This thesis Collective Actions of the UN Security Council for the Protection of Human Rights deals with, as the title suggests, collective actions for the protection of human rights with the mandate of the UN Security Council. The thesis is divided into an introduction, conclusion, and four chapters. In the first chapter, the system of human rights protection is described, as it was set up within the newly-formed United Nations after World War II. This chapter also deals with collective actions of the UN Security Council, with or without the use of force, on a theoretical level, e.g. their authorization and possibility of measures that can be taken within the UN system against the perpetrator. Second chapter deals with examples of collective actions of the UN Security Council during the Cold War period. In this era, collective actions of the UN Security Council were authorized only twice, in case of South Africa as a reaction to their policy of apartheid, and in case of South Rhodesia as a reaction to the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority government. Both cases are described in the chapter. The following chapter describes the development of human rights theories after the end of Cold War. With the end of the bipolar system, there is a shift in the perception of human...

This thesis tries to prove a functioning of the Blue Ocean Strategy on the case of Europen low-cost air transport. Through the Blue Ocean Strategy´s Analytical Tools and Frameworks, specifically with the help of the Strategy Canvas, the Four Actions Framework and the Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid, it is proven that the strategy introduced by the airline Ryanair in the nineties of the twentieth century corresponds to the Blue Ocean Strategy. Through the same Analytical Tools and Frameworks and a comparison of business models of three low-cost airlines also the time validity of the Blue Ocean Strategy is proven in this case. The functioning of the Blue Ocean Strategy on the case of European low-cost air transport was verified.

Les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général en droit de l’Union européenne sont des intérêts permettant la justification de restrictions aux différentes libertés de circulation. Ces raisons impérieuses sont donc un mode de justification. Un mode de justification essentiellement prétorien car c’est la Cour de justice qui l’a théorisé. Elle a instauré ces raisons dans l’arrêt Cassis de Dijon, étendu leur application à toutes les libertés de circulation et encadré cette application. Ainsi, ces raisons impérieuses sont soumises à la volonté de la Cour et à ses incertitudes. Par conséquent, si la jurisprudence est incertaine concernant les intérêts qualifiés de raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général voire contradictoire à propos des conditions liées aux raisons impérieuses, les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général sont un mode de justification par essence prétorien. D’ailleurs, si certains textes de droit de l’Union européenne reprennent la théorie élaborée par la Cour de justice, ils restent vraiment fidèles à la jurisprudence. Ces textes, aussi bien de droit primaire que de droit dérivé, reprennent des éléments essentiels de la théorie des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général et notamment les conditions élaborées par la Cour. Ces textes copient aussi les imperfections prétoriennes concernant la théorie des raisons impérieuses. On va même jusqu’à avoir une frontière entre les raisons impérieuses et les autres modes de justification tout aussi floue dans les textes que dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. Ainsi, malgré la reprise de la théorie des raisons impérieuses dans des textes, ce mode de justification reste par essence jurisprudentiel. / The mandatory requirements in the European Union law are reasons who can justify restrictions to the differents freedom of movements. So, those mandatory requirements are a justification method. An essentially jurisprudential justification method because it is the Court of justice who theorized it. It established thoses reasons in the Cassis de Dijon case, extended their application to every free movements and regulated their application. So, those mandatory requirements are also subject to the will of the Court and to its uncertainties. Therefore, if the jurisprudence is uncertain about interests named as mandatory requirements and even conflicting about its conditions, the mandatory requirements are an essentially jurisprudential justification method. Although, if some European Union law texts resume the jurisprudential made theory, they are truly loyal to the jurisprudence. Those texts, both primary and secondary law, pick up essential elements of the theory, in particular the conditions created by the Court. But those texts also copy the Courts imperfections about the theory. They even have a border between mandatory requirements and other justification methods equally blurred in the texts and in the jurisprudence. Thus, despite the retake of the theory of mandatory requirements in texts, this justification method stays essentially jurisprudential.

L’application extraterritoriale de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés soulève la question du rôle du principe de territorialité dans la détermination de l’étendue des droits constitutionnels. De façon plus générale, elle soulève la question du rapport entre territoire et droit. Cette thèse explore, dans un premier temps, les jalons de la méthodologie territorialiste en abordant les prémisses qui sous-tendent l’ascension du principe de territorialité comme paradigme juridique dominant. Les anomalies de ce paradigme sont par la suite présentées, de façon à illustrer un affaiblissement du principe de territorialité. Par la suite, l’auteure entreprend de déterminer le rôle du principe de territorialité dans l’établissement de l’espace occupé par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés en situation d’extraterritorialité. Les développements jurisprudentiels récents attestent de la prédominance du paradigme territorial, mais de nombreuses difficultés d’application sont rencontrées. Après avoir testé la viabilité de ce paradigme, l’auteure entreprend de définir un nouveau cadre analytique permettant de répondre à la question de l’application de la Charte en situation d’extraterritorialité sans se référer à la position géographique du demandeur, ni à son appartenance à une certaine communauté politique pré-déterminée. Ce cadre repose sur une conceptualisation de la notion d’autorité étatique transcendant l’exercice d’un pouvoir coercitif de l’État fixé à l’intérieur de ses limites territoriales. Une autorité relationnelle, qui s’appuie sur l’idée que tout pouvoir étatique tire sa source de la Constitution et, conséquemment, doit être assujetti à son contrôle. / This thesis is about the relationship between law and territory, and more particularly, about the relationship between the principle of territoriality and the scope of Charter rights. The author first introduces territoriality as dominant legal paradigm and analyses its underlying premises. The challenges that territoriality and methodological territorialism have recently faced are also examined. The purpose of the first part of this thesis is to show that the territorial paradigm is not immune to challenge, and to provide conceptual tools to get out of the “territorial trap”. The author then looks at how, and to what extent, territoriality currently shapes the scope of Charter rights. By analysing cases on point, the author concludes that although territoriality is, officially, the answer to the question of the scope of Charter rights, in practice, the principle does not provide sufficient guidance to the judiciary. The territorial principle’s normative weaknesses are added to its practical inability to determine the scope of Charter rights. In order to examine potential alternatives to the territorial principle, the author examines the parallel debate regarding the extraterritorial scope of American constitutional rights. American courts, rather than endorsing strict territoriaity, emphasize either the membership of the claimant (the subject of constitutional litigation), the limitations on state actions (the object of constitutional litigation), or pragmatic concerns in order to determine whether a constitutional protection applies in an extraterritorial context. The author then proceeds to examining how an alternative model could be developed in Canada in the context of extraterritorial Charter cases. She argues that the personal entitlement approach, when superimposed on the territorial paradigm, brings more injustice, not less, in that people can be sufficiently related to Canada to trigger a state action, but insufficiently connected to trigger Charter protection, hence creating a state of asymmetry. She also argues that territoriality, if understood in Westphalian terms, leads to the belief that a state action is not an action within the authority of the Canadian government if it is conducted outside of Canada, hence shielding these actions from constitutional srcutiny. The model the author advocates is based on a notion of relational authority and it seeks to emphasize not the place where a government act is performed, nor the identity of the persons subject to it, but the idea that any exercise of government power is potentially amenable to constitutional scrutiny.

The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.

This thesis defines the most important transport documents used in the carriage of goods by sea. It describes the way how they are used and the functions they perform. The main emphasis is focused on the bill of lading which is mostly used in the liner shipping and on the Charter Party, which is the basis of the realization of the tramp shipping. The thesis gives a comprehensive overview of a complicated international legislation of the liability relations in the maritime transport, which are differently regulated in the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg rules at present. There is also provided a basic overview of the maritime transport risks and the possibility of their coverage in order to reduce the negative impact of eventual damages.

La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne a acquis une force juridique contraignante depuis l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne. Les institutions européennes et les Etats membres lorsqu’ils mettent en oeuvre le droit de l’Union européenne sont donc liés par ses dispositions. Mais les autorités publiques ne devraient pas être les seules à être soumises au respect des droits et libertés qu’elle garantit. En effet, les particuliers, parce qu’ils peuvent, à l’instar des pouvoirs publics, attenter aux droits primordiaux de leurs semblables, devraient également être tenus de respecter cet instrument juridique lorsqu’ils se trouvent placés dans une situation régie par le droit de l’Union européenne. Autrement dit, la Charte des droits fondamentaux devrait déployer des effets juridiques dans le cadre des relations de droit privé lorsqu’il existe un lien de rattachement avec le droit de l’Union européenne. Cet effet horizontal permettrait ainsi aux particuliers de jouir effectivement des droits et libertés consacrés par la Charte. On attend donc des autorités publiques, conformément à leurs obligations positives, qu’elles protègent les droits que les particuliers tirent de cet instrument juridique. La reconnaissance de l’effet réflexe de la Charte des droits fondamentaux aura ainsi pour conséquence de créer des obligations tant pour les institutions européennes et les Etats membres que pour les personnes privées. / The Charter of fundamental rights has acquired a binding legal force since the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, the institutions of the European Union and member states when they implement the law of the European Union are bound by the provisions of the Charter. But the addressees of this legal instrument should not be only public authorities. Individuals, whenever it could impinge on freedoms and basic rights, should be subject, to compliance with the Charter when the matter falling the scope of EU law. In other words, the Charter of fundamental rights should have legal effects in private law relations when there is a connecting link to EU law. Horizontal effect would allow individuals to have full enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Charter. Public authorities must therefore, in keeping with their positive obligations, protect the rights derive from the provisions of this legal instrument. Therefore, the recognition of horizontal effect of the Charter will create obligations for both institutions of European Union and member states and private persons.

Si l’idée de la création d’une cour régionale de protection des droits de l’Homme remonte à 1961, elle ne s’est concrétisée qu’en 1998 avec l’adoption du protocole de Ouagadougou créant la Cour africaine des droits de l’Homme et des peuples. Cette juridiction vient compléter le mandat de la Commission africaine des droits de l’Homme et des peuples. Elle s’inscrit dans la lignée de ses homologues européenne et américaine et joue un rôle essentiel dans l’effectivité de la protection régionale des droits de l’Homme. De ce fait, l’étude de cette juridiction à la lumière de l’expérience européenne a pour but de mettre en exergue les particularités de cette cour tout en démontrant qu’elle a su adapter les standards internationaux en la matière, particulièrement les normes découlant du procès équitable. Il reste toutefois que sa compétence demeure ainsi singulière à bien des égards. Les États africains ont fait preuve de pragmatisme dans l’établissement de cette cour et n’ont pas opéré un mimétisme aveugle avec le modèle de la CEDH. Depuis son premier arrêt en 2009, la cour africaine a rendu des arrêts au fond qui apportent des précisions utiles tant sur les questions d’ordre procédural que sur le contenu des droits protégés. Cependant, elle reste confrontée à des défis qui menacent son avenir. La cristallisation des relations avec la CPI et l’incertitude de la création d’une cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme sont manifestement problématiques. La multiplicité des juridictions régionales ayant pour objectif l'intégration économique, mais pouvant statuer sur des questions relatives aux droits de l'Homme, soulève également un certain nombre d’interrogations / If the idea of creating a regional human rights court dates back to 1961, it became a reality in 1998, when the Ouagadougou Protocol establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples' rights (African Court) was adopted.This court complements the mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights. It is fully in line with its European and American counterparts and has undoubtedly a role to play in the effectiveness of the regional protection of human rights.Therefore, the study of this court, in the light of the European experience, aims to highlight the features of this court while demonstrating that it meets international standards in this area, particularly the standards derived under fair trial. His extended competence, whether contentious or advisory is unique in many ways.African states have demonstrated pragmatism in the establishment of this regional court and have not made a blind imitation with the model of the European Court of Human Rights. Since its first judgment in 2009, the African Court delivered judgment on the merits which provide information on both procedural issues and the content of the protected rights. Of course, challenges remain to be addressed. The crystallization of the relations with the International Criminal Court and the subsequent uncertainty about the creation of an African Court of Justice and Human Rights are clearly problematic. The multiplicity of regional courts whose main objective is economic integration, but who can also rule on questions relating to human rights, also raises a number of questions

Le système arabe des droits de l’homme repose, pour l’essentiel, sur un traité international, la Charte arabe des droits de l’homme. Il est institué, en vertu de ladite Charte, un Comité arabe des droits de l’homme qui surveille et contrôle l’application des obligations incombant aux États parties à la Charte. Malgré sa mise en place tardive (2004) par rapport à d’autres systèmes régionaux de protection des droits de l’homme, il s’est avéré que cette Charte est unique en son genre. Elle combine des droits divins et naturels et verrouille, de par le contenu des dispositions liminaires et finales de la Charte, sa propre évolution. Elle présente des traits qui, dans l’ordre international, n’appartiennent qu’à elle. En s’écartant du modèle des Pactes onusiens, la Charte ne consacre non seulement des droits en régression par rapport à ceux garantis dans lesdits Pactes, mais aussi des droits rédigés en termes ambigus dont la transposition dans l’ordre interne des États parties élargira encore le creuset jusqu’à rendre incertain l’efficacité de cette Charte.En somme, la Charte en elle-même, ainsi que son application, sont loin, pour le moment, de renforcer les normes universelles des droits de l’homme ou même de les maintenir à cause du caractère global du niveau de protection, qui est inférieur à celui des standards internationaux. Il est vrai que l’affirmation par la Ligue des États arabes des droits et libertés est une chose et que la garantie du respect de ces droits en est une autre. Or, en matière de droits de l’homme, la justiciabilité de la règle conditionne l’efficacité de la garantie et de sa sanction. L’analyse du système arabe de protection des droits de l’homme a conduit à constater qu’il ne satisfait pas à cette condition, contrairement à d’autres systèmes régionaux. D’où l’urgence de reformuler le texte de la Charte arabe dans une optique de mise en conformité aux normes internationales des droits de l’homme. / The Arab human rights system relies essentially upon an international convention, the Arab Charter on human rights. An Arab human rights Committee in set up under the Charter that supervises and monitors the implementation of Charter obligations by States parties. Despite its late establishment (2004) compared to other regional systems of human rights protection, the Charter has proved to be unique in its kind. The Charter combines divine and natural rights and, by means of its general and final provisions, succeeds in curtailing its own future development. Some features of the Charter are original compared to what one finds in other international instruments. As for that, the Charter deviates from United Nations conventional standards, as it enshrines several human rights in somewhat regressive or ambiguous forms. Transposition of these rights into domestic law is expected to further widen discrepancies with United Nations human rights standards and render as a whole the efficiency of the Charter quite uncertain.In other words, the Charter itself and its implementation are far, for the time being, from strengthening universal human rights, or even maintaining for them a level of global protection near to that prevailing in accepted international standards. It is notable to address that it is one thing for the Arab League to affirm human rights, and quite another to guarantee those rights. Yet, in the human rights field, the efficiency and coerciveness of the norm is conditioned to the possibility of some kind of effective judicial review. The assessment of the Arab human rights system prompts to assert that this requirement is only poorly met, in contrast with other human rights regional systems. Hence, the urgency to revise the text of the Arab Charter on human rights in a perspective aiming at guaranteeing its progressive compliance with international human rights standards.