Cette thèse comprend quatre articles résumés qui vont comme suit : Le premier essai étudie le comportement d’ajustement au capital réglementaire dans un régime de capital réglementaire multiple. La présence de cet essai est motivée par le fait que les modèles d’ajustement au capital bancaire existants déjà dans la littérature ne modélisent que l’ajustement à une seule mesure de capital et ne tiennent donc pas compte de l’importante corrélation entre les différentes normes de capital. Les résultats issus de ce travail sont de deux ordres. Premièrement, il est montré que la réglementation de deux ratios de capital (ajusté ou non au risque) est assimilable à la réglementation d’un ratio unique de capital (non ajusté au risque) dont la limite est assimilable à la valeur d’une option d’achat avec comme sous-jacent le taux de risque (réglementaire) des actifs bancaires. Une analyse de l’expérience du Canada et des États-Unis offre une justification supplémentaire à la résilience relative des banques canadiennes lors de la dernière crise des subprimes des années 2007. Le deuxième essai se consacre à l’analyse de la norme de coussin contracyclique introduite sous Bâle III. Cette norme vise à lisser les fluctuations cycliques indésirables dans le capital bancaire qui affectaient négativement l’octroi de crédit par les banques surtout en période de crise. Ce travail vise à quantifier le niveau de coussin requis en tenant compte des composantes cycliques du capital bancaire. Une analyse de l’implication des nouvelles normes de liquidité est également abordée. Le troisième essai analyse l’adéquation de l’application des nouvelles normes de capital contracycliques de Bâle III avec les coopératives de crédit canadiennes. En se basant sur les données des bilans comptables des coopératives canadiennes entre la période 1996 et 2014, Cet essai démontre que, contrairement aux institutions bancaires, les coopératives possèdent déjà une stratégie de gestion contracyclique pour leur coussin de capital. À cet effet, une introduction des nouvelles normes de coussin contracycliques n’affectera pas leur comportement d’ajustement. L’analyse révèle que le coussin de capital des coopératives de crédit sous-capitalisées sont procycliques et donc qu’une attention particulière de la part des régulateurs à l’endroit de ces coopératives serait nécessaire. iii Le quatrième essai est une extension de celui qui le précède ce sens où il analyse l’effet du capital réglementaire sur l’activité d’intermédiation des coopératives de crédit canadiennes. Nos résultats suggèrent que la croissance du portefeuille de prêt croît positivement avec le niveau de capitalisation des coopératives de crédit. À l’inverse, la croissance du portefeuille est négativement liée aux changements ou ajustements dans le capital réglementaire. Cette observation suggère que les coopératives de crédit devraient être encouragées via l’implémentation et le respect d’exigences de coussin de capital (de conservation et contracyclique) qui viseraient à détenir des niveaux suffisants de capitalisation. / The review of the articles included in this thesis can be summarized as follows: The first essay examines the behavior of regulatory capital adjustment in a multiple capital requirement regime such as the Basel III one. This essay is motivated by the fact that the existing bank capital adjustment models are designed to address adjustment towards a single capital ratio. Our findings are numerous. Firstly, it appears that the joint regulation of two capital ratios (adjusted and unadjusted for risk) is assimilated to the regulation of a single capital ratio (not adjusted to risk), whose limit is assimilated to the value of a call option written on (regulatory) asset risk ratio. An analysis of both the Canadian and US experiences in the joint capital regulation provides further justification for the relative resilience of Canadian banks (in comparison with their US counterparts) during the last subprime crisis of late 2007. The second essay is devoted to the analysis of the counter-cyclical buffer standard introduced under Basel III. This standard aims to smooth undesirable cyclical fluctuations in bank capital as this negatively affect the granting of credit by banks, especially in times of crisis. This work aims to quantify the required level of cushion by taking into account the cyclical components of bank capital. The implications of the new liquidity standards are also discussed. The third essay analyzes the appropriateness of the new counter-cyclical capital standards of Basel III to Canadian credit unions regulation. Based on data extracted from Canadian financial cooperatives balance sheets over the period between 1996 and 2014, this essay shows that unlike banking institutions, credit union capital is already countercyclical, and therefore the introduction of the countercyclical buffer would not alter their intermediation activities. However, the analysis also reveals that the capital cushion of under-capitalized credit unions is pro-cyclical, and therefore these credit unions need close monitoring from regulators regarding their adjustment behaviors following countercyclical measures’ adoption. v The fourth essay is an extension of the previous one in that it analyzes the effect of regulatory capital on lending by Canadian credit unions. Our findings suggest that the growth in the Canadian credit unions loan portfolio is positively associated with the level of capitalization. In contrast, we uncover a negative relation between change in credit union capital and the growth of their lending portfolio. This finding suggests that credit unions should be encouraged to hold adequate levels of capital. This can be achieved through the implementation of conservative and countercyclical capital requirements as advocated for banks.

ABSTRACT “Almost all places are in trouble, but some are in more trouble than others" Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993) Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993) contend that all places are in trouble now, or will be in the near future. The onset of globalisation of the world's economy, country political dynamics and the accelerating pace of technological changes are some of the forces that require all places to learn how to compete on the world arena. Porter (1990) states that the framework for understanding a company’s sources of competitive advantage can be extended to the level of nations. It is basically concerned with the question as to why some nations succeed in global competition when others fail. Nations must learn how to think more like businesses if they are to survive and should begin by identifying their competitive advantages and building on them. As countries compete for inward investment, tourism and export of goods and services- success or failure can accurately be chartered, and questions of reputation, image, identity and hence marketing and branding become central to the competitive edge (Olins, 1999). Faced with the challenge of a negative image, a country must adopt a proactive stance to correct this image. This is where the question of country branding comes in. Branding a country for many is misconstrued and interpreted to simply mean designing a new logo for their country and possibly a slogan to go underneath it. However country-banding proponents highlight that there is a difference between nation branding and tourism promotion. It helps even less that there are so many communications agencies that perhaps frustrated by lack of pure strategy capacity to sell to governments, have fallen into the habit of i Sibonokuhle GUMPO - 34462481 pandering to this misconception and simply selling logos and slogans to any government prepared to buy them (Anholt, 2003). However faced with the urgent need to address the crippling impact of a negative image, countries like Zimbabwe cannot simply wait and expect things to turn out for the better. Kotler et al (1993) stress that places are not able to respond to negative images concerning their nations as quickly as negative perceptions are built, be it through media, word of mouth or other channels. As a result the importance of a pro-active response cannot be overemphasized. This study explores the current negative image of Zimbabwe and tries to define the root or source of this negative image. Having defined or spelt out what is thought to be the problem, the researcher than explores possible ways of how the stakeholders of Zimbabwe can rebrand their country reflecting on known success stories. Kotler et al (1993) contend that the central tenet of marketing places is that in spite of the powerful internal and external forces that buffet them, places have within their collective resources and people the capacity to improve their relative competitive positions. Zimbabweans in general believe that their situation has been sensationalised by the media and is not a reflection of what is on the ground. By adopting a proactive stance in rebranding their country, Zimbabweans will perhaps finally realise that when it comes to image, “being in possession of the truth is not enough, the truth has to be sold” (Anholt,all places are in trouble now, or will be in the near future. The onset of globalisation of the world's economy, country political dynamics and the accelerating pace of technological changes are some of the forces that require all places to learn how to compete on the world arena. Porter (1990) states that the framework for understanding a company’s sources of competitive advantage can be extended to the level of nations. It is basically concerned with the question as to why some nations succeed in global competition when others fail. Nations must learn how to think more like businesses if they are to survive and should begin by identifying their competitive advantages and building on them. As countries compete for inward investment, tourism and export of goods and services- success or failure can accurately be chartered, and questions of reputation, image, identity and hence marketing and branding become central to the competitive edge (Olins, 1999). Faced with the challenge of a negative image, a country must adopt a proactive stance to correct this image. This is where the question of country branding comes in. Branding a country for many is misconstrued and interpreted to simply mean designing a new logo for their country and possibly a slogan to go underneath it. However country-banding proponents highlight that there is a difference between nation branding and tourism promotion. It helps even less that there are so many communications agencies ABSTRACT “Almost all places are in trouble, but some are in more trouble than others" Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993) Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993) contend that all places are in trouble now, or will be in the near future. The onset of globalisation of the world's economy, country political dynamics and the accelerating pace of technological changes are some of the forces that require all places to learn how to compete on the world arena. Porter (1990) states that the framework for understanding a company’s sources of competitive advantage can be extended to the level of nations. It is basically concerned with the question as to why some nations succeed in global competition when others fail. Nations must learn how to think more like businesses if they are to survive and should begin by identifying their competitive advantages and building on them. As countries compete for inward investment, tourism and export of goods and services- success or failure can accurately be chartered, and questions of reputation, image, identity and hence marketing and branding become central to the competitive edge (Olins, 1999). Faced with the challenge of a negative image, a country must adopt a proactive stance to correct this image. This is where the question of country branding comes in. Branding a country for many is misconstrued and interpreted to simply mean designing a new logo for their country and possibly a slogan to go underneath it. However country-banding proponents highlight that there is a difference between nation branding and tourism promotion. It helps even less that there are so many communications agencies that perhaps frustrated by lack of pure strategy capacity to sell to governments, have fallen into the habit of i Sibonokuhle GUMPO - 34462481 pandering to this misconception and simply selling logos and slogans to any government prepared to buy them (Anholt, 2003). However faced with the urgent need to address the crippling impact of a negative image, countries like Zimbabwe cannot simply wait and expect things to turn out for the better. Kotler et al (1993) stress that places are not able to respond to negative images concerning their nations as quickly as negative perceptions are built, be it through media, word of mouth or other channels. As a result the importance of a pro-active response cannot be overemphasized. This study explores the current negative image of Zimbabwe and tries to define the root or source of this negative image. Having defined or spelt out what is thought to be the problem, the researcher than explores possible ways of how the stakeholders of Zimbabwe can rebrand their country reflecting on known success stories. Kotler et al (1993) contend that the central tenet of marketing places is that in spite of the powerful internal and external forces that buffet them, places have within their collective resources and people the capacity to improve their relative competitive positions. Zimbabweans in general believe that their situation has been sensationalised by the media and is not a reflection of what is on the ground. By adopting a proactive stance in rebranding their country, Zimbabweans will perhaps finally realise that when it comes to image, “being in possession of the truth is not enough, the truth has to be sold” (Anholt, / Graduate School of Business Leadership / MBL

Les risques sont présents dans la vie courante des institutions financières. Cependant, lorsque les risques peuvent affecter l’épargne du public et l’économie, l’intervention de l’État devient nécessaire. Le problème se manifeste lorsque l’État n’établie pas des principes pour la réglementation des activités financières. Ceci implique que le réglementateur peut légiférer sur n’importe quel sujet de l’activité financière. On se demande alors s’il existe des limites à la réglementation des institutions financières. Pour nous, l’objectif de l’État dans le système financier est de stabiliser les expectatives normatives des institutions financières face aux risques, ce qu’il fait par le biais de la réglementation. Cette affirmation est appuyée sur la base des théories économiques de la réglementation et de la théorie des systèmes sociaux de Niklas Luhmann. Nous prenons comme exemple la réglementation des risques des caisses populaires au Québec. Ainsi, nous démontrons que la réglementation des caisses populaires est justifiée dans la mesure où elles expriment un besoin de réglementation de leurs risques. Ce qui nous amène aussi, par opposition, à constater que toutes les activités qui ne sont « risquées » peuvent être autorégulées par les instituions elles-mêmes.

Peru is one of the leading examples of a primary-product export economy which has failed to achieve a high level of economic development. In this study, two alternative explanatory models of such development failure are tested against evidence drawn from Peru's experience in the 1920's (the culminating decade of a cycle of export growth which began in the 1880's and was brought to a close by the world depression of 1930). The first of the models is drawn from the mainstream of orthodox writing on development. Integration of an economy into international commodity and capital markets is viewed as a positive step towards development, and failure to achieve development is therefore explained by appeal to special obstacles which prevent the working-out of market forces. A variety of such obstacles may be proposed, of which three possibilities are particularly relevant: the absence of a dynamic, responsive elite to initiate and guide a development process; a binding scarcity of capital; and an inability of the local economy to adjust to the technological requirements of development. Because of the existence of such obstacles, the argument runs, the impulse towards growth and modernisation given by integration into the international economic system fails to spread much beyond the export enclaves. Foreign factors of production (particularly capital and technological skills) supplement scarce local factors and thereby increase the strength of the forces working towards development; but in the final analysis development can proceed only as fast as the obstacles are overcome. The second, opposed, model of development failure suggests that market forces themselves work in such a way as to erode the local economy's capacity for development. Integration into the international economy, it is suggested, leads to economic retrogression rather than development, and may destroy a viable pre-existing capacity to generate development. Foreign capital enters the local economy not to fill gaps in its resource endowment, but because of market imperfections. Local enterprises are destroyed and local factors displaced by the process of investment by international firms. As a growing proportion of capital formation takes place in foreign-controlled, rather than locally-controlled, enterprises, the domestic economy's capacity to mobilise and allocate capital falls, and under-employment of local factors increases. Opening the local economy to international market forces also opens for the domestic elite the option of abandoning an entrepreneurial function, and converting themselves into client allies of foreign interests - a 'comprador' class, without commitment to the development of the broader national economy. The State participates also in this process of decay. The thesis of this study is that Peru's experience in the 1920's fails to correspond to the first of these two models, but yields some evidence favouring the second. In Chapter 1, four central issues in the debate are identified, and hypotheses derived from them are then tested in the six subsequent chapters. The four areas selected for investigation are the following: (i) Were there binding factor constraints which ruled out a self-sustaining development process? Attention focusses here particularly on the question whether there existed a 'savings gap', and whether the native elite may have been incapable of meeting the organisational, technological and psychological requirements of a development model. (ii) What is the effect upon income levels and development prospects of the process of foreign direct investment in primary-product export sectors? In particular, does foreign direct investment supplement the local economy's supply of scarce factors, or displace native factors of production from efficient employment? (iii) Does the Government perform satisfactorily as a regulating and bargaining agent, seeking to capture for the host economy the maximum possible gains from export growth in a context of foreign direct investment? The debate here hinges upon the question whether apparent failures of the Government in this role should be attributed to 'softness' or to deliberate policy. (iv) What is the effect upon native enterprises of a process of denationalisation of leading export sectors? The key question here is whether local capital and entrepreneurs displaced from activity in one sector by the arrival of foreign capital were subsequently reallocated towards productive employment in other sectors of the economy, or instead withdrew from active employment or were allocated into activities whose contribution to development was relatively slight. Chapter 2 describes the historical background to the Peruvian economy of the 1920's, indicating that the period since the 1880's had been anything but stagnant. Peru was able, using only local factors of production, to initiate a successful export-led growth process in the late nineteenth century, with important spread effects to other sectors. The country's integration into the international economy, however, quickly opened it to the entry of large international firms, which were welcomed by much of the local capitalist group, and which dominated the economy by the 1920's. Chapter 3 looks more closely at the capability of the native elite, and establishes that the entry of foreign capital was not dictated by any inability of the local economy to mobilise capital or to apply and develop technology, but occurred rather because of differences between foreign and local firms in the perception of risk and calculation of future earnings; of these, the first appears more important. Development along the lines already begun in the 1890's, the chapter concludes, could have been sustained under the control of domestic firms, given the application of appropriate government policy, and continued expansion of export opportunities abroad. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to a more detailed evaluation of the contribution to Peru's development made by the two leading foreign firms, which between them accounted for over half of the country's total export earnings by 1929. The methodology used is adapted from the recent UNCTAD studies of foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and hinges upon the comparison between the actual income effects generated by the foreign firms in practice, and the effects which could reasonably have been expected in the case of local control of those sectors in the absence of foreign capital. In both cases, the conclusion reached is that the net contribution of foreign capital was negligible or negative. Chapter 6 takes up the issue of government policy formation, asking why, if Peru was deriving so little advantage from the presence of foreign capital, the Government did not regulate the foreign firms more stringently. The enquiry takes the form of a detailed case study of the relations between the Government and the largest foreign firm, the International Petroleum Company. The main conclusion is that the Government was an effective and generally skilled regulator and bargainer within the goals which it set itself; but that those policy goals were certainly not optimal from the standpoint of national development. Rather, the Government tended to embody narrow group interests - particularly the interests of Government itself. Since the entry of large amounts of foreign capital in the early twentieth century displaced local entrepreneurs and capital from several export sectors, Chapter 7 considers the possibility that these factors of production might have been reallocated towards other sectors of the national economy, initiating dynamic growth there.

Résumé: Problématique : En réponse à la prévalence accrue de la maladie du diabète et au fardeau économique important que représente cette maladie sur le système de santé international, des programmes incitatifs pour les maladies chroniques furent instaurés à travers le monde. Ces programmes visent à inciter les médecins à appliquer les lignes directrices chez leurs patients avec besoin complexe en vue d’améliorer la santé des patients et par la suite de réduire les coûts incombés par le système de santé. Les programmes incitatifs étant nombreux et différents d’un pays à l’autre, les études actuelles ne semblent pas s’entendre sur les répercussions de tels programmes sur la santé des patients atteints de diabète. L’objectif de cette étude est d’évaluer les retombées d’un incitatif financier sur le contrôle glycémique de la population atteinte de diabète du Nouveau-Brunswick, au Canada. Méthodes : Cette étude transversale répétée et de cohorte a été menée grâce à des bases de données administratives du Nouveau-Brunswick contenant des données sur dix ans pour 83 580 patients adultes atteints de diabète et 583 médecins de famille éligibles. La santé des patients a été évaluée au niveau du contrôle glycémique, en mesurant les valeurs moyennes d’A1C annuelles à l’aide de régressions linéaires multivariées. Afin d’évaluer si les médecins changeaient leur pratique avec l’implantation du programme incitatif, nous regardions au niveau de la probabilité de recours annuel à au moins deux tests d’A1C en utilisant des régressions logistiques multivariées. Résultats : La probabilité de recours annuel à au moins deux tests d’A1C était plus élevée dans quatre sous-groupes étudiés : les patients nouvellement diagnostiqués après l’implantation du programme avaient des cotes plus élevées comparées aux nouveaux patients avant l’implantation du programme (OR=1.23 [1.18-1.28]); les patients pour lesquels un médecin avait réclamé l’incitatif comparés aux patients pour lesquels aucun médecin n’avait réclamé l’incitatif (OR=2.73 [2.64-2.81]); les patients pour lesquels un médecin avait réclamé l’incitatif avaient des cotes plus élevées après l’implantation du programme comparé à avant (OR=1.89 [1.80-1.98]); et finalement, les patients suivis par un médecin de famille qui a déjà réclamé l’incitatif avaient des cotes 24% plus élevées (OR=1.24 [1.15-1.34]). Il n’y avait pas de différence dans les valeurs d’A1C annuelles entre les 4 sous-groupes étudiés. Conclusion : L’implantation du programme incitatif a démontré que les médecins ont une meilleure probabilité de prescrire au moins deux tests d’A1C, ce qui suggère une meilleure prise en charge des patients. Cependant, le manque de changement au niveau du contrôle glycémique du patient suggère que l’étude des répercussions de l’incitatif devra être poursuivie afin de voir si elle mène à une amélioration d’issues cliniques chez les patients. / Abstract: Background: Diabetes prevalence does not stop increasing with time and the economic burden this disease represents for the international health care system is unmistakable. Governments worldwide have implemented financial incentives based on guideline achievements for physicians treating people living with diabetes in hopes that these improve the health of their patients and in return lower healthcare costs. Current incentive programs implemented are different from one country to another and studies to date are inconclusive as to their repercussions on the health of diabetic patients. The objective of this study was to evaluate the influence of an incentive on glycemic control at a population level in New Brunswick, Canada. Methods: We conducted repeated cross-sectional and cohort-based analyses using administrative databases with ten years of data on 83 580 adult diabetic patients and 583 eligible family physicians. The study outcomes included patients’ glycemic control, using annual A1C means (multivariate linear regressions) and the probability of delivering at least two A1C tests annually (multivariate logistic regressions). Results: The probability of prescribing at least two A1C tests annually was greater in four sub-groups: patients newly diagnosed with diabetes after the implementation of the program compared to new patients before the implementation (OR=1.23 [1.18-1.28]); patients for whom a physician had claimed the incentive compared to patients for whom no physician claimed the incentive (OR=2.73 [2.64-2.81]); patients for whom an incentive was claimed after the implementation of the program compared to before (OR=1.89 [1.80-1.98]); and finally patients followed by a family physician who claimed the incentive at least once compared to patients followed by a family physician who never claimed the incentive (OR=1.24 [1.15-1.34]). There was no difference in mean A1C between all four sub-groups. Conclusion: Implementation of an incentive program in New Brunswick was associated with greater odds of delivering at least two A1C tests, suggesting that follow-up of care by family physicians was improved. However, as no difference between A1C means was observed, this suggests that the assessment of this incentive program needs to be evaluated further to determine if it helps improve patients’ health outcomes.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

L’information constitue l’élément ou l’enjeu de nombreuses règles juridiques en droit financier. Ces règles imposent des obligations d’information aux émetteurs, aux intermédiaires financiers et aux investisseurs. Elles sanctionnent en outre les abus de marché en ce qu’ils constituent des atteintes aux qualités de l’information, et encadrent l’élaboration des opinions émises par les analystes financiers et les agences de notation. Dans un ensemble aussi hétérogène de règles, l’information reçoit diverses qualifications juridiques. La cohérence en la matière provient de la nécessité d’informer l’ensemble des acteurs du risque inhérent aux instruments financiers. L’information peut être étudiée à partir de ses fonctions intellectuelles, comme savoir communicable permettant de connaître le risque attaché aux instruments financiers. Alors que certaines données permettent de décrire le risque d’investissement, d’autres en servent l’appréciation dans la durée en vue de la réalisation de prédictions. Le droit positif évolue ainsi en s’appuyant sur ces deux fonctions intellectuelles de l’information : sa fonction descriptive et sa fonction prédictive. Cette analyse permet de renforcer l’intelligibilité d’un dispositif en évolution constante, qui suppose l’articulation du droit des sociétés, du droit des contrats et du droit répressif. Le droit des instruments financiers peut ainsi faire l’objet d’une analyse ordonnée à partir de l’information comme exigence permettant la prise d’un risque d’investissement. / Information constitutes the element or the stake of many a legal rule in financial Law. These rules dictate disclosure obligations to issuers, financial intermediaries and investors. Furthermore, they sanction market abuses, insofar as they undermine the qualities of the information, and provide a legal framework for the elaboration process of opinions voiced by financial analysts and credit rating agencies. In such a heterogeneous body of rules, diverse legal qualifications are applicable to information. The conistency of the discipline lies in the necessity to inform the participants of the risk inherent to financial instruments. From its intellectual functions, information can be studied as transmittable intelligence permitting a better understanding of the risk financial instruments entail. While some data allows for the description of the investment risk, other data enables its assesment over time in order to realize predictions. Substantive law evolves by drawing on the two intellectual functions of information: its descriptive function and its predictive function. This analysis helps to reinforce the intellegibility of constantly evolving legislation, which implies the joint study of company law, contract law and criminal business law. The law of financial instruments can thus be the subject of an analysis stemming from information as a requirement to the taking an investment risk.

Les bénéfices que procurent une saine réputation sont multiples : avantage comparatif inimitable, certification de la qualité, productivité supérieure des employés, etc. À l’opposé, en plus de ne pas avoir accès à tous ces bénéfices, les entreprises ayant une réputation trop embryonnaire ou qualifiée de mauvaise sont souvent limitées dans leur potentiel de croissance par des contraintes législatives et sociales. S’appuyant sur ces observations, plusieurs chercheurs se sont intéressés à évaluer les impacts de la réputation sur la performance et sur le risque d’une entreprise. À ce titre, les résultats concernant la performance anormale divergent en fonction de la période analysée, la méthodologie et l’estimateur de la réputation employé (p. ex. Filbeck et al., 2013; Anginer et Statman, 2010). En revanche, plusieurs études constatent une relation significative entre la réputation et les deux types de risque d’une entreprise, soit le risque systématique et idiosyncratique (p. ex. Delgado-Garcia et al., 2013; Oikonomou et al., 2012). Dans le même ordre d’idées, ce mémoire vise à analyser l’effet réputation sur la performance des entreprises américaines. Pour ce faire, nous employons une approche inconditionnelle suivant la méthode de Fama et French (1993) et une approche conditionnelle suivant la méthode de Ferson et Schadt (1996) afin d’expliquer le rendement quotidien de cinq types de portefeuilles. La réputation est évaluée de manière fragmentée, soit par agrégat global, par aspect, par dimension et en combinaison complémentaire, à partir de la base de données MSCI-KLD. Nos résultats soutiennent la présence d’un effet de réputation pour le marché américain entre 2004 et 2014. Cela s’exprime par une performance supérieure des modèles d’évaluation d’actifs financiers intégrant des facteurs de risque relatifs à la réputation. Soulignons toutefois que l’ajout de variables instrumentales relatives à la réputation n’améliore pas de manière significative l’explication des modèles traditionnels.

On propose d'analyser la gestion de la dette publique pour montrer que, si l’on tient compte des critères d’optimalité, la dette publique peut être un choix de financement du déficit public plus judicieux par rapport à la hausse des prélèvements obligatoires ou au seigneuriage. Pour ce faire, une étude comparative entre ces trois modes de financement est menée en tenant compte de leur faisabilité institutionnelle et en revisitant la notion d’optimalité d’un point de vue financier, i.e. compte-tenu des impacts sur la santé financière de l’Etat et d’un point de vue économique, i.e. par rapport à la performance économique du pays. Il est montré que la sous optimalité ou la non optimalité de la hausse des prélèvements obligatoires ou du seigneuriage peut être un motif incitant le Gouvernement à financer le déficit public par endettement. Toutefois, il est montré également que ce dernier doit répondre à des critères d’optimalité sinon il ne peut être considéré comme efficace. Par la suite, on montre que pour atteindre l’optimalité de la dette publique, le Gouvernement doit veiller à sa soutenabilité. Autrement dit, le Gouvernement doit éviter que la dette publique ne suive une tendance explosive qui risque de la rendre non optimale. Enfin, on met en avant le rôle que jouent les risques financiers dans la gestion de la dette publique pour montrer que c’est en partie la mauvaise prise en change de ces risques qui rend la dette publique non soutenable et non optimale. / The objective of this thesis is to analyze public debt management in order to show that, based on optimality criteria, public debt could be a more judicial financing choice in comparison with taxation or seigniorage. A comparative study between these three financing strategies is conducted by taking into consideration their respective institutional feasability and by revisiting the concept of optimality from a financial viewpoint, i.e. regarding the potential impacts on public finance soundness, and from an economic aspect, i.e. regarding the potential impacts on the economic performance of the country. The non optimality of taxation and seigniorage could be a motive for the Governement to finance public deficit by indebtedness. However, it must be highlighted that public debt must also comply with optimality criteria, otherwise it will be considered inefficient. Subsequently, it is shown that Government must aim at public debt sustainability in order to ensure its optimality. In other words, Governement must avoid public debt to follow an explosive path, which is likely to lead to its non optimality. Finally, the role of financial risks in public debt management is put forth in order to suggest that non optimal or non sustainable public debt is partly due to failing financial risk management. The case study is conducted in the member countries of the Indian Ocean Commission.

La synchronisation des flux physiques a reçu une importante attention dans la littérature. Si le non flux physique a reçu une attention toute particulière dans des domaines tels que le SCM, le pendant financier a longtemps était délaissé. Plus inquiétant, les délais de paiement ont longtemps été perçus comme un moyen de réduction du besoin en fonds de roulement des grandes entreprises. La crise des Subprimes a eu de lourdes conséquences sur le financement des entreprises les plus modestes, mettant en danger l’existence même de ces dernières. Notre travail initial de synchronisation des flux physiques et financiers instruits dans la cadre d’un partenariat CIFRE visait à trouver des solutions à ces problématiques en proposant des modèles d’optimisation sous contraintes. Néanmoins, notre volonté de mettre en œuvre nos travaux fut vaine et notre sujet a progressivement drifté vers la découverte de l’échec du déploiement d’un système ERP. Notre enracinement au sein d’une grande entreprise du secteur de la défense française nous a permis de mettre en œuvre une recherche action canonique en trois phases distinctes et a débouché sur la production d’un modèle de diffusion de l’innovation appliqué à l’ERP. Ce modèle en 6 phases, décrits les étapes successives du déploiement, en mettant en exergue l’impact des forces politiques au sein de l’organisation. / Synchronization of physical flows received significant attention in the literature. If the non-physical flows received special attention in areas such as SCM, financial for a long time was helpless. More worryingly, payment delays have long been seen as a means of reducing the need for working capital for large firms. The subprime crisis has had a serious impact on the financing of the smaller companies, endangering the very existence of the latter. Our initial synchronization job physical and financial flows educated in the context of a CIFRE partnership aimed at finding solutions to these problems by proposing models of optimization under constraints. However, our commitment to implement our work was in vain and our subject has gradually drifted to the discovery of the failure of the deployment of an ERP system. Our roots in a large enterprise sector French defense allowed us to implement an action research canonical three distinct phases and resulted in the production of a model of diffusion of innovation applied to the ERP. This model into 6 phases, described the successive stages of deployment, highlighting the impact of political forces within the organization