Since the beginning of the 21st century China has constantly stressed multilateralism as an important part of its foreign policy. This might be perceived as a significant shift from longtime favored unilateralism and bilateralism in conducting its foreign relations and a new pattern of action in China`s response to global affairs. This thesis examines the phenomenon of multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy, especially in terms of its main incentives and different interpretations. The hypothesis is based on assumption that China`s more active participation in the international organizations and increasing involvement in global affairs do not necessarily indicate China has embraced the concept of multilateralism entirely. In order to explore ambiguous dimensions of Chinese multilateralism, thesis focuses on China`s policy at United Nations Security Council. It concludes that the principal limitation of Chinese multilateralism is China`s strong adherence to the principle of state sovereignty, which has also affected China`s behavior as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

O objetivo central desta tese é o de analisar a participação de Organizações Não Governamentais (ONGs) internacionais nas políticas e práticas do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU) voltadas às agendas temáticas Crianças e Mulheres. Com base no estudo de duas coalizões, Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict e NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, busca-se examinar o panorama político e normativo que condiciona a atuação das ONGs, bem como as estratégias específicas utilizadas por elas para adentrar no domínio de paz e segurança internacionais. Pretende-se discutir se as ONGs estão presentes nas discussões do órgão e, caso afirmativo, em que medida suas estratégias influenciam as decisões estatais. A metodologia empregada foi a análise dos documentos divulgados pelas coalizões e das resoluções aprovadas pelo CSNU. Além disso, foram realizadas entrevistas com funcionários das coalizões e das missões estatais para entender como funcionam as relações entre as ONGs e o CSNU. A partir das perguntas de pesquisa e da metodologia empregada, o estudo discutiu proposições teóricas sobre a possibilidade de os atores não estatais interferirem nas deliberações intergovernamentais. Sugere-se que o enquadramento das ideias e normas, a formação de coalizões e a mobilização por meio de redes de advocacia criam estímulos que aumentam as chances de os ativistas influenciarem as decisões dos Estados-membros do CSNU. As conclusões desta tese permitem considerar, de um lado, a participação das ONGs num espaço tradicionalmente fechado à sua presença e, de outro, o desenvolvimento do CSNU, com destaque às adaptações que viabilizaram uma maior aproximação com as ONGs. / The aim of this thesis is to analyze the participation of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the policies of the United Nations Security Council on Children\'s and Women\'s issues. Based on the study of two coalitions, Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict and NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, it seeks to examine the political and normative framework that conditions the performance of NGOs. Furthermore, it looks at specific strategies used by them to enter into the field of international peace and security. The intention is to verify if NGOs are present in the discussions of this body and, if so, to what extent they influence state\'s decisions. From these research questions, the study discusses theoretical propositions about the possibility of non-state actors\' interference in intergovernmental deliberations. It suggests that framing of ideas and norms, the formation of coalitions and the mobilization through advocacy networks increase the likelihood of an impact on the decisions of member states. The conclusions allow us, firstly, to reflect upon the participation of NGOs in a space traditionally closed to their presence and, secondly, to visualize the development of the UNSC, highlighting some adaptations that led to a greater proximity with NGOs.

Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials--with the top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront--who highlight its potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. The military leaders--the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington--are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other "idealist" interventions that aim to change the domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. troops. Given the military's professional expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant--the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining--and it may not actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.

Cette thèse est une réflexion originale sur le droit international dans la crise, car elle aborde le droit international grâce à une théorie peu connue en droit, celle des systèmes dynamiques complexes. L’étude du cas particulier de la gestion normative de la crise par le Conseil de sécurité illustre les intérêts de l’utilisation d’une théorie novatrice en droit. La théorie des systèmes dynamiques complexes offre les outils d’une réflexion sur le droit, fondée sur les interactions du droit avec le contexte particulier dans lequel il intervient, la crise, et ses acteurs. La mise en lumière de ces interactions favorise une lecture critique du droit international dans la crise et permet de renouveler l’ontologie de ce droit. Les dynamiques complexes appréhendées et définies par cette théorie sont utiles lorsqu’il s’agit d’expliquer les atouts et les limites de l’action normative du Conseil. Par ailleurs en renouvelant l’ontologie du droit, la théoriedes systèmes dynamiques complexes facilite une lecture prospective de l’action normative du Conseil et insiste sur le rôle institutionnel du droit. / This thesis is an original reflection on international law in time of crisis, as it addresses international law through a little-known theory in law, that of complex dynamic systems. The study of the specific case of the normative management of the crisis by the Security Council illustrates the interest of the use of an innovative theory in law.The theory of complex dynamic systems provides the tools to think differently the law, based on the interaction of law with the particular context in which it operates, the crisis, and its actors. The highlighting of these interactions favors a critical reading of international law in time of crisis and helps to renew the ontology of law. The complex dynamic understood and defined by this theory are useful when explaining the strengths and limitations of the Council’s action in time of crisis. In addition to renewing the ontology of law, complex dynamic systems theory facilitates a prospective reading of the normative action of the Council and stresses the institutional role of law.

As operações de manutenção da paz da Organização das Nações Unidas vêm sendo empregadas há mais de 60 anos com o objetivo de assegurar a paz e a segurança internacionais. A partir dos conflitos da Somália, Bósnia e Ruanda ocorridos na década de 1990, caracterizados pelas massivas violações de direitos humanos e pela incapacidade da Organização de impedi-las, esta deu início a uma série de debates acerca de como melhor operacionalizar suas peacekeeping operations, a fim de que violações como aquelas não mais voltassem a ocorrer. Ademais, o entendimento, por parte do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, de que violações de direitos humanos e estabilidade internacional guardam estreita relação, colaborou para que esses debates se desenvolvessem. O presente trabalho tem como obejtivo analisar as propostas sugeridas com vistas ao aperfeiçoamento do modus operandi das peacekeeping operations em virtude das citadas violações de direitos humanos e a verificar se tais propostas estão sendo aplicadas nas operações de manutenção da paz atuais / The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations have been used for over 60 years with the goal of ensuring international peace and security. From the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda occurred in the 1990s, characterized by massive human rights violations and the inability of the Organization of preventing them, United Nations have initiated a series of debates about how to best operationalize its peacekeeping operations, in manner that those violations no longer occur. Moreover, the understanding by the United Nations Security Council that human rights violations and international stability are closely related, contributed to the development of these discussions. The present work aims, therefore, to assess the proposals suggested for the improvement of the modus operandi of peacekeeping operations in view of the aforementioned human rights violations and to verify whether they are being applied in todays peacekeeping operations.

<p>This paper analyses head of state immunity, a traditional rule of international law, in relation to the indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 against the current Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. It can be agreed that the doctrine of immunity in international law attempts to overcome the tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty. The statutes and decisions of international criminal courts make it clear that no immunity for international crimes shall be attached to heads of states or to senior government officials. However, the case against the Sudanese President, where the jurisdiction of the ICC was triggered by the UN Security Council‟s referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, represents the first case where a serving head of state has, in fact, been indicted before the ICC. From this case, a number of legal issues have arisen / such as the questions where the ICC‟s jurisdiction over an incumbent head of state, not party to the ICC Statute, is justified, and the obligations upon ICC state parties to surrender such a head of state to the requesting international criminal court. This paper gives an analysis of these questions.</p>

Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus drei Abschnitten.                                 I. Geopolitics, Aid and Growth Wir untersuchen den Effekt kurzfristiger politischer Motive auf die Effektivität von Entwicklungshilfe. Dabei testen wir, ob der Effekt der Hilfe auf Wirtschaftswachstum reduziert wird durch den Anteil der Jahre während der Hilfsvergabe, die ein Land temporäres Mitglied des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen war. Diese Mitgliedschaft sorgt für eine quasi zufällige Variation in der Höhe der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Hilfe und Wachstum schwächer und niedriger ist für Hilfe, die während der temporären Mitgliedschaft vergeben wurde. Unsere zwei Schlussfolgerungen sind: Erstens, der Einfluss politischer Motive untergräbt die Effektivität der vergebenen Hilfsgelder. Zweitens, Variablen die politisches Interesse widerspiegeln sind ungeeignet als ökonometrische Instrumente für Entwicklungshilfe. Dies weckt Zweifel an einer großen Anzahl existierender Forschungsergebnisse. II. Is there a Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings? Kreditratingagenturen werden oftmals für angeblich verzerrte Länderratings kritisiert. Dieser Abschnitt diskutiert, wie das Heimatland einer Ratingagentur deren Ratingentscheidungen aufgrund polit-ökonomischer Einflüsse und kultureller Unterschiede beeinflussen kann. Mithilfe von Daten über neun Agenturen aus sechs unterschiedlichen Ländern testen wir, ob die Agenturen bessere Ratings an ihr Heimatland oder mit ihnen ökonomisch, politisch oder kulturell verbundene Länder vergeben. Unsere Ergebnisse liefern Belege für die Existenz einer Verzerrung zugunsten des jeweiligen Heimatlandes, kulturell ähnlicher Länder, und von Ländern, in denen die Banken des Heimatlandes größeren Risiken ausgesetzt sind. Dabei scheint die linguistische Ähnlichkeit der Sprache die Haupterklärung für den gemessenen Vorteil des Heimatlandes zu sein. III. Crime, Incentives and Political Effort: A Model and Empirical Application for India Der große Anteil an Politikern, gegen welche kriminelle Vorwürfe erhoben werden, hat eine öffentliche Debatte und eine Literatur über dessen Gründe und Auswirkungen ausgelöst. Um die Auswirkungen von Kriminalität abzuschätzen, entwickeln wir ein Modell über die Anreize, welchen Abgeordnete ausgesetzt sind wenn sie entscheiden ob sie sich für ihren Wahlkreis engagieren sollen. Wir nutzen drei direkte und gut messbare Maße für das Engagement der Abgeordneten in der vierzehnten Lok Sabha während der Legislaturperiode von 2004-2009: Anwesenheitsquoten, Aktivität im Parlament und die Nutzungsrate eine Fonds für lokale Entwicklungsprojekte. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe dass kriminelle Abgeordnete im Schnitt ungefähr 5% niedrigere Anwesenheitsquoten haben, und niedrige Nutzungsraten des Fonds, aber sich nicht bezüglich der Aktivität im Parlament unterscheiden. Diese Unterschiede hängen vom ökonomischen Entwicklungsstand des Wahlkreises, einem Proxy für Möglichkeiten illegale Renten zu extrahieren und für die Intensität der Überwachung des Abgeordneten durch die Wähler, sowie von der Definition von Kriminalität ab. Wir nutzen beobachtbare Kontrollvariablen, Matchingtechniken und „Treatment Effect“ Regressionen, um zu zeigen, warum diese negativen Koeffizienten eine Obergrenze für den tatsächlich wohl noch größeren negativen Zusammenhang darstellen. Darüber hinaus analysieren wir, warum es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass Selektionsprobleme aufgrund unbeobachtbarer Einflussfaktoren unsere Ergebnisse vollständig erklären können.

<p>This paper analyses head of state immunity, a traditional rule of international law, in relation to the indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 against the current Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. It can be agreed that the doctrine of immunity in international law attempts to overcome the tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty. The statutes and decisions of international criminal courts make it clear that no immunity for international crimes shall be attached to heads of states or to senior government officials. However, the case against the Sudanese President, where the jurisdiction of the ICC was triggered by the UN Security Council‟s referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, represents the first case where a serving head of state has, in fact, been indicted before the ICC. From this case, a number of legal issues have arisen / such as the questions where the ICC‟s jurisdiction over an incumbent head of state, not party to the ICC Statute, is justified, and the obligations upon ICC state parties to surrender such a head of state to the requesting international criminal court. This paper gives an analysis of these questions.</p>

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Esta dissertação analisa uma novidade introduzida na política externa brasileira pelo governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: a não-indiferença. Esta diretriz surgiu como contraponto ao princípio da não-intervenção, no entanto o governo não delimitou adequadamente como aplicá-la, tendo em vista que em contextos similares a diplomacia Lula tomou atitudes diferentes. Para isso, são estudados sete casos de atuação do Brasil com relação a outros países: Venezuela, Bolívia, Paraguai, Honduras, Cuba, Irã e Haiti. A hipótese que orientou este estudo é de que na busca por aumentar o perfil político do Brasil, representado pela candidatura a um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, o governo brasileiro exerceu um excessivo ativismo que exigiu esforços políticos (omitindo-se inclusive em questões sobre direitos humanos), financeiros e militares. A diplomacia da solidariedade surge nesse contexto como justificativa à mediação de crises, cooperação técnica e até mesmo à intervenção, da qual o engajamento brasileiro no Haiti seria o melhor exemplo devido a sua multidimensionalidade. / The present dissertation analyzes an innovation in Brazilian foreign policy introduced by the Lula da Silva administration: the non-indifference. This guideline emerged in opposition to the principle of non-intervention, however the government did not define it properly nor have created rules to enforce it, considering that Lula`s diplomacy had different approaches to similar situations. To find out more about this trend, it was chosen seven case studies in which Brazilian foreign policy had to cope with other countries, such as: Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, Cuba, Iran and Haiti. The hypothesis which has oriented this research addresses that in order to increase Brazil`s political profile, represented by the pursue for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, the government has excessively raised its initiatives abroad which required political (neglecting human rights), financial and military efforts. The diplomacy of solidarity emerges as an argument to justify the Brazilian role in peace talks, cooperation measures and even intervention, which makes Haiti the best example due its multidimensionality.