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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
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Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 311 to 320 of 324 (0.031 seconds)| 311 |
Echoes of Invasion: Cultural Anxieties and Video GamesKeilen, Brian 17 July 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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Indie Game Development : An Interview Study on Game Development and the Free-to-Play Business ModelEngqvist, Pontus January 2024 (has links)
In a fast paced and ever evolving industry where video games have become an important partof consumers' everyday life, game development can be tricky. The process of developmentcontains challenges that can either make or break a game. This study aims to shed some lighton the indie game development process, what challenges it has, how an independent video gamedeveloper would approach this process and to give the reader a greater understanding of whatbusiness models are used within the video game industry.To gather data a semi-structured interview was conducted with indie game developers so thatthey could give their perspective on the process of developing games, the challenges andbusiness models within video game industry. The data was then analyzed using the thematicanalysis approach to find themes and relate the results to what literature had to say about thearea.The conclusion of this study show that indie development usually starts with an idea, which isthen created into an early protype for testing purposes as well as to gather feedback whetherthis idea could become a fully-fledged game. The conclusion also shows that one challengewith using the free-to-play business model is the fact that many game companies have startedusing this specific business model, because of this there is more competition amongst gamesutilizing the business model.
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Les écritures de l'histoire dans les romans québécois de la décennie 1980-1990 / The writing of history in the Quebec novels of the 1980sOllier-Pochart, Elsa 10 July 2012 (has links)
Cette étude propose l’analyse des écritures de l’Histoire à travers un corpus de huit œuvres romanesques publiées au Québec entre 1980 et 1990. Il s’agit de La Tribu et Les Plaines à l’envers de F. Barcelo, de la trilogie des Fils de la liberté de Louis Caron, du Premier jardin de Anne Hébert, de La Maison Trestler ou le 8ème jour d’Amérique de Madeleine Ouellette-Michalska et d’Un dernier blues pour Octobre de Pierre Turgeon. Là où la langue anglaise distingue « history » et « story », le français utilise le vocable « histoire ». Si sa polysémie peut engendrer des confusions, elle peut aussi générer les réflexions qui ont sous-tendu cette analyse. Comment l’histoire raconte-t-elle l’Histoire ? Comment les histoires permettent-elles de réécrire une Histoire plurielle dans le Québec des années 1980 ? Pour répondre à ces questions, trois axes sont développés. Le premier s’attache à analyser les rapports fraternels puis fratricides entre la littérature et l’Histoire, disciplines devenues distinctes au XIXème, puis il propose une réflexion sur le roman historique et les écritures romanesques de l’Histoire. Le deuxième axe présente une mise en regard des discours historique et romanesque au sein des œuvres constitutives du corpus. Enfin, dans une troisième partie, notre réflexion nous conduit à analyser les poétiques québécoises afin de montrer comment ces textes participent, par une réécriture mémorielle, à l’émergence d’une identité collective québécoise en cette fin de XXème siècle. / This study aims at analysing the writing of history through a corpus of eight novels, published in Quebec between 1980 and 1990. The corpus is comprised of La Tribu and Les Plaines à l’envers by F. Barcelo, of Louis Caron’s trilogy Fils de la liberté, of Premier jardin by Anne Hébert, of La Maison Trestler ou le 8ème jour d’Amérique by Madeleine Ouellette-Michalska’s and of Un dernier blues pour Octobre by Pierre Turgeon. While English distinguishes « history » from « story », French uses the single term « histoire ». If that polysemy may cause confusion, it may also generate a reflection, just as the one underlying this analysis: How does a story tell history? How have stories contributed to the rewriting of Quebec’s plural history in the 1980s? Answering these questions will require three main developments. The first part will be an attempt to explain and understand the fraternal yet fratricidal relationship between literature and history, two disciplines which became distinct in the 19th century. Moreover, it proposes a reflection on the historical novel and historical fiction. The second part will be devoted to the comparative study of the historical and narrative discourses within the constituent novels of the corpus. And finally, in a third part, our reflection will lead us to consider Quebec’s poetics, in order to show how –by rewriting memory– those texts have participated in creating Quebec’s collective identity at the very end of the 20th century.
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Kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan : Lätt infanteritaktik under brittiska markoperationerna i FalklandskrigetBlysa, Gustav January 2013 (has links)
Denna undersökning har studerat ett lätt infanteriförbands användning av kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan under en amfibieoperation samt vilka aspekter som påverkade möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning p.g.a. operationens amfibiska karaktär. Fallet har utgjorts av Parachute Regiments två bataljoner som under Falklandskriget utkämpade tre slag vid Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon och Wireless Ridge. Som analysverktyg har använts Robert Leonhards teori om den kombinerade bekämpningens tre principer. Indikatorer på principerna har varit syften med verkan hämtade ur teorin om de grundläggande förmågorna. Två av slagen befanns endast delvis kännetecknas av Leonhards två första principer, principerna om kompletterande system och dilemman. Den tredje principen om fördelaktig terräng uppfylldes inte. Det tredje slaget regementet utkämpade kännetecknades helt igenom av Leonhards två första principer medan den tredje delvis beaktades. Undersökningen konstaterar att kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan kan utvecklas av ett lätt infanteriförband under en amfibieoperation. Dock ledde ofördelaktig disponering av förbandet i de aktuella fallen till att kombinerad bekämpning tidvis omöjliggjordes. Leonhards tredje princip tenderade att förringas. De specifikt amfibiska aspekterna avseende möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning utgjordes främst av tillgången till fartygsartilleri, kraven på helikoptertransporterbart fältartilleri samt bristen på lätta trossfordon. / This dissertation has investigated how a light infantry force has used combined arms during an amphibious operation, specific factors related to the operations character affecting the possibility to develop combined arms have also been highlighted. The case chosen for the study was Parachute Regiments actions during the three battles of Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge during the Falklands War. As a analytical tool Robert Leonhard’s theory about the three principles of combined arms was used together with indicators borrowed from the theory about the warfighting functions purposes of fires. Two of the battles were found to be only partially characterized by Leonhard’s first two principles, complementary systems and dilemmas. The third principle about favorable terrain was neglected. The third battle was throughout characterized by the first two principles and to a larger extent than the former by the third principle. The dissertation concludes that light infantry can use combined arms during amphibious operations. The battles studied were, however, often characterized by unfavorable disposition of the force which affected the possibilities to use combined arms. Leonhard´s third principle was usually neglected. The most important amphibious aspects affecting the possibilities to combined arms were found to be naval gunfire support, light field artillery and the scarcity of light all-terrain vehicles.
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The battle of changing times : picaresque parodies from Bruegel to GroszCornew, Clive 11 1900 (has links)
This study focuses on Bruegel's parodic legacy in the picaresque tradition. It is based, on the one hand, on
visual rhetoric, visual parody, and the poetics of epideictic rhetoric; and, on the other, on the interaction
between epideictic rhetoric's salient features and the Bruegelian themes of camivalisation, the satirising of
human folly, and the ontic order of the World Upside Down topos as organising principles. The relationships
between the above themes are chronologically traced in various disguises in pictures by representative
picaresque artists from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries: i.e., in Bruegel, Steen, Hogarth, Daumier, and
Grosz. Each of these picaresque artists battled with their own times, parodying the paradigmatic targets of the
high mode, in both social and genre hierarchy, and in doing so revealed the complexities of the above themes
at work within an ever changing context-bound rhetoricity. / Art History, Visual Arts & Musicology / Thesis (D.Litt. et Phil.)
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"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. 31 July 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. 31 July 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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| 318 |
The battle of changing times : picaresque parodies from Bruegel to GroszCornew, Clive 11 1900 (has links)
This study focuses on Bruegel's parodic legacy in the picaresque tradition. It is based, on the one hand, on
visual rhetoric, visual parody, and the poetics of epideictic rhetoric; and, on the other, on the interaction
between epideictic rhetoric's salient features and the Bruegelian themes of camivalisation, the satirising of
human folly, and the ontic order of the World Upside Down topos as organising principles. The relationships
between the above themes are chronologically traced in various disguises in pictures by representative
picaresque artists from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries: i.e., in Bruegel, Steen, Hogarth, Daumier, and
Grosz. Each of these picaresque artists battled with their own times, parodying the paradigmatic targets of the
high mode, in both social and genre hierarchy, and in doing so revealed the complexities of the above themes
at work within an ever changing context-bound rhetoricity. / Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology / Thesis (D.Litt. et Phil.)
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| 319 |
"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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Counter Revolutionary Programs: Social Catholicism and the CristerosNewcomer, Daniel 20 April 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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