxas de juros no Direito Brasileiro, tanto nas operações praticadas no âmbito civil quanto naquelas contratadas junto ao Sistema Financeiro Nacional / This study proposes an analysis of the theme of usury in the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas to determine its applicability to the question of compensatory interest as it is now understood under Brazilian Law. Initially Aquinass concept is evaluated in the light of its triple base: Natural Law, which considers the sterility ofmoney and natural justice; Human Law, seen here as Roman Law, from which the notion offungibility of money and the conceptualization of mutuum agreements are derived; and Divine Law, taken by St. Thomas as a means of corroborating what is deduced from the other laws.Next, the critical issues involving interest and their usurious extrapolation are evaluated in the sphere of our national legal system, from both the perspectives of its historical evolution and of the discussions that involve the subject today. And finally, beginning with an appraisal of interest and usury compatible with the thinking of the Angelic Doctor, we will evaluate what woulddetermine the just price in mutuum contracts,seeking to establish parameters for an eventual limitation ofinterest rates in Brazilian Law, both in transactions involving non-banking entities and in those contracted within the National Financial System.

Os estudos sobre o direito natural costumam dividi-lo em três períodos característicos, cosmológico, teológico e racional, a depender do critério usado para a sua fundamentação, respectivamente, o kósmos, Deus ou a razão humana, sendo que Tomás de Aquino e Hugo Grotius podem ser considerados, cada um, grandes expoentes dos dois últimos períodos. Um dos objetivos do jusracionalismo foi buscar uma fundamentação do direito natural, e do direito como um todo, apenas na razão e natureza humanas, prescindindo-se de Deus. Entretanto, as mudanças nas mais diversas áreas ocorrem cada uma a seu tempo e não todas de uma vez. Por isso, apesar dos esforços empreendidos para se separar os campos do direito e da teologia, é possível que eles continuassem mais interligados do que se imaginava na passagem do jusnaturalismo teológico para o racional. No intuito de identificar se permaneceram algumas características, e quais, da fundamentação teológica nas doutrinas do direito natural racional, será feita uma comparação entre os sistemas de Tomás e Grotius, avaliando também se o holandês foi influenciado pelo italiano. Os resultados alcançados mostram que é possível se afirmar que Grotius, tendo feito mais de cinquenta referências a Tomás em apenas uma obra, foi por ele influenciado, havendo grandes semelhanças entre a fundamentação dos autores em questões cruciais de suas doutrinas, uma vez que concordam que a finalidade do homem não está nesse mundo, que Deus é o criador de tudo o que existe, especialmente do homem, cuja natureza e instrumentos peculiares, notadamente a razão, a linguagem e a vontade, são reflexo da própria natureza divina expressa na Trindade, que é dada aos homens a dignidade de criar, por si mesmos, regras para a organização da sociedade, com grande liberdade de ação dentro de uma moldura divina da lei, uma vez que a Providência não interfere ou suprime o livre-arbítrio, ainda que a Revelação seja um auxílio não apenas para a obtenção da beatitude, mas também para a convivência social e conhecimento da lei natural, e que mesmo o exercício da função de poder só existe por autorização divina, pois se os soberanos não podiam ser julgados por qualquer outra vontade humana, eles o seriam por Deus. Com isso, desde Tomás já se pode reconhecer que a lei natural é campo de atuação por excelência da criatura racional, e ela só adquire significado próprio quando aplicado a elas, bem como que o caráter teológico da obra de Grotius não pode ser negligenciado, e deve ser levado em conta em sua teoria. / Studies on natural rights tends to divide it into three characteristic periods, cosmological, theological and rational, depending on the criteria used as their fundament, respectively, the kósmos, God or the human reason, being possible to account Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius as two major thinkers in the latter, and each, periods. Amongst the goals of the jusrationalism was to seek for a foundation of natural right, and right as a whole, based solely on reason and human nature, with no recourse to God. However, changes in diverse areas occur each at its own time and not altogether. Hence, despite the efforts taken to split rights and theologys fields, it is possible that they remained more interconnected than one imagined in the transition from theological to rational jusnaturalism. In order to identify if some characteristics, and which, of theological fundament remain in rational natural laws doctrines, a comparison shall be made between Aquinas and Grotius systems, assessing whether or not the Dutch was influenced by the Italian. The results achieved show that is possible to say that Grotius, having made more than fifty references to Aquinas in just one work, was influenced by him, acknowledging great similarities in the fundament used by both in crucial aspects of their doctrine, since they agree that mans end is not in this world, that God is the creator of everything there is, specially man, whose nature and peculiar instruments, notably reason, language and will, are a reflect of divine nature itself as expressed in the Trinity, that is given to men the dignity to create the rules to organize, by themselves, society, with great freedom of action within the laws divine frame, inasmuch as Providence does not interfere or suppress free-will, although Revelation is meant to assist not only in beatitudes acquisition, but also in social life and natural laws knowledge, and that even exercising functions of power only exists in virtue of divine authorization, therefore if sovereigns couldnt be judged by any other human will, they would by God. Henceforth, since Aquinas it is possible to recognize that natural law is by excellence the acting field of rational creature, and it only acquires proper meaning when applied to them, as well as the theological character of Grotius works cannot be neglected and must be accounted in his theories.

A questão da existência de Deus acompanha o desenvolvimento intelectual de Tomás de Aquino e tem papel central em sua Suma de Teologia, na qual o filósofo desenvolve sua resposta através das conhecidas cinco vias para a prova da existência de Deus. O objetivo desta dissertação é percorrer o caminho traçado por Tomás de Aquino para chegar às cinco vias, mostrando a necessidade e a possibilidade da prova da existência de Deus como sujeito da Doutrina Sagrada. / The question of the existence of God follows the intellectual development of Saint Thomas Aquinas. It also plays a central role in his Summa Theologica, where the philosopher develops his answer trough “the five ways” of proving the existence of God. This dissertations aims to follow Saint Thomas Aquinas through the journey in developing \"the five ways\", by showing the need and the possibility to prove the existence of God as subject of the holy doctrine.

Um estudo sobre a razão prática em Tomás de Aquino, analisada sob a luz de seus primeiros princípios. Parte-se da pergunta de como o ser humano descobre o que é bom e mau para si o que requer cobrir dois momentos distintos de sua obra: o tratamento dado à synderesis e, em seguida, como os princípios por ela apreendidos se articulam e como funcionam na mente humana. Defende-se, por fim, que é um equívoco ler os princípios da lei natural como primariamente normativos no sentido deontológico do termo. São, antes, diretivos, conferindo à razão prática individual os bens de cuja posse depende a felicidade humana. As implicações dessa leitura para a ética de Tomás de Aquino que aparece agora sob forte roupagem eudaimonista são, por fim, analisadas. / The present study focuses on Aquinass exposition of practical reason, analyzed in light of its first principles. We begin with the question of how an individual human being discovers what is good and bad for himself, which is at the root of natural law, that is, rationally grounded morality. This requires covering two distinct moments of Aquinass work: his treatment of synderesis and, after it, how the principles apprehended by synderesis relate to one another and what kind of knowledge they give to the human mind. It is argued that it is a mistake to see the first practical principles as normative in the deontological sense. Rather, they are directive, furnishing practical reason with the goods on whose possession human happiness depends. The implications of this reading for Aquinass ethics are then analyzed and his ethical stance emerges as strongly eudaimonistic.

Esta tese tem como objetivo expor a teoria cartesiana da criação, desenvolvida nas Meditações. Começando pela submissão dos fundamentos da tradição filosófica (o realismo e o idealismo) ao método da dúvida, a crítica cartesiana acabará por atingir a cosmologia cristã, consolidada por Tomás de Aquino sobre o realismo aristotélico, bem como as soluções idealistas favoráveis à existência de verdades, essências e naturezas eternas e incriadas. A partir daí, Descartes desenvolve uma concepção de criação cuja universalidade envolve a ideia de Deus, a coisa pensante, as coisas simples e universais e as coisas materiais. A universalidade da criação é uma exigência da ideia cartesiana de Deus como ser sumamente perfeito. Entendida como perfeição, a onipotência divina requer a dependência absoluta de todas as coisas em relação a Deus enquanto causa eficiente, isto é, causa criadora. Do contrário, há uma clara negação da onipotência e, consequentemente, da perfeição divina. Pretendemos ainda mostrar que a teoria cartesiana da criação é o fundamento da teoria da livre criação das verdades eternas, que alguns intérpretes consideram incompatível com o sistema cartesiano. / This thesis aims to expose the Cartesian theory of creation, developed in Meditations. Submitting the foundations of the philosophical tradition, namely realism and idealism, to the methodical doubt, Cartesian criticism will eventually reaches out the Christian cosmology, consolidated by Thomas Aquinas on Aristotelian realism, as well as the favorable idealistic solutions to the existence of truths, essences and eternal and uncreated natures. From there, Descartes develops a conception of creation whose universality involves the idea of God, the thinking thing, the simple and universal things and the material things. The universality of creation is a requirement of the Cartesian idea of God as a supremely perfect being. Understood as perfection, divine omnipotence requires the absolute dependence of all things in relation to God while efficient cause, that is, creative cause. Otherwise, there is a clear denial of the omnipotence and consequently of the divine perfection. We also intend to show that the Cartesian theory of creation is the foundation of the theory of the creation of the eternal truths, that some interpreters consider incompatible with the Cartesian system.

Ce travail interroge la constitution d’une métaphysique de la personne humaine dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin. Si on s’accorde généralement à reconnaître que la réflexion thomasienne sur la personne a eu une influence décisive sur la compréhension moderne de l’homme comme personne, on constate également que l’expression personne humaine n’est pas familière de l’Aquinate et ne fait l’objet d’aucun développement particulier dans son œuvre. En effet, l’approche métaphysique de la personne humaine dans le corpus thomasien est logée dans les textes théologiques dans lesquels Thomas, suivant une démarche analogique, définit la personne divine en conservant l’affinité avec l'homme. Ce travail de conceptualisation, à la charnière de la théologie et de l’anthropologie, s’inscrit dans le sillage de la thématique chrétienne de l’homme image de Dieu. Dans le monde latin, les diverses composantes de cette riche tradition se rassemblent à la fin du VIe siècle autour de la figure de Boèce. Au détours des analogies sur les mystères de la Trinité et du Christ, Thomas est conduit à repenser la métaphysique de la substance et de la subsistence, héritage de la traduction de la notion grecque d'hypostase effectué par Boèce. Au bout du compte, ces analogies n’aboutissent pas seulement à une métaphysique de la personne subsistant dans la nature humaine, elles fondent ultimement une véritable métaphysique de la personne humaine en définissant une manière humaine de subsister. / This work examines the formation of a metaphysics of the human person in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. On one side it is generally agreed that the Thomistic thought on the person had a decisive influence on the modern understanding of man as a person, on the other side the term human person is not familiar of Aquinas and not subject to any particular development in his work. Indeed, the metaphysical approach of the human person in the Thomistic corpus is found in the theological texts in which Thomas defines the divine person maintening the affinity with man. This work of conceptualization deals with the Christian theme of man image of God using the analogy. In the Latin world, the various components of this rich tradition come together in the late sixth century around the figure of Boethius. From analogies on the mysteries of the Trinity and of Christ, Thomas is led to rethink the metaphysics of substance and subsistence inherited from the translation of the Greek notion of hypostasis made by Boethius. Ultimately, these analogies do not lead only to a metaphysics of the person subsisting in human nature, they found a true metaphysics of the human person by defining a human subsisting way.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Tomáš Adamovič "De magistro" Tomáše Akvinského "De magistro" by Thomas Aquinas Abstract The topic of the submitted Master Thesis is the "De magistro" question from the Disputed Questions on Truth by Thomas Aquinas. The aim of the work is to introduce basic thoughts of this text and present them in a broader context (compared to Plato, Augustine and heterodox Aristotelianisms). The herein applied methods include an analysis of the text, occasionally combined with compilation of Thomas Aquinas and comparison with the works of other authors. In the analysed text, Thomas Aquinas explains his concept of teaching, argues for the statements that a man can be called a teacher, that no one can be called a teacher of himself, that a man can be taught by an angel, and that teaching pertains more to the active life than to the contemplative life. The Thesis is supplemented with some questions of the present author. Keywords teacher, first principles, cognition, Thomas Aquinas, philosophy of education

M.A. (English) / This study applies st Thomas Aquinas's principles of love to William Shakespeare's Hamlet in order to establish the moral bases of the causes and effects of the actions of the characters in the play. The dissertation is divided into two parts comprising six chapters. The first part, chapter one, establishes the availability of st Thomas's precepts in the English Renaissance. The second part, comprising chapters two to six, applies st Thomas's principles relating to charitable and concupiscent love to the characters in the play. st Thomas's philosophy exerted a pervasive influence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and was accessible to educated circles in England. In view of this influence, it is possible that Shakespeare was influenced by Thomist thought when he wrote Hamlet. In this study, the characters are grouped in terms of the Thomist principles of love that they exemplify in Hamlet, with Horatio providing a moral norm, Claudius being the epitome of evil, and the central character, Hamlet, being a source of moral ambiguity. The cast of supporting characters reflects the nuances of good and evil in the play. The study concludes that, while Shakespeare's characters are governed by established Thomist principles, the translation of moral abstracts into practice elicits moral dilemmas that are difficult to resolve.

In this dissertation, I argue for the philosophical consistency of Aquinas’ hybrid view of human souls - that is, the idea that human souls, and only human souls, are at once substantial forms and subsistent things. I contend that the best way to understand the ontological status of human souls according to Aquinas is by means of the concept of ‘subsistent parts’. Since Aquinas characterizes souls as parts of substances, I propose a mereological analysis of the different types of part in Aquinas, and I conclude that souls should be seen as metaphysical parts of substances. An influential contemporary view holds that Aquinas’ doctrine is inconsistent on the grounds that nothing could be an abstract (form) and a concrete (subsistent) at the same time. I respond to this view by denying the widespread notion that substantial forms are purely abstract entities. I hold that the best way to make sense of Aquinas’ twofold approach to human souls is by saying that substantial forms possess an element of concreteness which is accounted for by the fundamental relationship between form and being. Finally, I address the question of taxonomy: how can we classify Aquinas’ view of the soul-body relation in light of the concepts that are currently used in philosophy of mind. I argue that the notion of a subsistent part entails the concept of ‘part-dualism’, which I present as standing midway between substance-dualism and nonreductive materialism, and also as being ontologically richer than property-dualism. I conclude this dissertation with a refutation of the idea championed by some prominent scholars that the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of the person.