El problema de valores propios (tambien llamado de autovalores, o eigenvalues) esta presente en diversas tareas cienficas a traves de la resolucion de ecuaciones diferenciales, analisis de modelos y calculos de funciones matriciales, entre otras muchas aplicaciones. Si los problemas son de dimension moderada (menor a 106), pueden ser abordados mediante los llamados metodos directos, como el algoritmo iterativo QR o el metodo de divide y vencerlas. Sin embargo, si el problema es de gran dimension y solo se requieren unas pocas soluciones (comparado con el tama~no del problema) y con un cierto grado de aproximacion, los metodos iterativos pueden resultar mas eficientes. Ademas los metodos iterativos pueden ofrecer mejores prestaciones en arquitecturas de altas prestaciones, como las de memoria distribuida, en las que existen un cierto numero de nodos computacionales con espacio de memoria propios y solo pueden compartir informacion y sincronizarse mediante el paso de mensajes. Esta tesis aborda la implementacion de metodos de tipo Davidson, destacando Generalized Davidson y Jacobi-Davidson, una clase de metodos iterativos que puede ser competitiva en casos especialmente dificiles como calcular valores propios en el interior del espectro o cuando la factorizacion de matrices es prohibitiva o ineficiente, y solo es posible una factorizacion aproximada. La implementacion se desarrolla en SLEPc (Scalable Library for Eigenvalue Problem Computations), libreria libre destacada en la resolucion de problemas de gran tama~no de valores propios, problemas cuadraticos de valores propios y problemas de valores singulares, entre otros. A su vez, SLEPc se desarrolla bajo el marco de PETSc (Portable, Extensible Toolkit for Scientic Computation), que ofrece implementaciones eficientes de operaciones basicas del algebra lineal, como operaciones con matrices y vectores, resolucion aproximada de sistemas lineales, factorizaciones exactas y aproximadas de matrices, etc. / Romero Alcalde, E. (2012). Parallel implementation of Davidson-type methods for large-scale eigenvalue problems [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/15188

Compilation of two papers, the first of which was accepted for publication in the South African Journal of Philosophy in the second half of 2001. / Why metaphors have no meaning : considering metaphoric meaning in Davidson. -- Bare idea of a conceptual scheme : relativism, intercultural communication and Davidson. / Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Since the publication of Donald Davidson's essay 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - in which he famously asserts that metaphor has no meaning - the views expressed in it have mostly met with criticism: prominently from Mary Hesse and Max Black. This article attempts to explain Davidson's surprise-move regarding metaphor by relating it to elements in the rest of his work in semantics, such as the principle of compositionality, radical interpretation and the principle of charity. I conclude that Davidson's views on metaphor are not only consistent with his semantic theory generally, but that his semantics also depend on these insights. Eventually, the debate regarding Davidson's views on metaphor should be conducted on the level of his views on the nature of semantics, the relationship between language and the world and the possibility of there existing something like conceptual schemes. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson's paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' ('OVICS') has become famous for the refutation accomplished in it of conceptual relativism. Via an argument that, essentially, all languages are intertranslatable, Davidson rejects the notion that different conceptual schemes can inhere in the supposed 'un-translatable' languages said to exist by, for instance, Whorf and Kuhn. Critics of Davidson's position have mainly focussed on practical issues, with many holding that his arguments in 'OVICS' ignore the realities of the real intercultural communication situation. In the present paper, I address criticisms of this sort. Davidson's arguments are reconstructed, with attention being paid to their dependence on the idea of practical application in the real intercommunication situation. With the aid of practical examples, the implications of elements of Davidson's philsophy of interpretation for intercultural communication are evaluated. Finally, radical interpretation is presented as a better model for intercultural dialogue than linguistically relativist ones. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Sedert die publikasie van Donald Davidson se opstel 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - waarin hy die berugte stelling maak dat metafoor geen betekenis het nie - is sy sieninge meestal begroet met kritiek, ook van prominente figure soos Mary Hesse en Max Black. Hierdie artikel poog om 'n verduideliking te vind vir Davidson se verassende skuif aangaande metafoor, deur sy sieninge hieroor te kontekstualiseer teen die agtergrond van elemente uit die res van sy werk in semantiek, soos die beginsel van komposisionaliteit, radikale interpretasie en die beginsel van rasionele akkomodasie ('charity'). Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor nie slegs naatloos aansluit by sy algemene sieninge aangaande semantiek nie, maar dat die res van sy semantiese teorie ook afhang van sy sieninge aangaande metafoor. Uiteindelik behoort die debat rakende Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor gevoer te word op die vlak van die aard van semantiek, die verhouding tussen taal en die werklikheid en die moontlike bestaan van konseptueie skemas. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson se artikel 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' het beroemdheid verwerf as teenargument vir die idee van konseptuele relativisme. By wyse van 'n argument dat alle tale in beginsel vertaalbaar is, verwerp Davidson die idee dat verskillende konseptueie skemas kan skuilgaan in die veronderstelde 'onvertaalbare' tale waarvan daar sprake is by byvoorbeeld Whorf en Kuhn. Kritici van Davidson se posisie beperk hul hoofsaaklik tot praktiese besware en 'n vername aanklag teen Davidson is dat hy die realiteite misken van werklike interkulturele gesprek. In hierdie artikel spreek ek sodanige kritiek aan. Ek herkonstrueer Davidson se argumente en voer aan dat dit deurgaans afhanklik is van die idee van toepassing in 'n praktiese situasie van interkulturele dialoog. By wyse van praktiese voorbeelde evalueer ek die implikasies van Davidson se filosofie van interpretasie vir interkulturele kommunikasie. Laastens bied ek radikale interpretasie aan as 'n beter model vir interkulturele dialoog as linguisties relativistiese modelle.

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The metaphysical discussion over causality and identity of events, in the aim of the physicalism, emerges in the context of the collapse of behaviorism. Whilst the paradigms of logical positivism dominated philosophy, the behaviorism dominated psychology. The rupture with the positivism was marked by the work of Willard V. O. Quine. The critics from the two dogmas of empiricism and the proposal of a radical translation allowed emergence of the theses of indetermination of meaning and inscrutability of reference. As alternative to empiricism, Quine recurs to ontological simplification and holism about theory, but considering the primacy of experience, he proposes a shift towards pragmatism. However, Quine’s pragmatism was founded in a behavioristic perspective on the acquisition of linguistic competences, and behaviorism didn’t stood as paradigm for the explanation of mentalist vocabulary. Quine had a great influence in the work and life of Donald Davidson. The ontological economy and the holism of theory marked Davidson’s work in his choice of events as basic entities and his approach to meaning in Truth and Meaning through a theory of truth. While in articles as Action, Reason and Causes Davidson develops an approach to the causal role of events in intention and action, stating that reasons are causes, in The Logical Form of Action Sentences and Causal Relations, he searches for the adequate logical forms of describing events and singular causal statements in order to establish an identity of events. The following metaphysical positions support, in Individuation of Events, a causal individuation criterion for events, and in Events as Particulars and Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson defends that events are spatiotemporal and unrepeatable particulars, finalizing a metaphysical discussion over of events that will enable him to approach the problem of the mind-body relation, in the anomalous monism argument. Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism presented in Mental Events proposes the thesis of monism – identity between physical events and mental events –, and anomalism of the mental – events do not fall under strict causal laws. To support these theses Davidson formulates three principles, whose conjunction gives us a non-reductionist version of token physicalism and, therefore, permits us to conciliate the mentalist vocabulary with the structure of physicalist language. In this sense, anomalous monism supports a supervenience theory of the mental. Despite the critics made to anomalous monism, as the epiphenomenalism accusation, the theory only crumbles in its initial presuppositions that is that of a priori causality and identity. Thus, the frailest aspects of the argument consist in the difficulty of tracking and identify in experience neural events with mental events, and in the formulation of strict laws. Those questions depend, respectively, on the advancement of neurosciences and physics. The present work, by the name of “Identity, Differentiation and Metaphysics of Events”, consists on an approach to metaphysics of events, in the context of the physicalism of tokens, more specifically to the Donald Davidson’s argument of the anomalous monism that argues for the identity of physical events and mental events and the causal role of mental events. It pretends, therefore, to coordinate the metaphysical discussion of events with Davidson’s anomalous monism. / A discussão metafísica sobre a causalidade e a identidade de eventos, no âmbito do fisicalismo, surge no contexto do colapso do behaviorismo. Porquanto os paradigmas do positivismo-lógico dominaram a filosofia, o behaviorismo dominou a psicologia. A ruptura com o positivismo é marcada pela obra de Willard V. O. Quine: a crítica aos dois dogmas do empirismo e a proposta de uma tradução radical, permitiu erguer as teses da indetermi-nação do significado e inescrutabilidade da referência. Como alternativa ao empirismo, Quine recorre à simplificação ontológica e ao holismo da teoria, mas com a primazia da experiência, propondo assim uma guinada rumo ao pragmatismo. Contudo, o pragmatismo de Quine era fundamentado numa perspectiva behaviorista para a aquisição de competên-cias linguísticas, e o behaviorismo não se firmou como paradigma para a explicação da vocabulário mentalista. Quine teve grande influência no trabalho e vida de Donald Davidson. A economia ontológica e o holismo da teoria marcam a obra de Davidson através da escolha de eventos como entidades básicas e da proposta de problematização do significado, em Verdade e Significado, através de uma teoria da verdade. Enquanto que em artigos como Action, Reasons and Causes Davidson desenvolve uma abordagem ao papel causal de eventos na intenção e na ação, afirmando que razões são causas, em The Logical Form of Action Sentences e Causal Relations, ele explora as formas lógicas adequadas para descrever eventos e para declarações causais singulares e para estabelecer uma identidade de eventos. As posições metafísicas daqui decorrentes sustentam, em Individuation of Events, um critério de individuação causal de eventos e em Events as Particulars e Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson sustenta que eventos são particulares espaciotemporais irrepetíveis, finalizando uma discussão metafísica de eventos que lhe permitirá abordar o problema da relação corpo-mente, no argumento do monismo anômalo. O monismo anômalo de Davidson, apresentado em Mental Events propõe as teses do monismo – identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais –, e do anomalismo do mental – eventos mentais falham em cair sob leis causais estritas. Para suportar essas teses, Davidson formula três princípios cuja conjunção nos dá uma versão não reducionista do fisicalismo de ocorrências, que, portanto, permite conciliar o vocabulário mentalista com a estrutura linguística fisicalista. Assim, o monismo anômalo suporta uma teoria da superveniência do mental. Apesar do monismo anômalo sofrer algumas críticas, como a acusação de epifenomenalismo, a teoria só sucumbe nos seus pressupostos iniciais, ou seja, a causalidade e a identidade a priori. Os aspetos mais frágeis do argumento consistem na dificuldade de rastrear e identificar, na experiência, eventos neurais com eventos mentais, e na formulação de leis estritas. Questões estas que dependem, respetivamente, do avanço das neurociências e desenvolvimento da física. O presente trabalho, pelo nome de “Identidade, Diferenciação e Metafísica de Eventos”, consiste numa abordagem à metafísica de eventos, no contexto do fisicalismo de ocorrências, mais especificamente do argumento do monismo anômalo de Davidson, que afirma a identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais, assim como o papel causal de eventos mentais. Pretende, portanto, coordenar a discussão metafísica de eventos com o monismo anômalo de Davidson.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Anomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind put forth by Donald Davidson in the 1970s. Although influential at the time, it received numerous criticisms, and it is now widely rejected. The present Master s Dissertation argues for a revision of the reasons for which anomalous monism should be rejected. According to a well known objection in the literature, anomalous monism entails the thesis of property epiphenomenalism, and should be rejected because this consequence is unacceptable. It is proposed that this objection is inadequate in its two crucial steps. First, property epiphenomenalism does not seem to follow from anomalous monism, and, second, there seems to be no sufficient reason for a decisive rejection of property epiphenomenalism. Despite this, there are alternative reasons for rejecting anomalous monism, which concern the justification of the monist thesis. At least one of the premises Davidson takes to support it appears to be false, and, additionally, the very possibility of the monism at issue is threatened by problems in the ontology of events it assumes. / O monismo anômalo é uma teoria em filosofia da mente proposta por Donald Davidson na década de 1970. Embora influente na época, essa teoria recebeu inúmeras críticas e é atualmente amplamente rejeitada. A presente dissertação argumenta em favor de uma revisão das razões pelas quais o monismo anômalo deve ser rejeitado. De acordo com uma objeção bem conhecida na literatura, o monismo anômalo implica a tese do epifenomenismo de propriedades e deve ser rejeitado porque essa consequência é inaceitável. Propõe-se que essa objeção é inadequada em seus dois passos cruciais. Em primeiro lugar, o epifenomenismo de propriedades não parece se seguir do monismo anômalo, e, em segundo, não parece haver razões suficientes para uma rejeição decisiva do epifenomenismo de propriedades. Apesar disso, há razões alternativas para se rejeitar o monismo anômalo, que dizem respeito à justificação da tese monista. Pelo menos uma das premissas que Davidson empregou em sua defesa parece falsa, e, adicionalmente, a própria possibilidade do monismo em questão é ameaçada por dificuldades na ontologia de eventos que pressupõe.

Submitted by Nadir Basilio (nadirsb@uninove.br) on 2016-06-06T20:05:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Edna de Souza Machado.pdf: 1327243 bytes, checksum: 7c82d441ec8cc32bdcc377b918bff284 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-06T20:05:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edna de Souza Machado.pdf: 1327243 bytes, checksum: 7c82d441ec8cc32bdcc377b918bff284 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-06-25 / This research, inserted into the marketing area, aims to investigate the influence of self-expanded (ARON et al., 1991) on consumer behavior in the Harley-Davidson brand community, an American brand of motorcycles, worldwide famous, whose owners get together, motivated by the brand for several purposes (SOLOMON, 2011). The problem raised by this research is to understand how is the influence of self-expanded on consumer behavior in the Harley-Davidson brand community. Thus, the rationale for this study lies in the approach taken by the light of the Theory of Planned Behavior (AJZEN, 1985) that consumers are influenced or motivated to participate in collective meetings, taking as a starting point the context in which they live, which is provided by the Harley-Davidson brand and they suffer behavioral changes due to the relationships that establish the self-expanded (ARON et. al., 1991) In addition, the brand has consumers that come together and are formed in a strong community setting out mutual commitments which share the same social identity. (BAGGOZI & DHOLAKIA, 2006; ATKIN, 2007; UNDEWOOD, BOND & BAER, 2001). The relevance of this study points to the fact that brand communities represent the key role study for the area of Marketing in Brazil because they offer conditions for us to investigate and understand, in depth, issues related to consumer behavior, understanding of the influence and the kind of culture that the Brazilian consumer receives in regard to Brand equity (ATKIN, 2007; YOO & DONTHU, 2001; AAKER 1998). The corpus of the research included a survey with 193 participants of brand communities. The methodological approach used was quantitative using the SmartPLS for data analysis. The results show that intergroup relations, with respect to attitudes, wishes and positive emotions are feelings shared and that enhance the desire to participate in the activities of this brand community, which culminates with the expansion of the participant's self Harley-Davidson community for belonging, involvement, social identity and behavior with the brand. / Esta pesquisa, inserida na linha de marketing, tem por objetivo investigar a influência do self-expandido (ARON et al., 1991) sobre o comportamento do consumidor na comunidade de marca Harley-Davidson, marca americana de motocicletas, cujos proprietários se reúnem, motivados pela marca, para finalidades diversas (SOLOMON, 2011). O problema levantado foi compreender como ocorre a influência do self-expandido sobre o comportamento do consumidor na comunidade de marca Harley-Davidson. A relevância deste estudo se dá pelo fato de que as comunidades de marca representam papel fundamental de estudo para a área de Marketing no Brasil, pois oferecem condições para se investigar e compreender, com mais profundidade, aspectos relacionados ao comportamento do consumidor, a compreensão sobre a influência e o tipo de cultura que o consumidor brasileiro recebe no que se refere à brand equity (ATKIN, 2007; YOO & DONTHU, 2001; AAKER, 1998). O corpus da pesquisa contou com uma survey com 193 participantes de comunidades de marca. A abordagem metodológica utilizada foi quantitativa com a utilização do SmartPLS para análise dos dados. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que as relações intergrupais, no que tange às atitudes, desejos e emoções positivas, são sentimentos compartilhados e que ampliam o desejo em participar das atividades dessa comunidade de marca, o que culmina com a expansão do self do participante da comunidade Harley-Davidson, pelo pertencimento, envolvimento, identidade social e comportamento com a marca.

Zugl.: Basel, Univ., Diss., 2002

Quel type de choses sont les raisons que nous donnons pour expliquer nos comportements ? Sont-ce des entités dans nos cerveaux causalement responsables de nos actions ? Sinon, doit-on accepter le dualisme cartésien ? Faut-il croire avec Davidson que les raisons sont des entités physiques pourtant impossibles à identifier en termes physiques ? Nous proposons une réponse alternative : les raisons sont des choses dont nous ne faisons pas l’expérience. Elles peuvent être dites guider nos actions, en vertu d’une cohérence que nous acquérons à travers le temps, en même temps qu’une identité personnelle claire. On défend donc ici la thèse wittgensteinienne selon laquelle les raisons ne sont pas des causes, et l’on cherche ce qu’elles sont positivement. Car il y a bien une différence, dans la réalité physique, entre agir pour une raison ou l’autre. Mais c’est une réalité que l’on recherche et construit, et non que l’on observe et nomme. En parlant de nos raisons, on parle avant de savoir, pour faire advenir quelque chose –quelque chose de physique, comme toute chose.On soutient ainsi contre Kim qu’il est possible de croire à la pertinence propre des raisons, tout en restant moniste, sans dommage pour la rationalité humaine.Tout ceci a d’importantes conséquences éthiques : l’évaluation des raisons et intentions n’est sensée que si elle est une tentative pour bien agir ; elle sera toujours non pertinente pour définir les actions passées, et cela remet gravement en cause la notion de mérite. Ainsi proposons-nous de concevoir la morale de façon dynamique, comme étant ce que l’on cherche toujours à rendre possible. / What kind of things are the reasons we use to explain our behavior? Are they material entities in the brain, causing actions? Are they, as Davidson says, physical entities that we cannot identify in physical terms? Are we forced to accept Cartesian dualism? This thesis proposes another answer. Reasons are not experienced. They are sought through action and conceptualization. They may be said to guide our actions, but not as events which cause actions; rather, they serve, over time, to construct coherent behavior and stable personal identity.We defend here the Wittgensteinian thesis that reasons are not causes. We show that it is consistent with monism. The difference between acting for this or that reason does exist in reality, but it is a reality that we construct and pursue, not one that we experience and name. This is because when we give reasons, we speak before knowing, in order to make something exist.Thus we argue, against Kim, that it is possible to be a monist, to defend the importance of rational explanations, and to deny the possibility of reducing reasons to causes. Indeed, the knowledge necessary to do so would be far beyond the knowledge we require to speak the language of reasons.This conception of reasons as things that we seek rather than thing that we experience has important consequences in ethics. Namely, that the evaluation of reasons or intentions only makes sense when one attempts to act appropriately; it is irrelevant in defining past actions. This means that the very idea of merit is problematic, and that morality itself is something we must constantly work to make possible.

<p>Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.</p> / <p>This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.</p>

Este trabajo analiza la crítica que muchos filósofos han dirigido contra la tesis de la indeterminación del significado inspirados por la idea que J. Searle desarrollara en su célebre artículo de 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defiende que la tesis constituye una reducción al absurdo de sí misma, ya que precisa hacer uso de distinciones semánticas que ella misma declara inexistentes. Esta reducción al absurdo se debe, siempre según Searle, a la perspectiva de tercera persona que adoptan los defensores de la tesis - Searle analiza aquí la exposición de la tesis de sus dos más ilustres defensores: W. V. O. Quine y D. Davidson - . Nuestro trabajo intenta mostrar cómo esta línea de ataque no dispone de argumentos satisfactorios. La tesis se estructura en tres grandes capítulos. En el primero se expone la tesis de la indeterminación del significado en sus dos grandes vertientes: la conocida como indeterminación de la traducción y la inescrutabilidad de la referencia. Se expone la tesis tal y como aparece en Quine primero y en Davidson después, analizando elementos de enorme relevancia para la tesis, como el holismo del significado y la relación entre la indeterminación y la infradeterminación.En la segunda parte se expone la mencionada crítica de Searle, con especial atención a cómo desarrollaron esta idea de rechazar la indeterminación apelando a una noción de significado desde la perspectiva de la primera persona autores como P. Alston y S. Soames. En la tercera parte se estudia la forma más novedosa que ha adoptado esta visión de "significado de primera persona", a saber, la apelación a las intuiciones lingüísticas de los hablantes. Ha sido D. Bar-On quien más ha ahondado en esta idea. Se defiende aquí la teoría davidsoniana acerca de la autoridad de la primera persona respecto al significado de sus palabras. Se defiende, en particular, la forma davidsoniana de conjugar la indeterminación con la autoridad de la primera persona.Cierra el trabajo una sección de "conclusiones y perspectivas", donde se resumen las conclusiones alcanzadas y se apuntan cuestiones que, tras las conclusiones obtenidas, merecen una profunda revisión. / This work analyzes the criticism that many philosophers have made to the thesis of meaning indeterminacy inspired by the idea exposed by J. Searle in his celebrated article, from 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defends that the thesis supposes a reductio ad absurdum of itself due to the fact that it requires semantic distinctions that it itself declares non-existent. This reductio is due, according to Searle, to the third person perspective adopted by the defenders of the thesis - Searle analyzes here the exposition of the it made by its two more distinguished defenders, namely, W. V. Quine and D. Davidson - . Our work tries to show that this line of attack does not have satisfactory reasons. This work is organized into three large chapters. The first one is devoted to exposing the thesis in its two aspects: the one known as indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. The thesis is exposed as it appears firstly in W. V. Quine and later in D. Davidson, studying different relevant factors for the it, as meaning holism or the relation between indeterminacy and underdetermination. The mentioned Searle's criticism is developed in the second chapter. The work analyzes here the arguments presented by the authors who have rejected the thesis by appealing to a first person perspective - viz. P. Alston or S. Soames - . The third chapter is devoted to studying the most current form this "first person meaning" has adopted, namely, the appellation to the linguistic intuitions of speakers. D. Bar-On has been the most prolific author following this line. We defend here the Davidsonian theory about first person authority with respect to the meaning of her words. We defend, in particular, Davidson's way of combining indeterminacy and first person authority. The work finishes with a section of "Conclusions and Perspectives", where the reached conclusions are summarized and some issues are brought up which, following on from our conclusions, need in-deepth revision.

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2016-08-17T20:10:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruna Panzarini.pdf: 1862995 bytes, checksum: 5f89732529dd6310ab82c32a36cb0b38 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-17T20:10:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruna Panzarini.pdf: 1862995 bytes, checksum: 5f89732529dd6310ab82c32a36cb0b38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study seeks to understand how a marketing communication's process practiced and considered as standard can instill into its customers minds symbolic elements about a life style and to be part of a brand's community. So the communication's work is lined to feed the imaginary of its customers by a philosofy of life and a peculiar way of living. The brands argumentation is guided in a manner that their custumers belongs to a "tribe" and this speech is similar every part of the globe. The case chosen to be studied was Harley-Davidson once its a brand that includes all these elements. The methodological procedures to for this thesis were literature research and documental that contributed to form the theoretical and informative knowleadge. Furthermore a fiedl research diveded in: participant observation with the customers in Sorocaba; HOG's participants, wich is the exclusive's Harley Davidson motorcycle club, semi-structure interviews with Sorocaba's HOG members, Sorocaba's dealership and the company's employees. Through this work it was noticed that the marketing communication and its actions come to the aspirations, sensations and desires of the customers and how they identify themselves with the brand and the way of life provided by it. The Harley-Davidson customers are great enthusiasts about the brand and its life filosophy. / Este estudo busca entender como um processo de comunicação mercadológica pode vincular na mente de seus consumidores elementos simbólicos sobre estilo de vida e pertencimento a uma comunidade da marca alimentando o imaginário de seus consumidores por meio de uma filosofia de vida e forma de viver muito particular. A argumentação da marca é regida em relação ao pertencimento de seus consumidores a uma "tribo", e o seu discurso aparenta ser semelhante em todos os cantos do mundo. O caso escolhido para estudo foi a Harley Davidson, pois é uma marca que integra todos esses elementos. Os procedimentos metodológicos escolhidos para esta dissertação foram pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, que contribuíram para a formação do conhecimento teórico e informacional. Além disso, uma pesquisa de campo subdividida em: observação participante com os consumidores da cidade de Sorocaba; participantes do HOG, que é o moto clube exclusivo da marca, coleta de entrevistas semiestruturadas com os membros do HOG de Sorocaba, concessionário Sorocaba e funcionários da empresa no Brasil. Por meio desse trabalho percebeu-se que a comunicação mercadológica e suas ações vêm ao encontro das aspirações, sensações e desejos dos consumidores e como eles se identificam com a marca e com o estilo de vida proporcionado por ela. Os consumidores Harley Davidson são grandes entusiastas da marca e da sua filosofia de vida.