Objetivamos analisar a construção do conceito de inimigo representado nos discursos de Osama bin Laden, durante o período de 1996 a 2004. Estes inimigos são constituídos a partir da edificação de uma realidade que apresenta Estados Unidos, Israel e seus aliados, como opressores dos muçulmanos. A fim de melhor compreender esta construção simbólica, buscaremos estudá-la com base na dinâmica de dois eixos fundamentais para a constituição do pensamento político-religioso de bin Laden: a herança teórica do islamismo radical, conjugada com a sua percepção acerca dos principais eventos geopolíticos contemporâneos envolvendo o mundo muçulmano. Dentro desta perspectiva, empregaremos o construtivismo em sua corrente linguística dos autores Nicholas Onuf e François Debrix como arcabouço teórico. Nos guiaremos pela prerrogativa de que a compreensão do mundo e da realidade ocorre de acordo com o modo como nós nos referimos a eles a partir de nossa linguagem. Como referencial metodológico que orientará nosso exame da construção do conceito de inimigo nos discursos de bin Laden, utilizaremos as categorias de operação da ideologia propostas por John Thompson na obra “Ideologia e Cultura Moderna – Teoria Social Crítica na Era dos Meios de Comunicação”. / We aimed to analyze the construction of the concept of enemy represented in Osama bin Laden‟s speeches, during the period 1996 to 2004. These enemies are making from the building of a reality that presents U.S., Israel and its allies, as oppressors of muslims. To better understand this symbolic construction, we will seek to study it based on the dynamics of two pillars for the constitution of bin Laden's politico-religious thought: the theoretical heritage of radical islam, combined with the author's perception about the main events contemporary geopolitical involving the muslim world. From this perspective, we will employ the Linguistic Constructivism of the authors Nicholas Onuf and François Debrix, as theoretical framework. We will be guided by the prerogative of the understanding of the world and reality occurs according to the way we refer to them from our language. As a methodological framework that will guide our examination of the construction of the concept of enemy in bin Laden's speeches, we will use the categories of operation of ideology proposed by John Thompson in his work "Ideology and Modern Culture - Critical Social Theory in the Era of the Media."

Objetivamos analisar a construção do conceito de inimigo representado nos discursos de Osama bin Laden, durante o período de 1996 a 2004. Estes inimigos são constituídos a partir da edificação de uma realidade que apresenta Estados Unidos, Israel e seus aliados, como opressores dos muçulmanos. A fim de melhor compreender esta construção simbólica, buscaremos estudá-la com base na dinâmica de dois eixos fundamentais para a constituição do pensamento político-religioso de bin Laden: a herança teórica do islamismo radical, conjugada com a sua percepção acerca dos principais eventos geopolíticos contemporâneos envolvendo o mundo muçulmano. Dentro desta perspectiva, empregaremos o construtivismo em sua corrente linguística dos autores Nicholas Onuf e François Debrix como arcabouço teórico. Nos guiaremos pela prerrogativa de que a compreensão do mundo e da realidade ocorre de acordo com o modo como nós nos referimos a eles a partir de nossa linguagem. Como referencial metodológico que orientará nosso exame da construção do conceito de inimigo nos discursos de bin Laden, utilizaremos as categorias de operação da ideologia propostas por John Thompson na obra “Ideologia e Cultura Moderna – Teoria Social Crítica na Era dos Meios de Comunicação”. / We aimed to analyze the construction of the concept of enemy represented in Osama bin Laden‟s speeches, during the period 1996 to 2004. These enemies are making from the building of a reality that presents U.S., Israel and its allies, as oppressors of muslims. To better understand this symbolic construction, we will seek to study it based on the dynamics of two pillars for the constitution of bin Laden's politico-religious thought: the theoretical heritage of radical islam, combined with the author's perception about the main events contemporary geopolitical involving the muslim world. From this perspective, we will employ the Linguistic Constructivism of the authors Nicholas Onuf and François Debrix, as theoretical framework. We will be guided by the prerogative of the understanding of the world and reality occurs according to the way we refer to them from our language. As a methodological framework that will guide our examination of the construction of the concept of enemy in bin Laden's speeches, we will use the categories of operation of ideology proposed by John Thompson in his work "Ideology and Modern Culture - Critical Social Theory in the Era of the Media."

Objetivamos analisar a construção do conceito de inimigo representado nos discursos de Osama bin Laden, durante o período de 1996 a 2004. Estes inimigos são constituídos a partir da edificação de uma realidade que apresenta Estados Unidos, Israel e seus aliados, como opressores dos muçulmanos. A fim de melhor compreender esta construção simbólica, buscaremos estudá-la com base na dinâmica de dois eixos fundamentais para a constituição do pensamento político-religioso de bin Laden: a herança teórica do islamismo radical, conjugada com a sua percepção acerca dos principais eventos geopolíticos contemporâneos envolvendo o mundo muçulmano. Dentro desta perspectiva, empregaremos o construtivismo em sua corrente linguística dos autores Nicholas Onuf e François Debrix como arcabouço teórico. Nos guiaremos pela prerrogativa de que a compreensão do mundo e da realidade ocorre de acordo com o modo como nós nos referimos a eles a partir de nossa linguagem. Como referencial metodológico que orientará nosso exame da construção do conceito de inimigo nos discursos de bin Laden, utilizaremos as categorias de operação da ideologia propostas por John Thompson na obra “Ideologia e Cultura Moderna – Teoria Social Crítica na Era dos Meios de Comunicação”. / We aimed to analyze the construction of the concept of enemy represented in Osama bin Laden‟s speeches, during the period 1996 to 2004. These enemies are making from the building of a reality that presents U.S., Israel and its allies, as oppressors of muslims. To better understand this symbolic construction, we will seek to study it based on the dynamics of two pillars for the constitution of bin Laden's politico-religious thought: the theoretical heritage of radical islam, combined with the author's perception about the main events contemporary geopolitical involving the muslim world. From this perspective, we will employ the Linguistic Constructivism of the authors Nicholas Onuf and François Debrix, as theoretical framework. We will be guided by the prerogative of the understanding of the world and reality occurs according to the way we refer to them from our language. As a methodological framework that will guide our examination of the construction of the concept of enemy in bin Laden's speeches, we will use the categories of operation of ideology proposed by John Thompson in his work "Ideology and Modern Culture - Critical Social Theory in the Era of the Media."

Militant Islamism is a phenomenon that has received significant attention during the lastdecades. Security scholars and policymakers have attempted to cope with the growingconcern of sympathizers willing to carry out terrorist attacks, but until today the need for afurther understanding of circumstances motivating this violence still remains. This causesdifficulties in effective policy responses to tackle militants as well as it strengthens hatredand equivocal perceptions on Islamic practices. This thesis is constituted on the idea that charismatic leadership partakes in the motivationalforces behind militant sympathizers. The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship ofself-concepts provided by charismatic leadership theory towards the contents exposed bymilitant leaders within Islamism. This relationship is examined in an analytical study ofspeeches through the cases of two former representative and inspirational leaders of militantIslamism: Osama Bin Laden and Anwar Al Awlaki. The idea is to contribute with a motivational account that is also sensitive to the context ofthis specific leadership based on past research. Remarks are thus exposed through aframework of concepts by Boas Shamir in charismatic leadership and the assisting tools of aqualitative content analysis. A deeper comprehension of how charismatic leadershipfunctions is significant for the future of policies in Islamist militancy and leadership.Following results indicates to pursue the joint study of Islamist militancy in relation tocharismatic response for more conclusive research.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.1 Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim¿s duty ¿to kill the Americans and their allies ¿ civilians and military ¿ ... in any country in which it is possible to do it.¿ Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that ¿nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food¿ has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as 1 bin Laden, Osama; al-Zawahiri, Ayman; Taha, Abu-Yasir Rifa¿i Ahmad; Hamzah, Mir; Rahman, Fazlul, 1998, ¿Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyin¿ (¿Declaraton of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders¿), al-Quds al-Arabi (UK) 9(2732), 23 Feb.: 3, <data.alquds.co.uk/Alquds/1998/02Feb/23%2520Feb% 2520Mon/QudsPage03.pdf>. Cornell University Library hosts an English translation and a photocopy of the original at <www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm> and <./fatw2.htm>, respectively (all web addresses as at 27 Jan. 2005). examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, ¿dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;¿ the continued bombing of Iraq ¿even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;¿ and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group¿s true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda¿s real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan¿s Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby¿s The Ambivalence of the Sacred,2 that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious ¿ or, as I came to think of myself, a secular ¿ person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, 2 Appleby, R. Scott, 2000, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield). I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden¿s arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden¿s words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the ¿war on terror¿ ¿ which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to ¿rethink secular and sacred¿ ¿ both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word ¿tolerance¿ itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs.3 Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting. By itself, tolerance does not encourage one to rethink one¿s relationship with something, and thus a nonconfrontational situation is not necessarily a peaceful one. As I researched the thesis, although I was aware of academic work concerning tolerance, I found that none of it contributed to my goals. Thus, the thesis took shape in such a way that a treatment of tolerance was unnecessary. As a final note I would like to mention another topic that did not fit into this thesis, which I regard as something of a loss ¿ gender. During my research, I was also aware of work in this field, and, again, the structure of this thesis is such that it was not necessary to mention it explicitly. However, if there is one single issue that cuts across religious and secular groups, as well as the conflicts I analyze, it is the effect of gender roles and issues. Yet the very breadth of the topic put me in a bind ¿ either I could thoroughly treat it and produce a much different thesis, or I could cursorily treat it, perhaps in the chapter on theory and methodology. I chose to do neither, because the first option would have obscured the value that this thesis does have, and the second would have been a paltry treatment of such a weighty topic. However, the theoretical schools I use 3 See, for example, the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1st 1933), Simpson, J.A., and Weiner, E.S.C., co-eds., in. al. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989), v. 18, pp. 199-200. in this thesis are amenable to a gendered interpretation. This is particularly the case with integral theory, the chief proponent of which, Ken Wilber, has addressed gender issues in a number of his primary works. One can easily discern what I define in this thesis as a strong-open analysis in his analysis of feminisms. He notes both the strength of the radical feminist perspective that champions female distinctiveness as well as the desire of liberal feminists to open social and political spheres traditionally closed to women, and seeks to bring them together.4 Thus, I am confident that this thesis can bolster future research that specifically addresses gender issues as they arise in conflicts with a religious element.

2001年9月11日發生在美國本土的自殺式恐怖襲擊事件之後，當時的小布希總統堅決宣示展開全面性「全球反恐怖主義戰爭」（Global War on Terrorism）。美國不僅以其強大的軍事力量，對付支持及庇護蓋達組織及其分支的國家，也與各國合作共同打擊恐怖主義。由於這是一場與傳統戰爭迥然不同的鬥爭，因此美國反恐的策略不但依賴軍事武力，還必須透過政治、外交、情報、金融與教育等多元途徑，並靈活運用國際的力量，徹底打擊恐怖主義。其中情報工作在反恐戰爭中扮演著非常重要的角色，因為恐怖分子在發動任何攻擊之前，可能會有些徵兆，若在事先能獲得蛛絲馬跡的情報，就能夠防患未然並且將危機消弭於無形。 在國際方面，9/11反而促成各國的合作，美國情報單位在這場反恐戰爭中也被賦予重要的任務，將反恐情報合作的觸角伸向全世界各個角落。由於美國與各國的合作程度影響全球打擊恐怖主義的成效，故有必要對美國主導的國際情報合作進行研究。美國在國際間致力反恐情報合作之際，同時也對其國內情報機制進行改革與重整。因為9/11的發生，很多人歸咎於國內情報單位的失職，美國政府於是開始對其情報圈，展開自杜魯門總統於1947年7月26日簽署《國家安全法案》以來，最重大的改革。因此也有必要對美國在9/11後的情報改革進行探討，以瞭解美國在此事件後所進行的國內情報改革情形及成效。 / In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, the U.S. President George W. Bush launched the “Global War on Terrorism”. The U.S. has fight against countries that support Al-Qaeda and its affiliate with powerful military strength and cooperated with various countries on combat terrorism. This is a disparately untraditional war and consequently America’s counterterrorism strategy is multi-faceted that includes not only military but also diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, education, etc. Intelligence, in particular, plays a pivotal role in this war. Signs of terrorist threat may be discovered and attacks can possibly be prevented if intelligence agencies received information about the plots in advance. The September 11 attacks have facilitated bilateral and multilateral cooperation between countries in the globe. The U.S. especially undertakes great responsibilities in fighting against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and attaches strings to its counter terrorism cooperation around the world. Since the strength of the cooperative movement between the U.S. and other countries may affect the outcome of the global cooperation, conducting a study on the U.S.-led international intelligence cooperation is critical. While endeavoring to enhance international intelligence cooperation on anti-terrorism, the U.S. has conducted reform and adjustment of the domestic intelligence community. Owing to its intelligence failure on the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government initiated the greatest reform on intelligence mechanism since the former President Truman had signed the National Security Act of 1947. Therefore, study on and analysis of the results and achievement of the U.S. intelligence reform after the September 11 attacks is a must-do.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Terrorism is the principal threat to global and national security in the post-11 September world. Facing terrorist threats at home and abroad, the United States has declared counterterrorism its top priority. As the United States embarks on its global counterterrorism campaign, it must draw on the experience of other countries. Specifically India, with an extensive history of counterterrorism efforts, can reveal important lessons applicable to America's endeavors. India offers three primary examples of counterterrorism strategies: Punjab, its northeast region, and Kashmir, from which four findings emerge. First, aggressive military operations are central to beating terrorism. Second, economic and social development programs, though not enough to end terrorism alone, are essential components of the larger national strategy. Third, terrorism cannot be stopped without international assistance. Terror networks export personnel, knowledge, weapons and money across international boundaries with growing frequency. This cannot be effectively stopped without a coordinated national and international effort. Fourth, to be successful, a counterterrorism strategy must engender the public's support for the government and promulgate a sense of public ownership to the conflict. By applying these lessons from the Indian case study, America's efforts to end terrorism both domestically and internationally will be significantly more productive. / Captain, United States Air Force

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Tal och texter kan innehålla så mycket; både uppenbara budskap och det som finns mellan raderna. Jag tror att vi kan lära oss mycket genom att ta del av andra människors ord och begrepp. Genom de begrepp vi använder uttrycker vi våra värderingar – det vi ser som bra och dåligt, viktigt och oviktigt. Människor i Västvärlden har genom historien generellt representerat ett idéarv som kan sägas vara specifikt för just Västvärlden. Ett sätt att tänka, se och tolka världen, som skiljer sig från människor i Öst. Annorlunda i Östs ögon. Och i Västs ögon är det Öst som är annorlunda. Där har man i generationer istället formulerat och omfamnat andra sätt att tänka, se och tolka världen. Ingen av dessa diskurser har förstås något självklart tolkningsföreträde och ingen kan ensam göra anspråk på sanningen. Men en tydlig konflikt existerar mellan de olika världsbilderna. Och den blir synlig bland annat i valen av ord och begrepp. Ord som frihet, framsteg, lydnad och rättvisa kan skapa olika associationer hos människor i Öst och Väst. Bakom orden och begreppen döljer sig de värderingar som är förhärskande i respektive diskurs. Jag har tittat närmare på några sådana värderingar för att se om de kan ge svar på frågor om orsakerna till konflikterna mellan Öst och Väst. Jag har härlett dessa värderingar bakåt i tiden för att komma åt de idéarv som två av diskurserna bygger på. Det är två diskurser med djupa rötter i historien – till synes oförenliga. Båda säger sig ha det rätta perspektivet och ofta även lösningar på världens problem. Men de tycks tala förbi varandra och se på varandra genom ett slags filter av fördomar, förutfattade meningar och oförsonlighet. När jag zoomat in några av dessa diskursers företrädare har jag sett att de båda diskurserna går att förstå och förklara genom att tillämpa teorier från idéhistorien. Jag har med hjälp av teorier om orientalism och occidentalism velat sätta fokus på politiska hållningar som kan uppfattas som ”extrema” och till synes liberala uppfattningar. Men vad är egentligen vad? Kan Usama Bin Laden hylla kärleken? Kan Tony Blair kräva lydnad? Det är angeläget att söka förståelse för de historiska sammanhang som ofta förblir outtalade eller ensidiga men som har betydelse för vår samtid. Jag är intresserad av hur Väst och Öst talar till och förhåller sig till varandra, med varandra och mot varandra. Med denna uppsats hoppas jag kunna bidra till lite större klarhet och insikt i den språkförbistring som orsakar konflikter i världen.