The inspiration behind this philosophical endeavor is an ethical one: interested in what it means to flourish as a human being – how to live well and authentically. Similar to medicine and how the ability to prescribe the appropriate treatment depends on first making a diagnosis, the focus of this work will to be understand the human condition and the ways in which subjectivity, one’s sense of self, is constituted. Given the general dissatisfaction with the modern metaphysical picture of the world, which analyzes the world in terms of the mutually exclusive and completely separate categories of nature/objects and society/subjects, I proceed from an alternative conceptual perspective, that of non-modernity, offered by Bruno Latour. By focusing on the actual practice of the sciences Latour develops one of his central concepts: mediation. From this understanding of the practices of mediation the world is revealed as an ontological continuum of hybrids – mixtures of human and nonhuman elements – that ranges from quasi-object to quasi-subject. Rather than being separate, nature and society are intimately interwoven and co-constituted, forming a nature-culture collective that is connected and defined by the network of relations between existing hybrids. Given this philosophical landscape of mediation, hybrids and networks, the question that I seek to address is how does this effect what it means to be human? What does it mean to human living in a hybrid world? I answer this question by articulating and developing Latour’s concept of quasi-subject. This will ultimately amount to saying that as humans, our sense of self and agency is co-constituted through our networks of relations with both humans and nonhumans. I conclude the paper by exploring some of the ethical implications that naturally emerge from such an understanding.

This thesis examines some of the different kinds of metaphors employed in our pedagogical practices. By using the Four Pillars of Philosophy for Children, an alternative metaphor for teaching philosophy is put forth as a viable alternative to the traditional options. This is what we can reasonably call the Rhapsode Metaphor.

Gender threat occurs in situations in which one is threatened by the possibility of acting like the opposite gender (Vandello et al., 2008) and is most pervasive for men (e.g., “you throw like a girl”). This study examined the question of whether men, after being told they performed like women, would respond with negative implicit evaluations of women. In addition, competence threat (with no reference to gender) was examined to see if it would affect men in the same way. Women were threatened by being told they performed like men, although it was hypothesized there would be no effect of gender threat for women. Participants completed a line bisection task and received false feedback regarding how they performed. The feedback was manipulated in terms of threat (threat versus not threat) and gender salience (gender was salient or not). Participants then completed two Implicit Association Tests: one to assess implicit prejudice against women and one to assess endorsement of tradition gender roles. Men who were threatened (regardless of gender salience) showed more implicit prejudice against women than men who were not threatened. Women showed an interaction of threat, gender salience, and explicit sexism. When gender was salient, threatened women low in explicit sexism had less favorable attitudes towards other women. Women high in explicit sexism showed no significant difference between threat and no threat. No effects were found for implicit gender stereotypes for men or women. Implications for gender threat theory and future directions are discussed.

In the western culture, historically speaking, there are different ideas of what gives an individual authority or power. There is also historical evidence of an unequal balance between men and women and throughout this thesis I will argue that this is still the case in contemporary society. This unbalance is evident in the ways in which women make use of their bodies in acts such as dieting and pregnancy, how women take on the role of caregivers, and the view of women in leadership positions. I maintain that one of the biggest concerns and contributors to this problem is the subject/object relationship in which women find themselves. In this dichotomy, women find themselves to be a subject and autonomous person while at the same time cognizant of the way they are viewed by others as objects. Within this subject/object dynamic, women become non-subjects and lose their autonomy. A large part of this ongoing relationship is due to the ways in which women use and are expected to use their bodies as well as minds due to social norms that have been passed down through the culture. This can stem from the way women physically maneuver their bodies as well as how others perceive their bodies typically in an inferior or sexualized way. The duality for women as objects is illustrated not only in the way men view women but in how women view other women as well. I will argue that many of the issues surrounding the subject/object dualism can be related back to the ways in which women, throughout their lives, use their bodies. I will illustrate how through the social education of women regarding how to utilize and experience their bodies, women often times lack both in physical ability as well as in leadership roles. I will illustrate how this takes place with young girls and how they maneuver their bodies in regards to physical capabilities. I will then examine the pregnancy process and the ways in which the subject/object relationship manifests due to the female body being seen as a human incubator and a thing that needs medical attention. Finally, I will look at the workplace and the different leadership styles that women are assumed to take as well as the potential resistance that accompanies the challenges to these norms. The types of barriers that are constructed for women to traverse and how those affect the abilities of women to function in a position of power within a university illustrate issues of gender equality for all women. Throughout the thesis, I will explore in detail some of the different barriers that have an impact on women. I argue that barriers have been constructed to hinder women and their perceived abilities within several contexts.

In this paper I attempt to formulate the Christianity-based ecocentric ethics, to answer the ecofeminists' quest to spiritually ground such ethics; I use the living example of the practices of the Catholic ''green sisters''.

Critical Realism, the Capabilities Approach, and Marxism, all have underdeveloped theoretical problems. For Critical Realism, the ceteris paribus clause, which is used to asses an ideological critique, does not properly specify what other things warrant the dismissal or acceptance of said critique. For the Capabilities Approach, a proper ontology or metaphysics is missing, and the claim that the Capabilities Approach can be metaphysically neutral is false. Finally, Marxism is good at describing the more onerous aspects of capitalism (e.g., alienation, exploitation, crisis), but it does not provide normative force for seeing these descriptions as bad. I argue that these three schools of thought, when connected through the ontology of Critical Realism, can be rendered mutually inclusive, and each theory can help address the lacuna in its respective counterpart. Critical Realism gives to Marxism and the Capabilities Approach ontological justification, and the Capabilities Approach gives to Critical Realism and Marxism normative force. And finally, Marxism gives to the Capabilities Approach a more radical, but consistent twist that furthers the goal of realizing our shared human powers.

There are different versions of the ethical approach known as “care ethics”, making care ethics more like a cluster of approaches rather than a singular one. Hence the question is not just whether care ethics is a suitable feminist ethic, but which version(s) of care ethics feminists should endorse. Considering which versions of care ethics are capable of recommending the sort of political activism that is required for progressive political change goes some distance in answering this question. The concern about whether care ethics can recommend the political activism needed for feminist aims arises because such activism exposes those the activist has intimate relationships with to various sorts of harm. I argue that when construed as an ethical theory that incorporates a decision procedure for generating correct conduct, care ethics recommends against the sorts of actions that are required of political activists and for the practical goals of feminists. Construed as an ethical framework that has the more modest concern of providing conceptual orientation and critical tools for interpreting and reflexively interrogating the ethical landscape, however, care ethics can overcome the challenge presented by political activism when including what Bernard Williams calls “ground projects” amongst its available tools. However, because feminist care theorists and others sympathetic with care ethics have criticized aspects of Williams’ account of ground projects, I first respond to these concerns in order to accommodate these criticisms and demonstrate that I am not importing something into care ethics as a framework that does not have a place there.

The goal of this thesis is to influence a re-evaluation of self conceptions in America in order to influence an alternative relational understanding of one’s self and others. This thesis begins based on the premise that individualism is a prominent aspect of American societies meaning its member’s understandings of their selves are self-centered, often non-empathetic, and in general more concerned with their own lives than that of others. The first half of this thesis is dedicated analyzing the American situation through an analysis of the sources of individualism and proving that individualism is actually an illusion that individuals falsely believe in. American Pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead are primarily discussed to offer a more socially oriented understanding of the self that begins the process of this thesis in defending a relational model of selfhood. The second half of this thesis introduces Ancient Chinese philosophy where the relationally constituted model of self is thoroughly fleshed out. An analysis of Confucian and Daoist philosophy is given to explain those traditions unique vocabulary and drastic differences from traditional Western theories of morality and self-understanding. The third half of this thesis uses an hybrid self conception derived from a combination of Pragmatist and Chinese thought to argue the Philosophy For Children (P4C) pedagogical model is the medium in which Americans can learn to re-evaluate their selves starting with educating their children. P4C is shown to be itself a model of relationality where children begin from younger ages to be more other-focused, empathetic, and communally involved.

This thesis attempts to provide a coherent view of the idea of ‘justice as fairness’ and, in particular, the ‘difference principle’ expressed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The main focus of the thesis is the difference principle and its limits. Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ is based on the thought experiment of the ‘original position’ in which people, considered as free and equal, deliberate under an imagined ‘veil of ignorance,’ i.e. not knowing which social roles or status they would occupy in their society. Rawls then argues that in the original position people come up with two major principles of justice, understood as principles that would be acceptable to people treated as free and equal. The second principle entails the so-called ‘difference principle,’ according to which the inequalities of, say, wealth and authority are just and fair only if they lead to compensating benefits for everybody and particularly the least advantaged. The thesis proceeds, then, by probing whether compared with other theories, , including a discussion of Dahl’s theory of democracy, Rawls’s difference principle could be a proper answer to one of the main questions of social justice. The questions is: how the economic fortune in a society should be distributed among citizens. However, despite Rawls’s aim to develop the difference principle as a practical normative theory, it fails to give us a pragmatic answer. The reason is: the statement of the difference principle fails to take into account one crucial point: to wit, the matter of time. The thesis develops two empirical economic scenarios to illustrate that there is a trade-off between the interests of the poor in short and long period of time. However, this important issue is not considered and discussed by Rawls which makes the theory inapplicable.

This thesis addresses primary concepts in the humanitarian intervention debates. I argue that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty. The global community has a moral obligation to act decisively in the face of extreme human rights abuses. There are two contrasting theoretical perspectives regarding international relations and humanitarian intervention: statism and cosmopolitanism. These contrasting perspectives contest the relative value of state sovereignty and human rights. Some of the most prominent ethicists in the debate have determined states have a “right” to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states to halt severe human rights abuses but there is no “duty”to intervene. These conclusions are largely based upon consequentialist considerations. This thesis argues a deontological perspective is essential. References to events Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo are made. There is a critical role for preemptive actions to play in addressing humanitarian crises and calls for global justice.