Title: Forgotten Apocalypse - The Czech Reflection of the Retreat of the German Heeresgruppe Mitte Author: Mgr. Tomáš Jakl Abstract: There are war campaigns that can be described simply, others more difficult to describe, and some cannot be reconstructed by a continuous narrative at all. The events in the Czech Lands in the first two weeks of May 1945 belong to the most difficult to describe. The fact that there was the largest of last German fighting groups of armies is well known. It is also commonly known that it was the Central Army Group commanded by Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner. Significantly less is known that as a result of the outbreak of the Czech Uprising, this group of armies retreated across the rebellious territory to the demarcation line between the US and the Red Army The last desperate illusion of German soldiers was that they would contact the Americans and jointly drive the Russians out of Europe. Allied Commander-in-Chief in the West, General Dwight David Eisenhower, did not intend to do anything after the death of US President Roosevelt, which the Soviet dictator could even interpret as a similar development. Not only did he forbid General Patton from crossing the agreed line in advance with the Soviets, visually accommodating the retreating Germans, but the US troops also released...

De nos jours, le motif de la « crise de l’éducation » est récurrent dans les discussions publiques sur le système éducatif, et ce des deux côtés de l’Atlantique. Aux Etats-Unis, c’est au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale qu’il prend une tournure nouvelle. Jusqu’alors on avait parlé de « crise » pour désigner les difficultés matérielles et financières du système, mais l’expression prend une autre signification après 1945, tandis que s’installe un débat entre les partisans de l’éducation moderne, modèle inspiré par les principes de l’éducation progressiste, et les défenseurs d’une éducation humaniste, qui dénoncent une dégradation des exigences intellectuelles et des résultats de l’enseignement public. Cette étude se propose de restituer les termes de ce débat et d’analyser ses répercussions sur les dynamiques du système éducatif américain. La confrontation entre deux philosophies de l’éducation ne se limite pas à la sphère des professionnels et on en retrouve les échos dans la presse de grande diffusion comme dans certains films hollywoodiens. Alors que les États-Unis font face à une crise de confiance après le lancement réussi du satellite Spoutnik, le gouvernement américain désigne le système éducatif comme maillon faible en s’appuyant sur les critiques formulées tout au long des années 1950 par les adversaires de l’éducation moderne. Le télescopage du débat sur l’éducation et des logiques de Guerre froide ouvre alors la voie à une intervention fédérale inédite dans le domaine de l’éducation, avec l’adoption du National Defense Education Act de 1958. / The “crisis in education” has been a recurrent theme in discussions about the American school system. In the United States, it was after WWII that the notion gained momentum and a new meaning. Until then, the term “crisis” had been merely used to evoke the dire material and financial state of education. The expression took another turn with the emergence of a debate between proponents of modern education (a model derived from the principles of progressive education) and partisans of liberal education who denounced an intellectual degradation in the school system. This dissertation analyzes this debate and its consequences on the dynamics of education in the United States. This strife between two conceptions of education is set apart by its significant influence and pervasion of society. Indeed, not only did it involve the circle of professional educators but it also touched lay men, so much so that it was integrated by popular culture. Confronted with a confidence crisis in the aftermath of the successful launch of satellite Sputnik, the U.S. government pinpointed the school system as the weak link of the American nation, taking advantage of the wave of criticisms against modern education that had dominated the 1950s. The combination of the debate on education with the logics of the Cold War paved the way for an unprecedented federal intervention in the field of education with the 1958 National Defense Education Act.

Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.

De nos jours, le motif de la " crise de l'éducation " est récurrent dans les discussions publiques sur le système éducatif, et ce des deux côtés de l'Atlantique. Aux Etats-Unis, c'est au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale qu'il prend une tournure nouvelle. Jusqu'alors on avait parlé de " crise " pour désigner les difficultés matérielles et financières du système, mais l'expression prend une autre signification après 1945, tandis que s'installe un débat entre les partisans de l'éducation moderne, modèle inspiré par les principes de l'éducation progressiste, et les défenseurs d'une éducation humaniste, qui dénoncent une dégradation des exigences intellectuelles et des résultats de l'enseignement public. Cette étude se propose de restituer les termes de ce débat et d'analyser ses répercussions sur les dynamiques du système éducatif américain. La confrontation entre deux philosophies de l'éducation ne se limite pas à la sphère des professionnels et on en retrouve les échos dans la presse de grande diffusion comme dans certains films hollywoodiens. Alors que les États-Unis font face à une crise de confiance après le lancement réussi du satellite Spoutnik, le gouvernement américain désigne le système éducatif comme maillon faible en s'appuyant sur les critiques formulées tout au long des années 1950 par les adversaires de l'éducation moderne. Le télescopage du débat sur l'éducation et des logiques de Guerre froide ouvre alors la voie à une intervention fédérale inédite dans le domaine de l'éducation, avec l'adoption du National Defense Education Act de 1958.

Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Montana, 2008. / Title from author supplied metadata. Description based on contents viewed on July 6, 2009. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in their commands.

No description available.

Over the last sixty years, voting patterns in the United States have changed dramatically, and this is especially true in the state of Florida. Though there is some literature in the field of political science that outlines the voting and election history of Florida and identifies some trends, this literature is extremely limited and is not comprehensive of the data that is available up to the present day. This study seeks to find Florida’s voting patterns and to explain how they can be understood by both the casual observer and the political scientist. To do so, unique methodology was applied that used the "relative margin" of both a county and a region in a particular election to give the Democratic nominee’s performance context both in the election in question and in history, by comparing the actual margin of victory or defeat of the Democratic nominee to the statewide margin of victory or defeat. This was an illuminating process that ultimately revealed some truths about the election history of Florida: the counties and regions most likely to vote for Democratic nominees in the 1950s and early 1960 are now among the least likely to do so, and the counties and regions most likely to vote for Republican nominees in the 1950s and early 1960s are now considered to be "swing" or "tossup" areas that are regularly and alternatively won by Democratic and Republican nominees. Additionally, the pattern of each region in how it voted in presidential elections was compared to forty seven other states in the country to provide further context as to how the election patterns can be understood in context.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In the early 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged citizens to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to the Soviet atomic threat by joining the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). Established by the United States Air Force (USAF), the GOC involved civilian volunteers surveying the skies for Soviet aircraft via watchtowers, alerting the Air Force if they suspected threatening aircraft. This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives.